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Foreword to the Third Edition
Many models exist for analyzing risk of banks and other corporate entities. Th is pub-
lication aims to complement existing methodologies by establishing a comprehensive 
framework for the assessment of banks, not only by using ﬁ nancial data but also by 
considering corporate governance. It takes as axiomatic that each of the key players in 
the corporate governance process (such as shareholders, directors, executive managers, 
and internal and external auditors) is responsible for some component of ﬁ nancial and 
operational risk management.
Th e book uses basic tools and techniques of ﬁ nancial risk analysis principles to dem-
onstrate how data can be converted into information through graphic highlights of risk 
trends and thereby alert senior management and boards when action may be required.
Th e ﬁ nancial sector crisis building up since 2007 has brought into stark relief the 
necessity of an integrated approach to risk management, highlighting key questions 
that should have been asked and perhaps were never asked. Th is book demonstrates 
the power of basic risk management principles in assisting the nonspecialist director, 
executive, or analyst to integrate various risk areas and ensures that the interrelation-
ships between diﬀ erent risk categories are clearly portrayed. Th e proposed framework 
also accommodates the fact that some risks might be immaterial in less sophisticated 
environments. A detailed questionnaire assists persons involved in performing due 
diligence or other investigative work on banks.
Th is third edition of Analyzing Banking Risk remains faithful to the objectives of 
the original. As such, the publication has been useful as a basis for a graduate banking 
risk analysis course as well as many risk analysis workshops. It now includes expanded 
material on management of the treasury function, including market performance and 
risk measurement as well as operational risk management.
Th is publication emphasizes risk management principles, and aims at being useful to 
a wide body of readers. Th e target audience remains those responsible for the analysis 
of banks and for the senior management or organizations directing their eﬀ orts. Since 
xiv Analyzing Banking Risk 
the publication provides an overview of the spectrum of corporate governance and risk 
management, it is not aimed at the narrow technical specialist who focuses on only one 
particular risk management area.
Kenneth G. Lay, CFA
Treasurer
Th e World Bank
Washington, D.C.
January 2009
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1.1 Introduction: The Changing Bank Environment
This publication provides a comprehensive overview of topics related to the assessment, analysis, and management of banking risks and offers a high-level corporate governance framework (aimed at nonspecialist 
executives). The framework emphasizes the accountability of key players in the 
corporate governance process in relation to the management of different di-
mensions of financial risk. 
Since the 1980s, rapid innovations in financial markets and the internation-
alization of financial f lows have changed the face of banking almost beyond 
recognition. Technological progress and deregulation have both provided new 
opportunities for and increased competitive pressures among banks and non-
banks alike. In the late 1980s, margins attained from traditional banking busi-
ness began to diminish and capital adequacy requirements began to increase. 
Banks have responded to these new challenges with vigor and imagination by 
entering new business areas focusing on superior information and knowledge 
management capabilities. 
Key Messages
This publication will discuss the assessment, analysis, and management of  ¶
banking risks.
Banks are exposed to ﬁ nancial, operational and environmental risks. ¶
A series of key players are accountable for corporate governance and various  ¶
dimensions of ﬁ nancial risk management.  
Analytical tools provided in this publication include a risk management  ¶
questionnaire containing data input tables. 
Ratios and graphs provide high-level management information. ¶
1
Overview of Banking Risks
2 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
The growth in international financial markets and a greater diversity of fi-
nancial instruments have allowed banks wider access to funds. At the same 
time, opportunities to design new products and provide more services have 
arisen. The pace of these changes does not appear to be slowing as banks are 
constantly involved in developing new instruments, products, and services. 
Traditional banking practice—based on the receipt of deposits and the grant-
ing of loans—is today only one part of a typical bank’s business, and it is often 
its least profitable.
Information-based activities, such as trading in financial markets and income 
generation through fees, are now the major sources of a bank’s profitability. 
Financial innovation has also led to the increased market orientation and mar-
ketability of bank assets, in particular through the introduction of securitiza-
tion and more advanced derivative products. 
The introduction of prudential capital requirements, which initially led to a 
variety of new “off-balance-sheet” financial instruments, was originally consid-
ered a prime motivator for such innovation. Financial derivatives, such as guar-
antees and letters of credit, as well as derivative instruments, such as futures 
and options, were not always shown as assets or liabilities even though they 
exposed banks to major risks. During the past few years, accounting regulators 
in major countries and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
have rectified some deficiencies in accounting practices by requiring all finan-
cial instruments to be shown on the balance sheets of entities trading in them.
The correlation between different types of risk, both within an individual bank 
and throughout the banking system, has therefore increased and become more 
complex. Internationalization and deregulation have increased the possibilities 
for contagion, as evidenced by the spread of financial crises from Thailand to 
the rest of Southeast Asia, to East Asia, Eastern Europe, and South America in 
the late 1990s, and by their effect on banking systems in the rest of the world. 
The financial sector crisis starting in 2007, originated in the United States and 
spread to the European Union and then to the rest of the world. The evolution 
of banking systems and markets has also raised important macro-prudential 
concerns and monetary policy issues. 
Some instruments are technically very complicated and are poorly understood—
except by a small group of experts who have specialized in their valuation, mod-
eling, and measurement—while many others pose complex problems in terms 
of technology, accounting, and operational risk management and control. 
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Although techniques for risk management and measurement have advanced, 
recent failures in accurate pricing of asset-backed products have shown that 
banking is still exposed to failures on a global scale. Despite the efforts of ac-
counting regulators, adequate disclosure of the nature and extent of these risks 
to shareholders and boards of directors is still at an early and somewhat experi-
mental stage.
The more general concern that financial innovation in banking may have the 
effect of concentrating risk and increasing volatility within the banking system 
as a whole is as relevant at the end of the first decade of the 21st century as it 
was in the heady days of the late 1990s, when huge profits were made through 
the financial engineering efforts of innovative finance experts. Recent develop-
ments have increased the need for and complicated the function of risk mea-
surement, risk management, and integrated approaches to internal controls. 
The quality of corporate governance of banks has become a much-debated top-
ic, and the approach to regulation and supervision is changing dramatically. 
For the individual bank, the new banking environment and increased mar-
ket volatility has necessitated an integrated approach to asset-liability and risk 
management techniques. 
1.2 Bank Exposure to Risk
Banks are subjected to a wide array of risks in the course of their operations, 
as illustrated in table 1.1. In general, banking risks fall into three categories: 
financial, operational, and environmental risks. 
Financial risks in turn comprise two types of risk. Traditional banking risks—
including balance sheet and income statement structure, credit, and solvency 
risks—can result in loss for a bank if they are not properly managed. Treasury 
risks, based on financial arbitrage, can result in a profit if the arbitrage is cor-
rect or a loss if it is incorrect. The main categories of treasury risk are liquidity, 
interest rate, currency, and market (including counterparty) risks.
Financial risks are also subject to complex interdependencies that may signifi-
cantly increase a bank’s overall risk profile. For example, a bank engaged in the 
foreign currency business is normally exposed to currency risk, but it will also 
be exposed to additional liquidity and interest rate risk if the bank carries open 
positions or mismatches in its forward book. 
4 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
Operational risks are related to a bank’s overall business processes and the 
potential impact thereon of compliance with bank policies and procedures, 
internal systems and technology, information security, measures against mis-
management and fraud, and business continuity concerns. Another aspect of 
operational risk encompasses the bank’s strategic planning, governance and 
organizational structure, management of staff careers and internal resources, 
product and knowledge development, and customer acquisition approach. 
Environmental risks are associated with a bank’s business environment, includ-
ing macroeconomic and policy concerns, legal and regulatory factors, and the 
overall financial sector infrastructure and payment systems of the jurisdictions 
in which it operates. Environmental risks include all types of exogenous risks 
that, if they were to materialize, could jeopardize a bank’s operations or under-
mine its ability to continue in business.
Table 1.1 The Banking Risk Spectrum
Financial Risks Operational Risks Environmental Risks
Balance sheet structure Internal fraud Country and political risks
Earnings and income 
statement structure
External fraud Macroeconomic policy
Capital adequacy Employment practices 
and workplace safety
Financial infrastructure
Credit Clients, products, and 
business services
Legal infrastructure
Liquidity Damage to physical 
assets
Banking crisis and 
contagion
Market Business disruption 
and system failures 
(technology risks)
Interest rate Execution, delivery, 
and process 
management
Currency
1.3 Corporate Governance 
As discussed, liberalization and the volatility of financial markets, increased 
competition, and diversification expose banks to new risks and challenges, re-
quiring the continuous innovation of ways to manage business and its associ-
ated risks in order to remain competitive. The increasing market orientation of 
banks has also necessitated changes in the approach to regulation and supervi-
sion. The responsibility for maintenance of the banking system and markets is 
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being redefined, in one country after another, as a partnership among a number 
of key players who manage various dimensions of financial and operational 
risks. This approach reconfirms that the quality of bank management, and es-
pecially the risk management process, are the key concerns in ensuring the 
safety and stability of both individual banks and the banking system as a whole. 
Table 1.2 portrays a risk management partnership in which each key player has 
a clearly defined accountability for a specific dimension of every risk area. 
The workings of the risk management partnership may be summarized as 
follows: 
Bank regulators and supervisors cannot prevent bank failures. Their primary 
role is to act as facilitators in the process of risk management and to enhance 
and monitor the statutory framework in which risk management is undertaken. 
By creating a sound enabling environment, regulators and supervisors have a 
crucial role in influencing the other key players. 
Shareholders are in a position to appoint the people in charge of the corporate 
governance process and should be carefully screened by regulators to ensure 
that they do not intend to use the bank solely to finance their own or their as-
sociates’ enterprises.
Ultimate responsibility for the way in which a bank’s business is conducted lies 
with the board of directors (sometimes called the supervisory board). The 
board has to set the strategic direction, appoint management, establish opera-
tional policies, and, most important, take responsibility for ensuring the sound-
ness of a bank. 
Executive management of a bank has to be ”fit and proper,” meaning not only 
that managers subscribe to standards of ethical behavior, but also that they have 
the competence and experience necessary to run the bank. Because the man-
agement is responsible for the implementation of the board’s policies through 
its day-to-day running of the bank, it is vital that it has intimate knowledge of 
the financial risks that are being managed. 
The audit committee and the internal auditors should be regarded as an ex-
tension of the board’s risk management policy function. The internal auditors 
traditionally performed an independent appraisal of a bank’s compliance with 
its internal control systems, accounting practices, and information systems. 
However, most modern internal auditors would describe their task as provid-
ing assurance regarding the bank’s corporate governance, control systems, and 
6 Analyzing Banking Risk 
Table 1.2 Partnership in Corporate Governance of Banks
Financial and Other 
Risk Management 
Areas Balance Sheet 
Structure
Income 
Statement 
Structure & 
Profi tability
Solvency 
Risk & 
Capital 
Adequacy
Credit Risk Liquidity Risk Market Risk
Interest Rate 
Risk
Currency 
Risk
Operational 
Risk
Key Players and 
Responsibilities
Systemic (key players): Accountability (dimension of risk for which key player is responsible)
Legal and Regulatory Authorities Set regulatory framework, including risk exposure limits and other risk management parameters, which will optimize risk management in the banking 
sector
Supervisory Authorities Monitor fi nancial viability and effectiveness of risk management. Check compliance with regulations
Institutional (key players):
Shareholders Appoint “fi t and proper” boards, management, and auditors
Board of Directors Set risk management and other bank policies. Ultimate responsibility for the entity
Executive Management Create systems to implement board policies, including risk management, in day-to-day operations
Audit Committee/ Internal Audit Test compliance with board policies and provide assurance regarding corporate governance, control systems, and risk management processes
External Auditors Express opinion and evaluate risk management policies
Public/Consumer (key players) 
Should demand transparency and 
full disclosure:
Investors/Depositors Understand responsibility and insist on full disclosure. Take responsibility for own decisions
Rating Agencies and Media Insist on transparency and full disclosure. Inform the public and emphasize ability to service debt
Analysts Analyze quantitative and non-quantitative risk-based information and advise clients
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risk management processes. Assurance can be achieved only through an under-
standing and analysis of the key risk indicators driving the individual processes 
making up each business line. Although audit committees play a valuable role 
in assisting management in identifying and addressing risk areas, the prime 
responsibility for risk management cannot be abdicated to them, but rather 
should be integrated into all levels of management. 
External auditors have come to play an important evaluative role in the risk-
based financial information process. Because bank supervisors neither can 
nor should repeat the work done by external auditors, proper liaison mecha-
nisms are necessary between these two parties, particularly on a trilateral basis 
that includes bank management. The audit approach should be risk oriented, 
rather than based on a traditional balance sheet and income statement audit. 
Overreliance on external auditors would weaken the partnership, especially if it 
leads to a weakening of the management and supervisory roles. 
The public/consumers as market participants have to accept responsibility for 
their own investment decisions. To do so, they require transparent disclosure 
of financial information and informed financial analyses. The public can be 
assisted in its role as risk manager if the definition of public is widened to in-
clude the financial media, financial analysts such as stockbrokers, and rating 
agencies. The small or unsophisticated depositor would normally need more 
protection than simply transparent disclosure. 
1.4 Risk-Based Analysis of Banks
Banking supervision, which is based on an ongoing analytical review of banks, 
continues to be one of the key factors in maintaining stability and confidence in 
the financial system. Chapter 15 explores bank supervision arrangements, the 
supervision process, and the role of supervisors in ensuring that banks operate 
in a safe and sound manner—that banks understand and adequately manage 
risks associated with their operations and that they hold sufficient capital and 
reserves to support these risks. The methodology used in an analytical review of 
banks, during the off-site surveillance and on-site supervision process, is simi-
lar to that of private sector analysts (for example, external auditors or a bank’s 
risk managers), except that the ultimate objective of the analysis is somewhat 
different. The analytical framework for the risk-based bank analysis advocated 
in this publication is therefore universally applicable. 
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Bank appraisal in a competitive and volatile market environment is a complex 
process. In addition to effective management and supervision, other factors nec-
essary to ensure the safety of banking institutions and the stability of financial 
systems and markets include sound and sustainable macroeconomic policies 
and well-developed and consistent legal frameworks. Adequate financial sector 
infrastructure, effective market discipline, and sufficient banking sector safety 
nets are also crucial. To attain a meaningful assessment and interpretation of 
particular findings, estimates of future potential, a diagnosis of key issues, and 
formulation of effective and practical courses of action, a bank analyst must 
have extensive knowledge of the particular regulatory, market, and economic 
environment in which a bank operates. In short, to be able to do the job well, 
an analyst must have a holistic perspective on the financial system, even when 
considering a specific bank. 
The practices of bank supervisors and the appraisal methods practiced by fi-
nancial analysts continue to evolve. This evolution is necessary in part to meet 
the challenges of innovation and new developments, and in part to accom-
modate the broader process of convergence of international supervisory stan-
dards and practices, which are themselves continually discussed by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. Traditional banking analysis has been 
based on a range of quantitative supervisory tools to assess a bank’s condition, 
including ratios. Ratios normally relate to liquidity, the adequacy of capital, 
loan portfolio quality, insider and connected lending, large exposures, and open 
foreign exchange positions. While these measurements are extremely useful, 
they are not in themselves an adequate indication of the risk profile of a bank, 
the stability of its financial condition, or its prospects. The picture ref lected by 
financial ratios also largely depends on the timeliness, completeness, and ac-
curacy of data used to compute them. For this reason, the importance of quality 
data that is both useful and transparent is discussed in chapter 14. Chapter 14 
also attempts to add another dimension to the issue of transparency, that is, 
accountability, which has become an important topic because of both the in-
creasing importance of corporate governance and risk management for modern 
financial institutions and bank supervisors (considered in chapters 3 and 15). 
The central technique for analyzing financial risk is the detailed review of 
a bank. Risk-based bank analysis includes important qualitative factors and 
places financial ratios within a broad framework of risk assessment, risk man-
agement, and changes or trends in such risks. Risk-based bank analysis also 
underscores the relevant institutional aspects. Such aspects include the quality 
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and style of corporate governance and management; the adequacy, complete-
ness, and consistency of a bank’s policies and procedures; the effectiveness and 
completeness of internal controls; and the timeliness and accuracy of manage-
ment information systems and information support. 
It has been said that risk rises exponentially with the pace of change, but that 
bankers are slow to adjust their perception of risk. In practical terms, this im-
plies that the market’s ability to innovate is in most circumstances greater than 
its ability to understand and properly accommodate the accompanying risk. 
Traditionally, banks have seen the management of credit risk as their most 
important task, but as banking has changed and the market environment has 
become more complex and volatile, the critical need to manage exposure to 
other operational and financial risks has become apparent. The elements of 
the risk-based analytical review covered in this publication are summarized in 
table 1.2. Chapter 4 discusses the overall structure of a bank’s balance sheet 
and focuses on the imbalances and mismatches in balance sheet structure that 
expose a bank to financial risk. Aspects of profitability, including management 
of a bank’s income and expenses, is elaborated in chapter 5. Chapter 6 consid-
ers capital adequacy and the quality of a bank’s capital, while chapter 7 covers 
credit risk management, including aspects of portfolio composition and quality 
and related policies and procedures. Components of the asset-liability manage-
ment process (liquidity risk, interest rate risk, and currency risk) are discussed 
in chapters 8 to 12; management of the liquidity portfolio in chapter 9; and 
market risk in chapter 10. Operational risk is covered in chapter 13. Numerous 
graphs and tables facilitate the understanding of these subjects. Although the 
discussions and information contained in the graphs and tables in chapters 4 
through 12 refer mainly to individual institutions, the same type of analysis can 
be conducted at the industry level. 
This publication pays special attention to risk exposures and the quality and ef-
fectiveness of a bank’s risk management processes. Risk management normally 
involves several steps for each type of financial risk and for the overall risk 
profile. These steps include the identification of an objective function, the risk 
management target, and measure of performance. Also important is the iden-
tification and measurement of specific risk exposures in relation to the selected 
objective function, including assessment of the sensitivity of performance to 
expected and unexpected changes in underlying factors. Decisions must also 
be made on the acceptable degree of risk exposure and on the methods and 
instruments to hedge excessive exposure, as well as on choosing and  executing 
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hedging transactions. In addition, the responsibilities for various aspects of 
risk management must be assigned, the effectiveness of the risk management 
process assessed, and the competent and diligent execution of responsibilities 
ensured. 
Where appropriate, a bank should be analyzed as both a single entity and on 
a consolidated basis, taking into account exposures of subsidiaries and other 
related enterprises at home and abroad. A holistic perspective is necessary when 
assessing a bank on a consolidated basis, especially in the case of institutions 
that are spread over a number of jurisdictions and/or foreign markets. A broad 
view serves to accommodate variations in the features of specific financial risks 
that are present in different environments. 
A risk-based bank analysis should also indicate whether an individual institu-
tion’s behavior is in line with peer group trends and industry norms, particularly 
when it comes to significant issues such as profitability, structure of the balance 
sheet, and capital adequacy. A thorough analysis can indicate the nature of and 
reasons for any deviations. A material change in risk profile experienced by an 
individual institution could be the result of unique circumstances that have no 
impact on the banking sector as a whole, or it could be an early indicator of 
trends that might be followed by other banks. 
1.5 Analytical Tools Provided
Each analysis may be unique, but the overall analytical process has many con-
sistent aspects with regard to off-site surveillance, on-site examination, a bank’s 
own risk management, or evaluation by technical professionals. This publica-
tion provides tools to assist with the bank analysis, including a questionnaire 
and a series of spreadsheet-based data input tables to enable an analyst to collect 
and manipulate data in a systematic manner (appendix 1). This publication is 
not a manual on how to use the tools, but a conceptual framework to explain 
the background to the tools. 
Questionnaire to facilitate the risk-based analysis of banks. The question-
naire and data tables should be completed by the bank being evaluated. The 
questions (see appendix A) are designed to capture management’s perspective 
on and understanding of the bank’s risk management process. The background 
and financial information requested in the questionnaire should provide an 
overview of the bank to allow for assessment of the quality and comprehensive-
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ness of bank policies, management, and control processes, as well as financial 
and management information. Questions fall into several categories: 
Institutional development needs ¶
Overview of the financial sector and regulation ¶
Overview of the bank (history and group and organizational structure)  ¶
Accounting systems, management information and internal controls, and  ¶
information technology 
Corporate governance, covering certain key players and accountabilities  ¶
Risk management, including balance sheet structure management, earn- ¶
ings and income statement structure, credit risk, and the other major 
types of financial and operational risk discussed in chapters 4 through 13 
Data input tables. The framework contains a series of input tables for financial 
data collection. The data can be manipulated into either ratios or graphs. The 
tables are related to the major financial risk management areas. The balance 
sheet and income statement serve as anchor schedules, with detail provided by 
all the other schedules. These tables can be easily modeled using commonly 
available spreadsheet software to produce ratios, statistical tables, and graphs, 
which can assist executives in the interpretation and analysis of a bank’s finan-
cial risk management process and its financial condition. 
The use of ratio analysis and graphs is discussed in chapter 2. Ratios are a basic 
tool for financial analysts and are essential to examine the effectiveness of a 
bank’s risk management process. They are normally the initial points that pro-
vide clues for further analysis. Changes in ratios over time offer a dynamic view 
of bank performance. The outputs of the framework include ratios on balance 
sheet structure, profitability, capital adequacy, credit and market risk, liquid-
ity, and currency risk. These make up a complete set of a bank’s ratios that are 
normally subject to off-site surveillance. The framework therefore serves as an 
effective tool to be used in bank supervision. 
Graphs. Graphs are powerful tools for analyzing trends and structures. They 
facilitate comparison of performance and structures over time, showing trend 
lines and changes in significant aspects of bank operations and performance. 
In addition, they provide senior management with a high-level overview of risk 
trends in a bank. Samples of graphs illustrate discussions on risk exposure and 
risk management in chapters 4 through 13 of this publication. These pertain 
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to asset and liability structures; sources of income; profitability and capital ad-
equacy; composition of loan portfolios; major types of credit risk exposures; and 
exposure to interest rate, liquidity, market, and currency risk. The graphs pro-
duced by the model may also be used during off-site surveillance. In this con-
text, they can serve as a starting point to help with on-site examination and to 
succinctly present the bank’s financial condition and risk management aspects 
to senior management. They can also help to illustrate points made by external 
auditors in their presentation to management or by other industry professionals 
who intend to judge a bank’s condition and prospects. 
Table 1.3 illustrates the more general use of the analytical tools provided with 
this publication.
Table 1.3 Possible Uses of Tools Provided
Analytical Phase Source and Tools Available Output
Data collection Questionnaire Completed input data, questionnaires, 
and fi nancial data tables 
Financial data tables
Data processing Completed input data, 
questionnaires, and fi nancial 
data tables 
Data processed by the model 
Analysis and interpretation of both 
processed and original input data 
Data converted into 
information 
Analytical results (output summary 
report, tables, and graphs) 
Off-site (desk) analysis of a bank’s 
fi nancial condition 
Analytical results Report on a bank’s fi nancial condition, 
risk management, and/or terms of 
reference for on-site examination 
Focused follow-up through an 
on-site visit, audit, or review 
engagement 
Off-site examination report 
and/or terms of reference for 
on-site examination 
On-site examination report 
Institutional strengthening On-site examination report Well-functioning fi nancial 
intermediary
Key Messages
The goal of ﬁ nancial management is to maximize the value of a bank. ¶
The central components of risk management are the identiﬁ cation, quantiﬁ cation,  ¶
and monitoring of the risk proﬁ le. 
The analysis of banks must take place in the context of the current status of a  ¶
country’s ﬁ nancial system. 
Financial sector development encompasses several steps that must be taken to  ¶
ensure that institutions operate in a stable and viable macropolicy environment 
with a solid legal, regulatory, and ﬁ nancial infrastructure. 
Risk-based ﬁ nancial analysis requires a framework for transparent disclosure. ¶
Analytical techniques facilitate an understanding of interrelationships between risk  ¶
areas within the bank and among different banks. 
Trend analysis provides information regarding the volatility and movement of an  ¶
individual bank’s ﬁ nancial indicators over different time periods.
The percentage composition of the balance sheet, income statement, and various  ¶
account groupings enables comparison between time periods, and also between 
different banking institutions at a given point in time.
Ratios are often interrelated, and when analyzed in combination, they provide  ¶
useful risk information. Computation of ratios and trends provides an answer only 
to what has happened.
2
A Framework for Risk Analysis
2.1 Financial Management
The goal of financial management is to maximize the value of a bank, as defined by its profitability and risk level. Financial management comprises risk management, a treasury function, financial planning 
and budgeting, accounting and information systems, and internal controls. In 
practical terms, the key aspect of financial management is risk management, 
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which covers strategic and capital planning, asset-liability management, and 
the management of a bank’s business and financial risks. The central compo-
nents of risk management are the identification, quantification, and monitor-
ing of the risk profile, including both banking and financial risks.
Risk management normally involves several steps for each type of financial 
risk and for the risk profile overall. These steps include identifying the risk 
management objective, risk management targets, and measures of performance. 
Also important are the identification and measurement of specific risk expo-
sures, including an assessment of the sensitivity of performance to expected 
and unexpected changes in underlying factors. Decisions must also be made 
regarding the acceptable degree of risk exposure, the methods and instruments 
available to hedge excessive exposure, and the choice and execution of hedging 
transactions. In addition, the responsibility for various aspects of risk manage-
ment must be assigned, the effectiveness of the risk management process must 
be assessed, and the competent and diligent execution of responsibilities must 
be ensured.
Effective risk management, especially for larger banks and for banks operating 
in deregulated and competitive markets, requires a formal process. In developing 
economies, especially those in transition, unstable, economically volatile, and 
shallow market environments significantly expand the range and magnitude of 
exposure to financial risk. Such conditions render risk management even more 
complex and make the need for an effective risk management process even more 
acute. The key components of effective risk management that should be present 
in a bank and be assessed by the analyst normally include the following:
An established line function at the highest level of the bank’s manage- ¶
ment hierarchy that is specifically responsible for managing risk and 
possibly also for coordinating the operational implementation of the poli-
cies and decisions of the asset-liability committee. The risk management 
function should be on par with other major functions and be accorded the 
necessary visibility and leverage within the bank.
An established, explicit, and clear risk management strategy and a  ¶
related set of policies with corresponding operational targets. There are 
various risk management strategies which have originated from differ-
ent approaches to interpreting interdependencies between risk factors 
and differences of opinion concerning the treatment of volatility in risk 
management.
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An appropriate degree of formalization and coordination of strategic  ¶
decision making in relation to the risk management process. Relevant risk 
management concerns and parameters for decision making on the opera-
tional level should be incorporated for all relevant business and func-
tional processes. Parameters for the main financial risk factors (normally 
established according to the risk management policies of a bank and 
expressed as ratios or limits) can serve as indicators to business units of 
what constitutes acceptable risk. For example, a debt-to-equity ratio for a 
bank’s borrowers expresses a level of credit risk. Maximum exposure to a 
single client is a risk parameter that indicates credit risk in a limited form.
Implementation of a process that bases business and portfolio decisions  ¶
on rigorous quantitative and qualitative analyses within applicable risk 
parameters. This process, including analysis of a consolidated risk profile, 
is necessary because of the complex interdependencies of and the need 
to balance various financial risk factors. Because the risk implications of 
a bank’s financial position and changes to that position are not always 
obvious, details may be critically important.
Systematic gathering of complete, timely, and consistent data relevant for  ¶
risk management and provision of adequate data storage and manipula-
tion capacity. Data should cover all functional and business processes, as 
well as other areas such as macroeconomic and market trends that may be 
relevant to risk management.
Development of quantitative modeling tools to enable the simulation and  ¶
analysis of the effects of changes in economic, business, and market environ-
ments on a bank’s risk profile and their impact on the bank’s liquidity, profit-
ability, and net worth. Computer models used by banks range from simple 
personal computer–based tools to elaborate mainframe modeling systems. 
Such models can be built in-house or be acquired from other financial institu-
tions with a similar profile, specialized consulting firms, or software vendors. 
The degree of sophistication and analytical capacity of such models may 
indicate early on the seriousness of the bank’s efforts to manage risk.
The Basel Capital Accord heightens the importance of quantitative model-
ing tools and the bank’s capacity to use them, as they will provide a basis for 
implementing the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to measuring a bank’s 
capital adequacy.
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2.2 Why Banks Are Analyzed
The changing environment in which banks find themselves presents major 
opportunities for banks, but also entails complex, variable risks that challenge 
traditional approaches to bank management. Consequently, banks must quickly 
gain financial risk management capabilities to survive in a market-oriented 
environment, withstand competition by foreign banks, and support private 
sector–led economic growth. 
An external evaluation of the capacity of a bank to operate safely and produc-
tively in its business environment is normally performed once each year. All 
annual assessments are similar in nature, but have slightly different focuses, 
depending on the purpose of the assessment: 
Public sector supervisory (regulatory) authorities assess if the bank is  ¶
viable, meets its regulatory requirements, and is sound and capable of 
fulfilling financial commitments to its depositors and other creditors. Su-
pervisory authorities also verify whether the bank’s operations are likely 
to jeopardize the safety of the banking system as a whole. 
External auditors, who are normally retained by the bank’s board of  ¶
directors, seek to ensure that financial statements fairly present the bank’s 
financial position and the results of its operations. In addition, regula-
tory authorities in many countries require external auditors to assess 
whether management meets predetermined risk management standards 
and to evaluate whether a bank’s activities expose the bank’s capital to 
undue risks. Banks are normally required to undergo an external audit 
that involves at least year-end financial statements and that is considered 
satisfactory to supervisory authorities. 
The financial viability and institutional weaknesses of a bank are also evaluated 
through financial assessments, extended portfolio reviews, or limited assurance 
review engagements. Such evaluations often occur when a third party evaluates 
credit risk that the bank poses, for example, in the context of 
participation in a credit-line operation of an international lending agency  ¶
or receipt of a credit line or loan from a foreign bank; 
establishment of correspondent banking relationships or access to interna- ¶
tional markets; 
equity investment by an international lending agency, private investors, or  ¶
foreign banks; or
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inclusion in a bank rehabilitation program.  ¶
The bank appraisal process normally includes an assessment of the institu-
tion’s overall risk profile, financial condition, viability, and future prospects. 
The appraisal comprises off- and on-site examinations to the extent considered 
necessary. If serious institutional weaknesses are found, supervisory authorities 
may recommend appropriate corrective actions. If the institution is not consid-
ered viable in its current condition, supervisory authorities may suggest actions 
to restore viability or to lead to the bank’s liquidation and closure. The bank 
review also assesses if the condition of the institution can be remedied with rea-
sonable assistance or if it presents a hazard to the banking sector as a whole. 
The conclusions and recommendations of a bank appraisal are typically 
expressed in a letter to shareholders, a memorandum of understanding, or as an 
institutional development program. The most common objective of the latter 
is to describe priorities for improvement, as identified in the analyst’s review, 
that would yield the greatest benefit to the institution’s financial performance. 
To the extent considered necessary, such recommendations are accompanied by 
supporting documentation, f lowcharts, and other relevant information about 
current practices. The institutional development program often serves as the 
basis for discussions among the institution’s management, government officials, 
and international lending agencies, which in turn launch implementation of 
recommended improvements and decide what technical assistance is needed. 
The process of bank analysis also occurs within the context of monetary pol-
icy making. Central banks have a mission to maintain a stable currency and 
economy. Three interrelated functions are critical to monetary stability: the 
implementation of monetary policy, the supervision of banks, and monitoring 
of the payments system. All three functions must take place to ensure stabil-
ity. Banking supervision therefore cannot be divorced from the wider mission 
of monetary authorities. Although the attention of central banking policy 
focuses on the macroeconomic aspect of general equilibrium and price stabil-
ity, micro considerations of individual banks’ liquidity and solvency are key to 
attaining stability. 
2.3  Understanding the Environment in Which 
Banks Operate
The compilation and analysis of risk management information from banks is 
a key task of bank supervisors and financial analysts. For bank management, 
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 financial analysts, bank supervisors, and monetary authorities, a risk-based 
 analytical review of individual banks’ financial data provides information on the 
banking sector as a whole, as market trends and relationships are highlighted. 
Sectoral analysis is important because it allows norms to be established for the 
sector as a whole, as well as for a peer group within the sector. The performance 
of individual banking institutions can then be evaluated on the basis of these 
norms. Deviations from expected trends and relationships may be analyzed 
further as they may disclose not only the risk faced by individual banks, but 
also changes in the financial environment of the banking sector as a whole. By 
examining sector statistics, an analyst can gain an understanding of changes 
that are occurring in the industry and of the impact of such changes on eco-
nomic agents and sectors. 
Because banks participate in both the domestic and international financial sys-
tems and play a key role in national economies, banking statistics can provide 
an insight into economic conditions. Financial innovation normally results in 
changes to measured economic variables, and as a result of this dynamism in 
the financial system, macroeconomists may find their monetary models no lon-
ger ref lect reality. 
The impact of banking activities on monetary statistics, such as money supply 
figures and credit extension to the domestic private sector, is also of concern to 
policy makers. Reviews of banks can serve as a structured mechanism to ensure 
that monetary authorities recognize and quantify nonintermediated funding 
and lending, as well as other processes that are important to policy makers in 
the central bank. The advantage of a structured approach to evaluating banks 
is that banking sector behavior is considered in a systematic and logical manner, 
making sector statistics readily available for macroeconomic monetary analysis. 
Bank supervisors are thereby placed in a position where they are able to mean-
ingfully assist monetary authorities, whose policies are influenced by develop-
ments in the banking sector. 
Financial System Infrastructure
Bank appraisal in a competitive and volatile market environment is a complex 
process. The assessment of a bank’s financial condition and viability normally 
centers around the analysis of particular aspects, including ownership struc-
ture, risk profile and management, financial statements, portfolio structure 
and quality, policies and practices, human resources, and information capacity. 
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To interpret particular findings, estimate future potential, diagnose key issues, 
and formulate effective and practical courses of action, an analyst must also 
have thorough knowledge of the particular regulatory, market, and economic 
environment in which a bank operates. In sum, to do his or her job well, an 
analyst must have a holistic view of the financial system. 
An environment that includes a poor legal framework, difficulties with the 
enforcement of financial contracts, or unstable macroeconomic conditions pres-
ents a higher level of credit risk and makes risk management more difficult. For 
example, an unstable domestic currency that lacks external convertibility pres-
ents a high level of risk. A bank’s overall business strategy and its specific policies 
and practices must both accommodate the economic and regulatory environ-
ment within which the bank operates and be attuned to market realities. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the building blocks that are required for sustainable 
financial sector development and a context for assessing financial risk and 
risk management. 
An unstable macroeconomic environment, with uneven economic per-
formance and volatile exchange rates and asset prices, is a principal cause of 
instability in the financial system. Such an environment makes the realistic 
valuation of a bank’s assets and the accurate evaluation of financial risks very 
difficult. The political environment is also important because it influences 
both the principles and the reality under which the financial sector functions. 
For example, under centrally planned financial systems, markets were greatly 
limited and banks, as well as their clients, did not have autonomy. Legal and 
judicial environments directly affect many aspects of a bank’s operations, such 
as exercising contractual rights to obtain collateral or to liquidate nonpaying 
borrowers. A transparent accountability framework establishes the foundation 
for a well-functioning business environment for banks and other institutions in 
the financial sector, as well as for their clients. 
The legal and regulatory framework for institutions, markets, contract-
ing and conduct, and failure resolution spells out the rules of the game for 
financial institutions and markets. Before appraising a bank, an analyst should 
understand the philosophical basis for pertinent laws and regulations and 
ascertain if the legal and regulatory framework is complete and consistent. The 
analyst should be thoroughly familiar with the framework not only because 
bank operations must comply with it, but also because it provides a context for 
a bank’s business, including the objectives and scope of allowed activities. In 
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Figure 2.1 A Framework for Financial Sector Development
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addition, knowledge of laws and regulations can prompt measures and actions 
that can be taken in crisis situations. 
Key elements of the institutional legal framework of the banking system 
include the central bank law and the banking law. The former defines the cen-
tral bank’s level of autonomy, systemic and functional responsibilities (which 
often include prudential supervision), regulatory prerogatives, and enforcement 
powers. The banking law defines the type of financial intermediation to be 
performed by banks (for example, universal banking), the scope of banking 
business in the particular country, conditions of entry and exit from the bank-
ing system, and capital and other minimum requirements that must be met 
and maintained by banks. In addition, the banking law specifies the corporate 
organization and the relationship between banks and the central bank. 
Another important element of the legal and regulatory framework involves pru-
dential regulations issued by the regulatory authorities. The objectives under-
lying such regulations include maintenance of the safety and stability of the 
banking system, depositor protection, and the minimal engagement of public 
funds. The most important prudential regulations include bank licensing, cor-
porate governance, closure and exit mechanisms, capital adequacy, and finan-
cial risk management. Financial risk management regulations (as elaborated in 
chapters 4 through 13) aim to limit the degree of a bank’s risk exposure, such 
as through foreign exchange and liquidity. Such measures ensure that a bank 
has sufficient capital to support its exposure to risk (also known as “capital ade-
quacy requirements”) and that it has adequate procedures or systems to assess 
and hedge and provide against risks, such as asset classification and provision-
ing procedures and value-at-risk models for market price f luctuations. 
A legal framework also encompasses other sections of the financial sector 
through laws pertaining to insurance companies, pension funds, capital mar-
ket authorities, and the wholesale and retail investment services industry. To 
protect consumers, a body of laws also exists to regulate contracting and market 
conduct and behavior. 
Other relevant laws relate to failure resolution—for example, insolvency, 
deposit insurance, and restructuring agencies—and to the technical capacity 
of the judiciary. The mechanisms for failure resolution and the banking sec-
tor safety net are intended to enhance the stability of and confidence in the 
banking system; however, if they are poorly designed, they can undermine 
market discipline. Elements of the banking safety net include the “lender-of-
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last-resort” function and deposit-insurance facilities. The specific form of a 
banking safety net has significant implications for risk management. For exam-
ple, the existence of lender-of-last-resort facilities—the main purpose of which 
is to provide temporary liquidity support to illiquid but solvent institutions—
may weaken risk management incentives for banks, which tend to maintain 
less liquidity and lend more when these facilities are in place. Likewise, the 
existence of deposit insurance, especially where the cost is underwritten by the 
state, may engender situations of moral hazard, such as the automatic bailout of 
banks, regardless of the quality of corporate governance or the status of finan-
cial risk management. 
Financial sector infrastructure strongly influences the quality of bank opera-
tions and risk management. Apart from the supervisory authorities (discussed 
in chapter 3), the payment system, a key element of financial sector infra-
structure, may be organized and managed by the central bank, by members 
of the banking system, or as an arrangement between individual banks and 
the central bank. The specific organization of the payment system determines 
the mechanisms for payment transactions. An inefficient payment system can 
result in significant cost and settlement risk to the banks. 
Infrastructure also encompasses various professions that are central to the 
financial sector, such as accounting and auditing, the actuarial profession, 
and investment advising. Adherence to international standards of accounting 
and auditing, coupled with a well-trained cadre of professionals in these fields, 
can make a significant difference to the fairness and transparency of financial 
statements. Fair, transparent statements greatly contribute to the facilitation of 
risk management, bank supervision, and consumer protection. 
Property registries are also a part of risk management infrastructure. Such 
registers define fixed and movable assets and marketable securities and effec-
tively protect property rights. They also facilitate the registration and collection 
of collateral and subsequent credit risk management. Risk reference registers 
serve the same purpose through the collection and maintenance of information 
on the credit history of individuals and firms, which are readily distributed to 
interested parties. 
In addition, rating agencies help with risk management by systematically 
researching banks, companies, and markets and making findings available to 
both financial professionals and the general public. In many countries, finan-
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cial infrastructure may also include research institutes, financial advisory ser-
vices, and similar establishments. 
Development of institutions includes forms and rules under which a particu-
lar financial institution can be incorporated and, on a broader scale, identifies 
its potential competitors. Increased competition in banking and finance and 
the trend toward homogenization of banking business have been major factors 
that influence changes in national banking systems. The concept of universal 
banking and the reality of financial markets have, however, increasingly blurred 
the lines between various institutions. In the context of risk management, the 
structure and concentration of ownership are key. A banking system domi-
nated by state-owned banks or financial institutions is prone to moral hazard 
situations, such as implicit guarantees, and tends to have competitive distor-
tions in its markets. A high concentration of ownership or assets also increases 
risk by subjecting the system to political pressures, because some banks are 
considered by government entities to be “too big to fail” and may therefore be 
artificially supported. In exceptional cases where systemic risk is at stake, a 
supervisory authority may choose to support the too-big-to-fail approach. In 
addition, the absence of foreign ownership typically indicates closed and inef-
ficient financial markets. 
Financial markets and instruments depicts the markets operating in the 
financial system, their modi operandi, and the terms of their operations. As 
mentioned previously, modern banks have moved beyond traditional deposit 
and credit markets to establish a direct presence in practically all aspects of 
the financial system. Originally established as specialized institutions, banks 
have sought new customers in wider geographical areas and have come to offer 
increasingly similar types of accounts, credit, and financial services. 
In addition to more intense competition among the different types of banks, the 
number and diversity of nonbank financial intermediaries have also increased. 
As a result, effective substitutes for banking products now exist and a broader 
range of services is available. The threat that nonbanking institutions will 
expand into banking services has likely been another stimulus for banks to 
adopt market-oriented behavior. Secondary markets have also grown in impor-
tance, which has reduced market segmentation and created more uniform cost 
structures for different financial institutions. 
Each type of market deals with specific financial products. Innovation has 
brought about a greater variety of financial instruments, the respective markets 
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of which are continuously increasing. In financial risk management terms, the 
understanding of the risk involved in key products offered by a bank and of the 
implications of specific markets—for example, in terms of liquidity or price 
stability—is key to being able to adequately appraise a bank. 
The availability and quality of banking skills is a central concern in the risk-
based appraisal of banks. It is essential that banks have good personnel man-
agement and that they are able to systematically develop banking skills within 
their organization. A good bank should be able to acquire the appropriate skills 
and to develop a suitable work culture. It should also have a process to optimize 
the mix of staff skills and experience and to develop staff performance levels in 
concert with its business and institutional goals. 
2.4 The Importance of Quality Data
The objective of financial statements prepared according to International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) is to increase transparency and provide information that 
is useful in making economic decisions. However, even financial statements 
prepared to exacting international norms do not contain all the information 
that an individual may need to perform all kinds of risk analysis, because finan-
cial statements largely portray the effects of past events and do not necessarily 
provide nonfinancial information. Nonetheless, IFRS statements do contain 
data about the past performance of an entity (income and cash f lows) as well as 
its current financial condition (assets and liabilities) that are useful in assess-
ing future prospects and risks. The financial analyst must be capable of using 
the financial statements in conjunction with other information to reach valid 
investment conclusions.
Financial statement analysis (analytic review) normally consists of a review of 
financial conditions and specific issues related to risk exposure and risk man-
agement. Such reviews can be done off-site, whereas an on-site review would 
cover a much larger number of topics and be more concerned with qualitative 
aspects, including quality of corporate governance, physical infrastructure, and 
management’s use of sound management information. 
A reliable assessment of the financial condition of banks requires well-trained 
analysts and supervisors because many bank assets are illiquid and lack an 
objectively determined market value. New financial instruments make it even 
more complex to assess the net worth of banks and other financial institu-
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tions in a timely manner. The liberalization of banking and capital markets has 
substantially increased the level of information required to achieve financial 
stability, while the provision of useful, adequate information on participants 
and their transactions has become essential for maintaining orderly and effi-
cient markets. For a risk-based approach to bank management and supervi-
sion to be effective, useful and timely information must be provided that meets 
the needs of each key player (see chapter 3). In principle, market participants, 
depositors, and the general public have no less a need for information than do 
supervisory authorities. 
In theory, the disclosure of information can be gradually improved indirectly 
through peer pressure from powerful parties in the marketplace. During nor-
mal times, such pressure might show banks that disclosure is to their advantage 
in raising funds, for example, if it prompts potential investors and depositors to 
provide capital. The desire to hide information—especially that which conveys 
poor results—unfortunately often translates into a lack of transparency, which is 
evident even in economies with advanced banking systems. Furthermore, given 
the sensitivity of bank liquidity to a negative public perception, the information 
with the strongest potential to trigger sudden and detrimental market reactions 
is generally disclosed at the last possible moment, usually involuntarily. 
Calls for greater transparency often indicate a failure to provide useful and 
timely information, and this is most acute when the information sought or pro-
vided is negative. Regulatory authorities have a responsibility to address the 
availability of information. While banking legislation has traditionally been 
used as a way to force disclosure of information, this process has historically 
involved the compilation of statistics for monetary policy purposes, rather than 
the provision of information necessary to evaluate financial risks. 
A more direct approach, now practiced by most regulatory authorities, involves 
mandating minimum disclosure, including a requirement that banks publish 
specified portions of their prudential reports (which do not reveal information 
that can be used by competitors) and other pertinent information. The value of 
disclosure depends largely on the quality of the information itself. However, 
because the provision of information can be costly, information needs have to 
be examined closely to ensure that the detriments of disclosure are fully justi-
fied by its benefits. 
Financial disclosure requirements normally focus on the publication of quanti-
tative and qualitative information in a bank’s annual financial report,  prepared 
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on a consolidated basis and made available to all market participants. The 
format for disclosure typically mandates a complete, audited set of financial 
statements, as well as qualitative information such as a discussion of manage-
ment issues and general strategy. Disclosed information provides the names, 
interests, and affiliations of the largest shareholders and nonexecutive board 
members and information on corporate structure; it also clarifies which parts of 
the financial statements have been audited and, in supplementary disclosures, 
which have not. Financial statements also contain information on off-balance-
sheet items, including quantitative estimates of exposure to shifts in interest or 
exchange rates. 
In addition to minimum disclosure requirements, financial sector disclosure 
can be improved by the formulation of standards on the quality and quantity of 
information that must be provided to the public. Given the increasing interna-
tionalization of banks and the increasing penetration of national banking sys-
tems, there is a strong need for minimum standards to ensure the cross-border 
comparability of financial statements. This responsibility has been taken by 
the International Accounting Standards Committee, which has developed a 
set of international standards to facilitate transparency and the proper inter-
pretation of financial statements. (Full discussion of data quality, transparency, 
and related accountability issues, including details on international financial 
reporting standards, is provided in chapter 14.) 
Disclosure requirements have to be reviewed periodically to ensure that users’ 
current needs are being met and that the burden on banks is not unnecessarily 
heavy. Because financial innovations and international influences are likely to 
expand information requirements, demands made on banks show no sign of 
diminishing in the future. However, a reliance on full disclosure as a means of 
monitoring banks requires too much of depositors, who would need an increas-
ing level of analytical sophistication to be able to evaluate the complex business 
of financial institutions. Furthermore, economies of scale exist in the processing 
and interpretation of financial information. In the future, professional financial 
market analysts, rating agencies (which are capable of handling sophisticated 
financial information), and the highly influential media are expected to play 
an increasingly important role in applying market discipline to influence or to 
correct bank behavior. 
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2.5 Risk-Based Analysis of Banks
The practices of bank supervisors and the appraisal methods of financial ana-
lysts continue to evolve. This evolution is necessary in part to meet the chal-
lenges of innovation and new developments, and in part to accommodate the 
broader convergence of international supervisory standards and practices, which 
are themselves continually discussed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. Traditional banking analysis is based on a range of quantitative 
supervisory tools for assessing a bank’s condition, including ratios. Ratios 
normally relate to liquidity, the adequacy of capital, quality of the investment 
portfolio, extent of insider and connected lending, size of exposures, and open 
foreign exchange positions. While these measurements are extremely useful, 
they are not in themselves an adequate indication of the risk profile of a bank, 
the stability of its financial condition, or its prospects. 
The central technique for analyzing financial risk is the detailed review of a 
bank’s balance sheet. Risk-based bank analysis includes important qualitative 
factors and places financial ratios within a broad framework of risk assessment 
and management and the changes or trends in risks. It also underscores the 
relevant institutional aspects, such as the quality and style of corporate gov-
ernance and management; the adequacy, completeness, and consistency of a 
bank’s policies and procedures; the effectiveness and completeness of internal 
controls; and the timeliness and accuracy of management information systems 
and information support.
Where appropriate, a bank should be analyzed as both a single entity and on 
a consolidated basis, taking into account exposures of subsidiaries and other 
related enterprises at home and abroad. A holistic perspective is necessary when 
assessing a bank on a consolidated basis, especially if the institution is spread 
over a number of jurisdictions or foreign markets. A broad view accommo-
dates variations in the features of specific financial risks that are present in 
different environments.
A risk-based analysis should also indicate whether an individual institution’s 
behavior is in line with peer group trends and industry norms, particularly when 
it comes to significant issues such as profitability, structure of the balance sheet, 
and capital adequacy. A thorough analysis can indicate the nature of and reasons 
for such deviations. A material change in risk profile experienced by an individ-
ual institution could be the result of unique circumstances that have no impact 
on the banking sector as a whole or could be an early indicator of trends. 
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The picture ref lected by financial ratios also depends largely on the timeliness, 
completeness, and accuracy of data used to compute them. For this reason, the 
issue of usefulness and transparency is critical, as is accountability, which has 
become an important topic because of both the growing importance of risk 
management for modern financial institutions and the emerging philosophy 
of supervision. 
Computation versus Analysis: 
The Importance of Integrated Financial Analysis
Financial analysis applies analytical tools to financial statements and other 
financial data to interpret trends and relationships in a consistent and dis-
ciplined manner. In essence, the analyst converts data into information and 
thereby enables the screening and forecasting of information. A primary source 
of data is the entity’s financial statements.
Integrating the various analytical components and techniques discussed in this 
chapter will distinguish a well-reasoned analysis from a mere compilation of 
various pieces of information, computations, tables, and graphs. The challenge 
is for the analyst to develop a storyline, providing context (country, macro-
economy, sector, accounting, auditing, and industry regulation, as well as any 
material limitations on the entity being analyzed), a description of corporate 
governance, and financial and operational risk and then relating the different 
areas of analysis by identifying how issues affect one another. 
Before starting, the analyst should attempt to answer at least the following 
questions:
What is the purpose of the analysis? ¶
What level of detail will be needed? ¶
What factors or relationships (context) will influence the analysis? ¶
What data are available?  ¶
How will data be processed? ¶
What methodologies will be used to interpret the data? ¶
How will conclusions and recommendations be communicated? ¶
Too much of what passes for analysis is simply the calculation of a series of ratios 
and verification of compliance with preset covenants or regulations, without 
analysis and interpretation of the implications of the calculations, establishing 
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“what happened” without asking the more important questions regarding why 
and its impact. Once the analyst is sure that the overall approach and reasoning 
are sound, the analytic review should focus on the following issues:
What happened, established through computation or questionnaires ¶
Why it happened, established through analysis  ¶
The impact of the event or trend, established through interpretation of  ¶
analysis
The response and strategy of management, established through evalua- ¶
tion of the quality of corporate governance
The recommendations of the analyst, established through interpretation  ¶
and forecasting results of the analysis
The vulnerabilities that should be highlighted, included in the recom- ¶
mendations of the analyst
An effective storyline—supporting final conclusions and recommendations—
is normally enhanced through the use of data spanning between 5 and 10 years, 
as well as graphs, common-size financial statements, and company and cross-
sectional industry trends.
The experienced analyst will distinguish between a computation-based approach 
and an analytic approach. With certain modifications, this process is similar to 
the approach used by risk-orientated financial supervisors and regulators.
2.6 Analytical Tools
There are many tools to assist with bank analysis, including questionnaires and 
Excel models that could easily be adapted to any banking environment. These 
often consist of a series of spreadsheet-based data-input tables that enable an 
analyst to collect and manipulate data in a systematic manner. This chapter 
does not discuss detailed steps regarding the use of such tools; rather it provides 
a conceptual framework to explain their background. 
Questionnaires and Data-Input Tables
Bank officials with sufficient authority and experience should complete any 
questionnaires and data tables used by analysts. Questions should be designed 
to capture management’s perspective on and understanding of the bank’s risk 
management process. The background and financial information requested in 
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the questionnaire will provide an overview of the bank as well as allow for 
assessment of the quality and comprehensiveness of bank policies, management 
and control processes, and financial and management information. Questions 
fall into the following categories: 
Institutional development needs ¶
Overview of the financial sector and regulation ¶
Overview of the bank (history and group and organizational structure)  ¶
Accounting systems, management information, and internal controls  ¶
Information technology  ¶
Corporate governance, covering key players and accountabilities  ¶
Financial risk management, including asset-liability management, profit- ¶
ability, credit risk, and the other major types of financial risk 
To facilitate the gathering and provisioning of data, an analytical model should 
contain a series of data-input tables for collecting financial data. The data can 
then be used to create either ratios or graphs. Data tables are normally related 
to the major areas of financial risk management. The balance sheet and income 
statements serve as anchor schedules, with detail provided by all the other 
schedules. The output of an analytical model (tables and graphs) can assist 
executives in the high-level interpretation and analysis of a bank’s financial risk 
management process and its financial condition. 
Automated Processing of Data
The framework described above envisages the automatic production of tables, 
ratios, and graphs based on computerized manipulation of input data. This 
allows the analyst to focus on interpretation and analysis—as opposed to mere 
processing of data—to measure a bank’s performance and to judge the effective-
ness of its risk management process. Combined with the qualitative information 
obtained from the questionnaire, these statistical tables and graphs make up the 
raw material needed to carry out an informed analysis, as required in off-site (or 
macro level) reports. The ratios cover the areas of risk management in varying 
degrees of detail, starting with balance sheet and income statement schedules. 
The graphs provide a visual representation of some of the analytical results and 
a quick snapshot of both the current situation in banks (such as financial struc-
ture and the composition of investment portfolios) and comparisons over time. 
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Ratios
A ratio is a mathematical expression of one quantity relative to another. There 
are many relationships between financial accounts and between expected rela-
tionships from one point in time to another. Ratios are a useful way of express-
ing relationships in the following areas of risk: 
Activity (operational efficiency): ¶  the extent to which an entity uses its 
assets efficiently, as measured by turnover of current assets and liabilities 
and long-term assets
Liquidity: ¶  the entity’s ability to repay its short-term liabilities, measured 
by evaluating components of current assets and current liabilities
Profitability: ¶  relation between a company’s profit margins and sales, 
average capital, and average common equity 
Debt and leverage: ¶  the risk and return characteristics of the com-
pany, as measured by the volatility of sales and the extent of the use of 
borrowed money
Solvency: ¶  financial risk resulting from the impact of the use of ratios of 
debt to equity and cash f low to expense coverage
Earnings, share price, and growth: ¶  the rate at which an entity can grow 
as determined by its earnings, share price, and retention of profits
Other ratios: ¶  groupings representing the preferences of individual ana-
lysts in addition to ratios required by prudential regulators such as bank-
ing supervisors, insurance regulators, and securities market bodies
Financial analysis can assist the analyst in making forward-looking projections. 
Financial ratios aid those projections in the following ways:
Provide insights into the microeconomic relationships within a firm,  ¶
which help analysts to project earnings and free cash f low (necessary to 
determine entity value and creditworthiness)
Provide insights into a firm’s financial f lexibility, which is its ability to  ¶
obtain the cash required to meet financial obligations or to acquire assets, 
even if unexpected circumstances should develop 
Provide a means of evaluating management’s ability  ¶
Although they are extremely useful tools, ratios must be used with caution. 
They do not provide complete answers about the bottom-line performance of 
a business. In the short run, many tricks can be used to make ratios look good 
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in relation to industry standards. An assessment of the operations and manage-
ment of an entity should therefore be performed to provide a check on ratios.
Graphs and Charts
Graphs are powerful tools for analyzing trends and structures. They facilitate 
comparison of performance and structures over time and show trend lines and 
changes in significant aspects of bank operations and performance. In addi-
tion, they provide senior management with a high-level overview of trends 
in a bank’s risk. Graphs can illustrate asset and liability structures; sources of 
income; profitability; capital adequacy; composition of investment portfolios; 
major types of credit risk exposures; and exposure to interest rate, liquidity, 
market, and currency risks. Graphs may be useful during off-site surveillance. 
In this context, they can serve as a starting point to help with on-site examina-
tions and to present the bank’s financial condition and risk management aspects 
succinctly to senior management. They also help external auditors to illustrate 
points in their presentation to management and other industry professionals to 
judge a bank’s condition and prospects. 
Figure 2.2 shows a bank experiencing significant growth in financial assets 
held for trading and a worrying decline in cash. Although not illustrated below, 
the analyst should compare pie charts for several previous years to determine 
whether the structural change represented in the current chart is representative 
of a general trend in the business.
In the same manner, a simple line graph can illustrate the growth trends in 
key financial variables (see figure 2.3). The rapid rise in loans and receivables 
is clearly illustrated alongside the alarming reduction in cash, creating more 
concern regarding the entity’s liquidity: the increase in trading securities and 
other investments could have caused the reduction in liquidity (depending on 
how these increases in working capital were financed).
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Figure 2.2 Composition of Assets, by Periods
Figure 2.3 Trends in Asset Growth, by Period
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2.7 Analytical Techniques
Data can be interpreted in many ways. Common analytical techniques include 
ratio analysis, common-size analysis, cross-sectional analysis, trend analysis, 
and regression analysis. 
Ratio Analysis
Financial ratios mean little when seen in isolation. Their meaning can be inter-
preted only in the context of other information. It is good practice to compare 
the financial ratios of a company with those of its major competitors. Typically, 
the analyst should be wary of companies whose financial ratios are far above 
or below industry norms. In some cases, evaluating a company’s past perfor-
mance provides a basis for forward-looking analyses. Such an evaluation may 
suggest that its performance is likely to continue at similar levels or that an 
upward or downward trend is likely to occur. However, for a company making 
a major acquisition or divestiture, for a new financial institution, or for a bank 
operating in a volatile environment, past performance may be less relevant to 
future performance.
An analyst should evaluate financial information based on the following:
Financial institution’s goals. ¶  Actual ratios can be compared with com-
pany objectives to determine if the objectives are being attained.
Banking industry norms (cross-sectional analysis). ¶  A company can be 
compared with others in the industry by relating its financial ratios to in-
dustry norms or a subset of the companies in an industry. When industry 
norms are used to make judgments, care must be taken, because (a) many 
ratios are industry specific, but not all ratios are important to all indus-
tries; (b) companies may have several lines of business, which distorts 
aggregate financial ratios and makes it preferable to examine industry-
specific ratios by lines of business; (c) differences in accounting methods 
can distort financial ratios; and (d) differences in corporate strategies can 
affect certain financial ratios.
Economic conditions. ¶  Financial ratios tend to improve when the 
economy is strong and to weaken during recessions. Therefore, financial 
ratios should be examined in light of the phase of the business cycle in 
which the economy is traversing. 
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Experience. ¶  An analyst with experience obtains an intuitive notion of 
the meaning of transformed data.
Common-Size Analysis
An analytical technique of great value is common-size analysis, which is 
achieved by converting all financial statement items to a percentage of a given 
financial statement item, such as total assets or total revenue.
Structure of the Balance Sheet
The structure of the balance sheet may vary significantly depending on the 
bank’s business orientation, market environment, customer mix, or economic 
environment. The composition of the balance sheet is normally a result of risk 
management decisions. 
The analyst should be able to assess the risk profile of the business simply by 
analyzing the relative share of various assets and changes in their proportionate 
share over time (see table 2.1). For example, if any item were to increase rapidly, 
one would question whether the bank’s risk management systems are adequate 
to handle the increased volume of transactions. In addition, a structural change 
could disclose a shift to another area of risk. These issues can be raised by an 
analyst, prior to a detailed review of the management of either credit or market 
risk. When linked to the amount of net income yielded by each category of 
assets, this analysis increases in importance, enabling a challenging assessment 
of risk versus reward. 
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Table 2.1 Balance Sheet Structure: Common Size Analysis
Balance Sheet Composition Year 1 Year 2
Cash and balances with central and commercial banks 9.30% 5.50%
Trading securities 13.20% 23.30%
Loans and receivables 65.80% 54.70%
Real estate assets 3.00% 4.80%
Investments in associates, subsidiaries and joint ventures 4.90% 7.10%
Other assets 3.80% 4.70%
Total assets 100% 100%
Customers' deposits 77.70% 74.10%
Due to banks and other fi nancial institutions 9.50% 7.20%
Other liabilities 3.80% 4.90%
Sundry creditors 0.10% 0.10%
Total equity 8.90% 13.70%
Total liabilities and capital 100% 100%
Analysis of the Income Statement
Common-size analysis can be used effectively on the income statement as well. 
The emphasis in the income statement would be on the sources of revenue 
and their sustainability. A question worth asking pertains to the proportion 
of income earned in relation to the amount of energy invested through the 
deployment of assets (see figure 2.4). When analyzing the income structure 
of a business, analysts should give appropriate consideration to and acquire an 
understanding of the following aspects:
Trends in and the composition and accuracy of reported earnings ¶
The quality, composition, and level of income and expense components ¶
Dividend payout and earnings retention ¶
Major sources of income and the most profitable business areas ¶
Any income or expenditure recognition policies that distort earnings ¶
The effect of intergroup transactions, especially those related to the  ¶
transfer of earnings and asset-liability valuations
 37
Chapter 2: A Framework for Risk Analysis
Figure 2.4 Assets Deployed versus Income Earned
Cross-Sectional Analysis
Ratios are not meaningful when used on their own, which is why financial 
analysts prefer trend analysis (the monitoring of a ratio or group of ratios over 
time) and comparative analysis (the comparison of a specific ratio for a group 
of companies in a sector or for different sectors—see table 2.2). This com-
parison becomes a useful tool in establishing benchmarks for performance and 
structure.
Cross-sectional analysis of common-size financial statements makes it easier to 
compare an entity to other entities in the same sector, even though the entities 
might be of different sizes and operate in different currencies. If the examples 
given in figure 2.2 or table 2.1 referred to two different banks, rather than sim-
ply the same bank over more than one year, then the conclusions would compare 
the relative levels of liquidity and structure of assets between the two banks.
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Table 2.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Two Different Bank Balance Sheet 
Structures
Balance Sheet Structure Bank 1 Bank 2
Cash and balances with central and commercial banks 9.30% 5.50%
Trading securities 13.20% 23.30%
Loans and receivables 65.80% 54.70%
Real estate assets 3.00% 4.80%
Investments in associates, subsidiaries and joint ventures 4.90% 7.10%
Other assets 3.80% 4.60%
Total assets 100% 100%
Customers' deposits 77.70% 74.10%
Due to banks and other fi nancial institutions 9.50% 7.20%
Other liabilities 3.80% 4.90%
Sundry creditors 0.10% 0.10%
Total equity 8.90% 13.70%
Total liabilities and capital 100% 100%
However, the analyst has to be realistic when comparing entities, because 
size does influence business results, and entities are seldom exactly the same. 
Differences in currency are eliminated in the percentage presentation, but 
the analyst must keep in mind the macroeconomic environment that influ-
ences variables such as competition and inflation across currency and national 
boundaries.
Cross-sectional analysis is not the solution to all problems, as different account-
ing policies and methods will influence the allocation of transactions to spe-
cific line items on the financial statements. For example, some companies could 
include depreciation in the cost of sales, while others could show it separately. 
However, if all these aspects are kept in mind, cross-sectional analysis offers 
the analyst a powerful analytical tool.
Trend Analysis
The trend of an amount or a ratio, which shows whether it is improving or dete-
riorating, is as important as its current absolute level. Trend analysis provides 
important information regarding historical performance and growth and, given 
a sufficiently long history of accurate seasonal information, can be of great assis-
tance as a planning tool for management. The trend analysis could incorporate 
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both currency and percentage changes for the last two years, as a small percent-
age change could hide a significant currency change and vice versa, prompting 
the analyst to investigate the reasons despite one of the changes being rela-
tively small. In addition, past trends are not necessarily an accurate predictor of 
future behavior, especially if the economic environment changes. These caveats 
should be borne in mind when using past trends in forecasting.
Table 2.3 Balance Sheet Growth, Year-on-Year Fluctuations
Balance Sheet Composition – year-on-year fl uctuations 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Cash and balances with central and commercial banks Base year -16% 7% 66% 74% -12%
Trading securities Base year 49% 14% 8% -25% 165%
Loans and receivables Base year 21% 21% 43% 62% 25%
Real estate assets Base year 53% -10% 8% -5% 137%
Investments in associates, subsidiaries and joint ventures Base year 119%
Other assets Base year 77% 40% 107% -17% 82%
Total assets Base year 28% 16% 34% 40% 50%
Customers' deposits Base year 29% 17% 25% 34% 43%
Due to banks and other fi nancial institutions Base year 12% 32% 334% 194% 13%
Other liabilities Base year 14% 11% 49% 27% 94%
Sundry creditors Base year 22% 26% 11% 166% 82%
Total equity Base year 28% 8% 75% 29% 130%
Total liabilities and capital Base year 28% 16% 34% 40% 50%
Variations of Trend Analysis
Changes in currency and percentages focus the analysis on material items. A 
variation of growth in terms of common-size financial statements is to com-
bine currency and percentage changes. Even when a percentage change might 
seem insignificant, the magnitude of the amount of currency involved might be 
significant and vice versa. Such combined analysis is therefore a further refine-
ment of the analysis and interpretation of annual changes.
Annual Growth (Year-to-Year)
Any business that is well positioned and successful in its market is expected to 
grow. An analysis of balance sheets can be performed to determine growth rates 
and the type of structural changes that have occurred in a business. Such an 
analysis indicates the general type of business undertaken by the enterprise and 
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requires an understanding of the structure of its balance sheet and the nature of 
its assets and liabilities. Even when growth overall is not significant, individual 
components of the balance sheet normally shift in reaction to changes in the 
competitive market or economic or regulatory environment (as illustrated in table 
2.3). As the balance sheet structure changes, inherent risks also change. The 
structure of a balance sheet should therefore form part of an assessment of the 
adequacy and effectiveness of policies and procedures for managing risk expo-
sures. In normal situations, the growth of a business’s assets is determined by an 
increase in the earnings base and access to stable external funding or investment, 
at a cost that is acceptable to the business.
Businesses that grow too quickly tend to take unjustified risks, and their admin-
istrative and management information systems often cannot keep up with the 
rate of expansion. Businesses that grow too slowly can likewise take risks that 
are unusual or poorly understood by them. Even well-managed businesses can 
run into risk management problems arising from excessive growth, especially 
concerning management of their working capital.
Cumulative Growth from a Base Year
The analysis that can be performed using this technique is not  significantly 
 different from looking at year-to-year growth. Reviewing the cumulative 
 effects of change over time, compared to a base year, dramatizes change and the 
need for remedial action when change outstrips the ability of risk management 
and administrative systems to keep up with growth or the enterprise’s ability to 
finance its expansion.
Regression Analysis
Regression analysis uses statistical techniques to identify relationships (or cor-
relations) between variables. Examples of such a relationship could be sales and 
medium-term trade finance over time or hotel occupancies compared to hotel 
revenues. In addition to analyzing trends over time, regression analysis enables 
analytic review as well as identification of items or ratios that are not behaving 
as they should be, given the statistical relationships that exist between ratios 
and variables.
Key Messages
Corporate governance provides a disciplined structure through which a bank sets its  ¶
objectives and the means of attaining them, as well as monitoring the performance 
of those objectives. 
Effective corporate governance encourages a bank to operate in a safe and sound  ¶
manner and to use its resources more efﬁ ciently. 
Financial risk management is the responsibility of several key players in the  ¶
corporate governance structure. Each key player is accountable for a dimension of 
risk management. 
The key players are regulators/lawmakers, supervisors, shareholders, directors,  ¶
executive managers, internal auditors, external auditors, and the general public.
Governance is affected by the relationships among participants in the governance  ¶
system. To the extent that any key player does not, or is not expected to, fulﬁ ll its 
function in the risk management chain, other key players have to compensate for 
the gap created by enhancing their own role. More often than not, it is the bank 
supervisor who has to step into the vacuum created by the failure of certain players. 
3
Corporate Governance
3.1 Corporate Governance Principles
Corporate governance relates to the manner in which the business of the bank is governed. It is defined by a set of relationships between the bank’s management, its board, its shareholders, and other stakehold-
ers. This includes setting corporate objectives and a bank’s risk profile, aligning 
corporate activities and behaviors with the expectation that management will 
operate the bank in a safe and sound manner, running day-to-day operations 
within an established risk profile and in compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations, while protecting the interests of depositors and other  stakeholders. 
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Effective governance practices are one of the key prerequisites to achieve and 
maintain public trust and, in a broader sense, confidence in the banking sys-
tem. Poor governance increases the likelihood of bank failures. Bank failures 
may impose significant public cost, affect deposit insurance schemes, and in-
crease contagion risks. 
Banks and banking may affect the welfare of a significant percentage of the 
world’s population. Banks’ corporate governance arrangements, therefore, can 
influence economic development. Sound corporate governance can create an 
enabling environment that rewards banking efficiency, mitigates financial risks, 
and increases systemic stability. Lenders and other providers of funds are more 
likely to extend financing when they feel comfortable with the corporate gov-
ernance arrangements of the funds’ recipient and with the clarity and enforce-
ability of creditor rights. Good corporate governance tends to lower the cost 
of capital, as it conveys a sense of lower risk that translates into shareholders’ 
readiness to accept lower returns. Good corporate governance has been proven 
to improve operational performance and reduce the risks of contagion from 
financial distress. Besides mitigating the internal risk of distress by positively 
affecting investors’ perception of risk and their readiness to extend funding, 
good governance increases firms’ robustness and resilience to external shocks. 
The key elements of a sound corporate governance framework in a bank include 
the following:
A well articulated corporate strategy against which the overall success  ¶
and the contribution of individuals can be measured.
Setting and enforcing clear assignment of responsibilities, decision- ¶
 making authority, and accountabilities appropriate for the bank’s selected 
risk profile.
Strong financial risk management function (independent of business  ¶
lines), adequate internal control systems (including internal and external 
audit functions), and functional process design with the necessary checks 
and balances.
Adequate corporate values, codes of conduct, and other standards of  ¶
 appropriate behavior and effective systems used to ensure compliance. 
This includes special monitoring of the bank’s risk exposures where con-
flicts of interest are expected to appear (for example, relationships with 
affiliated parties). 
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Financial and managerial incentives to act in an appropriate manner  ¶
 offered to the board, management, and employees, including compensa-
tion, promotion, and penalties (compensation should be consistent with 
the bank’s objectives, performance, and ethical values).
Transparency and appropriate information f lows internally and to  ¶
the public.
Table 3.1 summarizes the responsibilities of the key players involved in bank 
governance and risk management, including the type of engagement in the 
governance process.
Table 3.1 Key Players and Their Responsibilities
Key Players Responsibility
Importance
Policy Level Operational Level
Systemic
Legal and Regulatory Authorities Set stage Critical n/a
Bank Supervisors Monitor Indirect (monitoring) Indirect
Institutional
Shareholders Appoint key players Indirect Indirect
Board of Directors Set policies. Monitor effects. Approve any changes. Critical Important
Executive Management
Implement polices and 
strategies. Manage day-to-day 
operations
Critical Critical
Audit Committee/Internal Audit
Test compliance with bank 
policies regarding corporate 
governance, risk management 
processes and control systems
Indirect 
(compliance) Critical
External
External Auditors Evaluate and express opinion Indirect (evaluation) Very important
Outside stakeholders/Public Act responsibly n/a Indirect
The remainder of this chapter discusses latest international and national initia-
tives in setting the principles for a good governance process. It then discusses 
the roles and responsibilities of key players in the corporate governance process 
of a bank. The players directly involved in corporate governance and risk man-
agement are considered, as are those parties who determine the regulatory and 
public policy environment within which a bank operates and who have a major 
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influence on risk management. The activities of third parties, such as bank 
customers and market participants, are also mentioned.
3.2  Major Developments in Corporate Governance 
Principles
National authorities are paying more attention to corporate governance, as 
are institutions engaged in international trade, financial f lows, and protect-
ing the stability of international markets (for example, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], the Bank for International 
Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank). This 
attention can be attributed to several factors: (1) the growth of institutional 
investors—that is, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds, and 
highly leveraged institutions—and their role in the financial sector, especially 
in major industrial economies; (2) widely articulated concerns and criticism 
that the contemporary monitoring and control of publicly held corporations in 
English-speaking countries, notably the United Kingdom and United States, 
are seriously defective, leading to suboptimal economic and social development; 
(3) the shift away from a traditional view of corporate governance as centered 
on “shareholder value” in favor of a corporate governance structure extended to 
a wide circle of stakeholders; and (4) the impact of increased globalization of 
financial markets, a global trend toward deregulation of financial sectors, and 
liberalization of institutional investors’ activities. 
Aware of the critical importance of banks’ governance, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) published a guidance paper in 1999 to 
assist banking supervisors in promoting the adoption of sound corporate gov-
ernance practices. This guidance drew from principles of corporate governance 
that were published earlier that year by OECD to assist member countries in 
their efforts to evaluate and improve their corporate governance framework. 
Further details on OECD Principles of corporate governance are provided in 
the annex to this chapter. 
Since the publication of those documents, issues related to corporate gover-
nance have continued to attract considerable national and international atten-
tion in light of a number of high-profile breakdowns in corporate governance. 
Consequently, the improved version of OECD governance principles was pub-
lished in 2004, and the Basel Committee updated its governance principles for 
banking organizations in 2006. The governance principles were not intended to 
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be an additional requirement to the revised international framework for capital 
adequacy (Basel II), in fact, the principles are applicable regardless of whether 
a country chooses to adopt the Basel II framework. 
The philosophy behind the Basel Committee governance principles (see box 
3.1) is that sound governance can be achieved regardless of the form used by 
a banking organization, provided several essential functions are in place. The 
four important forms of oversight that should be included in the organizational 
Box 3.1 Corporate Governance for 
Banking Organizations
Principle 1 – Board members should be qualified for their positions, have a clear 
understanding of their role in corporate governance, and be able to exercise sound 
judgment about the affairs of the bank.
Principle 2 – The board of directors should approve and oversee the bank’s strate-
gic objectives and corporate values that are communicated throughout the banking 
organization.
Principle 3 – The board of directors should set and enforce clear lines of responsibil-
ity and accountability throughout the organization.
Principle 4 – The board should ensure that there is appropriate oversight by senior 
management consistent with board policy.
Principle 5 – The board and senior management should effectively utilize the work 
conducted by the internal audit function, external auditors, and internal control 
functions.
Principle 6 – The board should ensure that compensation policies and practices are 
consistent with the bank’s corporate culture, long-term objectives and strategy, 
and control environment.
Principle 7 – The bank should be governed in a transparent manner.
Principle 8 – The board and senior management should understand the bank’s op-
erational structure, including where the bank operates in jurisdictions, or through 
structures, that impede transparency (that is, “know-your-structure”).
Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, February 2006
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structure of any bank to ensure appropriate checks and balances include (1) 
oversight by the board of directors or supervisory board; (2) oversight by indi-
viduals not involved in the day-to-day running of the various business areas; 
(3) direct line supervision of different business areas; and (4) independent risk 
management, compliance, and audit functions. In addition, it is important that 
key personnel are fit and proper for their jobs. The implementation of the gov-
ernance principles set forth by the Basel Committee should be proportionate 
to the size, complexity, structure, economic significance, and risk profile of the 
bank and the group (if any) to which it belongs. The application of corporate 
governance standards in any jurisdiction will depend on relevant laws, regula-
tions, codes, and supervisory expectations.
Parallel to these international efforts, corporate governance has received sig-
nificant attention in a large number of countries, both in public policy de-
bates and as a reaction to negative developments in the corporate sector and 
financial markets caused by inadequate governance arrangements. Annex 3A 
provides a summary of some of the important national initiatives to improve 
various aspects of corporate governance, such as the work of the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (commonly referred 
to as COSO). The most interesting elements of the COSO include an inter-
nal control framework and enterprise risk management framework designed to 
help companies reduce the risk of asset loss, ensure the reliability of financial 
statements and legal compliance, and promote efficiency. 
3.3  Regulatory Authorities: Establishing a Risk-Based 
Framework
In this publication, regulation of banks refers to the establishment and approval 
of banking law; supervision of banks refers to the monitoring of bank finan-
cial and risk management. Countries use different organizational structures for 
regulation and supervision—sometimes separating regulation from supervision 
and housing the regulatory function in a ministry and the supervisory function 
in the central bank or an independent financial markets authority. 
The primary role of bank regulators and supervisors is to facilitate the process 
of risk management and to enhance and monitor the statutory framework in 
which it is undertaken. Bank regulators and supervisors cannot prevent bank 
failures. However, by creating a sound, enabling environment, they have a cru-
cial role to play in influencing the other key players. 
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A regulatory framework consists of more than just regulations designed to 
meet specific objectives. The regulatory environment embodies a general phi-
losophy and principles that guide both the content and the implementation of 
specific regulations. In general, regulators may take either a prescriptive or a 
market-oriented approach to their task. This choice is determined by the regu-
lator’s understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of the economy as 
a whole.
A prescriptive approach usually limits the scope of activities of financial insti-
tutions; it often results in regulations for all risks known to the regulators. The 
danger of such an approach is that regulations quickly become outdated and 
cannot address the risks stemming from financial innovation. 
In contrast, bank regulators that subscribe to a market-oriented regulatory 
approach believe that markets, by definition, function effectively, are capable 
of managing related financial risks, and should therefore be allowed to operate 
as freely as possible. With a market-oriented approach, the role of the regulator 
is focused on facilitating the improvement of risk management. The regulator 
and the regulated entity should agree on common objectives to ensure an ef-
ficient and effective process. In other words, when designing regulations, the 
regulator should take into account the views of market participants to avoid im-
practical or ineffective regulations. In practice, regulations in most major coun-
tries combine both a prescriptive approach and a market-oriented approach, 
leaning one way or another depending on individual circumstances. 
The new millennium has seen an acceleration of the shift toward a market-
oriented approach. Regulations address a broad spectrum of risks and provide 
principles on how to assess and manage risk without unnecessarily detailed 
rules and recommendations. In addition, because it is based on principles rather 
than rules, a market-oriented approach can adapt to changing market condi-
tions. Regulators should therefore concentrate on creating an environment in 
which the quality and effectiveness of risk management can be optimized and 
should oversee the risk management process exercised by the boards and man-
agement personnel of individual banking institutions. 
At the system level, regulators’ efforts are typically focused on maintaining 
public confidence in the banking sector and on creating an equitable market 
for financial institutions and providers of financial services. Regulators also 
aim to establish a free-market attitude toward bank supervision and profes-
sional supervisory functions, as well as to facilitate public understanding of the 
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bank management’s responsibility in the risk management process. In terms of 
financial risk management, regulators’ responsibilities center around improv-
ing quality at entry through strict licensing and minimum capital requirements 
and capital adequacy rules; toughening the fiduciary responsibilities and stan-
dards regarding bank owners, directors, and management personnel; providing 
guidelines on risk management and related policies; setting statutory guidelines 
with respect to risk positions; and evaluating compliance and overall risk man-
agement in a bank or banking system. Most regulators also conduct research on 
the latest developments in the field of risk management. 
As regulators are best positioned to act in the interest of depositors, they should 
maintain a f lexible legal framework and move swiftly and decisively when bank-
ing problems are identified. For example, the legal framework in the United 
States establishes several grounds for intervention by regulatory authorities. 
These include critical undercapitalization or expected losses great enough to 
deplete capital, insufficient assets or the inability to meet obligations, substan-
tial dissipation of assets, unsafe and unsound conditions, concealment of books 
and records, misuse of managerial position, and violation of the law. 
Once consensus has been reached that a problem exists that bank manage-
ment cannot effectively address, the typical recourse has been the removal of 
responsible managers and directors; fines; and where fraud is involved, crimi-
nal prosecution. Unfortunately, situations also arise in which regulators fail to 
identify problems at an early stage, sometimes as a result of unfavorable laws. 
Other factors include the highly technical nature of financial machinations, 
undue political influence, or even corruption because of the large profits or 
losses at stake. Fraud may also span institutions supervised by multiple regula-
tory authorities. 
3.4  Supervisory Authorities: Monitoring Risk 
Management
Bank supervision is sometimes applied incorrectly as a legal or administrative 
function focused largely on regulations related to the business of banking. Such 
regulations are often prescriptive in nature and impose onerous requirements 
on banks, which seek to circumvent them by developing innovative products. 
Once regulators and supervisors understand that they cannot bear sole respon-
sibility for preventing bank failures, they need to identify clearly what they are 
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capable of achieving and then focus on that specific mission. This process has 
already taken place in most industrial countries. More and more, the role of a 
bank’s supervisory authority is moving away from monitoring compliance with 
banking laws and old-style prudential regulations. A more appropriate mis-
sion statement today would be “to create a regulatory and legal environment in 
which the quality and effectiveness of bank risk management can be optimized 
to contribute to a sound and reliable banking system.” 
Because transactions of large banks are extremely complex and therefore hard 
to trace and evaluate, supervisors depend to a substantial degree on internal 
management control systems. The traditional approach to regulation and 
super vision has at times caused distortions in financial markets by providing 
negative incentives for the evasion of regulations, rather than encouraging the 
adequate management of financial risk. Since the late 1980s, there has been 
increasing recognition that the old approach to bank supervision does not live 
up to the challenges of a modern banking environment and turbulent markets. 
In some jurisdictions, this realization has laid the groundwork for an extensive 
process of consultation between regulators and banks seeking to establish the 
legal framework for a shift to a market-oriented, risk-based approach to bank 
supervision. To establish such a framework, the responsibilities of the different 
players in the risk management process have to be clearly delineated. 
The task of bank supervision becomes monitoring, evaluating, and, when nec-
essary, strengthening the risk management process that is undertaken by banks. 
However, the supervisory authority is only one of the many contributors to a 
stable banking system. Other players also are responsible for managing risk, 
and prudential regulations increasingly stress the accountability of top-level 
management. Recognizing the high cost of voluminous reporting requirements 
without corresponding benefits, many countries are moving toward a system of 
reporting that encourages and enables supervisors to rely more extensively on 
external auditors in the ordinary course of business, subject to having a clear 
understanding of their role in the risk management chain. The Basel II capital 
standard discussed in chapter 6 has introduced three pillars and specifically 
mentions the role of market discipline evaluated by external parties (for exam-
ple, rating agencies and external auditors). The move toward shared responsi-
bilities started in the 1990s, with New Zealand being one of the first examples 
of the new philosophy (see box 3.2). 
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A related, and important, development has been the toughening of public in-
formation disclosure requirements to facilitate the relegation of monitoring re-
sponsibilities to the public at large. The new approach to banking regulation and 
supervision also corresponds, in its essential elements, to the traditional style 
of regulation and supervision of nonbank financial intermediaries, and thereby 
contributes to making the regulatory environment for financial institutions more 
consistent and homogenous. One might easily argue that these changes have oc-
curred in reaction to and as an inevitable consequence of the increasing lack of 
distinctions between banks and nonbanking financial intermediaries. 
Box 3.2 A View Opposing On-Site 
Examination of Banks
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand provides a leading example of a 
regulatory environment that reflects the new philosophy of banking 
supervision. In the words of a former governor, 
“A further concern we have with on-site examinations or the off-site collection of 
detailed private information on banks, at least in the New Zealand context, is the 
risk that these approaches can blur the lines of responsibility for the management 
of banks. If the banking supervisor has responsibility for regular on-site examina-
tions, it presumably follows that the supervisor also has responsibility for encourag-
ing or requiring a bank to modify its risk positions or make other adjustments to 
its balance sheet where the supervisor has concerns in relation to the bank’s risk 
profile. This has the potential to erode the incentives for the directors and manage-
ment of banks to take ultimate responsibility for the management of banking risks, 
effectively passing some of this responsibility to the banking supervisor. It also has 
the potential to create public perceptions that the responsibility for the banking 
risks is effectively shared between a bank’s directors and the banking supervisors. 
In turn, this makes it very difficult indeed for a government to eschew responsibility 
for rescuing a bank in difficulty . . . I acknowledge that any system of banking su-
pervision creates a risk for the taxpayer in the event that a bank gets into difficulty. 
However, in order to minimize these risks, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand prefers 
to keep the spotlight clearly focused on the directors and management of a bank, 
rather than risk a further blurring of their accountability.” 
— D. T. Brash, 1997
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3.5  The Shareholders: Appointing the Right Policy 
Makers
Shareholders play a key role in the promotion of corporate governance. By 
electing the supervisory board and approving the board of directors, the audit 
committee, and external auditors, shareholders are in a position to determine 
the direction of a bank. Banks are different from other companies: the respon-
sibilities of management and the board are not only to shareholders but also to 
depositors, who provide leverage to owners’ capital. Depositors are different 
from normal trade creditors because the entire intermediation function in the 
economy, including payments and clearance (and therefore the stability of the 
financial system), is at stake. 
Banking and company laws, as well as regulators, recognize the importance of 
shareholders and directors. In the modern market-oriented approach to bank 
regulation, the emphasis on the fiduciary responsibility of shareholders has in-
creased significantly. This is ref lected in several ways, including more stringent 
bank licensing requirements and standards that a bank’s founder and larger 
shareholders must meet to be considered fit and proper. Actions that may be 
taken against shareholders who fail to properly discharge their responsibilities 
to ensure the appointment of fit and proper persons for the corporate gover-
nance process have also become broader. Bank licensing procedures normally 
require the identification of major shareholders and mandate a minimum num-
ber of shareholders (which varies among jurisdictions). 
Explicit approval of the supervisory authority is required for a person to be-
come a bank’s founder or “larger” shareholder, which normally implies own-
ing a certain percentage of the bank’s shares (typically in the range of 10–15 
percent). Such approval is based on the ability of shareholders to meet a certain 
set of predefined criteria. These criteria are designed to reassure the public that 
shareholders are able and willing to effectively exercise their fiduciary respon-
sibilities, are able to provide additional capital to the bank in times of need, 
and do not see the bank as a provider of funds for their favorite projects. The 
central bank normally approves all changes in the shareholding structure of a 
bank. The central banks in most jurisdictions also review and approve a bank’s 
charter and the key bylaws that determine the specific relationship of a bank 
with its shareholders. 
Shareholders should play a key role in overseeing a bank’s affairs. They are 
normally expected to select a competent board of directors whose members are 
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experienced and qualified to set sound policies and objectives. The board of 
directors must also be able to adopt a suitable business strategy for the bank, 
supervise the bank’s affairs and its financial position, maintain reasonable capi-
talization, and prevent self-serving practices among themselves and throughout 
the bank as a whole. 
In reality, shareholders may not be able to exercise the oversight function in 
large banks with dispersed ownership structures. Although the founders of a 
bank must meet certain standards, as a bank becomes larger and shares more 
widely held, shareholding may become so diffused that individual shareholders 
have no effective voice in the bank’s management and have little recourse but 
to sell their shares if they don’t like the way the bank is being managed. In such 
cases, effective supervisory oversight becomes critical. 
Assessing the Role of Shareholders
Determining a bank’s ownership, control structure, and the status of its capital 
are key elements of bank assessment. This process should include a review of 
the ownership register, where all shareholders holding more than 2 percent of a 
bank’s capital should be identified by name. The likelihood of a bank engaging 
in imprudent practices is higher if it is owned by the state than if it is owned by 
the private sector. An ownership review should therefore also include an assess-
ment of the percentage of direct or indirect shareholding by the state, by the 
cooperative sector, and by management and employees; it should also state any 
special rights or exemptions attached to shares. The majority shareholders and 
therefore the effective owners of the bank can be determined by using a tailored 
version of table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Shareholder Information 
Shareholders
Number of 
Shareholders
Shares Held 
% of SharesNumber Unit Size
Private companies 
Private individuals 
Public sector and government 
companies (<51% private) 
Names of shareholders who—directly 
or through intermediaries—control more 
than 2% of the bank’s shares 
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Other valuable information concerns the main focus of the larger shareholder 
businesses and of the people who control them. The bank’s corporate charter, 
any other documents of incorporation, and corporate bylaws should be reviewed 
to determine the exact nature of the relationship between shareholders and the 
bank. Special attention should be paid to any situations where more than 75 
percent of the votes of shareholders and directors is required to pass a motion 
as this could create unwarranted special protection (as opposed to legitimate 
protection of minority interests). A key question to ask is whether resolutions 
require greater than a simple majority to be accepted, and if so, under what 
circumstances. In addition, the existence of provisions that either limit voting 
rights or that allow voting rights to individual shareholders or classes of share-
holders that are disproportionate to their shareholding should be considered, as 
well as whether other options exist to acquire more capital.
Another issue is whether shareholders are carrying out their fiduciary respon-
sibilities effectively and whether they have taken advantage of their ownership 
position in the bank. In practical terms, this can be ascertained by reviewing 
select aspects, including the frequency of shareholder meetings, the number of 
shareholders who are normally present, and the percentage of total shares they 
represent. The level of direct involvement, if any, that the shareholders have 
with the bank, the supervisory board (directors), and the management board 
(executives) should also be taken into account. Such an assessment should in-
clude a review of the current composition of the management and supervisory 
boards; their remaining terms of office; and connections among board mem-
bers, shareholders, and bank customers. A review should be conducted of the 
bank’s level of exposure to shareholders having more than 1 percent of holdings 
who are bank customers, including an examination of amounts, terms, condi-
tions, and funding extended to shareholders through instruments such as loans 
and deposits. 
3.6  The Board of Directors: Ultimate Responsibility for 
a Bank’s Affairs
Ultimate responsibility for the way in which a bank’s business is conducted lies 
with the board of directors. The board sets the strategic direction,  appoints 
management, establishes operational policies, and, most important, takes 
 responsibility for ensuring the soundness of a bank. The board is answerable 
to depositors and shareholders for the lawful, informed, efficient, and able 
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 administration of the institution. The members of the board usually delegate 
the day-to-day management of banking to officers and employees, but board 
members are responsible for the consequences of unsound or imprudent policies 
and practices concerning lending, investing, protecting against internal fraud, 
and any other banking activity. 
A board of directors attracts significant interest from regulators because a risk-
based approach to bank supervision emphasizes a board’s fiduciary responsibili-
ties and seeks to ensure that its directors are qualified and able to effectively 
carry out such responsibilities. Laws and regulations typically govern the elec-
tion, required number, qualifications, liability, and removal of board members 
and officers, as well as disclosure requirements for directors’ outside business 
interests. Other laws and regulations address restrictions, prohibitions, pur-
chases from and sales to board members, commissions and gifts for procuring 
loans, embezzlement, abstraction, willful misapplication, false entries, penalty 
for political contributions, and other matters. 
The composition of a board of directors is crucial. Studies have found that 
nearly 60 percent of failed banks had board members who either lacked bank-
ing knowledge or were uninformed and passive regarding supervision of the 
bank’s affairs. A strong managing director and a weak board are a recipe for 
disaster. A board with a strong nonexecutive chairman is more likely to be able 
to provide objective inputs than a board whose chairman is also the chief execu-
tive. A banking institution needs a board that is both strong and knowledge-
able. It is essential that the board encourages open discussion and, even more 
important, that it tolerates conflict well, because conflict indicates that both 
sides of the coin are being considered. Therefore, shareholders considering the 
appointment of a board member should review qualifications, career and expe-
rience, sector expertise, relations with shareholders, and integrity. 
The required number of board members varies among jurisdictions, but in all 
cases the majority of board members should not be executives of the bank. In 
banking systems that use the supervisory board model, it is typical that all 
directors are nonexecutives. Despite the strengths of this approach, the lack of 
involvement in policy setting by wholly nonexecutive boards is a major disad-
vantage. Boards with only one executive member typically view the bank in the 
way that the managing director does. If a board of directors instead includes 
more than one executive member, board members will have a broader perspec-
tive and will be able to look at the company through the eyes of more than one 
senior executive. 
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A board must be strong, independent, and actively involved in its bank’s affairs. 
Both the bank directors and the executive management must adhere to high 
ethical standards and be fit and proper to serve. Although the bank’s direc-
tors will not necessarily be experts on banking, they should have the skills, 
knowledge, and experience to enable them to perform their duties effectively 
(see box 3.3). 
Box 3.3 Board of Directors: 
Effective Exercise of Duties
While not intended to be a “checklist” of requirements, the Committee 
has observed that boards of directors and their individual members 
strengthen the corporate governance of a bank when they do the 
following: 
Understand and execute their oversight role, including understanding the  ¶
bank’s risk proﬁ le; 
Approve the overall business strategy of the bank, including approval of the  ¶
overall risk policy and risk management procedures; 
Exercise their “duty of loyalty” and “duty of care” to the bank under  ¶
applicable national laws and supervisory standards; 
Avoid conﬂ icts of interest, or the appearance of conﬂ icts, in their activities  ¶
with, and commitments to, other organizations; 
Avoid getting involved in decisions when they have a conﬂ ict of interest that  ¶
makes them incapable of properly fulﬁ lling their duties to the bank; 
Commit sufﬁ cient time and energy to fulﬁ lling their responsibilities;  ¶
Structure themselves (as a board) in a way, including size, that promotes  ¶
efﬁ ciency and real strategic discussion; 
Develop and maintain an appropriate level of expertise as the bank grows in  ¶
size and complexity; 
Periodically assess the effectiveness of their own governance practices,  ¶
including nomination and election of board members and management of 
conﬂ icts of interest, determine where weaknesses exist, and make changes 
as necessary; 
Select, monitor and, where necessary, replace key executives, while ensuring  ¶
that the bank has an appropriate plan for executive succession, and 
determining that any intended successor(s) are qualiﬁ ed, ﬁ t and proper to 
manage the affairs of the bank; 
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One of the most important duties of the board is to ensure that the manage-
ment team has the necessary skills, knowledge, experience, and sense of judg-
ment to manage the bank’s affairs in a sound and responsible manner. The 
management team should be directly accountable to the board, and this rela-
tionship should be supported by robust structures. During good times, a board 
sets tone and direction. It oversees and supports management efforts, testing 
and probing recommendations before approving them, and makes sure that ad-
equate controls and systems are in place to identify and address concerns before 
they become major problems. During bad times, an active, involved board can 
help a bank survive if it is able to evaluate problems, take corrective actions, and 
when necessary keep the institution on track until effective management can be 
reestablished and the bank’s problems resolved. 
An effective board should have a sound understanding of the nature of the 
bank’s business activities and associated risks. It should take reasonable steps to 
ensure that management has established strong systems to monitor and control 
those risks. (The board’s risk management responsibilities are summarized in 
Provide oversight of the senior management of the bank by exercising their  ¶
duty and authority to question and insist upon straightforward explanations 
from management, and receive on a timely basis sufﬁ cient information to 
judge the performance of management; 
Meet regularly with senior management and internal audit to review policies,  ¶
establish communication lines and monitor progress toward corporate 
objectives; 
Promote bank safety and soundness, understand the regulatory environment  ¶
and ensure the bank maintains an effective relationship with supervisors;
Provide sound advice and recommend sound practices gleaned from other  ¶
situations; 
Avoid participation as the board of directors in day-to-day management of  ¶
the bank; and 
Exercise due diligence in the hiring and oversight of external auditors  ¶
in jurisdictions where this is the responsibility of the board (in some 
jurisdictions, external auditors are hired directly by shareholders). 
Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004
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box. 3.4.) Even if members of the board are not experts in banking risks and risk 
management systems, they should ensure that such expertise is available and 
that the risk management system undergoes appropriate reviews by qualified 
professionals. The board should in a timely manner take the necessary actions 
to ensure a capitalization of the bank that reasonably matches its economic and 
business environment and business and risk profile. 
The board should ensure that the bank has adequate audit arrangements and 
risk management committees in place and that risk management systems are 
properly applied at all times. Directors need not be experts in these risk man-
agement and audit mechanisms, but they should consult experts within and, if 
necessary, outside the bank to ascertain that such arrangements are robust and 
are being properly implemented. 
The board should also ensure compliance with banking laws and regulations 
applicable to a bank’s business. It should take all reasonable steps to ensure that 
the information in the bank’s disclosure statements is transparent and accurate 
and that adequate procedures are in place, including external audits or other 
reviews where appropriate, to ensure that the disclosed information is not false 
or misleading. 
A bank appraisal always includes an assessment of the structure and effective-
ness of the board. A major objective of the appraisal is to determine whether 
the board is staffed with competent and experienced directors who are able and 
willing to effectively carry out their responsibilities, who fully understand their 
duties, and who have developed adequate objectives and policies (box 3.4). The 
appraisal should include review of the minutes of board meetings and, for each 
functional area, a complete set of reports provided regularly to the relevant 
director. The follow-up actions undertaken by the directors can be assessed to 
determine if the board is effectively fulfilling its responsibility to supervise the 
affairs of the bank and to stay informed of the bank’s condition. 
A particularly important part of the appraisal is the review of the bank’s com-
pliance with laws and regulations and assessment of whether conflicts of inter-
est or self-serving practices exist. A self-serving board is a dangerous board, 
and when decisions involve a conflict of interest, the director in question should 
fully disclose the nature of the conflict and abstain from voting on the mat-
ter. Such transactions should be scrutinized carefully for the potential of self-
serving behavior. 
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Other self-serving practices of which supervisors and analysts should be aware 
include the use of a bank’s credit potential by directors, officers, or sharehold-
ers to obtain loans or to transact other business. The issuance of unwarranted 
Box 3.4 The Board’s Financial Risk 
Management Responsibilities
Legal principles in banking laws and regulations leave no room for doubt 
that the board of directors is the primary player in the risk management 
process. Following are the board’s primary responsibilities: 
Formulate a clear policy for each risk management area.  ¶
Design or approve structures that include clear delegation of authority and  ¶
responsibility at each level. 
Review and approve policies that clearly quantify acceptable risk, specifying  ¶
the quantity and quality of capital required for the safe operation of the 
bank. 
Ensure that senior management effectively takes the steps necessary to  ¶
identify, measure, monitor, and control the bank’s ﬁ nancial and operational 
risks. 
Periodically review controls to ensure that they remain appropriate and make  ¶
periodic assessment of the long-term capital maintenance program. 
Obtain explanations where positions exceed limits, including reviews of  ¶
credit granted to directors and other related parties, signiﬁ cant credit 
exposures, and adequacy of provisions made. 
Ensure that the internal audit function includes a review of adherence to  ¶
policies and procedures. 
Formally delegate to management the authority to formulate and implement  ¶
strategies. (The board should, however, critically appraise and ultimately 
approve the strategic plan.) 
Specify content and frequency of reports.  ¶
Ensure sound stafﬁ ng and remuneration practices and a positive working  ¶
environment. 
Perform an annual evaluation of the performance of the chief executive ofﬁ cer. ¶
Elect a committee, primarily made up of nonexecutive directors, to determine  ¶
the remuneration of executive directors. 
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loans to a bank’s directors or to their business interests is a serious matter from 
the standpoints of both credit and management. Losses that develop from such 
unwarranted loans are bad enough, but the weakening effect on the bank’s gen-
eral credit culture is likely to be even worse. Attention should also be paid to 
the possibility of gratuities being given to directors for the purpose of obtaining 
their approval of financing arrangements or of the use of particular services. 
3.7  Management: Responsibility for Bank Operations and 
the Implementation of Risk Management Policies
As highlighted in box 3.5, the financial soundness and performance of a banking 
system ultimately depend on the boards of directors and on the senior manage-
ment of member banks. The strategic positioning of a bank; the nature of a 
bank’s risk profile; and the adequacy of the systems for identifying, monitoring, 
and managing the profile reflect the quality of both the management team and 
the directors’ oversight of the bank. For these reasons, the most effective strategy 
to promote a sound financial system is to strengthen the accountability of direc-
tors and management and to enhance the incentives for them to operate banks 
prudently. The role of senior management is therefore a fundamental component 
of a risk-based approach to regulation and supervision. Regulators increasingly 
aim to strengthen the participation and accountability of senior management to 
accept key responsibility for the maintenance of a bank’s safety and soundness.
Box 3.5 Accountability of Bank Management
The Comptroller of the United States Currency made a study of bank failures be-
tween 1979 and 1988 to try to determine the root causes of those failures. The 
ultimate message of this study was that not all banks in a depressed environment 
fail: the banks with weak management were the ones that succumbed when times 
became difficult. 
The final words on this trend were offered by a governor of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve System: 
It is important to recognize that bank stockholders suffer losses on their invest-
ments, and senior bank management is almost always replaced, regardless of the 
resolution technique used. 
— E. W. Kelley, 1991
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The quality and experience of the individuals involved in a senior management 
team are important. In a financial institution, the process of risk management 
does not start at the strategy meeting or the planning process or in any other 
committee; it starts when a prospective employee is screened for appointment 
to the organization or for promotion to a senior position. 
Regulators take several different approaches to ensuring that management is fit 
and proper. Most regulators have established standards that have to be met by 
a manager, as listed in box 3.6. Jurisdictions with such standards often require 
the central bank to confirm the experience, technical capacity, and profes-
sional integrity of senior management before its members assume their duties. 
However, some jurisdictions do not, as a matter of policy, get involved in the 
appointment of senior management unless a bank is deemed unsafe due to in-
competent management. 
While the board and management need to support each other, each has its own 
distinct role and responsibilities to fulfill. The chief executive officer and the 
management team should run the bank’s day-to-day activities in compliance 
with board policies, laws, and regulations, and they should be supported by a 
sound system of internal controls. Although the board should leave day-to-day 
operations to management, the board should retain overall control. The dicta-
tion of a board’s actions by management indicates that the board is not fulfill-
ing its responsibilities, ultimately to the detriment of the institution. 
Management Information Availability 
to the Board of Directors
Management should provide directors with the information they need to meet 
their responsibilities and should respond quickly and fully to board requests. 
In addition, management should use its expertise to generate new and innova-
tive ideas and recommendations for consideration by the board. A bank should 
have adequate policies in place to increase the accountability of its managers. 
As the individuals with responsibility for bank stewardship, managers should 
be given incentives to maintain a well-informed overview of business activi-
ties and corresponding risks. The duties and responsibilities of a bank’s se-
nior management include appointment to middle-level management positions 
of people with adequate professional skills, experience, and integrity; the es-
tablishment of adequate performance incentives and personnel management 
systems; and staff training. Management should ensure that the bank has an 
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Box 3.6 “Fit and Proper” Standards for 
Bank Management
No previous convictions for any crime involving fraud, dishonesty, or  ¶
violence. 
No violation of any law that, in the opinion of the regulator, is designed to  ¶
protect the public against ﬁ nancial loss from the dishonesty or incompetence 
of or malpractice by the person concerned. This standard applies when the 
person is involved in the provision of banking, insurance, investment, and 
ﬁ nancial services or in the management of juristic persons. 
No indication that a director was the effective cause of a particular  ¶
company’s inability to pay its debts. 
No involvement in any business practice that was deceitful, prejudicial, or  ¶
that cast doubt on the manager’s competence and soundness of judgment. 
Whether any previous application by the person concerned to conduct  ¶
business has been refused, or whether any license to conduct business has 
been withdrawn or revoked. 
While ﬁ lling the role of a director or an executive ofﬁ cer of an institution, no  ¶
instance of the institution being censured, warned, disciplined, or the subject 
of a court order by any regulatory authority, locally or overseas. 
No instance of the person concerned being associated with an institution  ¶
that has been refused a license or has had its license to conduct business 
revoked. 
No dismissal, debarment, or disciplinary proceedings by any professional or  ¶
occupational organization, as initiated by an employer or professional body. 
No nonpayment of any debt judged due and payable, locally or elsewhere.  ¶
No declaration of insolvency.  ¶
No convictions of any offenses, excluding trafﬁ c violations, political offenses,  ¶
or offenses committed when the person in question was under the age of 
18 years. 
No litigation involving the person in question related to the formation or  ¶
management of any corporate body. 
No related-party transactions with the institution concerned. ¶
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adequate  management information system and that the information is trans-
parent, timely, accurate, and complete. 
The key managerial responsibility is to ensure that all major bank functions are 
carried out in accordance with clearly formulated policies and procedures, and 
that the bank has adequate systems in place to effectively monitor and manage 
risks. Managerial responsibilities for financial risk management are summa-
rized in box 3.7. 
Management’s role in identifying, appraising, pricing, and managing financial 
risk is described well by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The 
Basel Committee has stated that any corporation that uses new financial in-
struments has must ensure that all levels of management acquire knowledge 
and understanding of inherent risks and adapt internal accounting systems 
to ensure adequate control. Risk management should be an integral part of 
the day-to-day activities of each and every line manager in a bank so that risk 
management systems are properly applied and procedures are duly followed. 
Box 3.7 Management’s Responsibilities with 
Regard to Financial Risk 
Develop and recommend strategic plans and risk management policies for  ¶
board approval. 
Implement strategic plans and policies after approval by the board.  ¶
Establish an institutional culture promoting high ethical and integrity  ¶
standards. 
Ensure development of manuals containing policies, procedures, and  ¶
standards for the bank’s key functions and risks. 
Implement an effective internal control system, including continuous  ¶
assessment of all material risks that could adversely affect the achievement 
of the bank’s objectives. 
Ensure the implementation of controls that enforce adherence to established  ¶
risk limits. Ensure immediate reporting of noncompliance to management. 
Ensure that the internal auditors review and assess the adequacy of controls  ¶
and compliance with limits and procedures. 
Develop and implement management reporting systems that adequately  ¶
reﬂ ect business risks. 
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Management should also ensure that the bank has adequate internal controls, 
including appropriate audit arrangements, because risk management failures 
often result not from unanticipated or extraordinary risks, but from an ineffec-
tive decision-making process and weak controls. 
Recent changes in international banking have made the management process 
considerably more demanding. Financial innovation transfers price or market 
risk from one agent to another, but it does not eliminate the risk itself. The pace 
of innovation, the growth of off-balance-sheet transactions, and the unbun-
dling of different types of risk have made the analysis of financial statements 
and the management of a bank’s financial position more complex. Management 
increasingly faces important questions about how best to account for, monitor, 
and manage risk exposure and how to integrate off-balance-sheet activities into 
other exposures. 
Risk Analysis: Assessment of Management
It is also important that the quality of management be appraised. The assess-
ment of senior management personnel should concentrate on the following:
Integrity (fit and proper qualities) to manage a bank.  ¶
Adequate technical capacity and experience. These aspects can be evalu- ¶
ated based on the bank’s personnel practices in the area of management 
continuity. 
Systems in place to monitor and control the bank’s material risks, includ- ¶
ing credit, exposure concentration, interest rate, currency, solvency, 
liquidity, and other risks. Whether these systems are being properly 
applied and whether management takes appropriate actions, if and when 
necessary, should also be evaluated. 
Proper managerial guidance and adequate decisions in all key aspects of  ¶
the bank’s business. 
Compliance with all conditions of registration applicable to the bank.  ¶
Regular contact with those persons who are capable of controlling or sig- ¶
nificantly influencing the bank in a manner that is contrary to the bank’s 
interests. There should be policies that mandate the disclosure of direc-
tors’ conflicts of interest.
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3.8  The Audit Committee and Internal Auditors: 
An Extension of the Board’s Risk Management 
Function
While the board of directors is the ultimate risk manager, the audit committee 
can be regarded as an extension of the board’s risk management function. An 
audit committee is a valuable tool to help management with the identification 
and handling of risk areas in complex organizations. The mission statement of 
an audit committee that is organized according to modern principles should 
be “to enhance the management of operational risks on a groupwide basis.” 
Following from this, the goals of an internal audit function are to 
enable management to identify and manage business risks;  ¶
provide an independent appraisal;  ¶
evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of operations;  ¶
evaluate compliance with laws, policies, and operating instructions;  ¶
evaluate the reliability of information produced by accounting and com- ¶
puter systems; and
provide investigative services to line management.  ¶
Contrary views exist regarding the value of audit committees. Such commit-
tees have been likened to a straw of hope that boards cling to in an attempt to 
show that they are aware of risk management. It is logical that a board facing 
risk management problems will rush to the historical source of information 
about problems in the company, namely the auditors. The proponents of this 
view often point out that the auditors are simply checklist experts, while risk 
management has never been such a simple pursuit and should not be delegated 
to any committee, department, or team. 
Audit Committee and Internal Audit Responsibilities
Monitoring and directing the internal audit function is an integral part of the 
audit committee’s overall responsibilities. Both the board and management 
must have a tool to help ensure that policies are being followed and risks are 
being managed. Under a market-oriented approach, an audit extends beyond 
matters directly related to administrative controls and accounting. It comprises 
all methods and measures adopted within the business to safeguard the busi-
ness’s assets and manage its risks, check accuracy and reliability of accounting 
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and management information, promote operational efficiency, and encourage 
adherence to management policies. In short, the internal audit can be described 
as an independent appraisal function and, because it is established within an 
organization to examine and evaluate its activities, as a valuable service to 
the organization. 
The most important duties of internal auditors are to provide assurance regard-
ing corporate governance, control systems, and risk management processes. 
Internal auditors should also review annual financial statements prior to their 
submission to the board of directors, ensuring that appropriate accounting poli-
cies and practices are used in the development of financial statements. The 
review of financial statements must be detailed enough to allow internal audi-
tors to be able to report on a range of aspects, including the fairness of balance 
sheet and income statement presentation. The internal auditors also consider 
compliance with regulatory and legislative requirements, identify all significant 
discrepancies and disclosure problems, highlight differences between the an-
nual report and management accounts, and point to major f luctuations. 
Internal auditors and audit committees therefore have a very important contri-
bution to make in the risk management process. In general terms, risk manage-
ment responsibilities include monitoring the institution’s financial risk profile 
and reviewing management procedures. The responsibilities of audit commit-
tees and internal auditors in financial risk management are to
review management’s adherence to board policies and procedures, with  ¶
periodic reports to the board; 
provide assurance regarding corporate governance, control systems, and  ¶
risk management processes; 
verify the adequacy and accuracy of the information reported to the board  ¶
by management; 
improve communication between the board and management;  ¶
evaluate risk management measures for their appropriateness in relation  ¶
to exposures; 
test all aspects of risk activities and positions;  ¶
ensure effective management controls over positions, limits, and actions  ¶
taken when limits are exceeded; 
ensure that managers fully understand the established policies and proce- ¶
dures and have the necessary expertise to implement them; and
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assess operations and suggest improvements.  ¶
Internal auditors are also expected to evaluate the external audit function and 
to ensure follow-up by management of problems identified in auditors’ reports. 
One should, however, appreciate the difficulty of meeting the expectations of 
the public and regulatory entities. In reality, the ability of internal auditors 
and committees to satisfy all these requirements is limited. This issue has also 
received attention, by trying to design an effective framework and better meth-
odologies (e.g., COSO, as discussed in the annex to this chapter) that would 
make the internal audit process more effective.
3.9  External Auditors: A Reassessment of the 
Traditional Approach of Auditing Banks
The primary objectives of an audit are to enable the auditor to express an 
opinion on whether the bank’s financial statements fairly ref lect its financial 
condition and the results of its operations for a given period. The external au-
dit report is normally addressed to shareholders, but it is used by many other 
parties, such as supervisors, financial professionals, depositors, and creditors. 
The traditional approach to an external audit, according to the requirements of 
the International Standards of Auditing, typically includes a review of internal 
control systems. This assessment is undertaken to determine the nature and 
extent of substantive testing, provide an analytic review or trend analysis, and 
to undertake a certain amount of detailed testing. Apart from the audit of the 
income statement, certain line items on the balance sheet are audited through 
the use of separate programs, for example, fixed assets, cash, investments, or 
debtors. External auditors have traditionally looked for fraud and mismanage-
ment in the lending function. Audits rarely include a detailed credit analysis of 
borrowers, as bank supervisors have traditionally performed this function.
A risk-based approach to financial regulation also requires a reassessment of 
the conventional approach to external audits. External auditors, as an integral 
part of the risk management partnership, have a specific role to fulfill. If mar-
ket discipline is to be used to promote banking system stability, markets must 
first be provided with information and the capacity to hold directors and man-
agement accountable for the sound operation of a bank. External auditors play 
a key role in improving the market’s ability to determine which banks to do 
business with. 
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External auditors are expected to
evaluate risks inherent in the banks they are auditing;  ¶
analyze and evaluate information presented to them to ensure that such  ¶
information makes sense; 
understand the essence of transactions and financial engineering (struc- ¶
tures) used by the client bank; 
review management’s adherence to board policies and procedures;  ¶
review the information supplied to the board, shareholders, and  ¶
regulators; 
review adherence to statutory requirements; and ¶
report to the board, shareholders, and regulators on the fair presentation  ¶
of information submitted to them. 
It is clear that the philosophy of and the approach to external auditing are cru-
cial to the success or failure of a coordinated strategy of risk management. The 
work of the external auditor is, of course, an added protection for the consumer. 
It is therefore important that the profession shift from a mere balance sheet 
audit to an evaluation of the risks inherent in the financial services industry. 
When such an approach has been fully adopted by all auditors of financial in-
stitutions, the risk management process will be significantly enhanced and all 
users of financial services will benefit. 
The role of the accounting and auditing profession has also gained importance 
as part of the bank supervision process. Management letters and long-form 
reports submitted by auditors can provide supervisors with valuable insights 
into various aspects of a bank’s operations. This is especially important in situ-
ations when auditors become aware of facts that may endanger the stability of 
a particular bank or of the banking system. In many countries, especially those 
where supervisory resources are scarce, supervisors may try to avoid repeating 
the work that external auditors have already performed for client banks. In such 
situations, auditors have a broader mandate prescribed by law, but at a mini-
mum it is important to establish adequate liaison mechanisms. 
3.10 The Role of the General Public
Perhaps the greatest disservice that authorities have done to investors— particularly 
in jurisdictions where explicit deposit insurance does not exist—is to create the 
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illusion that regulators can guarantee the safety of the public’s deposits. When all 
is said and done, investors must understand that no amount of management or 
regulatory protection can take away their own responsibility for decisions regard-
ing their investments. Investors and depositors retain responsibility for applying 
sound principles in the diversification of risk and in the assessment of a finan-
cial institution. In those situations where consumers cannot protect themselves, a 
limited deposit insurance scheme for banks and simplified contractual disclosure 
for insurance companies and other portfolio managers may be considered. 
The only way in which the public can be protected is if it understands who 
is taking the risk: individuals as investors acting through agents (investment 
managers and brokers), or the financial intermediaries pooling their funds and 
acting as principals (banks). When this distinction is clearly established and the 
public more clearly understands the risks that investment entails, the principal 
role of financial intermediaries will be to ensure that consumers are protected. 
This will be particularly true if the “fit and proper” requirement described 
above is applied to all providers of financial services. 
Investors can be assisted in their roles as risk managers if the concept of “public” 
is broadened to include the financial media and analysts, such as stockbrokers, 
other advisors, and rating agencies. In addition, the market’s ability to provide 
a basis for informed decisions must be improved through full disclosure of the 
financial statements of banks, as well as by informed and competent analysis 
in the media. Investors’ interests can be safeguarded in more than one way, but 
disclosure of what is actually happening is essential. 
As a general principle, much of the justification for banking regulation rests on 
alleged imperfections in information disclosure. A policy of adequate informa-
tion provision would help to mitigate this underlying problem and possibly al-
low for the removal of many of the quantitative constraints that are prevalent in 
banking today. Emphasis on transparency and accountability of management 
would also reduce the compliance cost and regulatory distortions that are often 
associated with conventional approaches to banking regulation. 
Probably the most promising solution to these problems is legally mandated 
public disclosure. Louis Brandeis, a U.S. Supreme Court justice, observed 
in 1913 that sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants and electric light 
the most efficient policeman. This quaint-sounding aphorism still holds true. 
Brandeis made another crucial point: to be effective, disclosure must be made to 
the public. One of the most important benefits of mandating public disclosure 
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is that the awareness that information has to be publicly disclosed affects the 
conduct of financial institutions. Boards of directors and management know 
that, after having been assimilated by the financial press and competitors, even 
the most highly technical information will filter through to the public. In the 
United States and other countries with strict information disclosure require-
ments, the threat of private litigation engendered by public disclosure increases 
the incentive to management and boards to avoid problems. 
Another form of public disclosure occurs when entities such as Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service, and AM Best publish their ratings of com-
panies. Ideally, these private rating agencies balance the needs for public disclo-
sure and confidentiality. (As the agencies receive a great deal of information—
which is subsequently made public only in the form of their ratings—from the 
companies themselves, the agencies must respect the institutions’ desire to keep 
some things confidential.) Through published ratings, the agencies have the 
ability to act more quickly and have a more subtle effect than regulators com-
monly do. If rating agencies can build a reputation for reliability among finan-
cial analysts, senior management in banking institutions, and the broader pub-
lic, they can also provide an additional form of risk management for banks. 
Market discipline could, therefore, be encouraged as an effective means of re-
ducing the burden on regulators with regard to large, sophisticated investors. 
The role of financial analysts in assisting the public with risk management 
should not be underestimated. Financial analysts provide investment advice to 
clients and are therefore accustomed to presenting financial data from the per-
spective of investment risk. Investors who buy bank-negotiable certificates of 
deposit and other wholesale money market instruments should bear risk along 
with the creditors of bank holding companies. Faced with the possibility of los-
ing their investments, such investors will police banks to protect their interests. 
Although all regulation can be left to the market, a policy of sharing resources 
between authorities and the private sector is bound to be more effective than 
one of the parties acting alone. 
Nonetheless, ratings of institutions are sometimes downgraded only when 
problems have already extensively developed and when substantial, sometimes 
fatal, damage has been done. The question remains whether the market at large 
could have recognized deterioration or excessive risk taking at a sufficiently 
early stage if more information had been available. It will likely take a long time 
to develop techniques for the evaluation of risk and to standardize them in a 
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way to be adequately captured in published data. Market players are therefore 
limited in their ability to see credit problems as they develop. The experience 
of the 1980s, when each major credit problem caused surprise in the market, is 
likely to remain the general pattern for the foreseeable future. 
If market analysts cannot identify and properly evaluate credit and other prob-
lems until substantial harm has already been done, market discipline will be 
insufficient to protect the overall safety of the banking system or of deposit-
insurance funds. In fact, the belated imposition of market pressure may com-
plicate the task that supervisors have in dealing with problems. Consequently, 
the need for mechanisms to protect small and less-sophisticated investors will 
continue to exist. 
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Annex 3A: National Initiatives to Improve Corporate 
Governance
“. . . Simply complying with the rules is not enough. They should, as I have said 
before, make this approach part of their companies’ DNA. For companies that take 
this approach, most of the major concerns about compliance disappear. Moreover, if 
companies view the new laws as opportunities—opportunities to improve internal 
controls, improve the performance of the board, and improve their public reporting—
they will ultimately be better run, more transparent, and therefore more attractive to 
investors.”
William Donaldson
former U.S. SEC chairman 
Given the importance of corporate governance for effective operations and 
competitiveness, and for the larger economic context in which firms operate, 
the corporate governance framework has received increased attention, through 
both international and national initiatives. As mentioned, the most important 
international initiatives were 
Principles of Corporate Governance of the Organization for Economic  ¶
Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1999 and 2004, and
Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations by Basel Committee  ¶
on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements, 1999 
and 2006.
There were also numerous initiatives in various countries since the early 1990s 
that have all reinforced the principles by which entities should be governed. 
Such initiatives were typically triggered by some sort of crisis in the national 
financial or corporate systems. The most interesting examples that are often 
referred to include:
Internal Control – Integrated Framework: issued by the US Committee  ¶
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), 
1992 and 2006 (guidance to smaller firms)
Enterprise Risk Management Framework – issued by COSO, September  ¶
2004
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation in the United States, 2002 ¶
Cadbury Code in United Kingdom, 1992 and 2003 ¶
King Reports in South Africa, 1994 and 2002 ¶
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OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
Aware of the contribution that good corporate governance makes to economic 
growth, investment and financial market stability, member countries of the 
Box 3A.1 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
(Revised)
I. Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework – The cor-
porate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, 
be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibili-
ties among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities.
II. Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions – The corporate gover-
nance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights.
III. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders – The corporate governance framework 
should ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including minority and 
foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effec-
tive redress for violation of their rights.
IV. Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance – The corporate governance 
framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders established by law or 
through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation between corpora-
tions and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of financially 
sound enterprises.
V. Disclosure and Transparency – The corporate governance framework should 
ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regard-
ing the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and 
governance of the company.
VI. Responsibilities of the Board – The corporate governance framework should 
ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of man-
agement by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the 
shareholders.
In the original OECD document, each of the main sections is further elaborated in 
a lot more details.
OECD Secretariat, 2004
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) put gov-
ernance as one of the priority topic in 1998. The first set of OECD principles 
was developed in 1999. It has since become an international benchmark for 
policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. The 
OECD principles define corporate governance as involving “a set of relation-
ships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders, and other 
stakeholders.” Corporate governance also provides the structure through which 
the objectives of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objec-
tives and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate governance 
should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue ob-
jectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should 
facilitate effective monitoring. 
In 2002, the initial principles were thoroughly reviewed by the Steering Group 
on Corporate Governance to take account of new developments and experi-
enced of OECD member and nonmember countries. The new set of principles 
(box 3A.1) was announced in 2004. In addition to the key topics provided in 
box 3A.1, further details could be found on OECD site (www.OECD.org). 
The associated OECD Financial Stability Forum has designated the principles 
as one of the 12 key standards for sound financial systems.
The OECD principles have also provided a basis for bank governance prin-
ciples developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank 
for International Settlement. Supervisors have a keen interest in sound corpo-
rate governance as it is an essential element in the safe and sound functioning 
of a bank and may affect the bank’s risk profile if not implemented effectively. 
As the functions of the board of directors and senior management with regard 
to setting policies, implementing policies and monitoring compliance are key 
elements in the control functions of a bank, effective oversight of the business 
and affairs of a bank by its board and senior management contributes to the 
maintenance of an efficient and cost-effective supervisory system. 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission, United States (COSO)
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(commonly referred to as COSO) was convened by the U.S. Congress in re-
sponse to well-publicized financial irregularities that occurred in the late 1980s. 
COSO formulated an internal control framework designed to help organiza-
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tions reduce the risk of asset loss, ensure the reliability of financial statements 
and compliance with laws and regulations, and promote efficiency. COSO is 
recognized by many public sector and professional bodies as a standard for the 
evaluation of internal control and the risk environment. 
Integrated Framework for Internal Control of Financial Reporting. Under 
the COSO framework (see figure 3A.1), the effectiveness of an internal control 
system is measured by its capacity to provide reasonable assurance to man-
agement and to the board of directors of their bank’s achievement of its ob-
jectives in three categories: (1) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) 
reliability of financial reporting, and (3) compliance with applicable laws and 
regulation. The emphasis on behavior in the COSO model is a recognition of 
reality, namely that policies specify what management wants to happen; what 
actually happens, and which rules are obeyed, bent, or ignored, is determined 
by corporate culture.
The COSO internal control model consists of five interrelated components, 
which are inherent in the way management runs the organization. The com-
ponents are linked, and serve as criteria for determining whether or not the 
system is effective. The COSO components include control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, monitoring and learning, and information and 
communication. The COSO enterprise risk management framework and key 
components of operational risk approaches are summarized in table 3A.1. 
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Figure 3A.1 COSO – Enterprise Risk Management Framework 
Risk Management Framework. Another important theme addressed by 
COSO is the enterprise risk management. COSO divides the enterprise risk 
management (ERM) framework into eight interrelated components (see figure 
3A.1), including the following: 
Internal environment  ¶ – Internal environment describes the work envi-
ronment and risk preferences of an organization and sets the framework 
for how risk is viewed and addressed by its management and employees. 
Internal environment includes risk management philosophy, risk appetite, 
integrity and ethical values, and the environment in which they operate.
Objective setting ¶  – Objectives must be set up-front. Risk management 
function should ensure that there is a process for corporate management 
to set the objectives, that the chosen objectives support and align with the 
entity’s mission, and that they are consistent with its risk appetite.
Event identification ¶  – Internal and external events affecting achieve-
ment of an entity’s objectives must be identified, distinguishing between 
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risks and opportunities. Opportunities are channeled back to manage-
ment’s strategy or objective-setting processes.
Risk assessment ¶  – Risks are analyzed, considering the likelihood of 
occurrence and impact, as a basis for determining how they should be 
managed. Risks are assessed on an inherent and a residual basis.
Risk response ¶  – Management selects risk responses—avoiding, accept-
ing, reducing, or sharing risk—developing a set of actions to align risks 
with the entity’s risk tolerances and risk appetite. 
Control activities ¶  – Policies and procedures should be established and 
implemented to help ensure the risk responses are effectively carried out.
Information and communication ¶  – Relevant information is identified, 
captured, and communicated in a form and timeframe that enable people 
to carry out their responsibilities. Effective communication also occurs in 
a broader sense—flowing down, across, and up the entity.
Monitoring ¶  – The entirety of enterprise risk management must be moni-
tored and modifications made as necessary.
Other Initiatives
Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Legislation, United States, was the legislative response 
to a series of corporate scandals that erupted in the United States in the early 
2000s. Section 302 of SOX requires that management certify the following:
They have viewed their company’s financial report. ¶
To the best of their knowledge, the report contains no untrue statement  ¶
of a material fact and does not omit any material fact that would cause 
any statements to be misleading.
To the best of their knowledge, the financial statements and other finan- ¶
cial information in the report fairly present, in all material aspects, the 
company’s financial position, results of operations, and cash f lows.
They accept responsibility for establishing and maintaining disclosure  ¶
controls and procedures, and the report contains an evaluation of the 
 effectiveness of these measures.
Any major deficiencies or material weaknesses in controls and any  ¶
control-related fraud have been disclosed to the audit committee and 
external auditor.
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Table 3A.1 COSO Enterprise Risk Management Framework
COSO Enterprise Risk Management Framework
Functions Activities Internal Environment
Management 
Objectives
Risk & Event 
Identifi cation
Risk 
Assessment
Risk 
Response
Control 
Activities
Information 
Communication Monitoring
Enterprise:
1.  Strategic planning
2.  Governance
3.  General management
4.   Infrastructure and own 
capacity development 
5.  Business development
Operational:
6.  New client portfolio set-up
7.  Portfolio management
8.  Settlement & control
9.  Valuation & accounting
10. Risk analytics
Activities 
required to 
perform each of 
the 10 separate 
functions
Tone
Integrity
Ethics
Strategic People Likelihood Avoid Policies Identify relevant information
Monitor 
entire ERM 
process
View of risk Operational Processes Impact Reduce Procedures Capture Ongoing activities
Risk 
management 
philosophy
Reporting Systems Share Communicate Separate evaluations
Risk appetite Compliance External events Accept
Enable people 
to carry out 
responsibilities
Modify 
processes 
where 
needed
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The report discloses significant changes affecting internal controls that  ¶
have occurred since the last report and whether corrective actions have 
been taken.
The most contentious aspect of SOX is section 404, which is also the most 
costly to comply with. It requires management and the external auditor to re-
port on the adequacy of the company’s internal control over financial reporting 
(ICFR), as part of each annual reporting cycle. The report must affirm “the 
responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate 
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting.” The report 
must also “contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year, 
of the effectiveness of internal control structure and financial reporting pro-
cedures.” More specifically, the chief executive officer and the chief financial 
officer must personally report on the adequacy and effectiveness of internal 
controls over financial reporting, including:
the internal control framework used by management, ¶
management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls, ¶
disclosure of any material weaknesses found by the auditor, ¶
the result of the external audit required to independently evaluate man- ¶
agement’s assessment (a requirement of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission), and
a statement of any material weaknesses to be included in the company’s  ¶
annual report.
To do this, managers are generally adopting an internal control framework such 
as that described in COSO. In late 2006, a new standard was proposed to help 
alleviate the significant costs of compliance and improve the focus of assess-
ment on the most critical risk areas.
Cadbury Code, United Kingdom, emphasizes the principles of openness, in-
tegrity, and accountability. Openness is described as the basis for the confidence 
necessary between business and all those who have a stake in its success. Open 
disclosure of information contributes to the efficient working of the market 
economy, prompts boards to take effective action, and allows shareholders and 
others to scrutinize companies more thoroughly.
King Report, South Africa, is an example of an initiative to improve gover-
nance in a developing country. Unlike its counterparts in other countries at 
the time, the 1994 King Report in South Africa went beyond the financial 
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and regulatory aspects of corporate governance—it advocated an integrated ap-
proach to good governance in the interests of a wide range of stakeholders and 
the fundamental principles of good financial, social, ethical, and environmen-
tal practice. In adopting a participative corporate governance system of enter-
prise with integrity, the 1994 King Report emphasized the need for companies 
to recognize that they no longer act independently from the societies in which 
they operate. King moved away from a single focus on the entity’s bottom line 
by embracing economic, environmental, and social aspects of an entity’s activi-
ties. The report also distinguished accountability from responsibility.

Key Messages
The composition of a bank’s balance sheet assets and liabilities is one of the key  ¶
factors that determine the level of risk faced by the institution.
Growth in the balance sheet and resulting changes in the relative proportion of  ¶
assets or liabilities affect the risk management process.
Changes in the relative structure of assets and liabilities should be a conscious  ¶
decision of a bank’s policy makers: the board of directors.
Monitoring key components of the balance sheet may alert the analyst to negative  ¶
trends in relationships between asset growth and capital retention capability.
It is important to monitor the growth of low, nonearning, and off-balance-sheet  ¶
items.
Balance sheet structure lies at the heart of the asset-liability management process. ¶
4
Balance Sheet Structure
4.1 Introduction: Composition of the Balance Sheet
The goal of financial management is to maximize the value of a bank, as determined by its profitability and risk level. Since risk is inherent in banking and unavoidable, the task of financial management is to man-
age risk in such a way that the different types of risk are kept at acceptable levels 
and profitability is sustained. Doing so requires the continual identification, 
quantification, and monitoring of risk exposures, which in turn demands sound 
policies, adequate organization, efficient processes, skilled analysts, and elabo-
rate computerized information systems. In addition, risk management requires 
the capacity to anticipate changes and to act so that a bank’s business can be 
structured and restructured to profit from the changes—or at least to minimize 
losses. Supervisory authorities should not prescribe how business is conducted; 
they should instead maintain prudent oversight of a bank by evaluating the risk 
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composition of its assets and by insisting that an adequate amount of capital and 
reserves is available to safeguard solvency. 
Until the 1970s, the business of banking primarily consisted of the extension of 
credit—in other words, a simple intermediation of deposits that had been raised 
at a relatively low cost—and bank managers faced fairly simple decisions con-
cerning loan volumes, pricing, and investments. The key managerial challenges 
of the past were controlling asset quality and resulting loan losses, as well as 
managing overhead expenditures. With the background of recession, volatile 
interest rates, and inflation during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the manage-
ment of both assets and liabilities has become necessary to maintain satisfactory 
margin performance. The complexity of balance sheet management continued 
to increase as a result of deregulation in the 1980s, with growing competition 
for funds becoming a primary management concern. 
The era of deregulation and increased competition continued in the 1990s, 
including involvement by financial institutions other than banks. This envi-
ronment underscored the need for competitive pricing and, in practical terms, 
for an increase in and engagement of liabilities to maximize spread and control 
exposure to related risks. Because of  the inverse relationship of these two goals, 
a balancing act between maximizing the spreads versus controlling risk expo-
sures has become a focal point in the financial management, regulation, and 
supervision of banks. 
This chapter highlights the importance of the structure and composition of li-
abilities and assets, as well as the related income statement items. In addition, 
it illustrates the ways in which a bank’s risk managers and analysts can analyze 
the structure of balance sheets and income statements, as well as individual bal-
ance sheet items with specific risk aspects, for example, liquidity in the case of 
deposit liabilities or market risk in the case of traded securities. In this process, 
the interaction between various types of risk must be understood to ensure that 
they are not evaluated in isolation.
Asset-liability management, which includes raising and utilizing funds, lies at 
the financial heart of a bank. The asset-liability management process comprises 
strategic planning and implementation and control processes that affect the 
volume, mix, maturity, interest rate sensitivity, quality, and liquidity of a bank’s 
assets and liabilities. The primary goal of asset-liability management is to pro-
duce a high-quality, stable, large, and growing f low of net interest income. This 
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goal is accomplished by achieving the optimum combination and level of assets, 
liabilities, and financial risk. Asset-liability management is further discussed in 
chapter 12.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the composition of a bank’s assets and liabilities. An 
evaluation of the balance sheet structure requires understanding not only the 
bank, but also its business and competitive environment; the overall regulatory, 
economic, and policy environment; and the customer mix. The structure of a 
typical balance sheet, with deposits from customers on the liability side and 
loans and advances to customers on the asset side, is also reviewed. This pattern 
ref lects the nature of banks as intermediaries, with ratios of capital to liabilities 
at such a low level that their leverage would be unacceptable to any business 
outside the financial services industry. 
Figure 4.1 Composition of Bank Assets and Liabilities
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4.2 Bank Assets
The analyst should be able to assess the risk profile of the bank simply by ana-
lyzing the relative share of various asset items and changes in their proportion-
ate share over time. For example, if the loan portfolio drops significantly, while 
property lending increases materially, one would question whether the bank’s 
risk management systems are adequate to handle the increased risks. Normally, 
such a jump would ref lect a shift from one to another area of risk. Likewise, an 
increase or decrease in trading securities would indicate a change in the level 
of market risk to which the institution is exposed. Such an assessment is pos-
sible at a macro level, prior to any detailed review of credit, liquidity, or market 
risk management. When linked to the amount of net income yielded by each 
category of assets, this analysis increases in importance, necessitating a chal-
lenging assessment of risk versus reward.
A bank’s balance sheet (statement of financial position) is normally prepared on 
a liquidity basis—rather than the noncurrent/current asset basis of nonbank en-
terprises. An assessment of a bank’s liquidity, as evidenced in its balance sheet 
and statement of cash flows, is of paramount importance to the financial analyst. 
Banks need assets that are liquid to accommodate expected and unexpected bal-
ance sheet fluctuations. In environments where markets are not developed and 
the liquidity of different claims still depends almost exclusively on their maturity 
rather than on the ability to sell them, banks tend to keep a relatively high level 
of liquid assets that bear little or no interest. In such environments, liquid as-
sets typically account for at least 10 percent, or in extreme situations as much as 
30 percent, of total assets. Increasing market orientation, the growth of finan-
cial markets, and the greater diversity of financial instruments worldwide entail 
greater short-term flexibility in liquidity management, which in turn reduces the 
need to hold large amounts of liquid assets. In banking environments with devel-
oped financial markets, liquid assets typically account for only about 5 percent of 
total assets. An appraisal of whether the level of liquid assets is satisfactory must 
be based on a thorough understanding of money market dynamics in the respec-
tive country, as certain assets that appear liquid in good times may not be liquid 
in more difficult periods. Table 4.1 offers a sample spreadsheet that can be used 
to assess structural change in the liquidity of a bank’s assets.
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Table 4.1 Balance Sheet Assets
Assets Period 01 Period 02
Cash and cash balances with the central bank
Financial assets held for trading
Financial assets designated at fair value through profi t or loss
Available-for-sale fi nancial assets
Loans and advances to customers 
Held-to-maturity investments
Derivatives – Hedge accounting purposes
Tangible assets
Intangible assets
Investments in associates, subsidiaries and joint ventures
Tax assets
Other assets
Noncurrent assets and disposal groups classifi ed as held for sale
TOTAL ASSETS 100% 100%
Cash and Balances with the Central Bank
Cash and balances with the central bank represent the holdings of highly liquid 
assets, such as bank notes, gold coin, and bullion, as well as deposits with the 
central bank. A percentage of deposits is normally required to be held to meet 
the central bank’s reserve requirements and serve as a monetary policy tool. 
Flat-rate reserve requirements are used to control the amount of money that 
a bank is able to extend as credit. However, when banks are required to hold 
excessive reserve assets, particularly when the assets do not pay interest, the 
cost to banks increases. This creates incentives for banks to devise instruments 
that are not subject to reserve requirements, encourages intermediation through 
new channels, and may give a competitive advantage to institutions that are not 
subject to reserve requirements. Such practices tend to reduce the effectiveness 
and the importance of reserve requirements as a monetary policy tool. 
Regulators have tried to make reserve requirements more difficult to circum-
vent and to reduce the incentives for doing so. For example, changes in re-
serve requirements that have been introduced by regulators include a reduc-
tion of the level, type, and volatility of reserve holdings  Regulators have also 
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introduced an increase in the various types of compensation made to banks for 
maintaining reserves.
Financial Assets Held for Trading
These assets represent the bank’s investment and proprietary trading books in 
securities, foreign currencies, equities, and commodities. 
Although similar securities are involved, the investment portfolio (chapter 
10) must be distinguished from the proprietary trading portfolio (discussed 
in chapter 11). Proprietary trading is aimed at exploiting market opportuni-
ties with leveraged funding (for example, through the use of repurchase agree-
ments), whereas the investment portfolio is held and traded as a buffer/stable 
liquidity portfolio. 
Investment and trading assets are valued in terms of International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) 39 and can be classified as “trading, available-for-sale, or held-
to-maturity.” However, these assets would normally be disclosed at fair value 
(marked-to-market) in the bank’s financial statements (see chapter 5, section 5.2 
for the treatment of income on such assets and chapter 14 for International 
Financial Reporting Standards [IFRS] disclosure). 
In many developing countries, banks have been or are obligated to purchase 
government bonds or other designated claims, usually to ensure that a mini-
mum amount of high-quality liquidity is available to meet deposit demands. 
Frequently, the main purpose of such liquid asset requirements is to ensure a 
predictable f low of finance to designated recipients. Government is the most 
frequent beneficiary, often with an implicit subsidy. Such obligatory invest-
ments may diminish the availability and increase the cost of credit extended to 
the economy (and the private sector) and, because of the increased cost of credit, 
result in a higher level of risk. 
In developed countries and financial markets, an increase in bank investment 
and trading portfolios generally ref lects the growing orientation of a bank to 
nontraditional operations. In such cases, an investment portfolio comprises 
different types of securities instruments. In risk management terms, such an 
orientation would mean that a bank has replaced credit risk with market and 
counterparty risk. 
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Loans and Advances to Customers
Loans and advances to customers are normally the most significant component 
of a bank’s assets. These include loans for general working capital (overdrafts), 
investment lending, asset-backed installment and mortgage loans, financing of 
debtors (accounts receivable and credit card accounts), and tradable debt such 
as acceptances and commercial paper. Loans and advances are extended in do-
mestic and foreign currency and are provided by banks as financing for public 
or private sector investments. 
In the past decade, innovation has increased the marketability of bank assets 
through the introduction of sales of assets such as mortgages, automobile loans, 
and export credits used as backing for marketable securities (a practice known 
as securitization and prevalent in the United States and the United Kingdom). 
An analysis of this trend may highlight investment or spending activity in 
various sectors of the economy, while an analysis of a foreign currency loan 
portfolio may indicate expectations regarding exchange rate and interest rate 
developments. Further, evaluation of trade credits may reveal important trends 
in competitiveness of the economy and its terms of trade. 
Tangible Assets
Tangible assets such as property represent the bank’s infrastructure resourc-
es and typically include the bank’s premises, other fixed property, computer 
equipment, vehicles, furniture, and fixtures. In certain circumstances, banks 
may have a relatively high proportion of fixed assets, such as houses, land, or 
commercial space. These holdings would be the result of collections on col-
lateral, which, under most regulations, banks are required to dispose of within 
a set period of time. They may also ref lect the deliberate decision of a bank to 
invest in real estate if the market is fairly liquid and prices are increasing. In 
some developing countries, investments in fixed assets reach such high propor-
tions that central banks may begin to feel obliged to limit or otherwise regulate 
property-related assets. A bank should not be in the business of investing in 
real estate assets, and therefore a preponderance of these assets would affect the 
assessment of the bank. In more developed countries, real estate assets not ac-
quired in the normal course of banking business would be booked in a subsid-
iary at the holding company level to protect depositors from associated risks. 
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Investments in Associates, Subsidiaries, and Joint Ventures
Other investments could comprise a bank’s longer-term equity-type invest-
ments, such as equities and recapitalization/nontrading bonds held in the 
bank’s long-term investment portfolio. This includes equity investments in 
subsidiaries, associates, and other listed and unlisted entities. The percentage 
of a portfolio that is devoted to this type of instrument varies among countries, 
although not necessarily as a result of a bank’s own asset-liability management 
decisions. Such assets are also valued in terms of IAS 39 and will normally be 
classified as “available-for-sale, or held-to-maturity.” 
For equity investments, the balance sheet should be reviewed on a consolidated 
basis to ensure a proper understanding of the effect of such investments on the 
structure of the bank’s own balance sheet, and to properly assess the asset qual-
ity of the bank.
Other Assets
Other assets typically include prepaid amounts and other sundry items. These 
vary with regard to the predictability of income associated with a particular as-
set, the existence of markets for such assets, the possibility of selling the assets, 
and the reliability of the assessments of the asset’s useful life. The treatment 
of assets in evaluating capital adequacy can be controversial. For example, such 
assets may include suspense accounts, which have to be analyzed and verified 
to ensure that the asset is indeed real and recoverable. 
4.3 Bank Liabilities
As explained in section 4.2, the relative share of various balance sheet com-
ponents—liabilities, in this instance—is already a good indication of the risk 
levels and types of risk to which a bank is exposed. 
An increase in the level of nonretail deposits funding, such as repurchase agree-
ments or certificates of deposit, could expose the bank to greater volatility in 
satisfying its funding requirements, requiring increasingly sophisticated liquid-
ity risk management. Funding instruments such as repurchase agreements also 
expose a bank to market risk, in addition to liquidity risk. 
The business of banking is traditionally based on the concept of low margins 
and high leverage. Consequently, a special feature of a bank’s balance sheet is 
its low capital-to-liabilities ratio, which would normally be unacceptable to any 
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other business outside the financial services industry. The acceptable level of 
risk associated with such a structure is measured and prescribed according to 
risk-based capital requirements, which are in turn linked to the composition of 
a bank’s assets. 
Table 4.2 Balance Sheet Liabilities
Liabilities Period 01 Period 02
Central bank funding
Financial liabilities held for trading
Derivatives held for trading
Short positions 
Debt certifi cates (including bonds intended for repurchase in short term)
Other fi nancial liabilities held for trading – repurchase agreement obligations
Financial liabilities designated at fair value through profi t or loss 
Financial liabilities measured at amortized cost
Deposits from banks and other credit institutions
Deposits from customers
Debt certifi cates ( including bonds) - own securities issued
Subordinated liabilities
Financial liabilities associated with transferred fi nancial assets
Derivatives – Hedge accounting purposes
Fair value changes of the hedged items in portfolio hedge of interest rate risk 
Provisions
Tax liabilities 
Other liabilities 
Share capital repayable on demand (e.g. cooperative shares)
Liabilities included in disposal groups classifi ed as held for sale
TOTAL LIABILITIES 100% 100%
While the types of liabilities present in a bank’s balance sheet are nearly uni-
versal, their exact composition varies greatly, depending on a particular bank’s 
business and market orientation as well as by the prices and supply characteris-
tics of different types of liabilities at any given time. The funding structure of a 
bank directly affectsits cost of operation and therefore determines a bank’s profit 
potential and risk level. The structure of a bank’s liabilities also ref lects the spe-
cific asset-liability and risk management policies of a bank. Table 4.2 becomes 
the source used to illustrate a typical liability structure as per figure 4.4.
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Central Bank Funding
Borrowings from the central bank may appear among the bank’s liabilities. The 
most frequent reason for borrowing from the central bank is that changes have 
occurred in the volume of required reserves as a result of f luctuations in de-
posits. These shifts occur when banks have not correctly forecasted their daily 
reserve position and have been forced to borrow to make up the difference, or 
to assist banks to meet temporary requirements for funds. Longer-term credit 
from the central bank indicates an unusual situation that may be the result of 
national or regional difficulties or problems related to the particular bank in 
question. Historically, central bank financing was often directed toward a spe-
cial purpose determined by government policies—for example, in the areas of 
agriculture or housing—but this type of activity is increasingly out of date. 
Financial Liabilities Held for Trading: 
Repurchase Agreement Obligations
Instead of resorting to direct borrowing, a bank may sell and simultaneously 
agree to repurchase securities at a specific time or after certain conditions have 
been met. Repurchase structures are often used to fund a bank’s trading port-
folio and to enhance returns on such portfolios. 
The proprietary trading portfolio is therefore aimed at exploiting market op-
portunities with leveraged funding such as repurchase agreements, whereas the 
investment portfolio is held and traded as a buffer/stable liquidity portfolio—
and funded with more stable deposits. 
Repurchase agreements may expose banks to interest rate or market risks as 
they involve underlying securities, and even a credit risk if the buyer is unable 
to follow through on its commitments. The level of securities sold under re-
purchase agreements has (in the past) also served as a barometer of the level of 
disintermediation in the system, as well as the demand for wholesale funds. 
Financial Liabilities Measured at Amortized Cost
Deposits from other banks and financial institutions and deposits from cus-
tomers constitute financial liabilities that are measured at amortized cost.
Deposits from Banks and Other Credit Institutions
Deposits from banks and other credit institutions (interbank funding) includes 
all deposits, loans, and advances that are extended between banks; they are nor-
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mally regarded as volatile sources of funding. An analysis of interbank balances 
may point to structural peculiarities in the banking system, for example, when 
funding for a group of banks is provided by one of its members. 
Given the volatility of such funding sources, however, if a bank is an exten-
sive borrower, its activities should be analyzed in relation to any other aspects 
of its operations that influence borrowing. The acceptable reasons for reliance 
on interbank funding include temporary or seasonal loan or cash requirements 
and the matching of large and unanticipated withdrawals of customer deposits. 
Money centers or large regional banks engaged in money market transactions 
tend to borrow on a continuous basis. Otherwise, heavy reliance on interbank 
funding indicates that a bank carries a high degree of funding risk and is over-
extended in relation to its normal deposit volume. 
Deposits from Customers
Deposits usually constitute the largest proportion of a bank’s total liabilities. 
Deposits from customers—the amount due to other customers and deposi-
tors—represent money accepted from the general public, such as demand and 
savings, fixed and notice, and foreign currency deposits. The structure and 
stability of the deposit base is critical. Broader trends also come into play. An 
analysis of private sector deposits (including funding from repurchase agree-
ments and certificates of deposit) highlights economic trends related to the 
level of spending and its effect on inflation. Furthermore, growth in the money 
supply is calculated using total deposits in the banking system. A change in 
the level of deposits in the banking system is therefore one of the variables that 
influences monetary policy. 
Within the deposit structure, some items are inherently more risky than others. 
For example, large corporate deposits are less stable than household deposits, 
not only because of their higher degree of concentration but also because they 
are more actively managed. A large proportion of nonretail or nonstandard 
deposits can be unstable and tends to indicate that the bank may be paying 
higher rates of interest than its competitors or that depositors may be attracted 
by liberal credit accommodations. Cash collateral and various types of loan 
escrow accounts may also be counted as deposits, although these funds can be 
used only for their stated purpose. 
Competition for funds is a normal part of any banking market, and deposi-
tors, both households and corporations, often aim to minimize idle funds. A 
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bank should therefore have a policy on deposit attraction and maintenance and 
procedures for analyzing, on a regular basis, the volatility and the character of 
the deposit structure so that funds can be productively utilized even when the 
probability of withdrawal exists. Analysis of the deposit structure should deter-
mine the percentage of hard-core, stable, seasonal, and volatile deposits. 
Foreign Borrowings
International borrowing may occur in the same form as domestic funding, ex-
cept that it normally exposes a bank to additional currency risk. Direct forms 
of international borrowing include loans from foreign banks, export promo-
tion agencies in various countries, or international lending agencies, as well as 
vostro accounts. Indirect forms include notes, acceptances, import drafts, and 
trade bills sold with the bank’s endorsement; guarantees; and notes or trade 
bills rediscounted with central banks in various countries. The existence of 
foreign funding is generally a good indicator of international confidence in a 
country and its economy. 
4.4 Equity and Other Items
The equity of a bank represents the buffer available to protect creditors against 
losses that may be incurred by managing risks imprudently. Table 4.3 illustrates 
the presentation and disclosure of equity in terms of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). According to international norms, banks nor-
mally have three tiers of capital components (see chapter 6 for further discus-
sion). The key components of bank capital are common stock, retained earn-
ings, and perpetual preferred stock, all of which are counted as Tier 1 capital. 
Otherwise, to qualify for Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital, a capital instrument should 
have long maturity and not contain or be covered by any covenants, terms, or 
restrictions that are inconsistent with sound banking. For example, instruments 
that result in higher dividends or interest payments when a bank’s financial 
condition deteriorates cannot be accepted as part of capital. Tier 2 and Tier 3 
capital components will often mature at some point, and a bank must be pre-
pared to replace or redeem them without impairing its capital adequacy. When 
determining capital adequacy, the remaining maturity of Tier 2 and Tier 3 
capital components should therefore also be assessed. 
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Table 4.3 Components of a Bank’s Equity
Equity Period 01 Period 02
Issued capital
Share premium
Other Equity 
Revaluation reserves and other valuation differences on:
Reserves (including retained earnings)
<Treasury shares>
Income from current year
<Interim dividends>
Minority interest 
Total equity and minority interest
TOTAL LIABILITIES, MINORITY INTEREST AND EQUITY 100% 100%
Off-Balance-Sheet Items
Financial innovation has also led to a variety of new off-balance-sheet financial 
instruments. The costs associated with monetary policy regulations, such as 
minimum reserve requirements, and capital adequacy requirements have fre-
quently been circumvented by the use of off-balance-sheet instruments. Credit 
substitutes, such as guarantees and letters of credit, and derivative instruments, 
such as futures and options, do not count as assets or liabilities, even though 
they expose the bank to certain risks and hence carry a capital requirement. 
It is a challenge to manage risks in relation to such off-balance-sheet items. 
Consequently, it is important that management information accurately ref lects 
exposure in relation to these instruments. As part of managing the risk as-
sociated with off-balance-sheet items, it is important that the extent of the li-
ability or right is quantified. This can be accomplished by assessing the nature, 
volume, and anticipated usage of credit commitments, contingent liabilities, 
guarantees, and other off-balance-sheet items. Sensitivity to market changes 
that affect such instruments should also be determined in the context of the 
overall risk to the company. 
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4.5 Growth and Changes in the Balance Sheet
The banking sector’s assets comprise items that are a ref lection of individual 
banks’ balance sheets, although the structure of balance sheets may vary signif-
icantly depending on business orientation, market environment, customer mix, 
or economic environment. The composition of a bank’s balance sheet is nor-
mally a result of asset-liability and risk management decisions. Figures 4.2 and 
4.3 illustrate the structure and growth of the asset components of a bank over 
time. Figure 4.4 shows structural change and growth of capital and liabilities.
The analyst should be able to assess the risk profile of the bank simply by ana-
lyzing the relative share of various asset items and the changes in proportionate 
share over time. For example, if the loan portfolio jumps from 44 percent to 
58 percent of on-balance-sheet assets (figure 4.3 – period 4 to current period), 
one would question if the bank’s credit risk management systems are adequate 
to enable handling of the increased volume of loan transactions and of the loan 
portfolio. In addition, such a change would disclose a shift from another risk 
area. Likewise, an increase or decrease in trading securities would indicate a 
change in the level of market risk to which the institution is exposed. Such ob-
servations are possible prior to a detailed review of either the credit or the mar-
ket risk management areas. When linked to the amount of net income yielded 
by each category of assets, this analysis increases in importance, necessitating a 
challenging assessment of risk versus reward. 
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Figure 4.2 Structural Change and Asset Growth
 Figure 4.3 Changes in the Structure of a Bank’s Assets
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Figure 4.4 Structural Change and Growth of Capital and Liabilities 
4.6  Risk Analysis of the Balance Sheet Structure 
and Growth
A bank that is well positioned and successful in its market can be expected to 
grow. An analysis of balance sheets can be performed to determine growth rates 
and the type of structural changes that occur in a bank (table 4.4). Such an analy-
sis indicates the general type of business undertaken by a bank and requires an 
understanding of the structure of its balance sheet and the nature of its assets and 
liabilities. Even when overall balance sheet growth is not significant, individual 
components normally shift in reaction to changes in the competitive market or 
economic or regulatory environments (as illustrated by figures 4.1 to 4.4 above). 
As balance sheet structure changes, inherent risks also change. The structure of 
a balance sheet should therefore be a part of an assessment of the adequacy and 
effectiveness of policies and procedures for managing risk exposures. 
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Mismatches
Asset-liability mismatches can occur in several areas. A bank could have sub-
stantial long-term assets (such as fixed rate mortgages) funded by the short-term 
liabilities (such as deposits). This creates a maturity mismatch that increases 
liquidity risk. Alternatively, a bank could have all of its liabilities as f loating 
interest rates bonds, but assets in fixed rate instruments. This creates an interest 
rate mismatch. Or, a bank that chooses to borrow entirely in one currency and 
lend in another currency would have a significant currency mismatch. 
Mismatches are normally handled by the Asset Liability management func-
tions, which is further discussed in chapter 12.
Growth Trends
Table 4.4 Total Growth of Balance Sheet and Off-Balance-Sheet Items 
Total Growth (percent) Period 2 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
Current 
Period 
Total assets 100 120 150 190 258
Risk-weighted assets 100 160 205 295 370
Qualifying capital 100 205 254 295 315
Off-balance-sheet items as percentage of 
total assets 
1.09 1.39 15.89 24.62 24.92
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.5 illustrate the overall growth of a bank’s assets and 
capital. In addition, it highlights the extent to which a bank’s growth is bal-
anced, or the extent to which the bank has been able to maintain regulatory 
capital requirements in relation to total assets and risk-weighted asset growth. 
A graph of this kind could provide an early indicator of capital adequacy prob-
lems to come, which in turn could result from rapid expansion. 
In normal situations, the growth of a bank’s assets is justified by an increase 
in the stable funding base at a cost that is acceptable to the bank, as well as 
by profit opportunities. The spread between interest earned and interest paid 
should normally be stable or increasing. In a stable market environment, in-
creasing margins may indicate the acceptance of higher risk. To avoid increased 
lending risk, emphasis is often placed on fee-generating income, which does 
not involve a bank’s balance sheet.
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Figure 4.5 Total Growth of a Bank’s Assets and Capital
Banks that grow too quickly tend to take unjustified risks and often find that 
administrative and management information systems cannot keep up with 
the rate of expansion. Even well-managed banks can run into risk manage-
ment problems arising out of excessive growth, especially concerning their 
loan portfolios. 
In some countries, monetary policy conduct may limit or significantly affect 
the rate of growth and the structure of a bank’s assets. Despite the shift away 
from reliance on portfolio regulations and administrative controls, credit ceil-
ings have been and still are a relatively common method of implementing mon-
etary policy in some transitional economies, especially in countries with less-
developed financial markets. An alternative method of indirectly manipulating 
the demand for and level of credit in the economy has traditionally been to 
influence the cost of credit. 
Changes in banking and finance mean that the scope for circumventing credit 
ceilings and interest rate regulations has increased significantly. A loss of effec-
tiveness, and concerns over the distortions that credit ceiling and interest rate 
manipulations generate, are the reasons why these instruments are increasingly 
abandoned in favor of open-market interventions. The use of credit ceilings 
in countries where such monetary policies have been pursued for long periods 
of time may have reduced the competitive ability of banks and encouraged in-
novation and the creation of alternative instruments and channels of financial 
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intermediation. In other words, credit ceilings have inadvertently shaped the 
evolution of banking systems. 
Low-Earning and Nonearning Assets
Banks clearly need to keep a reasonable risk profile on a profitable basis. The 
cause for declining net interest margins must include the assessment of the level 
of low-earning or nonearning assets, particularly those with high risk. Figure 
4.6 provides a picture of the changing level, over time, of low- and nonearning 
assets. The proportion of these assets of the total assets of a bank has increased 
significantly during the periods under observation. This trend should be ana-
lyzed not only in relation to industry benchmarks or averages, but also within 
the context of changes over time. In this particular case, growth may have 
resulted from changes in the regulatory environment or in the bank’s fund-
ing structure, whereby the bank may have increased the proportion of funding 
subject to regulatory requirements. It could also have been due to poor asset 
management decisions. In many transitional economies, this asset category re-
flects forced holding of recapitalization bonds issued by governments to save 
their banking systems. 
Figure 4.6 Low-Earning and Nonearning Assets as a Percentage of 
Total Assets
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Off-Balance-Sheet Growth
Figure 4.7 similarly illustrates off-balance-sheet growth. This graph can be 
used to determine the growth of off-balance-sheet items and the proportion 
that such items constitute in total on- and off-balance-sheet activities. The 
bank under observation has obviously been increasing its off-balance-sheet 
activities, although the notional value of many off-balance-sheet instruments 
may not be directly related to the extent of risk exposure. An analyst should 
understand why and exactly which instruments have supported this significant 
trend. Because the off-balance-sheet items do expose a bank to financial risks, a 
few questions arise, including the risk implications of different instruments not 
present on the balance sheet. In addition, it is not known whether the return to 
the bank is equal to the additional risk taken or whether the bank has in place 
an adequate risk management system for off-balance-sheet exposures. 
Figure 4.7 Off-Balance-Sheet Items as a Percentage of Total Assets
Key Messages
Income and earnings are indicators of a bank’s capacity to carry risk or to increase  ¶
its capital.
Regulators should welcome proﬁ table banks as contributors to stability of ¶
the banking system.
Proﬁ tability ratios should be seen in context, and the potential yield on the “free”  ¶
equity portion of capital should be deducted prior to drawing conclusions about 
proﬁ tability.
The components of income could change over time, and core costs should be  ¶
compared to assumed core income to determine whether such costs are indeed 
fully covered. 
Management should understand which assets they are spending their energy on  ¶
and how this relates to the income generated from such assets.
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Income Statement Structure
5.1 Proﬁ tability
Profitability, in the form of retained earnings, is typically one of the key sources of capital generation. A sound banking system is built on prof-itable and adequately capitalized banks. Profitability is a revealing indi-
cator of a bank’s competitive position in banking markets and of the quality of 
its management. It allows a bank to maintain a certain risk profile and provides 
a cushion against short-term problems. 
The income statement, a key source of information on a bank’s profitability, 
reveals the sources of a bank’s earnings and their quantity and quality, as well as 
the quality of the bank’s loan portfolio and the focus of its expenditures. Income 
statement structure also indicates a bank’s business orientation. Traditionally, 
the major source of bank income has been interest, but the increasing orienta-
tion toward nontraditional business is also ref lected in income statements. For 
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example, income from trading operations, investments, and fee-based income 
accounts for an increasingly high percentage of earnings in modern banks. This 
trend implies higher volatility of earnings and profitability. It also implies a dif-
ferent risk profile from that of a traditional bank. 
Changes in the structure and stability of banks’ profits have sometimes been 
motivated by statutory capital requirements and monetary policy measures such 
as obligatory reserves. To maintain the public’s confidence in the banking sys-
tem, banks are subject to minimum capital requirements. The restrictive nature 
of this statutory minimum capital may cause banks to change their business mix 
in favor of activities and assets that entail a lower capital requirement. However, 
although such assets carry less risk, they may earn lower returns. Excessive 
obligatory reserves and statutory liquidity requirements damage profits and 
may encourage disintermediation. They may also result in undesirable bank-
ing practices. For example, the balance sheets of banks in many developing 
and transitional economies contain large proportions of fixed assets, a trend 
that adversely affects profitability. Regulatory authorities should recognize the 
importance of profits and, to the extent possible, avoid regulations that may 
unduly depress profitability. 
Taxation is another major factor that influences a bank’s profitability, as well 
as its business and policy choices, because it affects the competitiveness of vari-
ous instruments and different segments of the financial markets. For example, 
taxation of interest income, combined with a tax holiday for capital gains, can 
make deposits less attractive than equity investments. In general, banks adjust 
their business and policy decisions to minimize the taxes to be paid and to take 
advantage of any loopholes in tax laws. Beyond the level and the transparency of 
profit taxation, key areas to consider when assessing the business environment 
and profit potential of a bank are if and how fiscal authorities tax unrealized 
gains and interest income, and whether they allow provisions before taxation. 
Many fiscal authorities also apply direct taxes to banking transactions. 
A thorough understanding of profit sources and changes in the income/profit 
structure of both an individual bank and the banking system as a whole is 
important to all key players in the risk management process. Supervisory au-
thorities should, for example, view bank profitability as an indicator of stability 
and as a factor that contributes to depositor confidence. Maximum sustainable 
profitability should therefore be encouraged, because healthy competition for 
profits is an indicator of an efficient and dynamic financial system. 
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5.2 Income Statement Composition
A bank’s Statement of Comprehensive Income (the income statement) is a key 
source of information regarding the sources and the structure of its income. An 
example of an analytical income statement is shown in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Income Statement Composition
Financial & Operating Income and Expenses Period 01 Period 02
Interest income 
Interest expense
Interest income – net
Fee and commission income – net
Gains (losses) on fi nancial assets and liabilities held for trading
Exchange differences, net
Other operating income 
Other operating expenses
Administration costs
Impairment losses
Share of the profi t or loss of associates and joint ventures accounted for using 
the equity method
Profi t or loss from non-current assets and disposal groups classifi ed as held 
for sale 
TOTAL PROFIT OR LOSS BEFORE TAX FROM CONTINUING OPERATIONS
Profi t or loss after tax from discontinued operations    
Profi t or loss attributable to minority interest
PROFIT OR LOSS ATTRIBUTABLE TO EQUITY HOLDERS OF THE PARENT 100% 100%
Interest Income
Interest income originates from loans and all other advances extended by a 
bank, such as working capital, investment, and housing, and foreign currency 
loans, installments, overdrafts, and credit cards. It also includes interest re-
ceived on the bank’s deposits kept with other financial intermediaries. Interest 
income is normally calculated on an accrual basis, meaning that a bank cal-
culates interest due over the period of time covered by the income statement, 
regardless of whether or not the interest has been paid. Accounting policies 
should normally require that a loan be placed in a nonaccrual status if a client is 
overdue by a specified period of time (say, 60 days) or deemed to be potentially 
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unable to pay (regardless of whether the loan is overdue or not). At that point, 
all previously accrued but unpaid interest should be reversed out of income. 
The absence of such a policy normally results in banks with largely overstated 
interest income and profits. 
For management purposes, interest income would normally be further subdi-
vided by sources of income. For example, loan categories can be subdivided into 
loans to the government, to state enterprises, and to private enterprises (includ-
ing working capital loans and investment loans categories), and consumer loans 
to households, mortgage loans, etc. This subdivision is required for supervisory 
purposes. It may also be the result of a bank’s own internal organization, as 
modern, cost-conscious banks often develop elaborate pricing and costing sys-
tems for their various business and product lines to ensure that the contribution 
of each product to the bottom line is clearly understood. 
Interest Expense
Interest expense comprises interest paid on deposits and borrowings related 
to funding the loan portfolio. A breakdown of interest expenses provides an 
understanding of a bank’s sources of funding and of the corresponding fund-
ing cost. The subdivision of interest expense is typically based on both in-
struments and maturities, such as demand deposits, saving accounts, foreign 
currency deposits, and certificates of deposit. A bank with low interest expense 
and thus low funding costs is clearly better positioned than one with high in-
terest expense, as it would be able to lend at market rates with a higher interest 
margin. The smaller interest expense, however, often involves higher operat-
ing expenses. For example, household deposits typically involve lower interest 
expense but require branch networks to collect them, and the maintenance of 
deposit accounts is expensive. This is why some banks prefer funding by whole-
sale deposits, even if this implies higher interest expense. 
Net Interest Income
Net interest income is the difference between a bank’s interest income and in-
terest expense. The net interest income is the core of a traditional bank’s earn-
ings, and the aim of the bank would normally be to keep the net interest income 
stable and growing. In a f loating interest rate environment, this requires active 
management: banks normally try to adjust lending rates before deposit rates in 
rising interest-rate markets, and do the opposite in falling markets. 
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Gains (Losses) on Financial Assets and Liabilities Held 
for Trading
Gains or losses on financial assets and liabilities held for trading comprises 
income from the trading and stable liquidity investment books in securities, 
foreign currencies, equities, and commodities. This income is mostly due to the 
difference between the purchase and sale price of the underlying instruments, 
but it also includes interest amounts. The stability or sustainability of trading 
income affects the viability of a bank and is critically related to the quality of a 
bank’s market risk management function, the effectiveness of the corresponding 
functional processes, and the proper information technology support. Trading 
assets would normally be disclosed at fair value (marked-to-market adjustments 
will f low through the income statement) in the bank’s financial statements (see 
chapters 10 and 14). Available-for-sale assets are also disclosed at fair value, but 
marked-to-market adjustments are recorded in a reserve  account directly in the 
balance sheet. 
Other Operating Income
Other operating income, such as knowledge-based or fee-based income, in-
cludes income received from nontraditional banking business such as merchant 
banking or financial advisory services. This category also includes fee-based 
income derived from various services to clients, such as accounts or funds man-
agement services and payment transaction services. This class of income is gen-
erally desirable, as it does not inherently carry any capital charges. 
Exchange Differences
Exchange differences often appear in the income statements of banks in devel-
oping countries, as such banks are frequently funded by foreign loans. Gains or 
losses result from exchange rate changes that—depending on whether a bank’s 
net position was long or short and whether the domestic currency has depreci-
ated or appreciated—produce a gain or loss to the bank. 
Administrative Costs
Salaries and staff-related expenses, such as social security, pensions, and other 
benefits, are normally the largest cost item for a bank, because banking is a 
knowledge- and staff-intensive business. Computers and information technolo-
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gy–related expenses such as software licenses and application system develop-
ment and maintenance expenses have also become major cost items, especially 
in modern or internationally active banks that are critically dependent on in-
formation support for identifying market opportunities, for transaction pro-
cessing, and for risk management and management reporting. Administrative 
expenses also include costs related to rent and utilities, auditing and consulting 
expenses.
Efficient management of these expenses requires balancing short-term cost-
minimization strategies with investments in human and physical resources—
especially the banking technology necessary for effective management of bank-
ing risks and for the long-term maintenance of the bank’s competitive position. 
Besides loan loss provisions, administrative (operating) expense is the item with 
the most significant impact on the cost of intermediation, and it is also one of 
the most controllable items. The level of operating expenses is generally related 
to a bank’s efficiency.
Depreciation
Depreciation results from the reduction in value of a bank’s fixed assets. It is 
conceptually similar to provisions. Banks typically depreciate buildings over 25 
to 50 years, movable assets and office equipment over 3 to 5 years, and comput-
ers over 2 to 3 years. 
Provisions
Loan loss provisions are expenses related to the credit risk inherent in granting 
loans and advances. Provisions are made to compensate for the impaired value 
of the related loan principal and interest due. This may include write-offs and 
recoveries (that is, amounts recovered on loans previously written off), which 
may be shown as separate line items in the income statement. 
Impairment Losses
Impairment expenses relate to loss provisions for all other assets where the val-
ue of the asset could be impaired, for example, the assets in a bank’s long-term 
investment portfolio. In many countries, prudential requirements mandate that 
a bank carries assets at the lower of the nominal value or the market value (in 
which case loss provisions need to be made), and recognize any appreciation in 
value only when the investment is liquidated. 
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Share of the Proﬁ t or Loss of Associates Accounted for 
Using the Equity Method
This category comprises income from a bank’s longer-term equity-type invest-
ments, such as investments in associated companies and joint ventures held 
in the bank’s long-term investment portfolio. Investment income depends on 
the respective contractual rates and, for equity investments, on the financial 
performance of the respective companies. By its nature, the income from eq-
uity investments is difficult to accurately predict. Investment assets would be 
shown on the balance sheet as “investments in associates, subsidiaries, and joint 
ventures.” 
5.3 Analyzing the Sources of Banking Income
In today’s environment, markets that have traditionally been the sole domain 
of banks have opened up to competition from other institutions. Banks in turn 
have diversified into nontraditional markets and therefore no longer perform 
only a simple intermediation function, that is, deposit taking and lending. In 
fact, an overview of the industry’s profit structure in most developed countries 
reveals that the traditional banking business is only marginally profitable and 
that income from other sources has become a significant contributor to the 
bottom line. Bank profitability appears to be largely attributable to fee income 
generated from knowledge-based activities, including merchant banking, cor-
porate financing, and advisory services, and from trading-based activities in 
fixed-income securities, equities, and foreign exchange. 
The information contained in a bank’s income statement provides an under-
standing of the institution’s business focus and the structure and stability of 
its profits. To facilitate a comparison between different types of banking in-
stitutions, various income statement items—such as interest margins, fee and 
investment income, and overhead—are usually expressed as a percentage of 
total assets. By using the asset base as a common denominator, banks are able 
to compare themselves to the sector average and to other types of banks. When 
aggregated, such information can also highlight changes that occur within a 
peer group or the banking sector. 
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When analyzing a bank’s income structure, an analyst should give appropriate 
consideration to and acquire an understanding of the following aspects: 
Trends in and the composition and accuracy of reported earnings ¶
The quality, composition, and level of income and expense components  ¶
Dividend payout and earnings retention  ¶
Major sources of income and the most profitable business areas  ¶
The manner and the extent to which accrued but uncollected interest is  ¶
absorbed into income, in particular when such interest relates to loans 
that are or should be placed in risk categories of substandard or worse 
The extent to which collateral values (rather than operating cash f lows)  ¶
are the basis for decisions to capitalize interest or roll over extensions of 
credit 
Any income or expenditure recognition policies that distort earnings  ¶
The effect of intergroup transactions, especially those related to the  ¶
transfer of earnings and asset-liability valuations 
By changing the sequence of income statement items (see table 5.2), the analyst 
is able to determine the contribution of each of the different sources of banking 
income—assessing the importance of retail lending versus trading and invest-
ment banking activities.
In the current period column of the example in table 5.2, the various compo-
nents of income and expenses (even gross interest income and gross interest 
expenses) are disclosed as a percentage of the gross income per line item 5. Net 
interest income is calculated as the difference between gross interest income 
and interest expenses related to the loan portfolio and can be seen to make a 
relatively minor contribution to overall income—especially when the volume of 
activity to generate the net interest income is taken into account. 
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Table 5.2 Restructured Income Statement
Restructured Income Statement Current Period Prior Period
A. Interest and similar income on loan portfolio and interbank deposits 205
B. Interest expenses on deposits and loan portfolio funding instruments 170
1. Net interest income on loan portfolio  (A – B) 35
2. Other banking-related operating income 20
3. Trading-related income 41
4. Investment-related income (subsidiaries and associates) 4
5. Gross Income 100
6. Specifi c loan loss provisions and write-offs 6
7. Operating expenses 55
8. Expenses related to trading and investment activities 20
9. Other expenses and interest related to non-deposit borrowings 5
10. Net income/(loss) before tax 14
11. Income tax 7
Effective tax rate 50
As % of Net income/(loss) after tax
12. Net income/(loss) after tax 100
Transfers to general provisions 46
Dividends declared 14
Other (+/-) 0
Retained earnings for the period 40
5.4 Analyzing Quality of Earnings
The analysis of earnings quality starts by considering the structure of a bank’s 
income and its components—interest income, transactions-based fee income, 
trading income, and other sources of income—and the trends over the obser-
vation period. Figure 5.1 illustrates the composition of a bank’s gross income. 
(Note that the various figures in this chapter are used as an illustration and 
do not necessarily refer to the same bank.) Such a chart enables an analyst to 
determine the quality and stability of a bank’s profit, including its sources and 
any changes in its structure. This bar graph shows that the bank’s trading and 
investment income has become an increasing contributor to its gross income, 
while the contribution of interest income has decreased. 
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Figure 5.1 Structure of Gross Income
Changes in the income structure of banks has had the effect of improving prof-
itability without increasing the traditional credit risk that results from loan 
portfolios. For example, many corporate clients are able to attract funding in 
their own name through the issuance of commercial paper and bonds. Instead 
of maintaining large corporate loans on their balance sheets, banks increasingly 
underwrite or service issues of their large corporate clients or perform a market-
making function. Doing so generates fee income without increasing credit risk 
exposure. However, income generated in this manner (for example, through se-
curities trading and merchant banking) is by its nature less stable and predict-
able because it depends on market conditions and trading performance. The 
trading portfolio is also subject to market risk (discussed in chapter 10), which 
can be quite substantial.
Such tendencies normally require scrutiny, as in normal circumstances invest-
ment income is less stable than interest income. However, the trend may have 
been motivated by adverse changes in the bank’s macroeconomic or market en-
vironment, which would provide good reasons for such an orientation. Another 
reason would be that the return on investments has been significantly higher 
than the return on loans. Comparison of the gross income structure and the 
asset structure normally provides a reasonable basis for an answer to this anom-
aly; the analysis of income structure may also yield conclusions regarding the 
quality of asset management. 
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Figure 5.2 illustrates this process by comparing the composition of various asset 
categories with the composition of gross income. The purpose of this compari-
son is to determine exactly how the assets of a bank are engaged and whether 
the income generated is commensurate with the proportion of assets committed 
to each specific asset category (in other words, is the income earned where the 
energy is spent). Assets should normally be engaged in product categories that 
provide the highest income at an acceptable level of risk. The same analysis can 
be performed to identify categories of loans and advances that generate propor-
tionately lower yields. 
Figure 5.2 Assets Invested Compared with Income Sources 
An analytical comparison of classes of interest expenses with related liability 
categories highlights a bank’s exposure to specific sources of funding and re-
veals if structural changes are taking place in its sources of funding. A similar 
type of graph and analysis can be used to assess whether the components of 
interest expense in the total expenditures are of the same proportions as the 
related liabilities. Expensive categories of funding would be clearly highlighted 
on such a graph, and the reasons for the specific funding decisions would need 
to be explained. In the long term, this type of analysis would be able to high-
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light if and what sort of structural changes are taking place in the income and 
expenditure structure of a bank, and whether they are justified from the profit-
ability perspective. 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the next step, the analysis of how a bank’s income cov-
ers its operating expenses. In the case illustrated, the fee income and trading 
income significantly contribute to the bank’s profitability and to its capacity to 
carry the operating cost. The stability of the bank’s income has likely deterio-
rated, as fee and trading income are generally considered to be less stable than 
net interest (that is, intermediation) income. Both the gross income and the op-
erating expenses have shown significant growth in the observation period. In 
spite of the much higher income level, the bank’s bottom line does not appear 
to have improved. The analysis should determine the reason for the significant 
increase in operating expenses.
Figure 5.3 Sources of Income versus Costs
Operating expenses is one of the items on a bank’s income statement that can 
be controlled. One acceptable reason for the increase in operating expenses 
would be investments in human resources and banking infrastructure, which 
could be expected to pay off in the future. If no such reasons can be found, the 
bank should be asked to rethink its business strategy. 
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Figure 5.4 illustrates another view of trends in the level of operating expenses 
in relation to total assets, gross interest income, and gross operating income 
that could provide the analyst with information on the relationship between 
a bank’s expenses and earning capacity, as well as on whether the bank has 
optimized its potential. Income and expenses are presented in relation to total 
assets. When compared with industry norms, such a view can yield important 
conclusions, for example, that a bank’s expenses are high because it is over-
staffed. The ratios of operating expenses to interest income and of operating 
expenses to gross operating income are also very useful, as they clearly indicate 
the bank’s profitability. 
Figure 5.4 Operating Income Ratios
5.5 Analysis of Proﬁ tability Indicators and Ratios
Profit is the bottom line or ultimate performance result showing the net effects 
of bank policies and activities in a financial year. Its stability and growth trends 
are the best summary indicators of a bank’s performance in both the past and 
the future. Some profitability ratios are shown in table 5.3. 
Key indicators include the return on average equity, which measures the rate of 
return on shareholder investment, and the return on assets, which measures the 
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efficiency of use of the bank’s potential. Other ratios measure the profitability 
of a bank’s core business (for example, margin ratios), the contribution to profit 
of various types of activities, the efficiency with which the bank operates, and 
the stability of its profits. Ratios are observed over time to detect profitability 
trends. An analysis of changes of various ratios over time reveals changes in 
bank policies and strategies and in its business environment. 
Table 5.3 Profitability Ratios 
Profi tability Ratios
Prior 
Period 
Current 
Period Benchmark
Net interest income as percentage of average total assets 
Interest income as percentage of average earning assets 
Noninterest income as percentage of average total assets 
Net interest income net of provisions as percentage of total assets 
Interest expense as percentage of average total assets 
Intermediation spread 
Net interest income (net of provisions) as percentage of gross operating income 
Loan loss provisions as percentage of average total assets 
Dividends as percentage of net income after tax 
Return on average equity (pretax) 
Return on average equity (posttax) 
Return on average assets (pretax) 
Return on average assets (posttax) 
Operating expenses/gross operating income 
Staff costs/gross operating income 
Other operating income as percentage of gross operating income 
Other operating expenses as percentage of average total assets 
Total interest expense as percentage of average interest-bearing liabilities 
Interest on subordinated debt as percentage of average subordinated debt 
Noninterest income as percentage of operating income 
Numerous factors may influence a bank’s profitability. In some cases, inflation 
may increase operating costs faster than income. Marking the value of assets to 
market requires that unrealized gains are recognized as income; because these 
gains are yet to be realized, this may negatively affect the quality of earnings. 
Given the traditional narrow margin on which banks operate, a change in the 
level of interest rates will trigger changes in the gross profit percentage. Banks 
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are influenced by the high level of competition in the banking sector, and many 
have therefore made significant investments in infrastructure-related assets—
especially information technology—as part of their competition strategy. 
Investments such as these have both increased the overhead cost of banking 
and negatively affected profitability. 
Viewed in the context of the financial items to which they are related, operat-
ing ratios enable an analyst to assess the efficiency with which an institution 
generates income. Industry efficiency norms facilitate a comparison between 
individual banks and the banking system. A review of interest income in rela-
tion to loans and advances allows an analyst to determine the return on the loan 
assets. Similarly, a comparison of interest expenses and funding indicates the 
relative cost of funding. This process highlights the impact of monetary policy 
on the banking system and the effect that changes in official interest rates have 
on the profitability of a bank. 
The ratios can also be used in a broader context. The cost and revenue structure 
of the banking system can be assessed by calculating and analyzing provisions 
to loans and advances, interest margin to gross interest income, investment 
income to investments, and overhead to gross income. The value added by the 
banking system can be determined by calculating net income after taxes in rela-
tion to total average assets (that is, the return on average assets) and net income 
after taxes in relation to owner equity (that is, the return on equity). 
Bankers pay a great deal of attention to the message that is revealed by ratio 
analysis. Banks usually manage profitability by trying to beat market averages 
and keep profits steady and predictable as this attracts investors. Ratios are 
therefore extremely useful tools, but as with other analytical methods, they 
must be used with judgment and caution because they alone do not provide 
complete answers about the bottom-line performance of banks. In the short 
run, many tricks can be used to make bank ratios look good in relation to in-
dustry standards. An assessment of the operations and management of a bank 
should therefore be performed to provide a check on profitability ratios. 
The need to generate stable and increasing profits also implies the need to 
manage risk. Asset-liability management has become an almost universally ac-
cepted approach to profitability (risk) management. Because capital and profit-
ability are intimately linked, the key objective of asset-liability management 
is to ensure sustained profitability so that a bank can maintain and augment 
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its capital resources. Interest margins can be negatively affected by the bank’s 
failure to effectively manage credit risk. 
Strong and stable net interest margins have traditionally been the primary ob-
jective of bank managers, and they are still the primary determinant of inter-
mediation efficiency and earning performance. An analysis of the interest mar-
gin of a bank can highlight the effect of current interest rate patterns, while 
a trend analysis over a longer period of time can show the effect of monetary 
policy on the profitability of the banking system. It can also illustrate the extent 
to which banks are exposed to changes in interest rates, and thus the ability of 
management to effectively manage interest rate risk. 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the intermediation performance of a bank. The net in-
terest margin of the bank has shown a steady increase and then a significant 
deterioration in the recent period. Such a trend demands further analysis. The 
analyst should establish if this was due to systemic reasons, for example, if the 
interest margins were reduced as a result of increased competition. The reduc-
tion of interest margins, however, could also be the result of an increase in the 
cost of funds. Such a trend would negatively affect profitability and ultimately 
may even affect the solvency of a bank. 
Bottom-line profitability ratios—the return on equity and assets—indicate the 
net results of a bank’s operations in a financial year or over time. Figure 5.6 
illus trates how to adjust these profitability ratios by deducting an assumed cost 
of capital to show the real profit of a bank. By comparing the return on equity 
with the after-tax return on risk-free government securities, one can determine 
whether equity invested in the bank has earned any additional returns, as com-
pared with risk-free investments. The result, such as the one shown in figure 
5.6, may disclose that it could be better for shareholders to simply invest in risk-
free government securities or for the bank concerned to cease its intermediation 
function and close its doors. 
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Figure 5.5 Average Yield Differential on Intermediation Business
Figure 5.6 Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE), 
Adjusted for the Cost of Capital 
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5.6 Assessing Internal Performance
In such an intensively competitive business, modern banks can no longer af-
ford to carry insufficiently profitable products, services, or lines of businesses. 
International banks and financial conglomerates especially must organize their 
functions in a way that enables them to establish the exact contribution to the 
bottom line of their many constituent parts. In the last decade, more refined 
systems for profitability and performance measurement have been developed to 
address this need. 
The conclusions drawn by internal performance measurement systems directly 
affect the products offered and their pricing, shaping the bank’s entry and exit 
decisions concerning particular products or services. Internal measurement 
techniques usually take into account the underlying risk elements (which may 
negatively affect the bank’s expenses), and there-fore also contribute to enhanc-
ing risk management techniques. A good measurement system will also en-
hance the application of a consistent incentive compensation system, based on 
achievement rather than on hierarchy. 
A performance measurement framework comprises a number of elements, 
including an effective organization that allows a clear allocation of income 
and expenses to business units related to different lines of a bank’s business, 
products, and market segments; an internal transfer pricing system to measure 
the contribution of various business units to the bottom line; and an effective 
and consistent means to incorporate the respective risk elements into the per-
formance measurement framework. Once the net contributions are known, by 
business lines, products, or markets, it can be clearly established which custom-
er segments are the most promising and which products should be scrutinized 
concerning their revenue-generating capacity. A good performance measure-
ment framework also allows analysis of the net contribution a relationship with 
a large customer makes to the bank’s bottom line. 
Internal transfer pricing systems refers to the cost of funds as they are moved 
from one business unit to another. A sophisticated internal transfer pricing sys-
tem will also cover the allocation of overhead costs to business units and will 
include transfer prices for internal services such as accounting or legal services. 
Internal transfer prices could, in principle, ref lect the respective market prices, 
including maturities, and the repricing characteristics of the corresponding as-
sets and liabilities. In practice, most banks choose a weighted average based on 
their specific funding mix. 
 119
Chapter 5: Income Statement Structure
Branch relationships provide a good example of internal transfer pricing. When 
making a loan that it cannot fund itself, a business unit will “borrow” funds 
from the treasury; the same unit will “lend” money to the treasury when it col-
lects excess deposits. Internal transfer prices in both directions should be based 
on the same principles, but with applicable modifications. For example, the 
transfer price of deposits may be modified for the cost of obligatory reserves. 
For consistent application of such a system, a bank must also have a supporting 
management accounting system. 
There are a number of ways to incorporate risk into this framework. For the 
lending function, as an example, the internal cost of funds could ref lect the 
credit risk of the loan being funded, with a higher transfer price being allocated 
to lower-quality loans. Loans with higher risk could be expected to generate 
higher returns. Most banks apply a uniform transfer price for all loans, and 
the risk element is accommodated by requiring higher returns on lower-quality 
loans. 
Another step is to determine how much capital should be assigned to each of 
the different business or product lines. The key issue is not how to determine 
the right amount of capital to be assigned for each business unit, but how to 
assign capital to all businesses in a consistent manner and based on the same 
principles. In practice, it is often unnecessary to measure risk using sophisti-
cated modeling techniques for all bank business lines and products in order to 
determine the appropriate coefficients. And in any case it is nearly impossible to 
do it in a practical, consistent, and meaningful manner. Instead, banks typically 
use much simpler “return on risk capital”–type calculations. A practical ap-
proach followed by many banks is to use the weights provided under the Basel 
Accord (discussed in chapter 6) as a basis for calculations. 
Transfer pricing should be carefully scrutinized when the analysis concerns a 
bank that belongs to a banking group or a holding company, especially if the 
group is domiciled abroad. In some cases, internal transfer prices have been 
set that allow the parent to take profits from a bank, for example, by charging 
more than the applicable market price for funds borrowed by the bank from 
other business units or members of the conglomerate, or by paying less than 
the market price for funds provided by the same bank. Such cases are especially 
frequent in countries where there are limits to or complications with dividend 
repatriation. 

Key Messages
Capital is required as a buffer against unexpected losses.  ¶
Capital cannot substitute for bad management or for inadequate risk management  ¶
policies and practices. 
Capital consists of a strong base of permanent shareholders’ equity and disclosed  ¶
reserves, supplemented by other forms of qualifying capital (for example, 
undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves, general provisions for loan losses, 
hybrid instruments, and subordinated debt).
International standards for minimum capital and for assessment and measurement  ¶
of capital adequacy are set by the Basel Accord (Basel II), which deﬁ nes three tiers 
of capital. The ﬁ rst two tiers cover credit risk related to on- and off-balance-sheet 
activities, derivatives, and operational risk; the third tier partially covers market 
risk. 
Basel II set the total capital adequacy ratio at no lower then 8 percent. The capital  ¶
ratio is calculated using the deﬁ nition of regulatory capital and risk-weighted 
assets.
The 8-percent ratio must be seen as a minimum. In transitional or volatile  ¶
environments, a risk-weighted capital adequacy requirement of substantially more 
than 8 percent would be more appropriate. 
In practice, capital adequacy is calculated according to formulas prescribed  ¶
by the respective regulatory authorities (Pillar 1). It is monitored by the bank’s 
supervisory authority (Pillar 2). In addition, it is also subject to market discipline 
(Pillar 3).
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6.1  Introduction: The Characteristics and Functions 
of Capital
Almost every aspect of banking is either directly or indirectly influ-enced by the availability and cost of capital. Capital is one of the key factors to be considered when the safety and soundness of a particular 
bank is assessed. An adequate capital base serves as a safety net for a variety 
of risks to which an institution is exposed in the course of its business. Capital 
absorbs possible losses and thus provides a basis for maintaining depositor con-
fidence in a bank. Capital also is the ultimate determinant of a bank’s lending 
capacity. A bank’s balance sheet cannot be expanded beyond the level deter-
mined by its capital adequacy ratio. Consequently, the availability of capital 
determines the maximum level of assets. 
Capital, however, is not a substitute for bad management, poor risk manage-
ment, poor corporate governance, or weak internal controls.
The cost and amount of capital affect a bank’s competitive position. Shareholders 
expect a return on their equity, and the bank’s obligation to earn a reasonable 
return influences the pricing of bank products. There is also another market 
perspective: to grant loans and advances, a bank must normally be able to at-
tract deposits from the public. Doing so requires public confidence in the bank, 
which in turn can best be established and maintained by a capital buffer. If a 
bank faces a shortage of capital, or if the cost of capital is high, a bank stands to 
lose business to its competitors. 
The key purposes of capital are to provide stability and to absorb losses, thereby 
providing a measure of protection to depositors and other creditors in the event 
of liquidation. Consequently, the capital of a bank should have three important 
characteristics: 
It must be permanent.  ¶
It must not impose mandatory fixed charges against earnings. ¶
It must allow for legal subordination to the rights of depositors and  ¶
other creditors.
The total amount of capital is fundamental to the bank’s soundness. Also im-
portant is the nature of bank ownership, specifically the identity of those own-
ers who can directly influence the bank’s strategic direction and risk manage-
ment policies. A bank’s ownership structure must ensure the integrity of the 
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bank’s capital and be able to supply more capital, if and when needed. The 
ownership must not negatively influence the bank’s capital position or expose 
it to additional risk. In addition to owners who are less than “fit and proper” or 
who do not effectively discharge their fiduciary responsibilities, the structure 
of financial conglomerates may also negatively affect the capital of banks in 
such groups. 
Banks inherently have a relatively low capital-to-assets ratio. To encourage pru-
dent management of the risks associated with this unique balance sheet struc-
ture, regulatory authorities in most countries started to introduce certain capi-
tal adequacy requirements. In the late 1980s, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision took the lead to develop a risk-based capital adequacy standard 
that would lead to international convergence of supervisory regulations govern-
ing the capital adequacy of internationally active banks. The dual objectives 
for the new framework were to strengthen the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system and, by ensuring a high degree of consistency in 
the framework’s application, to diminish the sources of competitive inequality 
among international banks. This initiative resulted in the Basel Capital Accord 
of 1988 (Basel I Accord). Emergence of new instruments with complex risk 
profiles—increasing volatility and internationalization—and the trend toward 
financial conglomerates have prompted ongoing changes to Basel I. Eventually, 
this led to the introduction of a new and more sophisticated framework, known 
as the Basel II Accord.
6.2 Capital Adequacy Standards and the Basel Accords
The Basel I Accord offered a definition of regulatory capital, measures of risk 
exposure, and rules specifying the level of capital to be maintained in relation 
to these risks. It introduced a de facto capital adequacy standard, based on the 
risk-weighted composition of a bank’s assets and off-balance-sheet exposures, 
which ensured that an adequate amount of capital and reserves was maintained 
to safeguard solvency. While the original targets of the Basel I Accord were 
international banks, many national authorities promptly applied the Basel I 
Accord and introduced formal regulatory capital requirements. After the in-
troduction of the risk-based capital adequacy standard, risk-based capital ratios 
have increased significantly in all countries that have adopted the standard. 
The Basel I Accord has also played a major role in improving the safety of 
banking systems in less developed countries and in transitional economies. It 
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has been adopted and implemented in more than 100 countries and now forms 
an integral part of any risk-based bank supervisory approach. Aware that the 
banking environment in these countries entails higher economic and market 
risks, many regulators have introduced even higher standards, with 12 to 15 
percent often regarded as the appropriate capital adequacy ratio for transitional 
and developing environments.
The world financial system has seen considerable changes since the introduc-
tion of the Basel I Accord. The volatility of financial markets has increased, 
and there has been a significant degree of financial innovation. There also 
have been incidents of economic turbulence leading to widespread financial 
crisis—for example, in Asia in 1997 and in Eastern Europe in 1998. The risks 
that internationally active banks must deal with have become more complex. 
Consequently, there was an increasing concern whether the Basel I Accord pro-
vided an effective means to ensure that capital requirements matched a bank’s 
true risk profile; in other words, there was a growing belief that the Basel I 
Accord was not sufficiently risk sensitive. The risk measurement and control 
aspects of the Basel I Accord needed to be improved. 
In 1999, the Basel Committee started consultations that led to a new Capital 
Accord (Basel II Accord) that is better attuned to the complexities of the mod-
ern financial world. While the new framework aims to provide a more com-
prehensive approach to measuring banking risks, its fundamental objectives 
remained the same: to promote safety and soundness of the banking system and 
to enhance the competitive equality of banks. 
By 2006, the development of the Basel II Accord had been completed. A sig-
nificant aspect of the Basel II Accord is the greater use of the banks’ inter-
nal systems as an input to the capital assessment and adequacy calculations. 
It provides incentives for banks to improve their risk management practices, 
with increasingly sensitive risk weights when banks adopt more sophisticated 
approaches to risk management. It allows greater national discretion on how 
specific rules may be applied, permitting countries to adapt the standards to 
different conditions in national financial markets. In addition to the minimum 
capital requirements, the Basel II Accord includes two additional pillars: an 
enhanced supervisory review process (Pillar 2) and effective use of market dis-
cipline (Pillar 3). All three pillars are mutually reinforcing, and no one pillar 
should be viewed as more important than another (see figure 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1 Conceptual Framework for the Basel II Accord
Countries with well-developed financial systems that actively participated in 
the development of the Basel II Accord promptly started the transition pro-
cess, although its full implementation may take some time. For example, the 
European Union issued a new Basel II–based Capital Adequacy Directive in 
June 2006 obliging member countries to start convergence as of January 1, 
2007. The full implementation of all its elements in all member countries is 
expected by January 1, 2011. Table 6.1 provides a summary of all elements of 
the Basel II Accord. Further discussion in this chapter is based on and related 
to the Basel II Accord.
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Table 6.1 Summary of the Basel II Accord
Pillar One Pillar Two Pillar Three
Capital Adequacy Requirement / Basis Supervisory Review
Market Discipline
Detail
Credit Risk Market Risk Operational Risk
Regulators must 
ensure that banks 
have sound internal 
processes for 
capital assessment 
based on risk 
commensurate with 
risk profi le.
Enhanced disclosure 
to facilitate investor 
decision making. 
More detail required 
for banks that 
use advanced 
risk management 
approaches.
Standardized 
Approach
Internal Ratings Based 
Approaches
Standardized 
Approach
Internal 
Model
Basic 
Indicator 
Approach
Standardized 
Approach
Alternative 
Standardized 
Approach
Advanced Measurement Approaches
Foundations 
Approach
Advanced 
Approach
Building 
block 
Approach
Value-
at-Risk 
(VAR)
One 
indicator: 
gross 
revenue
Same 
indicator 
for different 
business 
lines
Different 
indicators 
for different 
business 
lines
Internal 
Measurement 
Approach 
(IMA)
Loss 
Distribution 
Approach 
(LDA)
Scorecard 
Approach
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
- Places more emphasis on banks’ own internal control and management, the supervisory review process, and market discipline
1 Similar to Basel 1, but more reliance on rating agencies.
2 Divide loan portfolio into seven buckets. Probability of default (PD) is provided by bank, with the exposure at default (EAD) and loss given default (LGD) provided by the regulator.
3 Divide loan portfolio into seven buckets. Probability of default (PD), Exposure at default (EAD) and Loss given default (LGD) all provided by the bank, using historical experience
4 Capital requirement calculated separately for market risks. Trading book used for interest, equities, currency and commodities risks, with latter two using the banking book as well
5 Market risk capital is based on higher of average VAR over past 60 days, or previous day’s VAR
6 A simplistic approach that uses a single indicator (gross revenue) as a proxy for overall operational risk exposure, to be multiplied by an alpha factor set by the Basel Committee.
7 Bank organizes itself into eight standard business lines—currently all using a common indicator, but fl exibility built in for future differentiation of indicators—to be multiplied by a beta factor set by Regulator.
8 Bank organizes itself into eight standard business lines. Retail banking and commercial banking use three-year averages of loans and advances as an indicator, to be multiplied by an m factor set by Regulator. This alternative removes the penalty when banks that engage in high-risk lending also have high profi ts before provisioning.
9 IMA uses information from standardized approach. Calculates exposure indicator (EI) and loss should an operational risk event occur (LGE). Expected loss (EL) is product of EI*LGE. IMA uses assumptions about relationship between expected and unexpected loss.
10 LDA allows bank to estimate distribution of losses and therefore attempts to assess unexpected losses directly.
11 Bank determines initial level of operational risk capital. Amount is modifi ed over time by capturing underlying risk profi le of different business lines. Approach relies on qualitative judgment, less on historical data.
12 Regulator must ensure that banks have sound internal processes for risk-based capital assessment commensurate with risk profi le.
13 Enhanced disclosure (quantitative and qualitative): based on materiality, to provide markets with information necessary to make investment decisions.  
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6.3   Constituents of Capital and Minimum Capital 
Requirements
Banks’ capital consists of three tiers. Tier 1 is the core capital, or regulatory 
capital. Tier 2 and Tier 3 are classified as supplementary capital, and their 
recognition is related to the amount of Tier 1 capital. The definition and con-
stituents of capital under the Basel II Accord are practically the same as under 
the Basel I Accord, but further changes in the definition of eligible capital are 
likely. Table 6.2 provides an overview of instruments that qualify as equity 
under Basel Accords.
Table 6.2 Overview of Qualifying Equity Instruments
TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 3
Equity shares Asset revaluation reserves Short-term subordinated debt
Retained earnings General provisions/loss reserves
Nonredeemable, noncumulative 
preference shares
Hybrid (debt/equity) capital 
instruments
Subordinated term debt
Tier 1 Capital
Tier 1 capital must be permanent, issued, and fully paid; noncumulative; able 
to absorb losses within the bank on a going-concern basis; junior to depositors, 
general creditors, and subordinated debt of the bank; and callable only after a 
minimum of five years with supervisory approval and under the condition that 
it will be replaced with capital of equal or better quality. The components of a 
bank’s balance sheet that meet the requirements of Tier 1 capital are 
equity shares; ¶
retained earnings; and  ¶
nonredeemable, noncumulative preference shares.  ¶
These Tier 1 components 
are regarded as core capital, or the primary capital of a bank;  ¶
allow a bank to absorb losses on an ongoing basis and are permanently  ¶
available for this purpose; 
allow a bank to effectively conserve resources when under stress, because  ¶
common stock provides the bank with full discretion as to the amount 
128 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
and timing of dividend payments; are the basis on which most market 
judgments of capital adequacy are made; 
provide an important source of market discipline over a bank’s manage- ¶
ment, through the voting rights attached to the common shares; and 
are expected to be the predominant form of a bank’s Tier 1 capital.  ¶
Tier 1 capital is common in all banking systems and is always clearly disclosed 
in published financial statements. It also has a crucial bearing on profit margins 
and on a bank’s ability to bear risk and be competitive. Such capital is regarded 
as a buffer of the highest quality.
It is important to know whether capital contributions were made in cash or in 
kind, such as fixed assets. Regulators sometimes limit the amount of contribu-
tions in kind and express the limit as a percentage of the total Tier 1 capital. 
Because contributions in kind may be subject to changes in value, regulators typ-
ically require that owners obtain a reliable third-party evaluation before includ-
ing the corresponding amount in a bank’s capital, taking into consideration the 
fact that revaluation reserves related to fixed assets form part of Tier 2 capital.
The pressure on Tier 1 capital has resulted in the increasing use of innovative 
capital instruments1 for capital adequacy purposes. The Basel II Accord limits 
the amount of innovative capital instruments to a maximum of 15 percent of 
Tier 1 capital. This limit means that the aggregate of noncommon equity Tier 1 
instruments with any explicit feature (other than a pure call option) that might 
lead to the instrument being redeemed is limited to 15 percent of the bank’s 
consolidated Tier 1 capital. 
1  The term “innovative capital instruments” refers to special purpose vehicles (SPVs), capital that 
is cost efficient and can be denominated, if necessary, in nonlocal currency. To be acceptable as 
Tier 1 capital, an SPV must, at a minimum, meet all the standard requirements for Tier 1 capital. 
In addition, it must be easily understood and publicly disclosed; proceeds must be immediately 
available without any limitations; the bank must have discretion over the amount and timing of 
distributions; distributions can be paid only out of distributable items; and where distributions 
are preset, they may not be reset based on the credit standing of the issuer. SPV-based step-ups 
are permitted in conjunction with a call option only if the moderate step-up occurs at least 10 
years after the issue date and if it results in an increase over the initial rate that is no greater than 
either (at national supervisory discretion) (a) 100 basis points, or (b) 50 percent of the initial credit 
spread, less the swap spread between the initial index basis and the stepped-up index basis. The 
terms of the instrument should provide for no more than one rate step-up over the life of the 
instrument. The swap spread should be fixed as of the pricing date.
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Tier 2 Capital
Although they do not have the permanence of core capital, other components 
of a balance sheet may be included in the bank’s capital base for the purpose of 
assessing capital adequacy. These components include capital obligations that 
would ultimately be redeemed or that contain a mandatory charge against fu-
ture income, whether or not earnings will be available. Such capital consists 
of instruments that have the same characteristics as both equity and debt, in-
cluding asset revaluation reserves, general provisions and general loss reserves, 
hybrid capital instruments (such as redeemable cumulative preference shares), 
and subordinated term debt. These types of capital constitute the Tier 2 capital 
of a bank. The total amount of the Tier 2 capital is limited to 100 percent of 
Tier 1 capital. 
Statutory limitations contained in the Basel Accords define the conditions un-
der which specific instruments may be included in Tier 2 capital:
Asset revaluation reserves ¶  may be included, provided that they are 
prudently valued and fully ref lect the possibility of price f luctuations 
and forced sales. Revaluation reserves arise in two ways. First, in some 
countries banks are permitted to revalue fixed assets (normally, their own 
premises) in accordance with changes in market value. Second, revalua-
tion reserves may arise as a result of long-term holdings of equity securi-
ties that are valued in the balance sheet at the historic cost of acquisition. 
For such revaluation reserves, a discount is normally applied to the dif-
ference between the historic cost book value and market value to ref lect 
potential volatility, and only 50 percent is included in Tier 2 capital. 
General provisions/loss reserves, ¶  which are held against future unidenti-
fied losses, also qualify. The amount of general provisions/loan loss re-
serves included in Tier 2 capital may not exceed 1.25 percent of the assets 
to which they are related. 
Hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments ¶  may be included if they are unse-
cured, subordinated, and fully paid up; are not redeemable without prior 
consent of the supervisory authority; and are able to support losses on an 
ongoing basis. In addition, the capital instrument should allow the service 
obligation to be deferred when the profitability of a bank cannot support 
payment. 
Subordinated term debt ¶  includes conventional, unsecured, subordinated 
debt capital instruments with a minimum original fixed term of matu-
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rity of more than five years. During the last five years before maturity 
is reached, a discount of 20 percent per year should be applied before 
inclusion as Tier 2 capital. Total subordinated term debt included in Tier 
2 capital cannot exceed 50 percent of core capital. 
Tier 3 Capital
In 1996, the Basel Committee introduced the concept of Tier 3 capital to allow 
banks, at the discretion of national regulators, to cover a part of their market 
risks. Consequently, Tier 3 capital covers only market risks that derive from 
equities and interest-bearing instruments in the trading book, as well as for-
eign exchange and commodities in the banking and trading books. The Tier 3 
capital instruments consist mostly of short-term subordinated debt. Statutory 
conditions placed on Tier 3 capital specify that it must have a maturity of at 
least two years and be subject to a lock-in provision that stipulates that neither 
interest nor principal may be paid if such payment results in a bank’s overall 
capital dropping below minimum requirements. 
Minimum Capital Requirements
The minimum risk-based standard for capital adequacy is set by the Basel 
Accords at 8 percent of risk-weighted assets, of which Tier 1 should be at least 
4 percent. Tier 2 capital amount is limited to 100 percent of Tier 1 capital. The 
calculation of Tier 2 capital (for example, inclusion of general provisions/loss 
reserves) depends on methods used to calculate the credit risk.2 Tier 3 capital 
is limited to 250 percent of the amount of Tier 1 capital that is allocated for 
market risks. Tier 2 may be substituted for Tier 3 capital up to a limit of 250 
percent, within the overall limits for the applicable limit to the Tier 2 capital. 
The capital ratio is calculated using the definition of regulatory capital and 
risk-weighted assets. The risk-weighted assets are related to credit, market, and 
operational risk. Total risk-weighted assets are determined by multiplying the 
capital requirements for market risk and operational risk by 12.5 (that is, the 
reciprocal of the minimum capital ratio of 8 percent) and adding the resulting 
figures to the sum of risk-weighted assets for credit risk. Thus, the formula for 
determining capital adequacy is
2  Under the standardized approach to calculating credit risk, general provisions can be included in 
Tier 2 capital up to the limit of 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets. Under the internal ratings–
based approach to credit risk calculation, general loss reserves must be excluded from Tier 2.
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(Tier 1 + Tier 2 + Tier 3) capital divided by (risk-weighted assets + (market 
risk capital charge × 12.5) + (operational risk capital charge × 1.25)) equals 
8 percent 
where 
Tier 1 is the entire amount of the bank’s Tier 1 capital.  ¶
Tier 2 is limited to 100 percent of Tier 1 capital; subordinated debt in- ¶
cluded in Tier 2 is limited to 50 percent of total Tier 2 capital. 
Tier 3 is limited to the amount that is eligible to support market risk (that  ¶
is, subject to the Tier 3 restrictions).
The capital adequacy calculation under the Basel II Accord is subject to certain 
adjustments, or deductions, related to using the internal ratings–based approach 
for credit risk and advanced measurement approach for operational risk, includ-
ing some transitional arrangements. The deductions from Tier 1 also include 
goodwill and investments in financial institutions. The latter is intended to dis-
courage cross-holding and “double leveraging” of capital in a banking system, 
which can make the system more vulnerable to the transmission of problems 
between capital-related institutions.
6.4 Risk-Based Regulatory Capital Allocation: Pillar 1
The capital adequacy standard under the Basel Accords is based on the prin-
ciple that the level of a bank’s capital should be related to the bank’s specific risk 
profile. The capital adequacy requirement was the sole essence of the Basel I 
Accord and it constitutes Pillar 1 under the Basel II Accord. Measurement 
of the capital adequacy requirement is determined by three risk components: 
credit risk, market risk, and (for Basel II) operational risk. For each of these risk 
components, there are a number of models that can be utilized. In principle, 
these include some forms of a standardized approach and an approach based on 
the bank’s internal modeling systems.
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Credit Risk
Figure 6.2 Basel II: Menu of Credit Risk Assessment Options
The central focus of the Basel Accords’ capital adequacy framework is the 
assess ment of credit risk, including aspects of country risk and counterparty 
risk. This is because banks are normally exposed to significant credit risk. The 
credit risk profile of a bank is determined by assigning to its assets and off-
 balance-sheet commitments various risk weights. The Basel I Accord intro-
duced a fairly simple standardized methodology with risk weights based on 
probability of losses for different classes of assets on a bank’s balance sheet. 
The off-balance-sheet exposures are included using multiplication factors, 
again related to the expected probability of losses for the respective class of 
instruments. The risk weighting of assets and off-balance-sheet positions has 
provided a major step toward improved objectivity in assessing the adequacy 
of bank capital. The simplicity of this methodology has also enabled it to be 
introduced in banking systems that are in their early stages of development. A 
summary of the simple standardized credit risk assessment methodology under 
Basel I is provided in annex 6A.
However, such simple weighting of assets provided only a crude measure of 
economic risk, primarily because the methodology is not effectively calibrated 
to account for different default risks. Consequently, the Basel II Accord pro-
vides a broader and better calibrated range of options for credit risk assessment 
to allow banks and supervisors to select approaches that are most appropri-
ate for their operations and their financial market infrastructure. The new ap-
proach also allows a certain degree of national discretion in the way each of the 
options may be applied in national markets (although this also means continued 
efforts to ensure the needed consistency in application). The revised framework 
includes a more complex version of a standardized approach and two versions 
of an internal ratings–based model. 
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The Standardized Approach
The standardized approach is based in large part on the assessments of external 
rating agencies. Table 6.3 provides a summary of risk-weight options for differ-
ent types of banks’ clients under the Basel II Accord. For the sovereign rating, 
the options include direct rating by specialized rating agencies or ratings based 
on export credit agencies. For the banks, Option 1 implies that the risk weight 
used for banks will be one rating category below the sovereign risk weight in 
that country (for AAA to BBB ratings). Option 2 uses a set of risk weights 
based on the actual rating of the borrowing bank. Lending to foreign banks in 
countries where there are no ratings agencies will follow the risk weights shown 
in the “unrated” column. Domestic banks will continue to carry a 20 percent 
risk weighting. Supervisory authorities could select options, applicable to their 
jurisdictions, that are best suited for their circumstances.
Eligibility criteria for acceptability of credit assessments made by external 
credit assessment institutions (or rating agencies) include objectivity, indepen-
dence, transparency, credibility, international recognition, and access to re-
sources needed to establish and then regularly update the individual ratings. 
The national supervisors are responsible for determining whether an external 
credit assessment institution credibly meets the eligibility criteria. Nonetheless, 
certain reservations about the use of such assessments remain because of the 
mixed record of agencies when rating less-than-prime borrowers and the use of 
different credit analysis methodologies by these agencies. In addition, in many 
developing countries there are no rating agencies or the agencies do not have 
adequate capacity. (An associated issue is the inadequacy of accounting and 
financial reporting standards, for both banks and their clients.)
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Table 6.3 Standardized Approach: Risk Weights under the Basel II Accord
 Risk Weights under the Standardized Approach of the Basel II Accord
Claims on Sovereigns and Central Banks
Option 1 – Based on Sovereign Credit Risk 
Assessment (CRA) by Specialized Rating Agencies
AAA to 
AA- A+ to A-
BBB+ to 
BBB- BB+ to B- Below B- Unrated
Lower weights may be applied to domestic 
currencies exposures.
Risk Weight 0% 20% 50% 100% 150% 100%
Option 2 – Based  on CRA of Export Credit 
Agencies (ECAs) risk scores 0–1 2 3 4–6 7
Supervisors may decide to use country risk scores 
assigned ECAs.
Risk Weight 0% 20% 50% 100% 150%
Claims on Banks, Public Sector Entities (Noncentral Government), and Securities Firms
Option 1 – Based on Sovereign CRA AAA to 
AA- A+ to A-
BBB+ to 
BBB- BB+ to B- Below B- Unrated
Risk weight is one category less favorable than for 
sovereigns, with 20% fl oor.
Risk Weight 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100%
Option 2 – Based on CRA of a Bank Itself AAA to 
AA- A+ to A-
BBB+ to 
BBB- BB+ to B- Below B- Unrated
Claims of three months’ or less maturity have more 
favorable risk weight. 
Risk Weight 20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 50%
Risk Weight, Short-term Claims 20% 20% 20% 50% 150% 20%
Claims on Private Sector Enterprises and Insurance Companies of Specialized Rating Agencies
Credit Assessment AAA to 
AA- A+ to A-
BBB+ to 
BBB- BB+ to B- Below B- Unrated
The risk weights should be increased if warranted 
by overall default experiences in a country.
Risk Weight 20% 50% 50% 100% 150% 100%
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Off-balance-sheet items under the standardized approach are to be converted 
into credit exposure equivalents using the conversion factors, which are similar 
to those established under the Basel I Accord.3 The treatment of credit risk 
related to derivative instruments (for example, forward contracts, swaps, op-
tions) also remains similar to the version introduced in 1995, with an amend-
ment to the Basel I Accord. With derivative instruments, banks are exposed to 
credit risk not for the full face value of their contracts, but only to the potential 
cost of restoring the cash f lows if the counterparty defaults. The theoretical 
basis for assessing the risk on all derivative instruments is the same, with the 
“credit equivalent” amounts being dependent on the maturity of the respec-
tive contract and on the volatility of the rates and prices underlying this type 
of instrument. For capital adequacy assessment, the derivative instruments are 
converted according to the same principles as the other types of off-balance-
sheet exposures. 
In the standardized approach, banks are allowed to use credit risk mitigation 
techniques (such as collateral, netting, and guarantees) to manage (that is, re-
duce) their exposures and risk weights. The Basel II Accord provides detailed 
instructions on the eligibility of credit risk mitigation techniques to reduce 
credit risk exposures and prescribes the related “haircut” rules.
Internal Ratings–Based (IRB) Approaches
Under the IRB approaches, banks are allowed to use their own internal models 
and risk estimates in determining the capital requirement for a given exposure. 
Conceptually, the IRB is based on asset classes. Under the IRB approaches, banks 
must categorize exposures into broad asset classes with different risk character-
istics. The asset classes include (a) corporate, (b) sovereign, (c) bank, (d) retail, 
and (e) equity. There are also subclasses.4 For each asset class, there are un-
expected losses (UL) and expected losses (EL). The Basel II Accord provides 
specific rules for the capital treatment of expected losses (covered by general 
loss reserves). The IRB models focus on the risk-weight functions for the un-
expected losses. 
3  One major change is that commitments of less than one year have a credit conversion factor (CCF) 
of 20 percent, rather then 0 percent established under the Basel I Accord. Only commitments that 
are unconditionally cancellable are eligible for the 0 percent CCF.
4  For example, the corporate asset class has five subclasses: project finance, object finance, 
commodities finance, income-producing real estate, and commercial real estate. The retail asset 
class has three subclasses: exposures to individuals, residential mortgage loans, and loans to small 
businesses.
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The risk measures include probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), 
the exposure at default (EAD), and effective maturity (M). The PD of a bor-
rower or group of borrowers is the central measurable concept on which the 
IRB approach is founded. Banks’ internal measures of credit risk are normally 
based on assessments of the risk characteristics of both the borrower and the 
specific type of transaction. In addition, a bank must estimate exactly how 
much it is likely to lose should a borrower default on an obligation. The mag-
nitude of likely loss is the LGD and is normally expressed as a percentage of a 
bank’s exposure. The actual loss is contingent upon the amount at the time of 
default, commonly expressed as EAD. The final element normally included in 
the IRB is the maturity of exposures. These components (PD, LGD, EAD, 
and M) form the basic inputs to the IRB approach. They combine to provide a 
measure of the expected intrinsic, or economic, loss; consequently, they form a 
basis for credit risk–related capital adequacy requirements. 
There is a common misconception that using one of the IRB approaches to 
measure credit risk would result in lower capital charges. This is not true: the 
measurements under the IRB will normally be more accurate, and the risk-
weight curve is far steeper for IRB approaches than for the standardized ap-
proach. As a consequence, a poor-quality loan portfolio will produce a higher 
capital requirement when using an IRB approach. Table 6.4 illustrates the risk 
weights for unexpected losses prescribed by the Basel II Accord under the IRB 
approach. It is also worth noting that using an IRB methodology will result in 
increased volatility in the capital requirement.
Table 6.4 IRB Approach: Risk Weights for Unexpected Losses (UL) for 
Specialized Lending 
IRB Approach: Risk-Weights for Unexpected Losses for Specialized Lending
Supervisory Category Strong Good Satisfactory Weak Default
External Credit Risk 
Assessment BBB- or better BB- or BB BB- or B+ B to C- Not Applicable
Risk weights: unexpected 
losses for specialized lending 70% 90% 115% 250% 0%
Risk weights: unexpected 
losses for high-volatility 
commercial real estate
95% 120% 140% 250% 0%
Specialized Lending: includes project fi nance, object fi nance, commodities fi nance
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For each of the asset classes covered under the IRB framework, there are 
two options: 
Foundation approach, where a bank provides its own estimates for the PD 
and uses the EAD and LGD provided by the supervisory authority. Once 
the total probable loss (given the various probabilities of default) is calculated, 
a capital charge is determined, based on a risk weight for each of the asset 
(sub)classes.
Advanced approach, where a bank provides its own estimates of PD, EAD, and 
LGD figures and its own calculation of M, based on historical experience. This 
alternative opens the door to credit risk modeling and introduces the concept 
of correlation, which—although not yet accepted by regulatory authorities and 
not permitted by the capital accord—is common practice among the more so-
phisticated banks. 
In practice, implementation of any of the IRB approaches includes the 
following elements: 
Classification of exposures by broad asset classes (for example, sovereign,  ¶
corporate, retail). 
Risk estimates that the bank must assign (using the standardized founda- ¶
tion approach or its own internal estimates) for each asset (sub)class or 
credit risk exposure. 
Risk-weight function to derive the respective capital requirements for  ¶
each exposure type.
A set of minimum requirements established by the supervisory authorities  ¶
that a bank must meet to be eligible to use an IRB approach. The mini-
mum requirements are related to methods, processes, controls, data col-
lection, and information technology systems that support the assessment 
of credit risk, the assignment of internal risk ratings, and the quantifica-
tion of default and loss estimates. 
Supervisory review of a bank’s compliance with the minimum require- ¶
ments, across all asset classes. In principle, the bank may choose one IRB 
approach for some asset classes and another for other asset classes. Once 
a bank adopts the IRB approach, it is expected to continue to employ the 
IRB approach indefinitely.
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To be eligible for using the IRB approach, a bank is required to demonstrate 
to its supervisor that it meets certain minimum requirements, at the outset and 
on an ongoing basis. The overarching principle for eligibility is that the rating 
and risk estimation systems and processes to be used by the bank provide for a 
meaningful assessment of borrower and transaction characteristics, a meaning-
ful differentiation of risk, and reasonably accurate and consistent quantitative es-
timates of risks that could be easily understood and verified by third parties (for 
example, supervisors or external auditors). Basel II sets detailed requirements 
for rating system design and operations, for risk quantification and validation of 
internal estimates, and for the related corporate governance and oversight. 
Market Risk
Market risk is defined as the risk of losses in on- and off-balance-sheet positions 
that arise from shifts in market prices. More specifically, market risk includes 
the general and specific interest rate and equity price risks for a bank’s trading 
book of debt and equity instruments and related off-balance-sheet contracts, and 
general foreign exchange and commodities risks throughout the bank (that is, in 
the trading and banking books). Trading book valuation methodologies typically 
include (a) marking-to-market, by daily valuation of positions at readily available, 
independently sourced, closeout market prices; (b) marking-to-model, which is 
benchmarked and extrapolated from market inputs; (c) independent price veri-
fication, in which market prices are (at least monthly) independently verified for 
accuracy by outside experts; and (d) valuation adjustments, as needed. 
For market risk assessment under the Basel II Accord, banks are allowed to use 
a standardized framework or an internal model approach. Both approaches result 
in the calculation of an actual capital charge, which is then converted into a 
notional risk weight, by using the percentage capital requirement set by the re-
spective national regulatory authorities. Market risk could be covered by Tier 1, 
2, or 3 capital, subject to the limitations explained in section 6.2. Assets subject 
to market risk capital requirements are excluded from the credit risk-weighted 
capital requirements. 
Standardized Framework
The standardized framework for market risk assessment is based on a building 
block approach. It comprises the general market risk that arises from the bank’s 
overall open position in four fundamental markets, and the specific risk associ-
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ated with the individual securities positions of a bank. The capital requirement 
is calculated separately for the following risks:
Interest risk in the bank’s trading book  ¶
Equities risk in the bank’s trading book  ¶
Currency risk in trading and banking books (see section 13.4 and figure 13.4) ¶
Commodities risk in trading and banking books  ¶
Once quantified, the separate capital charges are added together and multiplied 
by the reciprocal of the regulatory percentage capital adequacy requirement to 
create a risk weight for the market risk, from which the allowable portion of 
the Tier 3 capital adequacy requirement can be calculated. (For example, an 
8 percent capital adequacy requirement would result in a 12.5 multiplication 
factor—see note 1 in section 6.3 and annex 6A for details of the calculation.) 
Internal Model Approach: The Use of Value-at-Risk (VAR)
When using an internal model approach, the market risk capital charge is based 
on whichever is higher: the previous day’s value at risk (VAR; see section 11.5) 
or the average VAR over the last 60 business days. The actual capital require-
ment is calculated by using a model that falls within the recommended param-
eters. This figure is then multiplied by the factor k, designated by the national 
supervisory authorities and related to the quality of a bank’s risk management 
system. (K has a minimum value of 3.0.) Banks are expected by their supervi-
sory authorities to also add to k a “plus” factor—between 0.0 and 1.0—that is 
determined by the number of times back-testing of the internal model disclosed 
the predicted VAR to have been exceeded. Because this plus factor is related to 
the ex post performance of the internal model, its addition is expected to serve 
as a positive incentive to maintain a good-quality model. The Basel II market 
risk–related capital standard requires that the VAR must be computed daily and 
the market risk–related capital requirements met on a daily basis.
The use of internal models for the measurement of market risk is subject to 
the approval of supervisory authorities, based on a set of detailed requirements 
related to the following: 
Market risk management process ¶ . This should be comprehensive, under 
senior management scrutiny, integrated with but independent from op-
erations, with adequate controls, and with learning capacity. 
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Coverage ¶ . The risk measurement system should include specific risk 
factors related to interest rate risk, currency risk, equity price risk, and 
commodity price risk. 
Quantitative parameters of an acceptable internal model ¶ . Included among 
these are the frequency of VAR computations, an historical observation pe-
riod, confidence parameters, a holding period, and multiplication factors. 
Stress testing and external validation requirements ¶ . These include pa-
rameters to ensure that a bank tests against various assumptions and factors 
that potentially could create extraordinary gains or losses in the trading 
portfolio or make the control of risk difficult, to ensure that the bank has 
a system to act on what it learns from the stress test, and to ensure that the 
system is externally validated in terms of meeting the Basel criteria. 
Operational Risk
The Basel II Accord includes capital charges explicitly related to the opera-
tional risk. Operational risk is defined as “the risk of loss resulting from inade-
quate or failed internal processes, people, and systems or from external events.” 
Banking statistics indicate a steady increase in operational risk because of the 
increasing use of highly automated technology, the increase in retail operations 
and growth of e-commerce, increased outsourcing, and the greater use of com-
plex instruments and sophisticated techniques to reduce credit and market risk. 
This recognition has led to an increased emphasis on sound operational risk 
management by banks, as well as to the inclusion of operational risk in a bank’s 
internal capital assessments and allocation process. 
The framework for calculating operational risk related capital charges recog-
nizes three methodologies with increasing sophistication and risk sensitivity: 
basic indicator approach, standardized approach, and advanced measurement 
approach. Banks are expected to select the approach that is commensurate to 
their operational risk profile and risk management capacity. The selection is 
expected to be endorsed by the supervisory authority based on the quality of 
operational risk management system, availability of resources in the internal 
control and audit areas, and the quality of governance.
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Basic Indicator Approach
The basic indicator approach uses a single indicator as a proxy for a bank’s over-
all operational risk exposure. Banks using the basic indicator approach must 
assign capital for operational risk equal to the average of a fixed percentage 
(denoted as the alpha factor) of positive annual gross income over the previous 
three years. The gross income is defined as net interest income plus net non-
interest income (gross of any provisions and operating expenses and excluding 
profits/losses from sales of securities and any extraordinary or irregular items). 
The Basel II Accord has established 15 percent as a standard value for alpha. 
This approach will most likely be used by non-G10 banks. The method does 
not require much work from banks, and it is proposed as the most appropri-
ate method for use until management has in place adequate control processes, 
board oversight, data reporting, and audit processes related to operational risk. 
Standardized Approach
The standardized approach requires a bank to express its business profile through 
as many as eight standard business lines: corporate finance, trading and sales, retail 
banking, commercial banking, payment and settlement services, agency and cus-
tody services, asset management, and retail brokerage. Within each business line, 
gross income is again used as an indicator for the scale of business operations and 
thus the likely scale of operational risk exposures within each of the business lines 
(see table 6.5). The capital charge for each business line is calculated by multiplying 
the related gross income by a factor assigned for the respective business line (denoted 
the beta factor). Factor beta is a proxy for the industrywide experience of operational 
losses for the respective business line. The total capital charge for operational risk is 
calculated as the three-year average of capital charges on each of the business lines 
in each year. Banks that use this method do not have to collect operational loss data, 
but they are required to have effective standards of risk management. 
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Table 6.5 Operational Risk: Business Lines and Operational Loss Events Types
Operational Risk – Business Lines and Event Types per Basel
Event types
Business lines
Internal 
Fraud External Fraud
Employment 
Practices and 
Workplace Safety
Clients, Products 
and Business 
Services
Damage to 
Physical 
Assets
Business 
Disruption 
and System 
Failures 
(technology 
risk)
Execution, 
Delivery 
and Process 
Management
Identify 
Business 
Line with 
Highest 
Incidence 
of Monetary 
LossesRisk Drivers People External Events People
People / 
Processes
External 
Events
Systems / 
External 
Events Processes
Corporate fi nance
Trading and sales
Retail banking
Commercial banking
Payment and settlement
Agency and custody services
Asset management
Retail brokerage
Identify event types with highest 
incidence of monetary losses
* Basel identifi es 4 risk drivers – this table allocates the risk drivers to the events where they are most likely to have major impact. It does not preclude all risk drivers from contributing 
to all event types
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Advanced Management Approaches (AMAs)
The most risk-sensitive approaches are the three advanced management ap-
proaches (AMAs), which are derived from a bank’s internal risk measurement 
systems and associated operational loss data. Under the AMAs, the capital re-
quirement expected to cover the operational risk is estimated by the bank’s 
internal operational risk measurement system using the quantitative and quali-
tative criteria determined by the type of AMA used. There are three types of 
AMAs: 
Internal measurement approach (IMA).  ¶ This approach uses informa-
tion from the standardized approach, providing for each business line an 
exposure indicator (EI), the probability of a loss event occurring (PE), 
and the loss should such an event occur (LGE). The product of these fac-
tors and an additional risk factor produces the expected loss (EL). 
Loss distribution approach (LDA). ¶  This approach allows banks to es-
timate the likely distribution of operational losses over a given period for 
each business line or risk type. LDAs attempt to assess unexpected losses 
directly, whereas IMAs use assumptions about the relationship between 
expected loss and unexpected loss.
Scorecard approach. ¶  Under this approach, banks start with an initial 
level of capital covering operational risk assigned at the firm or business-
line level. This amount of capital is then modified over time by capturing 
the underlying risk profile of the different business lines. The scorecard 
approach requires qualitative judgment and relies less on historical data. 
In principle, the use of an AMA is subject to supervisory approval, as it pro-
vides significant f lexibility to banks. The approval is normally conditioned on 
a bank having a good-quality and independent operational risk management 
function, operational risk measurement systems integrated into the daily risk 
management process, and regular reporting of exposures and losses to senior 
management. The most critical requirement is for the sound operational risk 
management system, which must be based on a consistent use of internal loss 
data, relevant external data, scenario analysis, and factors ref lecting the busi-
ness environment and internal control systems.
6.5 Supervisory Review: Pillar 2
Supervisory review is the second pillar of the Basel II Accord and a critical part 
of the capital adequacy framework. The supervisory review has two objectives: 
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to assess whether banks maintain adequate capital necessary for the risks inher-
ent in their business profile and business environment, and to encourage banks 
to have policies and internal processes for assessing and managing capital ad-
equacy that are commensurate with their risk profile, operations, and business 
strategy. Figure 6.3 illustrates the key Pillar 2 components. 
The role of supervisors is to review the bank’s internal capital adequacy assess-
ments and management processes, to ensure that the bank’s capital targets and 
capital position are consistent with its overall risk profile and strategy, and to 
enable supervisory intervention if the bank’s capital does not provide a suffi-
cient buffer against risk. In an increasingly risky market environment, this is an 
increasingly sophisticated process. 
Figure 6.3 Supervisory Review: Pillar 2 Components
An important aspect of supervisory reviews is the assessment of compliance 
with the minimum standards and disclosure requirements of a bank using the 
IRB framework for the credit risk and AMA approaches for the operational 
risk. Supervisors also are expected to have an approach for identifying and 
intervening in situations where falling capital levels raise questions about the 
ability of a bank to withstand business shocks. The Basel II Accord has estab-
lished certain core principles for supervisory reviews. These principles, as well 
as the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (Basel, initially issued 
in September 1997 and updated in October 2006) and other guidance notes 
related to the supervisory review process published by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, are discussed in more details in chapter 15. 
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Supervisors are expected to take appropriate actions if they are not satisfied 
with the quality of a bank’s internal processes and the results of a bank’s own 
risk assessment and capital allocations. Supervisors are expected to have at their 
disposal the necessary enforcement powers and tools. For example, they should 
be able to require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum, if so mandat-
ed by the risk characteristics of a particular bank or its business environment, 
and to require prompt remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored. 
The Basel II framework sets special requirements for cooperation between su-
pervisors, especially for the cross-border supervision of complex banking or 
financial groups. More detailed discussion of the supervisory review process 
and techniques is provided in chapter 15.
6.6 Market Discipline: Pillar 3
The requirement for market discipline, the third pillar of the Basel II Accord, 
complements the minimum capital requirements and the supervisory review 
process. Market discipline is based on disclosure requirements. The banks are 
asked to disclose reliable and timely information needed by market participants 
to make well-founded risk assessments, including assessment of the adequacy 
of capital held as a cushion against losses and of the risk exposures that may 
give rise to such losses. 
The disclosure requirements are based on the materiality concept, that is, banks 
must include all information where omission or misstatement could change or 
influence the decisions of the respective information users. The only exception 
is proprietary or confidential information, the sharing of which could under-
mine a bank’s competitive position.  Disclosures are normally made quarterly or 
semiannually. Banks are expected to have a formal disclosure policy approved 
by the board of directors, including what will be disclosed, validation reporting 
frequency, and internal controls over the disclosure process. 
The areas that are subject to disclosure are capital structure, capital adequa-
cy, and risk exposure and assessment. The disclosures include qualitative and 
quantitative aspects. For each risk area (credit, market, operational, equity), 
qualitative aspects cover strategies, policies, and processes; the structure and 
organization of the respective risk management function; the scope and na-
ture of the risk measurement and reporting systems; the strategies and policies 
for hedging and mitigating risks; and processes and systems to monitor their 
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effectiveness. Quantitative aspects involve disclosures of the specific values. 
Transparency and disclosure are further discussed in chapter 14.
6.7 Management of Capital Adequacy
A bank’s management continues to be accountable that its bank has adequate 
capital. The capital management process should address all material risks faced 
by the bank. Given its business strategy, a bank must have clearly defined capi-
tal adequacy targets; adequate policies and processes to identify, measure, and 
report all material risks; a capital assessment process that relates its capital to 
the risk profile; and internal control systems that ensure the integrity of the 
overall capital assessment and management process. 
A bank’s board must also devote proper attention to all matters related to the 
maintenance of capital adequacy. The board has a responsibility to project capi-
tal requirements and to determine whether current growth and capital reten-
tion are sustainable, to establish sound risk management policies and effective 
risk management and control systems and procedures, to ensure efficient orga-
nization, and to provide adequate resources to attract and retain the necessary 
professional cadre. 
The quality of a bank’s assets must also be mentioned in the capital adequacy 
context. A bank’s capital ratios can be rendered meaningless or highly mis-
leading if asset quality is not taken into account. Particularly in developing 
or transition economies, but also in advanced market economies, many banks 
report impressive capital ratios when they may in fact be insolvent, because 
they have overstated asset quality and have provisioned inadequately for losses. 
An accurate assessment of asset quality and of off-balance-sheet exposures and 
contingent liabilities is critical for an accurate assessment of capital. Similarly, 
accurate evaluation of provisions and loan loss reserves is a critical input in the 
process of capital adequacy assessment. 
A bank’s capital ratio may be changed by altering either the numerator or the 
denominator of the ratio. In most cases, to reach or maintain the necessary 
capital level, banks have done both. They have increased Tier 1 and/or Tier 
2 capital by not distributing dividends and by issuing equity or subordinated 
debt; they have also changed the balance sheet structure by reducing total as-
sets (for example, by cutting back loans) and by shifting into assets that bear a 
lower risk weight (for example, by moving from corporate loans to government 
securities or residential mortgages). These decisions have often been motivated 
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by business cycles. In times of high demand, banks are more likely to increase 
capital; in downturns, they prefer to reduce the size of their balance sheets. 
Besides the business cycle aspects, important determinants in selecting the 
strategy to achieve or maintain capital adequacy include the degree of under-
capitalization and the time in which a bank must reach the minimum level of 
capital. If a bank’s condition deteriorates, its options for raising capital become 
increasingly limited and, at the same time, more expensive. This argues for a 
bank to maintain capital in excess of regulatory minimums. If its asset qual-
ity deteriorates, or if undercapitalization is serious and the time is short, then 
raising new capital immediately is the only effective solution. Hoping that the 
problem will solve itself is a fool’s game that will cost the bank far more in the 
long run. Rapid shrinking of the balance sheet often means that a bank is shed-
ding its highest-quality or most liquid assets. This masks the problem in the 
short run, but creates an even larger problem in the medium term. 
The introduction of capital adequacy standards has also motivated regulatory 
capital arbitrage, ref lecting bank efforts to keep their funding cost, including 
equity, as low as possible. Because the cost of equity is generally perceived as 
much greater than the cost of debt, banks that would otherwise keep lower 
capital see the imposition of capital adequacy as a form of regulatory taxation. 
As with other such forms of taxation, some banks develop methods to mini-
mize the taxes. In practice, capital arbitrage has often exploited the differences 
between true economic risk and credit risk as measured by the Basel Accords’ 
risk-weighting methodology. Capital arbitrage can be exercised in a number 
of ways, including shifting the asset composition toward less weighted assets 
through some form of securitization or by creating credit substitutes (which 
also carry lower risk weights). 
6.8 Analysis of a Bank’s Capital Adequacy
Capital adequacy analysis comprises three steps: 
(a) analysis of the structure of qualifying capital, 
(b) analysis of the bank’s risk profile and risk exposures, and 
(c) evaluation of the bank’s current and future capital needs.
There are no conceptual differences between the Basel I and Basel II approaches 
to capital adequacy assessments—the approach is essentially the same in both. 
148 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
However, the analysis of the bank risk profile and risk exposures and the as-
signment of risk weights are much more complex under the Basel II Accord be-
cause of the use of more complex methodologies (which are more sensitive and 
better attuned to capture the risk profiles of banks’ business lines). Therefore, 
while illustrating the elements of the capital adequacy assessment process, the 
following discussion will make references to the Basel I Accord to keep the 
discussion simple and to the point. 
Analysis of the Structure of a Bank’s Capital
The capital adequacy assessment starts with analysis of the components of a 
bank’s capital, as illustrated in figure 6.4. (The figures presented in this section 
illustrate the analysis of a bank’s capital, but the different figures do not refer to 
the same bank.) The Tier 1 core capital components, including common stock 
and retained earnings, should account for more than 50 percent of the total 
capital. The shareholding structure and the identity of larger shareholders are 
also important. In extreme circumstances the shareholders may be called upon 
to increase a bank’s capital, either by adding new capital or by forgoing dividend 
payments. However, no amount of capital would be adequate for a bank with 
malevolent shareholders, incompetent management, or an incompetent board. 
Figure 6.4 Components of a Bank’s Capital Structure
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The changes in volume of capital and its structure over time are also signifi-
cant. For the bank shown in figure 6.4 there were some changes in capital 
structure. Any changes in capital structure, especially reductions involving 
core capital, should be credibly explained. A careful analysis is also needed in 
situations where a reduction of capital is indicated, to explain exactly why and 
what provoked the loss of capital and to ensure that the bank has learned from 
the experience and taken adequate measures to prevent a similar situation in 
the future. The analyst could also compare the changes in capital volume to 
the bank’s risk profile. In general, the changes in capital volume should be in 
concert with the expected changes in the risk profile to provide an adequate 
cushion for the bank’s risk exposures. 
In addition to analyzing the structure of the bank’s capital base, one should 
consider the level and demand for dividends being placed on the bank by share-
holders. In periods of economic downturn or situations where the bank’s condi-
tion is deteriorating, the bank should reduce or eliminate dividend payments to 
its shareholders. 
Analysis of a Bank’s Risk Proﬁ le
The next step in the capital adequacy assessment is the assessment of the bank’s 
risk exposures. This includes credit risk and market risk under both Basel 
Accords, plus operational risk under Basel II. Starting with the credit risk, the 
bank’s on- and off-balance sheet assets categories are classified according to the 
risk categories specified in the Basel I Accord (or subject to the analysis using 
the approach agreed with the supervisory authority under Basel II) and are as-
signed the corresponding risk weight. 
The analyst should notice the structure of risk-weighted assets and if and how 
this has changed over time. Whenever there are changes in risk weights, the 
questions to be addressed are whether this is a result of the bank’s business 
strategy decisions, whether the risk weights ref lect actual risk, whether the 
bank is able to understand and adequately manage the higher level of risk, and 
what appears to be the trend for the future. 
Using the methodology set by Basel I Accord, figure 6.5 illustrates a summary 
risk profile of a bank, with changes in the risk profile over time in terms of av-
erage risk weighting, including on- and off-balance-sheet items. It appears that 
the weighted average of the bank’s total risk profile has been reduced in the ob-
servation period. The analyst should understand why and what is the trend. For 
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example, the total average could have been reduced because the bank increased 
its off-balance-sheet business. The weighted average of on-balance-sheet items 
could have been reduced because the bank started to engage in regulatory capi-
tal arbitrage or because of changes in its demand structure. 
Figure 6.5 Risk Profile of On- and Off-Balance-Sheet Items
Evaluation of a Bank’s Current and Future Capital Needs
Once the denominators corresponding to credit, market, and operational risk 
of a bank are determined, the capital adequacy ratio calculation is straightfor-
ward. Table 6.6 illustrates selected capital adequacy ratios of a bank and their 
trends over time. A decline in the percentage of core capital in relation to the 
total qualifying capital would indicate that Tier 2 capital or debt instruments 
are being used to a greater degree to meet minimum capital requirements. This 
situation would in turn indicate a relative shift to less permanent forms of capi-
tal. The capital adequacy ratio indicates whether or not the bank is meeting the 
minimum capital requirements. 
When a bank’s capital adequacy ratio shows deterioration, it is a cause for con-
cern. The reason could be that the bank has increased the size of its balance 
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sheet, while still meeting minimum capital requirements. Should the growth 
trend continue, it would mean that the bank would have to increase capital to be 
able to maintain the minimum capital ratio. Another reason for a deteriorating 
capital ratio could be that the bank has changed its risk profile. In such a case, 
the analyst should investigate if the bank has adequate policies, procedures, and 
controls in place to effectively handle the higher risk profile of its operations. 
The trend analysis is illustrated in figure 6.6, which traces the capital of a bank 
over time (in the context of the Basel I Accord). The capital is split into Tier 1, 
Tier 2, and Tier 3 categories, and these are compared to the capital necessary 
to meet the 8 percent and 15 percent risk-weighted minimum capital require-
ment. The bank under review has significantly increased its capital, as well as 
its risk-weighted capital ratios. This situation likely indicates that this bank is 
positioning itself for future growth. While capital adequacy is clearly not an is-
sue, this calls for a review of the bank’s internal processes and controls to ensure 
that it is adequately prepared to handle the increasing volume of business and, 
most likely, the increasing degree of risk. 
Figure 6.6 Actual versus Required Capital
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The next question to be addressed is whether a bank can continue to meet its 
minimum capital requirements in the future. Analysis of this question should 
include stress tests for situations that might arise in which risk or the bank’s 
capacity to control risk could get out of hand. Figure 6.7 illustrates capital ad-
equacy projections under normal circumstances, made as part of the process 
of risk management and capital planning. The graph shows the end result of 
possible situations that a bank may encounter in the future and highlights any 
projected excess or deficiencies in capital adequacy. 
Figure 6.7 Estimating Potential Capital Requirement 
The projection in figure 6.7 is based on a simplistic assumption that risk-
weighted assets will grow by 10 percent and net qualifying capital by 5 percent, 
and that the bank’s risk profile will remain the same. This expected business 
growth would clearly result in a capital shortfall. A bank may take a number 
of actions to address an expected shortfall in capital adequacy, including the 
following: 
Tier 1 capital increase, by asking shareholders to add capital, by retaining  ¶
earnings, or by issuing new shares in the market 
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Tier 2 capital increase—if there is space for this in the bank’s capital  ¶
structure—by issuing the appropriate instruments
Change of business policy to focus on business with lower capital  ¶
requirements
Reduction in the size of its balance sheet or of its growth ¶
Annex 6A: Credit Risk–Related Weight Assignments Under 
the Basel I Accord, Covered by Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital
The Basel I Accord used a fairly simple categorization of credit-related risks, 
each carrying a weight related to the likelihood of unanticipated losses. 
Following are the typical risk weights assigned to major categories of loans and 
advances under Basel I capital adequacy standards.
Credit Risk Related to On-Balance-Sheet Items
Cash claims on central governments or on central banks, denominated  ¶
and funded in the national currency: 0 percent. This weighting indicates 
that financial assets related to governments or central banks are interna-
tionally regarded as risk free, if denominated in the national currency. This 
assumption clearly does not hold true when a government’s fiscal condition 
gives reason for concerns or when a government defaults on its debt.
Claims on domestic public sector agencies: 0 to 50 percent, at national  ¶
discretion. This risk weighting relates to financing, including off-balance-
sheet financing and guarantees, made available to the public sector and to 
quasi-governmental organizations. This relatively low weighting reflects 
the view that quasi-governmental bodies are also regarded as low risk. 
Loans guaranteed by or collateralized by securities of such entities are 
also subject to the same risk weight. National authorities typically assign 
the weight of 10 or 20 percent, which may not be realistic, especially in 
developing countries. Although claims on public sector agencies may ulti-
mately be realized, in many situations the point of collection is not within 
the timeframe of the original financial contract.
Claims on banks: 20 percent ¶ . This low weighting is a consequence of the 
intensive regulation and supervision to which banks are subjected. As a result 
of formalized risk management procedures and the available central bank 
 accommodation, interbank loans are regarded as less of a credit risk than 
other loans and advances. For banks outside the Organisation for Economic 
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Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 20 percent risk weighting 
 applies only to claims with a residual maturity of less than one year.
Residential mortgages: 50 percent ¶ . This weighting indicates the tra-
ditionally sound nature of such investments. Mortgages, however, are 
increasingly risky as a result of the high level of consumption expendi-
tures secured by mortgage bonds, which are in turn tied to more f lexible 
mortgage products (for example, home equity loans or advances against 
capital that has already been paid). Consequently, the relatively low risk 
weight accorded to residential mortgages could distort the allocation 
of credit, because loans that finance consumption expenditures can be 
granted at a price that is not economically justifiable.
Other loans: 100 percent. ¶  This weighting generally indicates the higher 
risk to which a bank is exposed when it extends loans to the private sec-
tor or to companies owned by public sector entities. Other claims in this 
category include claims on governments outside the OECD that are de-
nominated in currencies that are not national currencies; on banks outside 
the OECD, for claims of residual maturities of more than one year; on 
real estate and other investments; and on fixed and other assets.
Credit Risk Related to Off-Balance-Sheet Items
The Basel I Accord framework also includes off-balance-sheet items. Off-
balance-sheet exposures are treated by converting them into on-balance-sheet 
credit risk exposures by applying the corresponding credit conversion factors to 
different types of instruments or transactions. The multiplication factors are 
derived from the estimated likelihood of default. Credit conversion factors for 
major off-balance-sheet categories are defined as follows:
Commitments (such as standby facilities and credit lines) with maturities  ¶
of up to one year, or those that can be unconditionally cancelled at any 
time: 0 percent.
Short-term, self-liquidating, trade-related contingencies, such as docu- ¶
mentary credits subject to collateral by underlying shipments: 20 percent.
Certain transaction-related contingent items, such as performance bonds,  ¶
bid bonds, warranties, and standby letters of credit related to a particular 
transaction; note issuance facilities and revolving underwriting facilities; 
and other commitments, such as formal standby facilities and credit lines 
with maturities of more than one year: 50 percent.
 155
Chapter 6: Capital Adequacy
Direct credit substitutes such as general guarantees of indebtedness (for  ¶
example, standby letters of credit that serve as financial guarantees for 
loans and securities) and acceptances (for example, endorsements), sale 
and repurchase agreements, and forward asset purchases: 100 percent.
The risk weighting of assets and off-balance-sheet positions has provided a major 
step toward improved objectivity in assessing the adequacy of bank capital. The 
simplicity of this methodology has also enabled it to be introduced in banking sys-
tems that are in their early stages of development. However, this simple weighting 
of assets provides only a crude measure of economic risk, primarily because the 
methodology is not effectively calibrated to account for different default risks.
Credit Risk Related to Derivative Instruments
In 1995, the Basel I Accord was amended to include the treatment of forward 
contracts, swaps, options, and similar derivative contracts. With such derivative 
instruments, banks are exposed to credit risk not for the full face value of their 
contracts, but only to the potential cost of restoring the cash f lows if the coun-
terparty defaults. The theoretical basis for assessing the risk on all derivative 
instruments is the same, with the “credit equivalent” amounts being dependent 
on the maturity of the respective contracts and on the volatility of the rates and 
prices underlying this type of instrument. For capital adequacy assessment, the 
derivative instruments are converted according to the same principles as the 
other types of off-balance-sheet exposures. Table 6A.1 summarizes the weights 
used for multiplication.
Table 6A.1 Credit Risk Multiplication Factors for Derivative Instruments
Credit Risk Multiplication Factors for Derivative Instruments
Residual Maturity Interest Rate
Exchange Rate 
and Gold Equity Commodities
One year or less 0.00% 1.00% 6.00% 10.00%
One to fi ve years 0.50% 8.00% 7.00% 12.00%
More than fi ve years 1.50% 10.00% 8.00% 15.00%
Since the early 1990s, larger banks with more complex business and risk pro-
files have invested resources in developing models for credit risk arising from 
their significant business operations. These models are intended to assist banks 
in better quantifying, aggregating, and managing risks across geographic and 
product lines. Consequently, such modeling practices prompted development 
of a new capital accord—Basel II.
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Annex 6B: Calculation of the Capital Adequacy Ratio to 
Include Market Risk (Tier 3 Capital)
Background
1. The Basel I Accord divides capital into two types: core capital (Tier 1) and 
supplementary capital (Tier 2). These capital elements, taken together, are de-
signed to meet the explicit capital charge for credit risk and allow for a buffer 
to cover other risks.
2. With the implementation of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment to Basel I, 
Tier 3 capital, consisting of short-term subordinated debt, was created. Tier 3 
capital can be used to partially offset the capital charge for market risks, includ-
ing foreign exchange risk and commodity risk. However, the amount of Tier 3 
capital that can be used for market risks is limited to 250 percent of the amount 
of Tier 1 capital that is allocated to market risks. Tier 2 capital may be substi-
tuted for Tier 3 up to a limit of 250 percent, provided that the overall limits on 
Tier 2 capital in the 1988 Capital Accord (Basel I) are adhered to.
3. When calculating the market risk capital charge, the result is the actual 
amount of capital that must be held; when calculating credit risk, the amount of 
capital needed is determined by multiplying risk-weighted assets by 8 percent. 
To create a link between credit risk and market risk, the market risk capital 
charge must be multiplied by 12.5 (the reciprocal of 8 percent) and then added 
to the risk-weighted assets calculated for credit risk purposes.
4. Thus, the formula for determining capital adequacy can be illustrated as 
follows: 
where 
Tier 1 is the entire amount of the bank’s Tier 1 capital.  ¶
Tier 2 is limited to 100 percent of Tier 1 capital; subordinated debt in- ¶
cluded in Tier 2 is limited to 50 percent of total Tier 2. 
Tier 3 is limited to the amount that is eligible to support market risk,  ¶
subject to the restrictions in paragraph 2, above. 
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Example: Calculation of the Capital Adequacy Ratio to 
Include Market Risk (Tier 3 Capital)
Assumptions: 
1. The bank is operating in a regime that requires an 8 percent minimum capi-
tal requirement. 
2. The bank has calculated its risk-weighted assets as 10,000 and its capital 
charge for market risk as 500. 
3. The bank has 750 of Tier 1 capital, 250 of Tier 2 capital, and 700 of Tier 3 
capital. 
Solution—see table 6B.1: 
1. To calculate the denominator of the equation above, the market risk capital 
charge must be multiplied by 12.5, the product of which will be added to risk-
weighted assets of 10,000. In this example the denominator will be 16,250. 
2. One can then determine that in an 8 percent capital environment, the bank 
will require a minimum of 1,300 in capital (16,250 × 8% = 1,300). Of this amount, 
800 is for credit risk (10,000 × 8% = 800), and 500 is for market risk (6,250 × 8% 
= 500). 
3. To determine if the bank has sufficient eligible capital, one must look at the 
composition of its Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 capital. Beginning with credit risk, 
because the minimum capital charge is 800 for credit risk, the bank can use all 
of its 250 in Tier 2 capital for credit risk. As a consequence, only 550 of Tier 1 
capital will be needed for credit risk, leaving an excess of 200 in Tier 1 capital 
available to meet the market risk capital charge. 
4. It is important to note that the amount of Tier 3 capital that may be used 
to cover market risk is limited to 250 percent of the amount of available Tier 1 
capital. In this example, the bank would be limited to 500 of Tier 3 capital for 
market risk (200 × 250%), despite the fact that it has 700 of Tier 3 capital avail-
able. Wanting to maximize its use of Tier 3 capital, the bank will calculate the 
amount of Tier 3 capital that is 250 percent of Tier 1 capital and that when 
summed together with Tier 1 capital will equal 500. As shown in the table be-
low, the market risk capital charge is 500, and the bank can meet this with 143 of 
the 200 in Tier 1 capital that remains after the credit risk charge and 357 of Tier 
3. The 357 represents 250 percent of the 143, and the two, when added together, 
equal the 500 market risk capital requirement. 
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5. Finally, to calculate the bank’s capital ratio, all of the Tier 1 capital (750) 
plus the eligible Tier 2 capital (250) is added to the eligible Tier 3 capital (357). 
The denominator is 16,250 (as discussed above), resulting in a capital adequacy 
ratio of 8.35 percent.
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Table 6B.1 Calculating the Allowable Portion of Tier 3 Capital
Available 
Capital
Risk-Weighted 
Assets
Minimum 
Capital Charge 
@ 8 % 
Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 Capital 
Utilized for 
Credit Risk
Tier 1 and 
Tier 3 Capital 
Required for 
Market Risk
Minimum 
Capital 
Requirement
Eligible 
Capital 
(excluding 
unused Tier 3)
Unused But 
Eligible Tier 
3 – Currently 
Provided by 
Tier 1
Unused But 
Not Eligible 
Tier 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Credit risk Tier 1: 750 10,000 800 Tier 1: 550 Tier 1: 550 Tier 1: 750
Tier 2: 250 Tier 2: 250 Tier 2: 250 Tier 2: 250
Market risk Tier 3: 700 6,250 500 Tier 1: 143    Tier 1: 143 Tier 3: 357 Tier 3: 143 Tier 3: 200
Tier 3: 357 Tier 3: 357
Totals 16,250 1,300 800 500 1,300 1,357
Capital ratio 8.35%
1. These amounts are provided in the text.
2. Capital requirement of 500,  multiplied by  12.5  (the reciprocal of  8)  =  6,250.
3. Risk-weighted assets multiplied by the percentage requirement:  10 000 * 8 %  =  800  and 6,250 * 8 %  =  500.
4  It would be reasonable for the bank to use all its Tier 2 capital fi rst (up to 100 % of Tier 1 capital).
5. Tier 3 ratio to Tier 1  may not exceed 250:100 (250/350) . Tier 3 capital allowed to fulfi ll requirement = 250/350*500  = 357. The remaining 143 (500 - 357) must come from Tier 1 capital.
6. Consolidation of columns 4 and 5.
7. The required ratio for T3:T1, results in an actual capital adequacy ratio of 8.35%  (750 + 250 + 357) /16,250 = 8.35%). This is due to the excess T1 capital in the bank (750 - 550 - 143 = 57)
8. Tier 3 capital can eventually equal the market risk capital requirement of 500. Hence the excess (500-357).
9. The excess Tier 3 capital, above the requirement (700-500), cannot be used unless the current market risk capital requirement of 500 increases.

Key Messages
Credit risk management lies at the heart of survival for the vast majority of banks.  ¶
Credit risk can be reduced by implementing policies to limit connected-party  ¶
lending and large exposures to related parties. 
Asset classiﬁ cation and subsequent provisioning against possible losses affect  ¶
not only the value of the loan portfolio, but also the underlying value of a bank’s 
capital. 
The proﬁ le of customers ( ¶ who the bank has lent to) must be transparent. 
Risks associated with the key banking products ( ¶ what the bank has lent) must be 
understood and managed. 
The maturity proﬁ le of loan products ( ¶ how long the loans are for) interacts strongly 
with liquidity risk management. 
A bank’s capacity for credit risk management will contribute signiﬁ cantly to the  ¶
quality of its risk management practices.
7
Credit Risk Management
7.1 Establishing Policies for Managing Credit Risk
Credit or counterparty risk is the chance that a debtor or issuer of a financial instrument—whether an individual, a company, or a coun-try—will not repay principal and other investment-related cash f lows 
according to the terms specified in a credit agreement. Inherent to banking, 
credit risk means that payments may be delayed or not made at all, which can 
cause cash f low problems and affect a bank’s liquidity. Despite innovation in 
the financial services sector, more than 70 percent of a bank’s balance sheet 
generally relates to this aspect of risk management. For this reason, credit risk 
is the principal cause of bank failures. Although the discussion of the credit risk 
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management function is primarily focused on the loan portfolio, the principles 
relating to the determination of creditworthiness apply equally to the assess-
ment of counterparties that issue financial instruments.
Financial analysts as well as bank supervisory agencies place considerable im-
portance on formal policies laid down by the board of directors and imple-
mented or administered by management. A lending or financing policy should 
outline the scope and allocation of a bank’s credit facilities and the manner in 
which a credit portfolio is managed—that is, how investment and financing 
assets are originated, appraised, supervised, and collected. A good policy is not 
overly restrictive and allows for the presentation of proposals to the board that 
officers believe are worthy of consideration, even if they do not fall within the 
parameters of written guidelines. Flexibility is needed to allow for fast reaction 
and early adaptation to changing conditions in a bank’s mix of assets and the 
market environment. 
Virtually all regulators prescribe minimum standards for managing credit risk. 
These cover the identification of existing and potential risks, the definition of 
policies that express the bank’s risk management philosophy, and the setting of 
parameters within which credit risk will be controlled. 
There are typically three kinds of policies related to credit risk management. 
One set aims to limit or reduce credit risk. These include policies on concen-
tration and large exposures, diversification, lending to connected parties, and 
overexposure. The second set aims to classify assets. These mandate periodic 
evaluation of the collectibility of the portfolio of credit instruments. The third 
set aims to provision loss or make allowances at a level adequate to absorb an-
ticipated loss.
7.2 Regulatory Policies to Limit Exposures 
To reduce or limit credit risk, regulators pay close attention to three issues: 
exposure to a single customer, related party financing, and overexposure to a 
geographic area or economic sector. 
Large Exposures to a Single Customer or Connected Parties
Large-exposure and concentration limits usually refer to the maximum permit-
ted exposure to a single client, connected group, or sector of economic activity 
(for example, agriculture, steel, or textiles). This is especially important for 
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small, regionally oriented or specialized banks. A lending policy should also 
require that all concentrations be reviewed and reported on a frequent basis. 
Modern prudential regulations usually stipulate that a bank refrain from in-
vesting in or extending credit to any individual entity or related group of en-
tities in excess of a prescribed percentage of the bank’s capital and reserves. 
Most countries impose a single-customer exposure limit of between 10 and 25 
percent of capital. The threshold at which reporting to supervisory authorities 
becomes necessary should normally be set somewhere below the maximum ex-
posure limit. Supervisors can then devote special attention to exposures above 
the threshold and require banks to take precautionary measures before concen-
tration becomes excessively risky. 
The main difficulty in defining exposure is to quantify the extent to which 
less-direct forms of credit exposure should be included within the exposure 
limit. As a matter of principle, contingent liabilities and credit substitutes—
such as guarantees, acceptances, letters of credit, and all future commitments—
should be included, although the treatment of specific instruments may vary. 
For example, a financial obligation guarantee may be treated differently than 
a performance risk guarantee. The treatment of collateral is another conten-
tious issue, as the valuation of collateral can be highly subjective. As a matter 
of prudence, collateral should not be considered when determining the size of 
an exposure. 
Another conceptual question is the definition of the term “single client.” 
According to international practice, a single client is an individual, legal per-
son, or a connected group to which a bank is exposed. A connected group cov-
ers clients that are mutually associated or control other clients, either directly or 
indirectly, normally through a voting right of at least 15–20 percent, a dominant 
shareholding, or the capacity to control policy making and management. In ad-
dition, the exposure to a number of single clients may represent a cumulative 
risk if financial interdependence exists and their expected source of repayment 
is the same. (See figure 7.1 for a hypothetical example.) 
In practical terms, a large exposure usually indicates a bank’s commitment to 
support a specific client. Here the risk is that a bank that extends credit to a 
large corporate client may not be objective in appraising the risks associated 
with such credit. 
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Figure 7.1 Exposure to Top 20 Clients
The management of large exposures involves an additional aspect: the bank’s 
ability to identify common or related ownership, to exercise effective control, 
and to rely on common cash f lows to meet its own obligations. Particularly 
in the case of large clients, banks must pay attention to the completeness and 
adequacy of information about the debtor. Bank credit officers should moni-
tor events affecting large clients and their performance on an ongoing basis, 
regardless of whether they are meeting their obligations. When external events 
present a cause for concern, credit officers should request additional informa-
tion from the debtor. If there is any doubt that the person or group receiving 
the investment or financing might have difficulty meeting its obligation to the 
bank, the concerns should be raised with a higher level of credit risk manage-
ment, and a contingency plan for addressing the issue should be developed. 
Related Party Financing
Dealing with related or connected parties is a particularly dangerous form of credit 
risk exposure. Related parties typically include a bank’s parent, major sharehold-
ers, subsidiaries, affiliate companies, directors, and executive officers. Such par-
ties are in a position to exert control over or influence a bank’s policies and deci-
sion making, especially concerning credit decisions. A bank’s ability to identify 
and track extensions of credit to insiders is crucial (see table 7.1 and figure 7.2). 
 165
Chapter 7: Credit Risk Management
Table 7.1 Related Party Lending
Amount of 
Loans
Amount of 
Weak Loans
Amount of Loans, 
as Percentage of 
Qualifying Capital
Weak Loans as 
Percentage of 
Qualifying Capital
Collateral 
Held
Shareholders holding 
more than 5 percent 
of shares
Shareholders holding 
less than 5 percent 
of shares
Shareholders of any 
shareholders
Board of directors
Executive 
management
Entities controlled by 
the bank
Entities having 
control over the bank
Close relative to any 
of the above
Total
Figure 7.2 Related Party Lending and Affected Loans
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The issue is whether credit decisions are made on a rational basis and according 
to the bank’s policies and procedures. An additional concern is whether credit is 
based on market terms or on terms that are more favorable with regard to amount, 
maturity, rate, and collateral than those provided to the general public.
Most regulators establish limits for related parties, typically stipulating that to-
tal credit to related parties cannot exceed a certain percentage of Tier 1 or total 
qualifying capital. If prudential regulations have not established such a limit, 
the bank should maintain one as a matter of board policy. Prudent banking 
practice requires board approval of all facilities extended to related parties. 
7.3 Management Policies to Reduce Credit Risk
A lending policy should contain an outline of the scope and allocation of a 
bank’s credit facilities and the manner in which a credit portfolio is managed, 
that is, how loans are originated, appraised, supervised, and collected. As stated 
earlier, a good lending policy is not overly restrictive, but allows for the presen-
tation of loans to the board that officers believe are worthy of consideration, 
even if they do not fall within the parameters of written guidelines. Flexibility 
must exist to allow for fast reaction and early adaptation to changing conditions 
in a bank’s earning assets mix and market environment. A number of elements 
make up sound lending policies. 
Lending Authority
Lending authority is often determined by the size of a bank. In smaller banks, 
it is typically centralized. To avoid delays in the lending process, larger banks 
tend to decentralize according to geographical area, lending products, and 
types of customers. A lending policy should establish limits for all lending of-
ficers. If policies are clearly established and enforced, individual limitations 
may be somewhat higher than would normally be expected, depending on the 
officer’s experience and tenure with the bank. Lending limits could also be 
based on group authority, which would allow a committee to approve larger 
loans. Reporting procedures and the frequency of committee meetings should 
be specified. 
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Type of Loans and Distribution by Category
A lending policy should specify the types of loans and other credit instruments 
that the bank intends to offer to clients and should provide guidelines for spe-
cific loans. Decisions about types of credit instruments should be based on the 
expertise of lending officers, the deposit structure of a bank, and anticipated 
credit demand. Types of credit that have resulted in an abnormal loss should 
be controlled by senior management or avoided completely. Limitations based 
on aggregate percentages of total loans in commercial, real estate, consumer, or 
other credit categories are common. Policies related to such limitations should 
allow for deviations that are approved by the board. 
Appraisal Process
A lending policy should outline where the responsibility for appraisals lies and 
should define formal, standard appraisal procedures, including reference to re-
appraisals of renewals or extensions. Acceptable types and limits on the amount 
of appraisals should be outlined for each type of credit facility. Circumstances 
requiring appraisals by qualified independent appraisers should also be de-
scribed. The ratio of the amount of the loan to the appraised value of both 
the project and collateral, as well as the method of valuation and differences 
among various types of lending instruments, should be detailed. A lending 
policy should also contain a schedule of down payment requirements, where 
applicable. 
Loan Pricing
Rates on various loan types must be sufficient to cover the costs of funds, loan 
supervision, administration (including general overhead), and probable losses. At 
the same time, rates should provide a reasonable margin of profit. Rates should 
be periodically reviewed and adjusted to reflect changes in costs or competi-
tive factors. Rate differentials may be deliberately maintained either to encourage 
some types of borrowers to seek credit elsewhere or to attract a specific type of 
borrower. Guidelines for other relevant procedures, such as the determination 
of fees on commitments or penalty interest rates, are also an element of pricing 
policy. 
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Maturities
A lending policy should establish the maximum maturity for each type of cred-
it, and loans should be granted with a realistic repayment schedule. Maturity 
scheduling should be determined in relation to the anticipated source of repay-
ment, the purpose of the loan, and the useful life of the collateral. 
Exposure to Geographic Areas or Economic Sectors
Another dimension of risk concentration is the exposure of a bank to a single sec-
tor of the economy or a narrow geographic region (see figure 7.3). This makes a 
bank vulnerable to weaknesses in a particular industry or region and poses a risk 
that it will suffer from simultaneous failures among several clients for similar 
reasons. This concern is particularly relevant for regional and specialized banks 
or banks in small countries with narrow economic profiles, such as those with 
predominantly agricultural economies or exporters of a single commodity.
It is often difficult to assess the exposure of a bank to various sectors of the 
economy, as most bank reporting systems do not produce such information. 
For example, a holding company of a large diversified group could be used to 
finance projects in various industries in which the company operates. In any 
case, banks should have well-developed systems to monitor sector risks, assess 
the impact of adverse trends on the quality of their portfolios and income state-
ments, and deal with increased risk.
Figure 7.3 Sectoral Analysis of Loans 
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Banks engaged in international lending face additional risks, the most impor-
tant of which are country (or sovereign) and transfer risks. The country risks 
encompass the entire spectrum of risks posed by the macroeconomic, political, 
and social environment of a country that may affect the performance of cli-
ents. Transfer risks are the difficulties that a client might have in obtaining the 
foreign exchange needed to service a bank’s obligations. The classification of 
international loans should normally include both country and transfer risks. A 
bank may be asked to provision for international loans on a loan-by-loan basis, 
whereby the level of necessary provisions is raised to accommodate additional 
risk. Alternatively, a bank may determine aggregate exposures to country and 
transfer risks on a country-by-country basis and provide special reserves to ac-
commodate risk exposures. 
Insistence on Availability of Current Financial Information
The safe extension of credit depends on complete and accurate information 
regarding every detail of the borrower’s credit standing. A possible exception 
to this rule is the case in which a loan was originally approved with readily 
marketable collateral to be used as the source of repayment. A lending policy 
should define the financial statement requirements for businesses and individu-
als at various borrowing levels and should include appropriate guidelines for 
audited, unaudited, interim, cash f low, and other statements. It should include 
external credit checks required at the time of periodic updates. If the loan ma-
turity is longer than one year, the policy should require that the bank’s officers 
prepare financial projections with the horizon equivalent to the loan maturity, 
to ensure that the loan can be repaid from cash f low. The assumptions for the 
projections should be clearly outlined. All requirements should be defined so 
that any negative credit data would clearly indicate a violation of the bank’s 
lending policy. 
Collections Monitoring
A lending policy should define delinquent obligations of all types and specify 
the appropriate reports to be submitted to the board. These reports should in-
clude sufficient detail to allow for the determination of the risk factor, loss 
potential, and alternative courses of action. The policy should require a follow-
up collection procedure that is systematic and becomes progressively stronger. 
Guidelines should be established to ensure that all major problem loans are 
presented to and reviewed by the board. 
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Limit on Total Outstanding Loans
A limit on the total loan portfolio is usually expressed relative to deposits, capi-
tal, or total assets. In setting such a limit, factors such as credit demand, the 
volatility of deposits, and credit risks should be considered. 
Maximum Ratio of Loan Amount to the Market Value of 
Pledged Securities
A lending policy should set forth margin requirements for all types of securities 
that are accepted as collateral. Margin requirements should be related to the 
marketability of securities. A lending policy should also assign responsibility 
and establish a timetable for periodic pricing of collateral. 
Impairment Recognition
A bank should have policies in place to systematically identify and recognize 
the impairment of a loan or a collectively assessed group of loans. This should 
be done whenever a bank will likely be unable to collect the amounts due ac-
cording to the loan agreement. Impairment can be recognized by reducing the 
carrying amount of the loan to its estimated realizable value through an exist-
ing allowance or by charging the income statement during the period in which 
the impairment occurs. 
Renegotiated Debt Treatment
Renegotiated debt refers to loans that have been restructured to provide a re-
duction of either interest or principal payments because of the borrower’s dete-
riorated financial position. A loan that is extended or renewed with terms that 
are equal to those applied to new debt with similar risk should not be consid-
ered renegotiated debt. Restructuring may involve a transfer from the borrower 
to the bank of real estate, receivables or other assets from third parties, a debt-
to-equity swap in full or partial satisfaction of the loan, or the addition of a new 
debtor to the original borrower. 
A good practice is to have such transactions approved by the board of directors 
before concessions are made to a borrower. Bank policies should also ensure that 
such items are properly handled from an accounting and control standpoint. A 
bank should measure a restructured loan by reducing its recorded investment 
to a net realizable value, taking into account the cost of all the concessions at 
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the date of restructuring. The reduction should be recorded as a charge to the 
income statement for the period in which the loan is restructured. A signifi-
cant amount of renegotiated debt is normally a sign that a bank is experiencing 
problems. An exception to this general approach applies in a market environ-
ment of falling interest rates, when it may be in the interest of both debtors and 
creditors to renegotiate the original credit terms. 
Written Internal Guidelines
Finally, a lending policy should be supplemented with other written guidelines 
for specific departments of the bank. Written policies and procedures that are 
approved and enforced in various departments should be referenced in a bank’s 
general lending policy. The absence of written policies, guidelines, and proce-
dures is a major deficiency and a sign that a board of directors is not properly 
executing its fiduciary responsibilities. 
7.4 Analyzing Credit Risk
Loan Portfolio Structure 
The detailed composition of assets usually provides a good picture of a bank’s 
business profile and business priorities as well as the type of intermediation risk 
that the bank is expected and willing to take. Any analysis should include an 
overview of what products have been lent, to whom, and for how long. 
An aggregate loan portfolio analysis should include the following: 
A summary of the major loan types, including details of the number of  ¶
customers, average maturity, and the average interest rate earned 
Distribution of the loan portfolio, including various perspectives on the  ¶
number of loans and total amounts—for example, according to currency, 
short- (less than one year) and long-term (more than one year) maturities, 
industrial and other pertinent economic sectors, state-owned and private 
borrowers, and corporate and retail lending 
Loans with government or other guarantees ¶
A review of loans by risk classification  ¶
An analysis of nonperforming loans  ¶
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To illustrate this process, figure 7.4 shows the profile of a bank’s borrowers, in-
cluding individuals and public sector and other enterprises. This profile high-
lights the target customer segments that pose an acceptable risk to a bank. 
The figure also traces the shift of target customer profiles from public sector 
enterprises toward the private sector. 
Figure 7.4 Customer Profile: Who We Are Lending To
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Figure 7.5 illustrates the various products that a bank can lend out in response 
to market demand. Changes in a bank’s target customers clearly affect the dis-
tribution of its lending products. 
Figure 7.5 Customer Loans by Product 
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Figure 7.6 traces the evolution of the maturity structure (or length) of a bank’s 
loans to customers. Changes in maturity structure may be influenced by shifts 
in customers and lending products as well as by a bank’s risk factors and mac-
roeconomic trends.
Figure 7.6 Maturity of Loans to Customers 
Loan Portfolio Review
A loan portfolio ref lects a bank’s market position and demand, its business and 
risk strategy, and its credit extension capabilities. When feasible, the loan port-
folio review (see box 7.1) should normally include a random sampling of loans 
so that approximately 70 percent of the total loan amount and 30 percent of the 
number of loans are covered. It should also consider at least 75 percent of the 
total loan amount and 50 percent of the number of all foreign currency loans 
and of all loans with maturities greater than one year. In addition, a detailed 
credit portfolio review should include the following: 
All loans to borrowers with aggregate exposure larger than 5 percent of  ¶
the bank’s capital 
All loans to shareholders and connected parties  ¶
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All loans for which the interest or repayment terms have been resched- ¶
uled or otherwise altered since the granting of the loan 
All loans for which cash payment of interest or principal is more than 30  ¶
days past due, including those for which interest has been capitalized or 
rolled over 
All loans classified as substandard, doubtful, or loss  ¶
In each of these cases, a loan review should consider documentation in the 
borrower’s file and involve a discussion with the responsible credit officer of 
the borrower’s business, near-term prospects, and credit history. When the to-
tal amount due exceeds 5 percent of a bank’s capital, the analysis should also 
consider the borrower’s business plans for the future and the potential conse-
quences for debt service capacity and principal repayment.
Box 7.1 Contents of a Loan Review File
For each of the loans reviewed, a summary file should be made showing 
the following: 
Borrower’s name and line of business  ¶
Use of proceeds  ¶
Date credit was granted  ¶
Loan maturity date, amount, currency, and interest rate  ¶
Principal source of repayment  ¶
Nature and value of collateral/security (or valuation basis, if a ﬁ xed asset)  ¶
Total outstanding liabilities, including loan principal and interest due and all  ¶
other real and contingent liabilities, in cases where the bank is absorbing the 
credit risk 
Delinquency or nonperformance, if any  ¶
Description of monitoring activities undertaken for the loan  ¶
Financial information, including current ﬁ nancial statements and other  ¶
pertinent information
Speciﬁ c provisions that are required and available ¶
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Interbank Deposits
Beyond loans, interbank deposits are the most important category of assets for 
which a bank carries credit risk. This category may account for a significant 
percentage of a bank’s balance sheet, particularly in countries that lack con-
vertibility but allow their citizens and economic agents to maintain foreign 
exchange deposits. Other reasons for interbank deposits are the facilitation of 
fund transfers, the settlement of securities transactions, or because certain ser-
vices are more economically or efficiently performed by other banks because 
of their size or geographical location. A review of interbank lending typically 
focuses on the following aspects:
The establishment and observation of counterparty credit limits, includ- ¶
ing a description of existing credit limit policy 
Any interbank credits for which specific provisions should be made  ¶
The method and accuracy of reconciliation of nostro and vostro accounts  ¶
Any interbank credits with terms of pricing that are not the market norm  ¶
The concentration of interbank exposure with a detailed listing of banks  ¶
and amounts outstanding as well as lending limits 
From a credit risk management perspective, interbank deposits should be treat-
ed just like any other credit risk exposure. A bank’s policy should require that 
correspondent banks be carefully reviewed for exposure limits, as well as their 
ability to provide adequate collateral. Banks from regulatory environments that 
are strict, well supervised, and in tune with international standards are custom-
arily treated as a lesser risk than banks from developing countries.
Off-Balance-Sheet Commitments
All off-balance-sheet commitments that incur credit exposure should also be 
reviewed. An assessment should be made of the adequacy of credit risk analysis 
procedures and the supervision and administration of off-balance-sheet credit 
instruments, such as guarantees. An off-balance-sheet portfolio review should 
be carried out with the same principles and in a manner similar to a loan port-
folio review. The key objective of a review of individual off-balance-sheet items 
is to assess the ability of the client to meet particular financial commitments in 
a timely manner. 
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7.5 Asset Classiﬁ cation and Loan Loss Provisioning
The quality of a bank’s loan portfolio is assessed through a classification and 
loss provisioning process. The specific objective of these reviews is to assess the 
likelihood that the credit will be repaid, as well as whether the classification 
of the loan proposed by the bank is adequate. Other considerations include the 
quality of collateral held and the ability of the borrower’s business to generate 
the necessary cash.
Asset Classiﬁ cation Categories
According to international standards, assets are normally classified in the fol-
lowing categories: 
Standard, or pass ¶ . When debt service capacity is considered to be be-
yond any doubt. In general, loans and other assets that are fully secured 
(including principal and interest) by cash or cash substitutes (for example, 
bank certificates of deposit and Treasury bills and notes) are usually clas-
sified as standard regardless of arrears or other adverse credit factors.
Specially mentioned, or watch ¶ . Assets with potential weaknesses that 
may, if not checked or corrected, weaken the asset as a whole or poten-
tially jeopardize a borrower’s repayment capacity in the future. This, for 
example, includes credit given through an inadequate loan agreement, a 
lack of control over collateral, or without proper documentation. Loans to 
borrowers operating under economic or market conditions that may nega-
tively affect the borrower in the future should receive this classification. 
This also applies to borrowers with an adverse trend in their operations or 
an unbalanced position in their balance sheet, but which have not reached 
a point where repayment is jeopardized. 
Substandard ¶ . This classification indicates credit weaknesses that jeop-
ardize debt service capacity, in particular when the primary sources of 
repayment are insufficient and the bank must look to secondary sources 
for repayment, such as collateral, the sale of a fixed asset, refinancing, or 
fresh capital. Substandard assets typically take the form of term credits 
to borrowers whose cash f low may not be sufficient to meet currently 
maturing debts or loans, and advances to borrowers that are significantly 
undercapitalized. They may also include short-term loans and advances 
to borrowers for which the inventory-to-cash cycle is insufficient to 
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repay the debt at maturity. Nonperforming assets that are at least 90 days 
overdue are normally classified as substandard, as are renegotiated loans 
and advances for which delinquent interest has been paid by the borrower 
from its own funds prior to renegotiations and until sustained perfor-
mance under a realistic repayment program has been achieved. 
Doubtful ¶ . Such assets have the same weaknesses as substandard assets, 
but their collection in full is questionable on the basis of existing facts. 
The possibility of loss is present, but certain factors that may strengthen 
the asset defer its classification as a loss until a more exact status may be 
determined. Nonperforming assets that are at least 180 days past due are 
also classified as doubtful, unless they are sufficiently secured. 
Loss ¶ . Certain assets are considered uncollectible and of such little value 
that the continued definition as bankable assets is not warranted. This 
classification does not mean that an asset has absolutely no recovery or 
salvage value, but rather that it is neither practical nor desirable to defer 
the process of writing it off, even though partial recovery may be possible 
in the future. Nonperforming assets that are at least one year past due are 
also classified as losses, unless such assets are very well secured. 
Nonperforming Loans
The concept of nonperforming assets is typically introduced as part of a dis-
cussion on asset classification. Nonperforming assets are those not generating 
income. As a first step, loans are often considered to be nonperforming when 
principal or interest on them is due and left unpaid for 90 days or more. (This 
period may vary by jurisdiction.) Loan classification and provisioning entails 
much more than simply looking at amounts overdue. The borrower’s cash f low 
and overall ability to repay amounts owing are significantly more important 
than whether the loan is overdue or not. 
For financial reporting purposes, the principal balance outstanding, rather 
than delinquent payments, is used to identify a nonperforming loan portfolio. 
The nonperforming loan portfolio is an indication of the quality of the total 
portfolio and ultimately that of a bank’s lending decisions. Another such in-
dicator is the bank’s collection ratio. Table 7.2 and figure 7.7 illustrate aspects 
of nonperforming loans over a period of time and the level of provisions put in 
place to record potential losses. 
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Table 7.2 Loan Portfolio Statistics
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Gross loans
Overdue loans
Overdue loans as percentage of total loans
Bad debts
Bad debts as percentage of total loans
Specifi c provisions
Specifi c provisions as percentage of total loans
Market value of security held (for assets with specifi c provisions)
Coverage ratio (market value of collateral as a percentage of specifi c provisions)
Value of loan loss provision as percentage of total loans
Loans to private sector as percentage of total loans (gross)
Loans to individuals as percentage of total loans (gross)
Loans to public sector as percentage of total loans (gross)
20 largest borrowers as percentage of total gross loans portfolio
20 largest borrowers as percentage of total off-balance-sheet items
20 largest borrowers as percentage of net interest income
20 largest borrowers as percentage of total assets
20 largest borrowers as percentage of qualifying capital
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Figure 7.7 Loan Portfolio Statistics
When assessed within the context of nonperforming loans, the aggregate level 
of provisions indicates the capacity of a bank to effectively accommodate credit 
risk. The analysis of a nonperforming loan portfolio should cover the following 
aspects: 
Aging of past-due loans, including principal and interest, and classified  ¶
by more than 30, 90, 180, and 360 days, should be broken down by type 
of customer and branch of economic activity to determine overall trends 
and whether all customers are affected equally. 
Reasons for the deterioration of the loan portfolio quality should be  ¶
determined, which can help identify possible measures the bank can 
undertake to reverse a given trend. 
A list of nonperforming loans, including all relevant details, should be  ¶
assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine if the situation is reversible, 
exactly what can be done to improve repayment capacity, and whether 
workout or collection plans have been used. 
Provision levels should be considered to determine the bank’s capacity to  ¶
withstand loan defaults. The impact on profit and loss accounts should 
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be considered to determine exactly how the bank will be affected by the 
deterioration of asset quality. 
A number of reasons can explain deteriorating loan portfolio quality. It is un-
avoidable that banks make mistakes in judgment. However, for most failed 
banks, the real problems are systemic in nature and rooted in the bank’s credit 
culture. Box 7.2 describes the kinds of problems that indicate distortion in a 
bank’s credit culture. 
Box 7.2 Signs of a Distorted Credit Culture
Self-dealing 
An overextension of credit to directors and large shareholders, or to their interests, 
while compromising sound credit principles under pressure from related parties. 
Self-dealing has been the key issue in a significant number of problem banks. 
Compromise of credit principles 
Arises when loans that have undue risk or are extended under unsatisfactory terms 
are granted with full knowledge of the violation of sound credit principles. The rea-
sons for the compromise typically include self-dealing, anxiety over income, com-
petitive pressures in the bank’s key markets, or personal conflicts of interest. 
Anxiety over income 
A situation in which concern over earnings outweighs the soundness of lending 
decisions, underscored by the hope that risk will not materialize or lead to loans 
with unsatisfactory repayment terms. This is a relatively frequent problem because 
a loan portfolio is usually a bank’s key revenue-producing asset. 
Incomplete credit information 
This indicates that loans have been extended without proper appraisal of borrower 
creditworthiness. 
Complacency 
This is a frequent cause of bad loan decisions. Complacency is typically manifested 
in a lack of adequate supervision of old, familiar borrowers, dependence on oral in-
formation rather than reliable and complete financial data, and an optimistic inter-
pretation of known credit weaknesses because of survival in distressed situations 
in the past. In addition, banks may ignore warning signs regarding the borrower, 
economy, region, industry, or other relevant factors or fail to enforce repayment 
agreements, including a lack of prompt legal action.
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Lack of supervision 
Ineffective supervision invariably results in a lack of knowledge about the bor-
rower’s affairs over the lifetime of the loan. Consequently, initially sound loans may 
develop problems and losses because of a lack of effective supervision.
Technical incompetence 
This includes a lack of technical ability among credit officers to analyze financial 
statements and obtain and evaluate pertinent credit information. 
Poor selection of risks 
This tendency typically involves the following:
The extension of loans with initially sound ﬁ nancial risk to a level beyond the  ¶
reasonable payment capacity of the borrower. This is a frequent problem in 
unstable economies with volatile interest rates. 
Loans where the bank-ﬁ nanced share of the total cost of the project is  ¶
large relative to the equity investment of the owners. Loans for real estate 
transactions with narrow equity ownership also fall into this category. 
Loans based on the expectation of successful completion of a business  ¶
transaction, rather than on the borrower’s creditworthiness, and loans made 
for the speculative purchase of securities or goods. 
Loans to companies operating in economically distressed areas or industries.  ¶
Loans made because of large deposits in a bank, rather than on sound net  ¶
worth or collateral. 
Loans predicated on collateral of problematic liquidation value or collateral  ¶
loans that lack adequate security margins. 
Commercial Bank Examination Manual
Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation
December 1985
Overdue Interest
To avoid the overstatement of income and ensure timely recognition of nonper-
forming assets, bank policies should require appropriate action on uncollected 
interest. Two basic methods exist for handling both the suspension and nonac-
crual of interest. First, in cases where the interest is suspended, it is accrued 
or capitalized and an offsetting accounting entry is made for a category called 
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“interest in suspense.” For reporting purposes the two entries must be netted; 
otherwise the assets will be inflated. 
Second, when a bank places a loan in nonaccrual status, it should reverse un-
collected interest against corresponding income and balance sheet accounts. 
For interest accrued in the current accounting period, the deduction should 
be made directly from current interest income. For prior accounting periods, 
a bank should charge the reserve for possible loan losses or, if accrued interest 
provisions have not been provided, the charge should be expensed against cur-
rent earnings. A nonaccruing loan is normally restored to accruing status after 
both principal and interest  in arrears have been repaid or when prospects for 
future contractual payments are no longer in doubt. 
In some jurisdictions, a bank may avoid taking action on interest in arrears if 
the obligation is well secured or the process of collection is underway. A debt 
is considered to be well secured if it is backed by collateral in the form of liens 
on or pledges of real or personal property. Such collateral, including securities, 
must have a realizable value that is sufficient to discharge the debt in full ac-
cording to contract terms or by a financially responsible party. A debt is “in the 
process of collection” if collection is proceeding in due course, either through 
legal action or through collection efforts that are expected to result in repay-
ment of the debt or in its restoration to current status. 
Classifying Assets
Asset classification is a key tool of risk management. Assets are classified at 
the time of origination and then reviewed and reclassified as necessary (accord-
ing to the degree of credit risk) a few times a year. The review should consider 
service performance and the client’s financial condition. Economic trends and 
changes in the market for and the price of goods also affect evaluation of loan 
repayment. Assets classified as “pass” or “watch” are typically reviewed twice a 
year, and critical assets are reviewed at least quarterly. 
Banks determine classifications by themselves but follow standards that are 
normally set by regulatory authorities. 
Primary emphasis is placed on the client’s ability and willingness to meet obli-
gations out of prospective operating cash f low. Some jurisdictions require that 
all credit extended to an individual client should be assigned the same risk 
classification, while differences in classification should be noted and justified. 
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Other jurisdictions recommend that each asset be assessed on its own mer-
its. In cases where assets may be classified differently depending on whether 
subjective or objective criteria are used, the more severe classification should 
generally apply. If supervisory authorities, and in many cases external auditors, 
assign more stringent classifications than the bank itself, the bank is expected 
to adjust the classification. 
In some advanced banking systems, banks use more than one rating level for 
assets in the category of pass or standard. The objective of this practice is to im-
prove the ability to differentiate among different types of credit and to improve 
the understanding of the relationship between profitability and rating level. 
Loan Loss Provisioning
Asset classification provides a basis for determining an adequate level of provi-
sions for possible loan losses. Such provisions, together with general loss re-
serves that are normally counted as Tier 2 capital and are not assigned to spe-
cific assets, form the basis for establishing a bank’s capacity to absorb losses. 
In determining an adequate reserve, all significant factors that affect the col-
lectibility of the loan portfolio should be considered. These factors include the 
quality of credit policies and procedures, prior loss experiences, loan growth, 
quality of management in the lending area, loan collection and recovery prac-
tices, changes in national and local economic and business conditions, and gen-
eral economic trends. 
Assessments of asset value should be performed systematically, consistently 
over time, and in conformity with objective criteria. They should also be sup-
ported by adequate documentation. 
Estimates of the level of necessary loan loss provisions inherently include a 
degree of subjectivity. However, management discretion should be exercised in 
accordance with established policies and procedures. An analysis of adequacy of 
the overall allowance for losses should include the following aspects:
A survey of the bank’s existing provisioning policy and the methodology  ¶
used to carry it out. In particular, the value attributed to collateral and its 
legal and operational enforceability should be considered. 
An overview of asset classification procedures and the review process,  ¶
including the time allotted for review. 
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Determination of the current factors that are likely to cause losses associ- ¶
ated with a bank’s portfolio and that differ from the historical experience 
of loss. These may include changes in a bank’s economic and business 
conditions or in its clients, external factors, or alterations of bank proce-
dures since the last review. 
A trend analysis over a longer period of time, which serves to highlight  ¶
any increases in overdue loans and the impact of such increases. 
An opinion of the adequacy of the current policy and, on the basis of the  ¶
loans reviewed, extrapolation of additional provisions necessary to bring 
the bank’s total loan loss provisions in line with International Financial 
Reporting Standards. 
Policies on loan loss provisioning range from mandated to discretionary, de-
pending on the banking system. The tax treatment of provisions also varies 
considerably from country to country, although many economists believe that 
provisions should be treated as business expenses for tax purposes. Tax consid-
erations should not, however, influence prudent risk management policies. In 
some highly developed countries, it is left to the banks to determine the pru-
dent level of provisions. While some merit exists in estimating loss potential on 
a case-by-case basis, particularly for large borrowers, it may be more practical 
to assign a level of required provisions based on each classification category. In 
many countries, in particular those with fragile economies, regulators have es-
tablished mandatory levels of provisions that are related to asset classification.
The established level of mandatory provisions is normally determined by cer-
tain statistics. In countries where the legal framework for debt recovery is highly 
developed, such as the United States, studies have demonstrated that approxi-
mately 10 percent of substandard assets eventually deteriorate into loss. The 
percentages for doubtful and loss classifications are approximately 50 percent 
and 100 percent, respectively. In developing countries where the legal frame-
works and traditions for debt collection may be less effective, provisions in the 
range of 20 to 25 percent of substandard assets may be a more realistic estimate 
of loss potential. Table 7.3 can be used as a guide to the level of provisions in 
countries with less-developed legal frameworks. 
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Table 7.3 Recommended Loan Loss Provisions 
Classifi cation Recommended Provision Qualifi cation
Pass 1–2 percent General loss reserve
Watch 5–10 percent Specifi c provision
Substandard 10–30 percent Specifi c provision
Doubtful 50–75 percent Specifi c provision
Loss 100 percent Specifi c provision
Loss Assets and Workout Procedures
Two approaches exist for dealing with loss assets. One is to retain loss assets on 
the books until all remedies for collection have been exhausted. This is typical 
for banking systems based on the British tradition; in such cases, the level of 
loss reserve may appear unusually large. The second approach requires that all 
loss assets be promptly written off against the reserve, that is, removed from the 
books. This approach is typical of the U.S. tradition and is more conservative—
loss assets are considered to be nonbankable but not necessarily nonrecover-
able. By immediately writing off loss assets, the level of the reserve will appear 
smaller in relation to the outstanding loan portfolio. In evaluating the level of 
provisions established by a bank, an analyst must clearly understand whether 
the bank is aggressively writing off its losses or is simply providing for them. 
The approach used in a particular country often depends on the taxation ap-
plied to provisions by the fiscal authorities. 
Workout procedures are an important aspect of credit risk management. If 
timely action is not taken to address problem loans, opportunities to strengthen 
or collect on these poor-quality assets may be missed and losses may accumu-
late to a point where they threaten a bank’s solvency. An assessment of workout 
procedures should consider the organization of this function, including depart-
ments and responsible staff, and assess the performance of the workout units 
by reviewing attempted and successful recoveries (in terms of both number and 
volume) and the average time for recovery. The workout methods used and the 
involvement of senior management should also be evaluated. 
During a workout process, each loan and borrower should be considered on 
their own merits. Typical workout strategies include the following: 
Reducing the credit risk exposure of a bank, for example, by having the  ¶
borrower provide additional capital, funds, collateral, or guarantees 
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Working with the borrower to assess problems and find solutions to in- ¶
crease loan service and repayment capacity, such as the providing advice, 
developing a program to reduce operating costs and increase earnings, 
selling assets, designing a debt restructuring program, or changing loan 
terms 
Arranging for a borrower to be bought or taken over by a more creditwor- ¶
thy party, or arranging for some form of joint-venture partnership 
Liquidating exposure through out-of-court settlement or by taking legal  ¶
action, calling on guarantees, foreclosing, or liquidating collateral 
7.6 Assessing Credit Risk Management Capacity
When carrying out its duties on behalf of both depositors and shareholders, 
a board of directors must ensure that a bank’s lending function fulfills three 
fundamental objectives: 
Loans should be granted on a sound and collectible basis.  ¶
Funds should be invested profitably for the benefit of shareholders and  ¶
the protection of depositors. 
The legitimate credit needs of economic agents and households should be  ¶
satisfied. 
The purpose of a review of risk management capacity is to evaluate whether the 
lending process is well organized; if policies are properly described in internal 
procedures and manuals; if staffing is adequate and diligent in following estab-
lished policies and guidelines; and whether the information normally available 
to participants in the lending process is timely, accurate, and complete. 
Lending Processes
The integrity and credibility of the lending process depend on objective credit 
decisions that ensure an acceptable risk level in relation to the expected return. 
A review of the lending process should include analysis of credit manuals and 
other written guidelines applied by various departments of a bank, and of the 
capacity and actual performance of all departments involved in the credit func-
tion. It should also cover the origination, appraisal, approval, disbursement, 
monitoring, collection, and handling procedures for the various credit functions 
provided by the bank. Specifically, the review should cover the following: 
188 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
A detailed credit analysis and approval process, including samples of loan  ¶
application forms, internal credit summary forms, internal credit manu-
als, and loan files 
Criteria for approving loans, determining loan pricing policy and lend- ¶
ing limits at various levels of the bank’s management, and for making 
arrangements for lending through the branch network 
Collateral policy for all types of loans, including the actual methods and  ¶
practices concerning revaluation of collateral and files related to collateral 
Administration and monitoring procedures, including responsibilities,  ¶
compliance, and controls 
A  process for handling exceptions  ¶
The review should involve interviews with all middle-level managers of all de-
partments that have a credit function. It should also include reviews of indi-
vidual credit files. A review of the volume of the credit applications that have 
been appraised versus those that have been approved in the past 6 or 12 months 
(in terms of both total numbers and dollar amounts) would be one indication of 
the quality of credit appraisal.
Human Resources Analysis
This assessment should identify the staff involved in credit origination, apprais-
al, supervision, and processes to monitor credit risk. Specifically, their number, 
levels, age, experience, and specific responsibilities should be identified. Staff 
organization, skills, and qualifications should be analyzed in relation to policies 
and procedures. All ongoing training programs for a bank’s credit staff should 
be reviewed and their adequacy assessed. The quality and frequency of staff 
training is usually a good indicator of the level of lending skills. 
Information Flows
Because the lending function is usually spread throughout an organization, 
a bank must have efficient systems for monitoring adherence to established 
guidelines. This can best be accomplished through an internal review and re-
porting system that informs the directorate and senior management of how 
policies are being carried out and that provides them with sufficient informa-
tion to evaluate the performance of lower-echelon officers and the condition 
of the loan portfolio. Because information is the basic element of the credit 
 189
Chapter 7: Credit Risk Management
management process, its availability, quality, and cost effectiveness should be 
analyzed. In addition, because information needed in the credit management 
process may be dispersed in different parts of the bank, an analysis should pay 
particular attention to information f lows, especially whether the information 
actually supplied is complete and available in a timely and cost-effective man-
ner. Such an analysis should be closely linked to a review of human resources, 
organizational and control structures, and information technology. 

8
Liquidity Risk Management
8.1 The Need for Liquidity
Liquidity is necessary for banks to compensate for expected and unex-pected balance sheet f luctuations and to provide funds for growth. It represents a bank’s ability to efficiently accommodate the redemption of 
deposits and other liabilities and to cover funding increases in the loan and in-
vestment portfolio. A bank has adequate liquidity potential when it can obtain 
needed funds (by increasing liabilities, securitizing, or selling assets) promptly 
and at a reasonable cost. The price of liquidity is a function of market condi-
tions and the market’s perception of the inherent riskiness of the borrowing 
institution. 
In the introduction to the June 2008 consultation paper (box 8.1), the Basel 
Committee on Bank Supervision states the following:
Key Messages
Liquidity management is a key banking function and an integral part of the asset  ¶
liability management process. 
Banks are particularly vulnerable to liquidity problems, on an institution-speciﬁ c  ¶
level and from a systemic/market viewpoint. 
The source of deposits ( ¶ who provides the bank’s funding) adds to the volatility of 
funds, as some creditors are more sensitive to market and credit events than others. 
Diversiﬁ cation of funding sources and maturities enables a bank to avoid the 
vulnerability associated with the concentration of funding from a single source. 
Liquidity management policies should comprise a risk management (decision- ¶
making) structure, a liquidity management and funding strategy, a set of limits 
to liquidity risk exposures, and a set of procedures for liquidity planning under 
alternative scenarios, including crisis situations. 
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Liquidity is the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet  ¶
obligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses. 
The fundamental role of banks in the maturity transformation of short- ¶
term deposits into long-term loans makes banks inherently vulnerable to 
liquidity risk, both of an institution-specific nature and that which affects 
markets as a whole. 
Virtually every financial transaction or commitment has implications for  ¶
a bank’s liquidity. 
Effective liquidity risk management helps ensure a bank’s ability to meet  ¶
cash f low obligations, which are uncertain as they are affected by external 
events and other agents’ behavior. 
Liquidity risk management is of paramount importance because a liquid- ¶
ity shortfall at a single institution can have systemwide repercussions. 
Financial market developments in the past decade have increased the  ¶
complexity of liquidity risk and its management.
Box 8.1 Principles For Sound Liquidity Risk 
Management and Supervision
Draft for Consultation
Principle 1: A bank is responsible for the sound management of liquidity risk. A bank should establish 
a robust liquidity risk management framework that ensures it maintains sufficient liquidity, including 
a cushion of unencumbered, high quality liquid assets, to withstand a range of stress events, includ-
ing those involving the loss or impairment of both unsecured and secured funding sources
Principle 2: A bank should clearly articulate a liquidity risk tolerance that is appropriate for its busi-
ness strategy and its role in the financial system.
Principle 3: Senior management should develop a strategy, policies and practices to manage liquidity 
risk in accordance with the risk tolerance and to ensure that the bank maintains sufficient liquidity.
Principle 4: A bank should incorporate liquidity costs, benefits and risks in the product pricing, per-
formance measurement and new product approval process for all significant business activities (both 
on- and off-balance sheet), thereby aligning the risk-taking incentives of individual business lines 
with the liquidity risk exposures their activities create for the bank as a whole.
Principle 5: A bank should have a sound process for identifying, measuring, monitoring and control-
ling liquidity risk. This process should include a robust framework for comprehensively projecting 
cash flows arising from assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items over an appropriate set of time 
horizons. 
Principle 6: A bank should actively manage liquidity risk exposures and funding needs within and 
across legal entities, business lines and currencies, taking into account legal, regulatory and opera-
tional limitations to the transferability of liquidity. 
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Principle 7: A bank should establish a funding strategy that provides effective diversification in the 
sources and tenor of funding. It should maintain an ongoing presence in its chosen funding markets 
and strong relationships with funds providers to promote effective diversification of funding sources. 
A bank should regularly gauge its capacity to raise funds quickly from each source. It should identify 
the main factors that affect its ability to raise funds and monitor those factors closely to ensure that 
estimates of fund raising capacity remain valid. 
Principle 8: A bank should actively manage its intraday liquidity positions and risks to meet payment 
and settlement obligations on a timely basis under both normal and stressed conditions and thus 
contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems. 
Principle 9: A bank should actively manage its collateral positions, differentiating between encum-
bered and unencumbered assets. A bank should monitor the legal entity and physical location where 
collateral is held and how it may be mobilized in a timely manner. 
Principle 10: A bank should conduct stress tests on a regular basis for a variety of institution-specific 
and market-wide stress scenarios (individually and in combination) to identify sources of potential 
liquidity strain and to ensure that current exposures remain in accordance with a bank’s established 
liquidity risk tolerance. A bank should use stress test outcomes to adjust its liquidity risk manage-
ment strategies, policies, and positions and to develop effective contingency plans. 
Principle 11: A bank should have a formal contingency funding plan (CFP) that clearly sets out the strate-
gies for addressing liquidity shortfalls in emergency situations. A CFP should outline policies to manage 
a range of stress environments, establish clear lines of responsibility, include clear invocation and esca-
lation procedures and be regularly tested and updated to ensure that it is operationally robust. 
Principle 12: A bank should maintain a cushion of unencumbered, high quality liquid assets to be 
held as insurance against a range of liquidity stress scenarios, including those that involve the loss 
or impairment of unsecured and typically available secured funding sources. There should be no 
legal, regulatory or operational impediment to using these assets to obtain funding. 
Public disclosure 
Principle 13: A bank should publicly disclose information on a regular basis that enables market 
participants to make an informed judgment about the soundness of its liquidity risk management 
framework and liquidity position. 
Principle 14: Supervisors should regularly perform a comprehensive assessment of a bank’s overall 
liquidity risk management framework and liquidity position to determine whether they deliver an 
adequate level of resilience to liquidity stress given the bank’s role in the financial system. 
Principle 15: Supervisors should supplement their regular assessments of a bank’s liquidity risk man-
agement framework and liquidity position by monitoring a combination of internal reports, pruden-
tial reports and market information. 
Principle 16: Supervisors should intervene to require effective and timely remedial action by a bank 
to address deficiencies in its liquidity risk management processes or liquidity position. 
Principle 17: Supervisors should communicate with other supervisors and public authorities, such as 
central banks, both within and across national borders, to facilitate effective cooperation regarding 
the supervision and oversight of liquidity risk management. Communication should occur regularly 
during normal times, with the nature and frequency of the information sharing increasing as appro-
priate during times of stress.
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision
June 2008
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Liquidity risk management lies at the heart of confidence in the banking sys-
tem, as commercial banks are highly leveraged institutions with a ratio of as-
sets to core (Tier 1) capital in the range of 20:1. The importance of liquidity 
transcends the individual institution, because a liquidity shortfall at a single 
institution can have systemwide repercussions. It is in the nature of a bank 
to transform the term of its liabilities to different maturities on the asset side 
of the balance sheet. Because the yield curve is typically upward sloping, the 
maturity of assets tends to be longer than that of liabilities. The actual inflow 
and outflow of funds do not necessarily ref lect contractual maturities, and yet 
banks must be able to meet certain commitments (such as deposits) whenever 
they come due. A bank may therefore experience liquidity mismatches, making 
its liquidity policies and liquidity risk management key factors in its business 
strategy. 
Liquidity risk management therefore addresses market liquidity rather than 
statutory liquidity. The implication of liquidity risk is that a bank may have 
insufficient funds on hand to meet its obligations. (A bank’s net funding in-
cludes its maturing assets, existing liabilities, and standby facilities with other 
institutions. It would sell its marketable assets in the stable liquidity investment 
portfolio [see chapter 10] to meet liquidity requirements only as a last resort.) 
Liquidity risks are normally managed by a bank’s asset-liability management 
committee (ALCO), which must therefore have a thorough understanding of 
the interrelationship between liquidity and other market and credit risk expo-
sures on the balance sheet. 
This chapter focuses on the management of expected cash f lows. Understanding 
the context of liquidity risk management involves examining a bank’s approach 
to funding and liquidity planning under alternative scenarios. As a result of 
the increasing depth of interbank (money) markets, a fundamental shift has 
taken place in the authorities’ attitude toward prudent liquidity management. 
Supervisory authorities now tend to concentrate on the maturity structure of 
a bank’s assets and liabilities rather than solely on its statutory liquid asset 
 requirements. They do this using maturity ladders for liabilities and assets dur-
ing specific periods (or time bands), a process that represents a move from the 
calculation of contractual cash outflows to the calculation of expected liquidity 
f lows.
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8.2 Liquidity Management Policies
In day-to-day operations, the management of liquidity is typically achieved 
through the management of a bank’s assets. In the medium term, liquidity is 
also addressed through management of the structure of a bank’s liabilities. The 
level of liquidity deemed adequate for one bank may be insufficient for another. 
A particular bank’s liquidity position may also vary from adequate to inade-
quate according to the anticipated need for funds at any given time. Judgment 
of the adequacy of a liquidity position requires analysis of a bank’s historical 
funding requirements, its current liquidity position and its anticipated future 
funding needs, the options it has for reducing funding needs or attracting ad-
ditional funds, and the source of funding. 
The amount of liquid or of readily marketable assets that a bank should hold 
depends on the stability of its deposit structure and the potential for rapid loan 
portfolio expansion. Generally, if deposits are composed primarily of small, 
stable accounts, a bank will need relatively low liquidity. A much higher liquid-
ity position normally is required when a substantial portion of the loan port-
folio consists of large long-term loans, when a bank has a somewhat high con-
centration of deposits, or when recent trends show reductions of large corporate 
or household deposit accounts. Situations also can arise in which a bank should 
increase its liquidity position—for example, when large commitments have been 
made on the asset side and the bank expects the client to start utilization. 
The liquidity management policies of a bank normally comprise a decision-
making structure, an approach to funding and liquidity operations, a set of 
limits to liquidity risk exposure, and a set of procedures for liquidity planning 
under alternative scenarios, including crisis situations. The decision-making 
structure ref lects the importance that management places on liquidity: banks 
that stress the importance of liquidity normally institutionalize the structure 
for liquidity risk management in the ALCO and assign ultimate responsibility 
for setting policy and reviewing liquidity decisions to the bank’s highest man-
agement level. The bank’s strategy for funding and liquidity operations, which 
should be approved by the board, sets specific policies on particular aspects 
of risk management, such as the target liabilities structure, the use of certain 
financial instruments, or the pricing of deposits. 
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Liquidity needs usually are determined by the construction of a maturity lad-
der (see table 8.1) that comprises expected cash inflows and outflows over a 
series of specified time bands. The difference between the inflows and out-
flows in each period (that is, the excess or deficit of funds) provides a starting 
point from which to measure a bank’s future liquidity excess or shortfall at any 
given time. 
Table 8.1 Maturity Profile of Assets and Liabilities (Liquidity Mismatches)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Assets
Less than 3 months 8,440,268 9,306,606 10,272,647 11,497,545 15,203,780 31,725,644
3 months to 1 year 1,748,961 1,779,905 2,946,684 6,068,174 5,896,048 10,908,547
Over 1 year 5,144,749 8,511,279 9,558,988 13,047,642 21,898,451 21,799,745
Total assets 15,333,978 19,597,790 22,778,319 30,613,361 42,998,279 64,433,936
Liabilities
Less than 3 months 7,861,928 9,924,646 12,533,008 18,103,033 21,738,876 38,536,352
3 months to 1 year 6,308,929 8,059,233 8,520,962 9,498,927 17,543,080 17,638,551
Over 1 year  1,163,121 1,613,911 1,724,349 3,011,401 3,716,323 8,259,033
Total liabilities 15,333,978 19,597,790 22,778,319 30,613,361 42,998,279 64,433,936
Liquidity Mismatches
Less than 3 months 578,340 -618,040 -2,260,361 -6,605,488 -6,535,096 -6,810,708
3 months to 1 year -4,559,968 -6,279,328 -5,574,278 -3,430,753 -11,647,032 -6,730,004
Over 1 year  3,981,628 6,897,368 7,834,639 10,036,241 18,182,128 13,540,712
Once its liquidity needs have been determined, a bank must decide how to 
fulfill them. Liquidity management is related to a net funding requirement; 
in principle, a bank may increase its liquidity through asset management, lia-
bility management, or (and most frequently) a combination of both. In prac-
tice, a bank may meet its liquidity needs by disposing of highly liquid trading 
portfolio assets or assets that are nearly liquid, or by selling less-liquid assets 
such as excess property or other investments. On the liabilities side, this can be 
achieved by increasing short-term borrowings and short-term deposit liabilities, 
by increasing the maturity of liabilities, and ultimately by increasing capital. 
Many banks, particularly smaller ones, tend to have little influence over the total 
size of their liabilities. Their liquid assets enable such banks to provide funds 
to accommodate fluctuations in deposit levels and to satisfy increases in loan 
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demand. Banks that rely solely on asset management to maintain liquidity in the 
face of shifts in customer asset and liability preferences concentrate on adjusting 
the price and availability of credit and the level of liquid assets that they hold. 
Asset liquidity, or how “salable” the bank’s assets are in terms of both time 
and cost, is central to asset-liability management. To maximize profitabil-
ity, bank management must weigh the full return on liquid assets (yield plus 
insurance value) against the higher return associated with less-liquid assets. In 
most cases, liquid assets normally are maintained only as a liquidity buffer that 
banks can use should they encounter funding problems and depositors have to be 
refunded. Banks otherwise prefer to invest in assets with higher yields. Income 
derived from higher-yield assets nonetheless may be offset by a forced sale, which 
may in turn become necessary as a result of adverse balance sheet fluctuations. 
The number of banks that rely solely on manipulation of the asset structure to 
meet liquidity needs is declining rapidly, as the interbank (money) markets de-
velop. Seasonal, cyclical, or other factors often can cause aggregate outstanding 
loans and deposits to move in opposite directions, resulting in a loan demand 
that exceeds available deposit funds. A bank that relies on asset management 
should restrict loan growth to a level that can be supported by available deposit 
funds. As an alternative, liquidity needs may be met through liability sources 
such as money markets. 
Another challenge for liquidity management is contingent liabilities, such as 
letters of credit or financial guarantees. These represent potentially significant 
cash outflows that are not dependent on a bank’s financial condition. 
Although outflows in normal circumstances typically may be low, a general 
macroeconomic or market crisis can trigger a substantial increase in cash out-
flows because of the increase in defaults and bankruptcies in the enterprise 
sector that normally accompanies such events. Low levels of market liquidity, 
further exacerbating funding shortfalls, often accompany banking crises. 
Foreign Currency Aspects
The existence of multiple currencies also increases the complexity of liquidity 
management, particularly when the domestic currency is not freely convertible. 
A bank may have difficulty raising funds or selling assets in foreign currencies 
in the event of market disturbances or changes in domestic monetary or foreign 
exchange policies. In principle, a bank should have a management system (that 
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is, measuring, monitoring, and control) for its liquidity positions in all major 
currencies in which it is active. In addition to assessing its aggregate liquidity 
needs, a bank should also perform a separate analysis of its liquidity strategy 
for each currency. Key decisions in managing liquidity in individual foreign 
currencies center on the structure of such management: who is responsible for 
liquidity and liquidity risk in each currency, and within what parameters. 
A bank that operates in foreign currencies but does not maintain branch offices 
abroad usually manages liquidity of foreign currencies at its headquarters. A 
typical scheme for a bank with offices abroad is that policy setting and overall 
coordination and supervision are kept at headquarters, but the responsibility for 
the bank’s liquidity in a major foreign currency is delegated to the branch office 
in the country issuing that currency. The liquidity strategy for each currency, or 
exactly how its foreign currency funding needs will be met, should be a central 
concern of the bank. The bank must also develop a back-up liquidity strategy 
for circumstances in which its usual approach to liquidity funding is disrupted. 
Depending on the size of its foreign exchange operations and its portfolio in 
each currency, the bank may define a back-up liquidity strategy for all curren-
cies or may draw up a separate contingency plan for each. 
8.3 The Regulatory Environment
The most significant development in prudential liquidity regulation in the past 
two decades has been the assessment of liquidity needs by calculating expected 
cash f lows based on the maturity structure of a bank’s assets and liabilities. 
However, even regulators that have adopted the cash-flow methodology believe 
that the stock (of liquid assets) approach has an important, if supplementary, 
role to play and should not be neglected (see box 8.1 and figure 8.1). This stance 
is based on the perception that the increasingly important role of liquidity man-
agement, in addition to being an asset-liability management tool, has signifi-
cant implications for the stability of the banking system as a whole. Certain 
crucial premises influence this stability, including the confidence of banks in 
each other, the confidence of major suppliers of funds in banks, and the exis-
tence of normal market conditions. 
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Figure 8.1 Statutory Liquidity Required versus Actual Liquid Assets Held
Banking legislation normally contains specific liquidity requirements that 
banks must meet. These prudential requirements should not be viewed as the 
primary method for managing liquidity risk; the opposite in fact is true. Given 
the importance of liquidity, a bank with prudent management should establish 
certain policy guidelines for risk management in addition to determining re-
sponsibility for planning and day-to-day fund management. Typical liquidity 
regulations (or a bank’s own liquidity guidelines) are summarized in box 8.2.
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Box 8.2 Typical Liquidity Regulations or 
Internal Liquidity Guidelines
A limit on the loan-to-deposit ratio  ¶
A limit on the loan-to-capital ratio  ¶
Guidelines on sources and uses of funds  ¶
Liquidity parameters: for example, liquid assets should not fall below “X”  ¶
percent or rise above “Y” percent of total assets 
A percentage limit on the relationship between anticipated funding needs  ¶
and available resources to meet these needs: for example, the ratio of 
primary sources over anticipated needs should not fall below “X” percent 
A percentage limit on reliance on a particular liability category: for example,  ¶
negotiable certiﬁ cates of deposit should not account for more than “X” 
percent of total liabilities 
Limits on the minimum/maximum average maturity of different categories  ¶
of liabilities: for example, the average maturity of negotiable certiﬁ cates of 
deposit should not be less than “X” months
Trends in the prudential supervision of liquidity, as in other areas of regulation, 
have tended to lag behind market trends. In addition, less progress has been 
made in the international coordination and convergence of liquidity regulation 
than, for example, in the field of capital adequacy. Nevertheless, some impor-
tant changes have taken place, including the following: 
A relative decline in the importance of liquid asset requirements as a  ¶
supervisory tool, in favor of the cash-flow or maturity-profile approach 
Emphasis on the continual need for a stock of stable liquid assets as a  ¶
supplementary method of controlling risk 
A shift away from statutory requirements toward a more f lexible approach  ¶
to setting guidelines and monitoring liquidity 
Greater emphasis on evaluating the liquidity of individual banks, rather  ¶
than an across-the-board approach
Greater efforts by supervisors to improve bank standards for the informa- ¶
tion and control systems that are used to manage liquidity 
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Incorporation into the regulatory framework of off-balance-sheet prod- ¶
ucts and new methods of asset-liability management
The approach to supervision is therefore increasingly focused on the indepen-
dent evaluation of a bank’s strategies, policies, and procedures and its practices 
related to the measurement, monitoring, and control of liquidity risk. The em-
phasis increasingly is on the management structures necessary to effectively ex-
ecute a bank’s liquidity strategy and on the involvement of senior management 
in the liquidity risk management process.
Most countries now make a clear distinction between instruments of prudential 
supervision and monetary control. This applies particularly to the holding of 
specific liquid assets. In recent years, a greater reliance on control of the money 
supply as a major policy instrument—together with structural changes in the 
banking environment—has highlighted the incompatibility of and inconsisten-
cy between prudential supervision and monetary control. When banks attempt 
to circumvent the impact of monetary policy instruments such as the cash-
reserve requirement, which forms part of the prudential liquid asset require-
ments (for example, by moving liabilities related to repurchase agreements off 
the balance sheet), liquidity risk management may be negatively affected.  
8.4 The Structure of Funding
Funding structure is a key aspect of liquidity management. A bank with a stable, 
large, and diverse deposit base is likely to have fewer liquidity problems than a 
bank lacking such a deposit base. The assessment of the structure and type of 
deposit base and evaluation of the condition (that is, the stability and quality) of 
the deposits thus is the starting point for liquidity risk assessment. The type of 
information that is necessary to conduct this assessment includes the following: 
Product range. ¶  The different types of deposit products available should 
be noted, along with the number of accounts and the balance raised for 
each. This information is best presented in a schedule that shows the 
product type, such as savings or checking account, six-month deposit, or 
deposit with maturity greater than six months. (Product types are defined 
according to a bank’s own product offerings.) The nature of the depositor 
(for example, corporate or retail) should also be shown, because each type 
of depositor has a certain behavioral pattern. Breakdowns by the terms of 
deposit, including currency, maturity, and interest rates, should also be 
included. 
202 
Analyzing Banking Risk
Deposit concentration. ¶  The assessment should look at an itemization for 
all customers with deposits that aggregate to more than a certain percent-
age of total assets, with terms and pricing shown for each. 
Deposit administration. ¶  Information should be gathered on the adequa-
cy of the systems that record and control depositor transactions and inter-
nal access to customer accounts, as well as on the calculation and form of 
payment of interest (for example, average daily or period-end balance). 
Because of the competition for funds, most corporations and individuals seek 
to minimize their idle funds and the effect of disintermediation on a bank’s de-
posit base. A bank’s management therefore typically will adopt a development 
and retention program for all types of deposits. In addition to deposit growth, 
management also must look at the quality of the deposit structure to determine 
what percentage of the overall deposit structure is based on stable or hard-core 
deposits, f luctuating or seasonal deposits, and volatile deposits. This step is 
necessary if funds are to be invested with a proper understanding of anticipated 
and potential withdrawals. Figure 8.2 illustrates the source of deposits (that 
is, from whom they have been received, including households and public and 
private sector enterprises) for the particular bank under observation. Deposit 
management is a function of a number of variables, some of which are not under 
the direct control of bank management. 
Figure 8.2 Deposit Sources 
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Interbank Funding
Another key ingredient of a liquidity profile is a bank’s ability to obtain ad-
ditional liabilities (also known as its liquidity potential). The marginal cost 
of liquidity (that is, the cost of incremental funds acquired) is of paramount 
importance in evaluating the sources of liquidity. Consideration must be given 
to such factors as the frequency with which a bank needs to refinance maturing 
purchased liabilities and its ability to obtain funds through the money market. 
For a bank that operates frequently in short-term money markets, the crucial 
determinant of the ability to borrow new funds is its standing in the market.
The obvious difficulty of estimating the ability to borrow is that until a bank 
enters a market, the availability of funds at a price that will give a positive yield 
spread cannot be determined with certainty. Changes in money market condi-
tions may cause a bank’s capacity to borrow at a profitable rate to decline rap-
idly. In times of uncertainty, large investors and depositors tend to be reluctant 
to trade with small banks because they are regarded as risky. The same pattern 
may also apply to larger banks if their solvency comes into question. 
8.5 Cash Flow Analysis
Maturity mismatches are an intrinsic feature of banking, including the short-
term liability financing of medium-term and long-term lending. The crucial 
question is not whether mismatching occurs—because it always does—but to 
what extent, and whether this situation is reasonable or potentially unsound. 
Put another way, one can ask how long, given its current maturity structure, 
a bank could survive if it met with a funding crisis, and what amount of time 
would be available to take action before the bank became unable to meet its 
commitments. These questions should be asked by banks, regulators, and, ul-
timately, policy makers. This aspect of liquidity risk management also implies 
that access to the central bank, as the lender of last resort, should be available 
only to solvent banks that have temporary liquidity problems. 
Figure 8.3 provides a view of a bank’s maturity ladder. The trends are reviewed 
over time to determine whether the mismatches are increasing. An increased 
mismatch could be the result of problems in obtaining long-term funding for 
the bank or could ref lect a deliberate decision based on the bank’s view of fu-
ture interest rate movements. For example, banks tend to increase their short-
term mismatches if they expect interest rates to fall. 
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Figure 8.3 Liquidity Mismatches
The focus of such an analysis is not only the size of the mismatch but also its 
trends over time, as these could indicate if the bank has a potential funding 
problem. When reviewing the short-term mismatch as a percentage of total li-
abilities, an analyst will need to determine the proportion of the total funding 
that has to be renewed on a short-term basis. Liquid assets actually held can 
then be compared with the value of the short-term mismatch to assess how 
much of the latter is in fact covered by a buffer stock of high-quality liquid as-
sets. In addition, other readily marketable securities should be considered. 
The contractual maturity-term structure of deposits over time can also be used 
to ascertain if the funding structure is changing. If it is, the analyst should de-
termine whether the bank is experiencing funding shortages or is deliberately 
changing its funding structure. Figure 8.4 provides a trend analysis of the ma-
turity profile of the deposit base. This analysis can be used to evaluate whether 
a bank’s policy change is of a permanent or erratic nature, as well as to assess 
the regularity of funding problems (that is, the amount of funding that has to 
be renegotiated contractually on a short-term basis). 
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Figure 8.4 Maturity Profile of Deposit Base
While it is apparent that the maturity structure of deposits for the observed 
bank has changed, the reasons are not straightforward or easy to determine. For 
example, in volatile economies characterized by high inflation and in countries 
where the public lacks confidence in the banking system, the maturity of de-
posits tends to be much shorter than in stable economies. The worsening of the 
observed bank’s economic environment could have triggered the shortening of 
maturities. At the same time, it is apparent that the bank’s source of deposits 
changed during the period, with individual household deposits as a percent-
age of total deposits increasing and private enterprise deposits decreasing (see 
figure 8.2). The change in average maturity could therefore be at least partly 
attributed to changes in funding sources. 
Once the contractual mismatch has been calculated, it is important to deter-
mine the expected cash f low that can be produced by the bank’s asset-liability 
management model. The cash f low statement in a bank’s annual report can be 
useful in this regard (see figure 8.5). 
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Figure 8.5 Cash Flows (Derived from Cash Flow Statement)
Neither the contractual nor the expected mismatch will be accurate, but both 
will indicate the amount of funding that a bank might be required to obtain 
from nonclient sources. The sources available to banks could include the cen-
tral bank’s liquidity support facilities (geared toward liquid assets held by the 
individual banks) and money market funding. The amount remaining for use 
of central bank facilities indicates the size of the expected money market short-
age. Money market committees of central banks use this critical variable to 
determine the monetary policy options that are available to them for market 
interventions. 
An additional aspect that should also be assessed is the potential impact of 
credit risk on liquidity. If large exposures or excessive sector risk were to mate-
rialize, there could be significant consequences for liquidity. The type of credit 
risk exposure, especially sector concentration, should be considered and specifi-
cally evaluated. For example, in the early 1980s and again in 2008, many banks 
in the United States suffered huge losses as a result of poor real estate lending 
practices. 
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8.6  Volatility of Funding and Concentration of Deposits
Another critical aspect of liquidity risk management is dependence on a single 
source of funding (also known as concentration risk). If a bank has a few large 
depositors and one or more withdraw their funds, enormous problems will occur 
if alternative sources of funding cannot quickly be found. Most banks therefore 
monitor their funding mix and the concentration of depositors very closely, to 
prevent excessive dependence on any particular source. The sensitivity of banks 
to large withdrawals in an uncertain environment cannot be overemphasized.
Regulators increasingly are focusing on mismatches in liquidity f lows and on 
the ability of banks to fund such mismatches on an ongoing basis, rather than 
on statutory liquid assets and traditional access to the central bank. 
An appraisal of a bank therefore must give adequate attention to the mix between 
wholesale and retail funding and, in connection to this, to the exposure to large de-
positors and whether or not an undue reliance on individual sources of funds exists. 
Figures 8.6 and 8.7 illustrate an assessment of concentration in the bank under ob-
servation. The aim of such an assessment is to establish if the bank is exposed to a 
creditor large enough to cause a liquidity crisis if it were to withdraw its funding. 
By calculating the percentage of the short-term mismatch that large deposits 
represent, an analyst can obtain a picture of the sensitivity of the bank or of 
the banking sector as a whole to withdrawals by large suppliers of funds. The 
proportion of wholesale funding to retail funding is another means of measur-
ing sensitivity to large depositors. Overall, the increasing volatility of funding 
is indicative of the changes in the structure and sources of funding that the 
banking sector is undergoing. 
To assess the general volatility of funding, a bank usually classifies its liabilities 
as those that are likely to stay with the bank under any circumstances—for ex-
ample, enterprise transaction accounts—and those that can be expected to pull 
out if problems arise. The key issues to be determined for the latter are their 
price sensitivity, the rate at which they would pull out, and which liabilities 
could be expected to pull out at the first sign of trouble. 
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Figure 8.6 Ten Largest Sources of Deposits as a Percentage of the 
Total Deposits 
Figure 8.7 Funding Concentration
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8.7 Liquidity Risk Management Techniques 
The framework for liquidity risk management has three aspects: measuring and 
managing net funding requirements, market access, and contingency planning. 
Forecasting possible future events is an essential part of liquidity planning and 
risk management. The analysis of net funding requirements involves the con-
struction of a maturity ladder and the calculation of the cumulative net excess or 
deficit of funds on selected dates. Banks should regularly estimate their expected 
cash flows instead of focusing only on the contractual periods during which 
cash may flow in or out. For example, cash outflows can be ranked by the date 
on which liabilities fall due, by the earliest date a liability holder can exercise an 
early repayment option, or by the earliest date that contingencies can be called. 
An evaluation of whether or not a bank is sufficiently liquid depends on the 
behavior of cash f lows under different conditions. Liquidity risk management 
must therefore involve various scenarios. The “going-concern” scenario has es-
tablished a benchmark for balance sheet–related cash f lows during the normal 
course of business. This scenario is ordinarily applied to the management of a 
bank’s use of deposits. A second scenario relates to a bank’s liquidity in a crisis 
situation when a significant part of its liabilities cannot be rolled over or re-
placed—implying contraction of the bank’s balance sheet. This scenario relates 
to many existing liquidity regulations or supervisory liquidity measures. 
A third scenario refers to general market crises, wherein liquidity is affected in 
the entire banking system, or at least in a significant part of it. Liquidity man-
agement under this scenario is predicated on credit quality, with significant 
differences in funding access among banks. From the perspective of liquidity 
management, an implicit assumption can be made that the central bank will 
ensure access to funding in some form. The central bank in fact has a vested 
interest in studying this scenario because of the need it would create for a total 
liquidity buffer for the banking sector—and for a workable means of spreading 
the burden of liquidity problems among the major banks. 
Table 8.2 provides a simple forecasting tool for liquidity needs under normal 
business conditions, under conditions of liquidity crisis, and under conditions of 
general market crisis. Projections for a bank’s liquidity in a crisis situation should 
start to be derived systematically and rigorously as soon as the bank foresees 
persistent liquidity shortfalls or experiences difficulties rolling over or replacing 
its liabilities. Projections of liquidity during a market crisis should start to be 
derived at the first indication that the macroeconomic situation is  changing, or 
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that assumptions regarding the behavior of the bank’s assets or liabilities under 
normal business conditions are not holding. A bank may preempt a potential 
crisis by deliberately changing the behavior of its assets or liabilities—for exam-
ple, by becoming more aggressive in the market, by forgoing expected profits, 
or by severing its relationships with certain types of borrowers. 
Table 8.2 Maturity Ladder under Alternative Scenarios 
Cash Infl ows 
Normal Business 
Conditions Bank-Specifi c Crisis General Market Crisis
Maturing assets (contractual)
Interest receivable
Asset sales
Drawdowns
Others (specify)
Total infl ows
Cash infl ows
Maturing liabilities (contractual)
Interest payable
Disbursements on lending commitments
Early deposit withdrawals
Operating expenses
Others (specify)
Total outfl ows
Liquidity excess (shortfall)
Diversified liabilities and funding sources usually indicate that a bank has well-
developed liquidity management. The ability to readily convert assets into cash 
and access to other sources of funding in the event of a liquidity shortage also 
are very important. For example, to bridge short-term fluctuations and to pre-
vent problems from occurring, banks may ensure that lines of credit or funding 
are available through other financial institutions. The level of diversification 
can be judged according to instrument types, the type of fund provider, and 
geographical markets. 
In practice, however, it may be difficult to obtain funding when a dire need 
for it exists. Certain unusual situations also may have an impact on liquidity 
risk, including internal or external political upheavals (which can cause large 
withdrawals), seasonal effects, increased market activity, sector problems, and 
economic cycles. 
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Management must evaluate the likely effect of these trends and events on fund-
ing requirements. All banks are influenced by economic changes, but sound 
financial management can buffer the negative changes and accentuate the posi-
tive ones. Management must also have contingency plans in case its projections 
prove to be wrong. Effective planning involves the identification of minimum 
and maximum liquidity needs and the weighing of alternative courses of action 
to meet those needs. 
Large banks normally expect to derive liquidity from both sides of the balance 
sheet and maintain an active presence in interbank and other wholesale mar-
kets. They look to these markets as a source for the discretionary acquisition 
of short-term funds on the basis of interest rate competition, a process that can 
help them meet their liquidity needs. Conceptually, the availability of asset and 
liability options should result in a lower cost for liquidity maintenance. The 
costs of available discretionary liabilities can be compared with the opportunity 
cost of selling various assets, because banks also hold a range of short-term as-
sets that can be sold if necessary. These assets also serve as reassurance to the 
potential suppliers of funds, thus enhancing a bank’s ability to borrow. 
The major difference between liquidity in larger and smaller banks is that, in 
addition to deliberately determining the asset side of the balance sheet, larger 
banks are better able to control the level and composition of their liabilities. 
They therefore have a wider variety of options from which to select the least 
costly method of generating required funds. Discretionary access to the money 
market also reduces the size of the liquid asset buffer that would be needed if 
banks were solely dependent upon asset management to obtain funds. 
When large volumes of retail deposits and lending are at stake, outf lows of 
funds should be assessed on the basis of probability, with past experience serv-
ing as a guide. Banks with large volumes of wholesale funds can also manage 
liquidity through maturity matching. This means that an appropriate degree of 
correspondence between asset and liability maturities must be sought, but not 
that an exact matching of all assets and liabilities is necessary. 
Table 8.3 and figure 8.8 illustrate the liquidity management of a bank and how 
the bank’s liquidity position has deteriorated over time. The percentage of loans 
funded from the bank’s internally generated sources has steadily decreased. In 
contrast, the percentage of volatile liabilities has increased, and volatility cover-
age has become significantly worse. Unfortunately, simple graphs such as that in 
figure 8.8 cannot tell the whole story. The assessment of bank liquidity, whether 
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by banks themselves, by their supervisors, or by outside analysts, is a complex 
process that cannot be reduced to any single technique or set of formulas. 
Table 8.3 Liquidity Ratios
Liquidity Ratios Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Readily marketable assets as percentage of total assets
Volatile liabilities as percentage of total liabilities
Volatility coverage (readily marketable assets as percentage of 
volatile liabilities)
Bank run (readily marketable assets as percentage of all 
deposit-type liabilities)
Customer loans to customer deposits
Interbank loans as percentage of interbank deposits
Net loans and investments as percentage of total deposits
Demand deposits as percentage of customers deposits
Deposits with maturities longer than three months as 
percentage of customer deposits
Less-than-90-days deposits as percentage of customer deposits
Certifi cates of deposit as percentage of customer deposits
Ten largest deposits as percentage of customer deposits
Figure 8.8 Liquidity Ratios: Trend Analysis 
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In reality, a bank’s position and reputation within the financial community 
influence its liquidity management options. This connection is based on many 
factors, the most crucial of which is the bank’s past and prospective profita-
bility. Properly understood, a maturity profile can be a useful indicator of a 
bank’s position and may yield important information, for example, when a sud-
den increase in maturity mismatches occurs. However, maturity profiles should 
be analyzed in conjunction with information about the bank’s off-balance-
sheet business, management objectives, and systems of control. Some banks are 
better positioned than others to quickly alter the maturity pattern of their bal-
ance sheet. 
Although the acquisition of funds in a market at a competitive cost enables prof-
itable banks to meet the expanding customer demand for loans, the misuse or 
improper implementation of liability management can have severe consequences. 
The following risks are associated with the practice of market  funding–based 
liquidity management: 
Purchased funds may not always be available when needed. If the market  ¶
loses confidence in a bank, the bank’s liquidity may be threatened. 
Overreliance on liability management may cause a tendency to minimize  ¶
the holding of short-term securities and to relax asset liquidity standards, 
which may result in a large concentration of short-term liabilities that 
support assets with longer maturities. During times of tight money, this 
tendency could squeeze earnings and give rise to illiquid conditions. 
As a result of rate competition in the money market, a bank may incur  ¶
relatively high costs when obtaining funds and may be tempted to lower 
its credit standards to invest in high-yield loans and securities. 
If a bank purchases liabilities to support assets that are already on its books,  ¶
the high cost of purchased funds may result in a negative yield spread. 
When national monetary tightness occurs, interest rate discrimination  ¶
may develop, making the cost of purchased funds prohibitive to all but 
a limited number of large banks. Small banks with restricted funding 
should therefore avoid taking excessive loans from money market sources. 
Preoccupation with obtaining funds at the lowest possible cost and with  ¶
insufficient regard to maturity distribution can greatly intensify a bank’s 
exposure to the risk of interest rate f luctuations. 
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Other Investment Portfolios
Key Messages
The objective of investment management is to maximize the return on a portfolio  ¶
within policy constraints that address liquidity and market value volatility. 
A bank’s liquidity portfolio serves as a source of prudential liquidity to cover short- ¶
term liabilities when the bank may not have access to normal sources of funding.
The liquidity portfolio is also a source of return and is usually actively managed  ¶
against a benchmark to generate a positive spread over the cost of funds. 
A liquidity policy typically sets the minimum size of the liquidity portfolio, usually in  ¶
terms of coverage of short-term liabilities. 
The liquidity policy also sets risk limits to control credit risk, interest rate risk,  ¶
and foreign currency risk to ensure the necessary level of liquidity and to protect 
earnings and capital. The liquidity portfolio typically is managed against a 
benchmark portfolio based on the underlying funding or on the holder’s liabilities. 
9.1 Nature of the Liquidity Portfolio
For commercial banks, the liquidity portfolio traditionally was one of the key tools for liquidity management, providing a back-up source of funds to meet unexpected levels of withdrawals or net redemptions.1 The de-
velopment of deep and liquid interbank markets, however, means that banks 
1  The term “liquidity portfolio” is used firstly to distinguish it from the proprietary trading 
portfolio, and secondly to accentuate the prudential nature and minimum level of liquidity that it 
signifies.
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borrow to meet any funding shortfalls, with the result that day-to-day liquidity 
operations have become a liability management issue. 
The liquidity portfolio nonetheless has remained as a fallback source of funds 
to meet liabilities coming due if a bank won’t or can’t access alternative sources 
of funding. The tightening or closing of interbank markets can occur during 
periods of systemic risk, when lenders will not provide funds because of broad 
risk aversion, or because of a negative event specific to the institution. 
The objective of investment management is to maximize the return on a portfolio 
within policy constraints that address liquidity and market value volatility. In most 
cases, the liquidity portfolio is structured to generate positive carry (that is, the 
return is higher than the cost of funds and contributes positively to the net income 
of the bank). This is typically achieved by the assumption of credit risk and interest 
rate risk. In the case of credit risk, the bank invests in securities that have a lower 
credit standing and thus a higher yield than the bank’s funding instruments. This 
is called credit transformation. In the case of interest rate risk, management will 
take advantage of the upward slope of the yield curve and invest in assets that have 
a slightly longer duration than its funding instruments. This is called maturity 
transformation. Both of these positions normally result in a profit for the bank, 
but income and capital can be at risk in the case of credit deterioration, yield curve 
inversion, or upward shifts in yields. These risks need to be tightly controlled to 
protect bank income and capital from unacceptable levels of loss. 
For commercial banks, the size of the liquidity portfolio relative to total as-
sets will tend to increase during periods of slow economic growth, when the 
demand for commercial and industrial loans is low and credit worthiness of 
clients deteriorate. Conversely, an increase in economic growth typically leads 
to a decline in the liquidity portfolio as funds are redeployed toward loans with 
higher expected returns. For prudential liquidity portfolios, the investment 
policy should specify a minimum size relative to short-term liabilities to ensure 
that the portfolio can fulfill its role as a provider of liquidity in times of stress. 
9.2 Investment Policy
The investment policy sets out the rationale for holding a liquidity portfolio 
and defines any target levels, usually in terms of short-term liability coverage. 
From a regulatory perspective, the target level normally would be described as 
a liquid asset ratio. The investment policy also sets out broad credit and market 
risk parameters.
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Benchmark Position
The most neutral market risk position, from the perspective of the balance 
sheet, matches the risk profile of the liquidity portfolio with the risk profile of 
the liabilities with respect to currency, duration, and credit. This neutral posi-
tion is generally referred to as the benchmark position. Any deviation from this 
position would expose a bank’s income and capital to risk. At the policy level, 
it is important to specify the baseline position for the liquidity portfolio (the 
benchmark) and the tolerance for risk resulting from active management. One 
efficient way to express this tolerance is in terms of a “risk budget,” whereby 
the board (or its delegates) approves an acceptable level of income or capital 
loss. This risk budget can then be implemented into a risk management struc-
ture, wherein risks are independently measured and limited to ensure that the 
board’s risk tolerance is not exceeded. 
9.3 Strategic Asset Allocation
The objective of the strategic asset allocation (SAA) process is to maximize 
the expected return within the asset-liability management (ALM) constraints 
relating to liquidity, income, and capital volatility. This process is critical in 
central banks and banks with large asset management portfolios, but may be 
less important in a commercial banking environment. 
The goal of SAA is therefore to determine the policy mix of asset classes that 
becomes the benchmark portfolio—which, subject to the constraints mentioned 
above, maximizes the value of that portfolio (or minimizes its cost). SAA uses 
a quantitative framework to optimize the risk and return characteristics of as-
sets through projections of contingencies that may affect the future liability 
structure. 
SAA should specify the neutral currency composition, portfolio duration, and 
eligible instruments. Reserves adequacy and any minimum return requirements 
should be the main determinants of the desirable risk-return profile for the re-
serves; this profile should then be embodied in a benchmark portfolio. 
The SAA framework is used by asset managers to make a periodic determina-
tion of the optimal policy mix of asset classes. The process is a two-step exercise: 
the first step is to propose duration, liquidity, and asset class constraints that are 
acceptable and that would enable net worth and liquidity goals to be met; the 
second step is to select a benchmark that is replicable and that would maximize 
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expected return within these constraints. Critical senior management inputs to 
the SAA exercise are normally expressed by the board of directors through an 
investment policy statement, the elements of which are as follows:
Investment policy objectives (earnings and risk tolerance): 
Minimum income requirement  ¶
Credit risk (the tolerance of outright default)  ¶
Market risk (the tolerance of volatility of returns over the investment  ¶
horizon) 
Business risks (consideration of any correlation between asset classes and  ¶
the core business of the bank) 
Investment policy constraints: 
Liquidity requirements  ¶
Investment time horizon under normal and adverse circumstances  ¶
Legal, regulatory, and tax considerations  ¶
Unique needs, such as foreign currency composition, based on currency  ¶
composition of actual or contingent liabilities 
The importance of the SAA process in terms of the returns generated by each 
dimension of the portfolio management function is underscored by the finding 
that SAA typically accounts for more than 90 percent of long-term perfor-
mance. Tactical trading is therefore a much less significant driver of portfolio 
risk and return. 
Central Bank Aspects
In the case of central banks, foreign currency reserves portfolios are held to meet a 
country’s need for foreign currency when it is unable to borrow from other sourc-
es. In broad terms, the optimal long-term risk profile for these reserves is set with 
respect to the rationale for holding such reserves, rather than the composition of 
the central bank’s balance sheet. This is particularly true for emerging markets 
and other countries that do not enjoy deep and certain access to the capital market 
borrowings that otherwise could serve to finance any external imbalances. The 
investment policy for a central bank therefore should set out an SAA based jointly 
on the rationale for holding reserves and on the amount of reserves that could be 
considered adequate relative to any actual and contingent claims. 
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9.4 Benchmark Portfolio
A benchmark portfolio represents the optimal risk profile for the liquidity 
(investment) portfolio with respect to the rationale for holding funds and the 
characteristics of the underlying liabilities. A good benchmark is a replicable, 
transparent portfolio strategy that complies with risk constraints. The bench-
mark provides the baseline for measuring both risk and performance. 
From an investment perspective, a benchmark portfolio can be defined as a rep-
licable notional portfolio, approved by senior management, that embodies the 
investment objectives of the financial institution. A benchmark portfolio rep-
resents the best feasible passive strategy, given the objective of holding liquid-
ity, the risk tolerance of the institution, and other constraints (such as capital 
preservation). The setting of an investment benchmark can also be described as 
the “operationalization” of the SAA process. 
Benchmarks are critical for evaluating performance versus long-term strategy; 
they also are used as fallback positions when the portfolio manager has a neu-
tral market view or a stop-loss is triggered. In essence, the long-term objec-
tive of the benchmark function—a neutral strategy—is to provide a replicable 
portfolio with a constant risk profile versus the market. It is used to evaluate 
both the value added in returns and the risk exposure resulting from active 
management. 
Benchmarks can be set for liabilities as well as assets. A liability benchmark 
could compare the cost of funding of the institution to that of comparable bond 
issues of similar institutions with the same credit rating and market standing. 
However, establishment of a funding benchmark is complicated, as there are no 
standard funding transactions in the market. The credit rating of the issuer is 
only one factor that influences price; maturity of the issue and specific call or 
other features also have a major effect on the cost of funding. Only the market 
environment is really common to all issuers. 
The construction of a benchmark focuses on areas that are less emphasized 
during the SAA process. Benchmarks typically specify a target currency com-
position, allocation to specific assets or indexes, and a duration target. Figure 
9.1 illustrates the bridging aspects of the benchmarking process—providing a 
context for the evaluation of managers’ portfolio performance, in line with the 
policies decided on during the SAA phase. 
220 
Analyzing Banking Risk
Figure 9.1 Benchmarking: Link between Strategic Asset Allocation and 
Portfolio Management
Benchmarking: Link Between Strategic Asset Allocation and Portfolio Management
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Portfolio Management
Responsibilities Responsibilities
Management or Board of Directors Portfolio managers
Investment Horizon Investment Horizon
Medium to long-term (> 1 year) Daily trading to three-month  horizons
Decision-Making Parameters Decision-Making Parameters
Risk-return tradeoff for various asset classes and 
sectors
Performance – expected excess return versus the 
benchmark
Stress testing for worst-case scenarios Risk or possible deviation of returns versus the 
benchmark
Positions / Holdings Positions / Holdings
Long – actual SAA view Deviation from the benchmark (security / sector / 
duration / currency selection)
Value-Added Value-Added
Policy framework Active management – excess return
Benchmarking is a critical risk management tool, providing a yardstick for the 
measurement of performance and actual risk from active management. For a 
benchmark to be realistic, it must represent a simple and unambiguous, f lexible, 
investable, and replicable portfolio, easily implemented with no influence on 
market prices. Rules pertaining to the benchmark must be transparent. Its char-
acteristics, constituents, and rebalancing rules have to be agreed upon in advance 
and be available or easily accessible for portfolio risk management purposes. 
A benchmark is typically constructed using externally available market indexes. 
These indexes may be made up of a set of specific securities that meet defined 
characteristics, or the indexes may be based on a synthetic market indicator 
such as LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) or a swap rate. These in-
dexes should be combined in such a way as to create a benchmark portfolio that 
meets the currency, duration, liquidity, and credit constraints set out in the 
investment policy. A few examples of the market indexes generated and made 
available by index providers are shown in table 9.1. 
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Table 9.1 Examples of U.S. Dollar Market Indices
Market Sector Indices
U.S. government securities 1–12-month Treasury bills, 1–10-year Treasury bonds 
Banks Overnight federal funds 3-month LIBID 
Mortgage-backed securities Master Mortgage Index 
AAA Asset-backed securities Floating rate: R0F1; Fixed rate: R0A1 
Large capitalization equities Standard & Poor’s 500 
A good benchmark should be comprehensive and should include all opportu-
nities under normal market conditions. It should provide a fair, realistic base-
line strategy. Changes must be few and understandable, and the benchmark 
should not preclude participants that may not invest in the specific segments or 
countries addressed by the benchmark. Transaction and tax costs ought to be 
predictable and transparent. If the above criteria are met, performance can be 
measured against objective indexes.
9.5 Eligible Instruments
Financial instruments are approved for the investment policy when they meet 
certain criteria based on the rationale for holding these funds. For liquidity 
portfolios, the main criterion should be the instrument’s liquidity—that is, the 
ability to realize funds in a timely fashion, without negatively affecting the 
price of the instrument. The precondition for liquidity is the existence of deep 
and broad markets with multiple market makers that stand ready to buy (bid 
for) the assets. Liquidity is provided through both cash and futures markets 
because dealers generally are more willing to make continuous markets in in-
struments in which they can, in turn, offset their risk by using futures. 
In assessing the required level of liquidity, policy makers need to consider 
the investment horizon over which the funds would need to be drawn down. 
Instruments suitable for working capital or daily liquidity needs are quite dif-
ferent from those that would be liquidated over several months or more. For 
prudential liquidity portfolios, it is also important to consider the liquidity of 
the instruments during times of systemic crisis. As noted, systemic crises may 
exogenously affect a bank’s ability to access funds. During such a crisis, the 
bank may be selling assets in stressed markets, characterized by much lower 
levels of liquidity. 
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9.6 Credit Risk
In the context of the liquidity portfolio, credit risk refers to the risk of default. 
But it is also related to liquidity, as markets for low-rated credits generally are 
thinner than those for higher-rated credits, and the liquidity of assets with low 
credit ratings will significantly worsen during systemic crises. For both of these 
reasons, the investment policy should constrain the credit risk of the investment 
instrument both at the specific-issuer level and at the portfolio level. 
With respect to specific-issuer credit risk, most banks rely on multiple inde-
pendent credit rating agencies when establishing minimum ratings for eligible 
assets. When different agencies have split ratings, the policy should specify 
which rating prevails. The allowable level of exposure to any one institution 
typically also is constrained, with the exposure level set usually as a percentage 
of the creditor institution’s own funds. 
At the portfolio level, credit risk is controlled through global limits, expressed 
as a percentage of the total portfolio. A fundamental risk management tool is 
diversification; typically the liquidity portfolio will constrain the exposure to 
any one institution as a maximum percentage of the total portfolio. In addition, 
the investment policy may seek to minimize the vulnerability of the portfolio 
to systemic risks. Systemic risk is defined as a risk that affects a class of institu-
tions that share a common business, country of origin, or type of asset. The in-
vestment policy may thus also set a percentage limit to the share of the portfolio 
that may be exposed to any single country, industry, or sector. 
Table 9.2 gives a breakdown of types of credit risk and risk management tools. 
Table 9.2 Credit Risk in Liquidity Portfolios
Credit Risk Risk Tool Benchmark Limits
Specifi c- creditor risk 
Credit rating Minimum rating requirements 
Size of exposure Maximum exposure as a percentage of the institution’s capital base 
Diversifi cation Maximum exposure to any one institution as a percentage of total assets 
Systemic risk Not applicable Maximum exposure to any industry or sector in a single country as a percentage of total assets 
Country risk Credit rating 
Maximum exposure per country as a percentage of 
total assets 
Minimum credit ratings 
Sector risk Sector groupings Maximum exposure per sector as a percentage of total assets 
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9.7 Market Risk
Market risk is defined as the volatility of income or market value resulting from 
fluctuations in underlying market factors such as currency, interest rates, or 
credit spreads. For commercial banks, the market risk of the liquidity portfolio 
arises from mismatches between the risk profile of the assets and their funding. 
The benchmark portfolio, which should be based on the currency, duration, 
and credit characteristics of the underlying liabilities, stands as a proxy for the 
liabilities. Any deviation from the benchmark portfolio would thus give rise to 
risk and should be constrained.2 
9.8 Active Management
Active management is the investment process by which an institution’s port-
folio is repositioned versus the benchmark portfolio, within the risk level autho-
rized by the board, to seek excess returns (performance against the benchmark 
portfolio). The investment process of the institution ought to be well defined 
and repeatable, with clear objectives, processes, and accountabilities. 
There is no standard investment process. Individual institutions may emphasize 
different styles of risk taking according to their investment policy, business phi-
losophy, and strengths relative to the market. Some investment processes are 
fairly centralized, using team-based decisions; others are completely decentral-
ized, allocating to individual risk takers a part of the risk budget within which 
they manage quite independently. Other investment processes are hybrids, with 
teams making the fundamental decisions relating to sector exposures, and indi-
vidual managers implementing these decisions through security selection and 
tactical trading decisions. 
Portfolio management decisions may be based on fundamental analysis of the 
macro- and microeconomic drivers of value, on technical analysis (charting) of 
the market, or on exploitation of arbitrage possibilities between different mar-
kets using quantitative pricing models. A few institutions, particularly hedge 
funds, may focus on only one of these techniques, but most banks will use a 
2  For central banks in developing countries, the rationale for holding foreign currency reserves is 
typically that these reserves provide backing for some portion of the country’s foreign currency 
liabilities and assist its management of the exchange rate. The strategic asset allocation and 
ensuing benchmark portfolio in such cases thus ref lect these underlying contingent liabilities, 
rather than balance sheet values.
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combination of fundamentals, technical analysis, and modeling to develop their 
investment strategies. 
In assessing the adequacy of risk management systems, it is important to un-
derstand the process and style with which investments are made, because the 
approach of an institution to risk taking dictates the level of sophistication that 
is required of the risk management system. For example, a highly leveraged 
portfolio management style would require sophisticated risk measurement and 
monitoring systems, because any losses would be multiplied by the leverage 
factor. Even low-risk, so-called arbitrage trades can result in devastating losses 
when highly leveraged, as was seen in the Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) failure of 1999. 
At the other extreme, some banks or institutions take much more conservative 
positions with regard to the benchmark, opting for minimal outright market 
exposure. This management style obviously requires a less-sophisticated risk 
management support system. Figure 9.2 illustrates the relationship between 
passive management (managing the portfolio to the benchmark), active trading 
and directional trading.
Figure 9.2 Portfolio Management Styles
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9.9 Risk Budgets
A risk budget establishes the tolerance of the board to income or capital loss 
from market risk over a given horizon, typically one year due to the  accounting 
cycle. Institutions that are not sensitive to annual income requirements may 
have a longer horizon, which would also allow for a greater degree of freedom 
in portfolio management.
Once an annual risk budget has been established, a system of risk limits must 
be put in place to guard against actual or potential losses exceeding the risk 
budget. There are two types of risk limits, and both are necessary to constrain 
losses to within the prescribed level (the risk budget). The first type is stop-
loss limits, which control cumulative losses from the mark-to-market of exist-
ing positions relative to the benchmark. The second is position limits, which 
control potential losses that could arise from future adverse changes in market 
prices. 
Stop-Loss Limits
Stop-loss limits are set relative to the overall risk budget. The allocation of 
the risk budget to different types of risk is as much an art as it is a science, 
and the methodology used will depend on the set-up of the individual invest-
ment process. Some of the questions that affect the risk allocation include the 
following: 
What are the significant market risks of the portfolio?  ¶
What is the correlation among these risks?  ¶
How many risk takers are there?  ¶
How is the risk expected to be used over the course of a year?  ¶
The risk positions arising from different markets and risk takers generally are 
not perfectly correlated, and the aggregate of individual stop-loss limits may 
exceed the risk budget. Compliance with stop-loss limits requires frequent, if 
not daily, performance measurement. Performance is the total return of the 
portfolio less the total return of the benchmark. The measurement of perfor-
mance is a critical statistic for monitoring the use of the risk budget and compli-
ance with stop-loss limits. 
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Position Limits
Position limits also are set relative to the overall risk budget and are subject 
to the same considerations discussed above. The function of position limits, 
however, is to constrain potential losses from future adverse changes in prices 
or yields (see also chapter 11). Table 9.3 lists the main market risks or market 
factor sensitivities and the types of position limits that are commonly used to 
constrain these risks to acceptable levels. 
Table 9.3 Market-Risk Management Tools
Market Risk Factor Sensitivity
Risk Management Tool 
(Benchmark Limits)
Foreign currency Open position Percent deviation 
Interest rate risk Modifi ed duration DV01
DV01
Duration deviation limits 
Net DV01 limits 
Yield curve exposure Key rate duration *** 
Credit spread risk DV01 of credit positions Net DV01 limits 
Options: 
Directional risk 
Convexity 
Volatility
Delta position
Gamma 
Vega 
Portfolio risk Value at risk (VAR) *** (percent of capital) 
Note: *** Important risk statistics, but not conducive to implementation as hard limits.
The DV01 is the dollar value of a basis point and gives the change in the market value in absolute terms for a basis-point 
change in yields. The modifi ed duration gives the percentage change in the market value for a basis-point change in yields.
9.10 Management Reporting
A key element in the delegation of risk-taking authority is accountability for 
the risks taken. This usually is effected through management reports. These 
reports should focus on key statistics relating to 
the composition of the portfolio versus the benchmark,  ¶
the performance to date of the portfolio and the benchmark, and  ¶
the existing portfolio risk as measured by the tracking error or value at risk.  ¶
Management reports should also include descriptive analysis of market strate-
gies, market movements, and results. Performance attribution is also extremely 
useful, as it allows for an ex post critique of the results from specific risk-taking 
activities. This can help an institution refine its investment process to focus on 
those activities in which it has a proven track record and to eschew those activi-
ties in which it has been unable to generate excess returns.  
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Key Messages
Banks use leveraged funds with shorter-term maturity—often repurchase  ¶
agreements—for their own trading activities. 
All securities classiﬁ ed as available for sale or fair value through the proﬁ t and  ¶
loss, are subject to market risk measurement, whereas portfolios held to maturity 
eliminate the necessity to recognize ﬂ uctuations in market valuations. 
Market risk results from the volatility of positions taken in the four fundamental  ¶
economic markets: interest-sensitive debt securities, equities, currencies, and 
commodities. 
The volatility of each of these markets exposes banks to ﬂ uctuations in the price or  ¶
value of marketable ﬁ nancial instruments. 
In sophisticated market environments, with sufﬁ cient depth, banks can normally  ¶
hedge against market volatility. The resulting net effective open position determines 
the amount of the portfolio that remains exposed to market risk. 
Capital has to be retained as a buffer against potential losses from market risk;  ¶
such capital is referred to as Tier 3 capital. 
10.1 Sources of Market Risk: Selected Concepts
Market risk is the risk that an entity may experience loss from unfa-vorable movements in market prices resulting from changes in the prices (volatility) of fixed-income instruments, equity instruments, 
commodities, currencies, and related off-balance-sheet contracts. In addition, 
market risk comes from the general foreign exchange and commodities risks 
throughout the bank (that is, in the trading and banking books). 
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The major components of market risk are therefore interest rate risk, equity 
risk, commodities risk, and currency risk. Each component of risk includes a 
general market risk aspect as well as a specific risk aspect that originates in the 
specific portfolio structure of a bank. 
Exposure to market risk may arise as a result of the bank taking deliberate 
speculative positions or may come from the bank’s market-making (dealer) 
activities. 
The increasing exposure of banks to market risk is due to the trend of busi-
ness diversification away from the traditional intermediation function toward 
market-making and trading activities, whereby banks set aside “risk capital” for 
deliberate risk-taking activities. The trading portfolio must be distinguished 
from the liquidity portfolio (see chapter 9). Trading is aimed at exploiting 
market opportunities with leveraged funding (for example, through the use of 
repurchase agreements), whereas the liquidity portfolio is held and traded to 
provide a buffer against risk. Both proprietary trading and liquidity portfolios 
are subject to market risk.
Volatility
The price volatility of most assets held in securities portfolios is often significant. 
Volatility occurs even in mature markets, although it is much higher in new or 
illiquid markets. The presence of large institutional investors—such as pension 
funds, insurance companies, or investment funds—has also had an  impact on 
the structure of markets and on market risk. Institutional investors adjust their 
large-scale, stable liquidity investment and trading portfolios through large-
scale trades, and in markets with rising prices, large-scale purchases tend to 
push prices up. Conversely, markets with downward trends become more ner-
vous when large, institutional-size blocks are sold. Ultimately, this leads to a 
widening of the amplitude of price variances and therefore to increased market 
risk. The advent of electronic trading has widened this phenomenon.
Recognizing Price Changes and Marking to Market
Marking to market refers to the repricing of a bank’s portfolios to ref lect 
changes in asset prices from market price movements. This policy requires that 
the asset be repriced at the market value of the asset in compliance with IAS 39. 
Because assets in a trading portfolio are constantly sold and bought, price posi-
tions related to a bank’s trading portfolio should be evaluated and marked to 
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market at least once per day. The reports prepared in this process should be 
submitted to and reviewed by the senior bank managers responsible for the 
bank’s investment, asset-liability, and risk management. 
IAS 39 requires that trading (and available-for-sale) positions be marked to 
market in the balance sheet, with the f luctuations in market value for the trad-
ing portfolio then to f low through the income statement. The f luctuations in 
available-for-sale portfolios are taken to equity. Although the process is con-
ceptually simple, marking to market can be difficult in markets that are shallow 
or lack liquidity. Most banks quantify market risks by tracing the historical 
loss experienced by various instruments and markets, but banks in volatile or 
 illiquid market environments, often without the benefit of sophisticated tech-
nology, face the problem of how to transform this complex analysis into a work-
able solution that can be effectively applied to their everyday business. 
Interest Rate Risk
Positions in fixed-income securities and their derivatives (for example, ex-
change-traded futures, forward rate agreements, swaps, and options) present 
interest rate risk. The risk factors refer to the aggregate market sensitivity of 
the bank’s portfolio, where the short and long positions in different instru-
ments may be offset. Risk factors related to interest rate risk are estimated in 
each currency in which a bank has interest-rate-sensitive on- and off-balance-
sheet positions. 
Equity Risk
Equity risk relates to taking or holding trading-book positions in equities or in-
struments that display equity-like behavior (for example, convertible securities) 
and their derivatives (for example, futures and swaps on individual equities or 
on stock indexes). Equity-related risk is calculated for the specific risk of hold-
ing a security (beta) and for the position in a market as a whole. For derivatives, 
the risk is measured by converting the derivative into a notional equity position 
in the relevant underlying instrument. 
Commodity Risk
Holding or taking positions in exchange-traded commodities, futures, and 
other derivatives presents commodity risk. Commodity prices may be volatile 
as commodity markets are often less liquid than financial markets, and changes 
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in supply and demand can have dramatic effects on prices. Managing a com-
modity book can be a complex task, as it entails directional risk from changes in 
spot prices; basis risk from changes in the price relationship between two simi-
lar, but not identical, commodities; and gap risk, which captures the changes in 
forward prices arising from maturity mismatches. Another operational aspect 
of commodities risk relates to delivery risk and the necessity to close out posi-
tions before delivery. 
Currency Risk
Currency risk refers to trading positions in currencies and gold. Excluded from 
this treatment are the so-called “structural positions”—that is, positions of a 
nondealing or nontrading nature such as investments in foreign branches (see 
chapter 11). The net open position in a currency normally includes the spot 
position, the forward position, the delta-based equivalent of the total book of 
foreign currency options, and any other items in the trading books that repre-
sent profit or loss in foreign currencies. 
Other Risks
Underdeveloped infrastructure in a secondary market could increase risk and 
complicate risk measurement. For example, in some markets settlement takes 
place several days after transactions are concluded. This lengthy settlement 
period necessitates an accurate assessment of counterparty risk—that is, the 
risk that the position will move into the money during the settlement period 
but the counterparty fails to deliver. Certain volatility specific to individual 
securities cannot be explained by other factors and should be factored into over-
all risk assessment and management. In some countries, markets in financial 
instruments are not liquid, resulting in potentially much higher market price 
volatility and therefore greater exposure to risk. The widespread development 
of derivative instruments has allowed banks to hedge their open positions in 
ever-more-sophisticated ways; however, because market liquidity is a crucial 
precondition for the use of such instruments, concern has grown regarding the 
valuation and effectiveness of hedges made in less-developed markets. 
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10.2 Measuring Interest Rate Sensitivity
The combination of a volatile interest rate environment, deregulation, and a 
growing array of on- and off-balance-sheet products have made the manage-
ment of interest rate risk a growing challenge. At the same time, informed use 
of interest rate derivatives—such as financial futures and interest rate swaps—
can help banks manage and reduce the interest rate exposure that is inherent in 
their business. Bank regulators and supervisors therefore place great emphasis 
on the evaluation of bank interest rate risk management, particularly since the 
implementation of market risk–based capital charges, as recommended by the 
Basel Committee. 
Interest-Rate Risk Sources
The sensitivity of interest income when interest rates change, originates from 
four types of interest rate risk, namely, repricing risk, yield curve risk, basis risk, 
and optionality. 
Repricing risk. Variations in interest rates expose a bank’s income and the un-
derlying value of its instruments to f luctuations. The most common type of in-
terest rate risk arises from timing differences in the maturity of fixed rates and 
the repricing of the f loating rates of bank assets, liabilities, and off-balance-
sheet positions. The basic tool used for measuring repricing risk is duration, 
which assumes a parallel shift in the yield curve.
Yield curve risk. Repricing mismatches also expose a bank to risk deriving 
from changes in the slope and shape of the yield curve (nonparallel shifts). 
Yield curve risk materializes when yield curve shifts adversely affect a bank’s 
income or underlying economic value. For example, a bank’s position may be 
hedged against parallel movements in the yield curve; for instance, a long po-
sition in bonds with 10-year maturities may be hedged by a short position in 
5-year notes from the same issuer. The value of the longer-maturity instrument 
can still decline sharply if the yield curve increases, resulting in a loss for the 
bank. As figure 10.1 illustrates, yield curves do not necessarily shift in a parallel 
fashion. In such cases key rate duration is employed to measure the price impact 
of the shift.
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Figure 10.1 Illustration of Nonparallel Shifts in the Yield Curve
Basis risk, also described as spread risk, arises when assets and liabilities are 
priced off different yield curves and the spread between these curves shifts. 
When these yield curve spreads change, income and market values may be 
negatively affected. Such situations can occur when assets that are repriced 
monthly—based on an index rate (such as U.S. Treasury bills) or at the prime 
rate offered on loans to customers—are funded by a liabilities that may also 
reprice monthly, but possibly based on a different index rate (such as LIBOR 
or swaps). Basis risk thus derives from an unexpected change in the spread be-
tween the two index rates. 
Optionality.  An increasingly important source of interest rate risk stems from the 
options embedded in many bank assets and liabilities (for example in  mortgage-
backed securities). Options may be stand-alone derivative instruments, such as 
exchange-traded options, or they may be embedded within otherwise standard 
instruments. The latter may include various types of bonds or notes with call or 
put provisions, nonmaturity deposit instruments that give depositors the right 
to withdraw their money, or loans that borrowers may prepay without penalty. 
Such options lead to increased volatility risk as well as prepayment risk. 
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Duration
Duration is a measure of price sensitivity to changes in interest rates. Specifically, 
duration which is expressed as a numbers of years, gives the percentage change 
in the price of a fixed-income security for a specified change in interest rates. 
There are three measures of duration: Macauley, modified, and effective duration. 
Duration has become the single most common measure of interest rate risk for 
fixed-income investment portfolios and trading positions. Originally duration 
was used exclusively to measure interest rate risk for these portfolios because 
they were marked to market and the change in the market value would flow 
through income. Corporate finance specialists, however, have increasingly fo-
cused attention on the economic value of the firm in addition to its current earn-
ings. Given this change in focus, modified duration was introduced to measure 
the sensitivity of the economic value of capital to a change in interest rates. 
Duration is based on the time to receipt of future cash f lows. When interest 
rates rise, the net present value of a fixed set of future cash f lows will decline. 
For marketable securities, this will translate into a commensurate decline in 
price. Conversely, when interest rates decline, the net present value or price of a 
series of future cash f lows will increase (see figure 10.2). 
Figure 10.2 Duration as an Indicator of Interest Rate Risk in a Portfolio
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The impact of duration can be illustrated in a very simple example using the 
effective duration of a 10-year bond with a nominal value of $1 million, which 
pays a coupon of 5 percent. If market rates are also 5 percent at the issue date, 
the coupon is paying the required market yield, and the value of the bond must 
be 100 percent of $1 million—or simply referred to as 100.
Assume that the market rates decline to 4 percent. The value of the bond will 
then increase as the bond pays a higher coupon than the market requires. The 
new market value will be 108.18. Similarly, if the market rates move to 6 per-
cent, the value of the bond will decrease as the bond pays a lower coupon than 
the market requires. The new market value will be 92.56.
The effective duration formula now uses these observed values to calculate in-
terest rate sensitivity, expressed in years, as follows:
108.18 – 92.56 / 2 * 100 * 1% = 15.62 / 200 * .01 = 7.8
The new price of the bond when market rates fall less the price of the bond if 
 interest rates were to rise
divided by
two times the market value of the bond before the rate movements multiplied by
the size of the movement
Given that the effective duration of the bond above is 7.8 years, one can conclude 
the following:
For each 1 percent (or 100 basis point [bp]) move in interest rates, the  ¶
percentage value of the bond will change by 7.8 percent, calculated as 
follows:
.01 * 7.8 = .078 = 7.8%
For each 100 bp change in interest rates, the value of a bond with a mar- ¶
ket value of $ 1 million will change by $78,000, calculated as follows:
.01 * 7.8 * $1,000,000 = $78,000
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For each 1 bp change in interest rates, the value of a bond with a market  ¶
value of $1 million will change by $780 (normally referred to as DV01 or 
PV01 ), calculated as follows:
.0001 * 7.8 * $1,000,000 = $780
Knowing the change in value caused by a one basis point move is useful for the 
calculation of value at risk (section 10.4). 
Duration is additive. The duration for each bond in a bond portfolio can be 
calculated separately (known as key rate duration) and then added together to 
determine the duration of the portfolio. Key rate duration is a refinement of 
duration. It incorporates the fact that the pricing of individual bonds can be 
determined by different parts of the yield curve and that each part of the yield 
curve reacts differently to an exogeneous price shock (in a nonparallel manner 
as illustrated in figure 10.1 above).
10.3 Portfolio Risk Management
By its very nature, market risk requires constant management attention and 
adequate analysis. Prudent managers should be aware of exactly how a bank’s 
market risk exposure relates to its capital. Market risk management policies 
should specifically state a bank’s objectives and the related policy guidelines 
that have been established to protect capital from the negative impact of un-
favorable market price movements. Policy guidelines should normally be for-
mulated within restrictions provided by the applicable legal and prudential 
framework. While policies related to market risk management may vary among 
banks, certain types of policies are typically present in all banks. 
Other matters that should be addressed by the marking-to-market policy are 
pricing responsibility and the method used by a bank to determine the new 
(market) price of an asset. Risk management policy should stipulate that prices 
be determined and the marking to market be executed by officers who are inde-
pendent of the respective dealer or trader and his or her managers. Some juris-
dictions have enacted prudential regulations that specifically cover the process 
of marking to market the value of a bank’s assets, sometimes with a high level 
of detail. In practice, the pricing of positions would be less than effective if in-
dependent, third-party price quotes were not taken into consideration. A bank 
should routinely acquire the latest price and performance information available 
from external sources on assets held in its portfolios. 
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Position Limits
A market risk management policy should provide for limits on and monitoring 
of positions (long, short, or net positions in markets and products), bearing in 
mind the liquidity risk that could arise on execution of unrealized transactions 
such as open contracts or commitments to purchase and sell securities (for ex-
ample, option contracts or repurchase agreements). Such position limits should 
be related to the capital available to cover market risk. Banks, especially those 
with large, stable liquidity investment and trading portfolios, would also be 
expected to set limits on the level of risk taken by individual traders and dealers. 
These limits are related to several factors, including the specific organization 
of investment and trading functions and the technical skill level of individual 
dealers and traders. The sophistication and quality of analytical support that is 
provided to the dealers and traders may also play a role, as do the specific char-
acteristics of a bank’s stable liquidity investment or trading portfolios and the 
level and quality of its capital. This type of policy should specify the manner 
and frequency of position valuations and position limit controls. 
Stop-Loss Provisions
Market risk management policy should also include stop-loss sale or consulta-
tion requirements that relate to a predetermined loss exposure limit (risk budget). 
The stop-loss exposure limit should be determined with regard to a bank’s capi-
tal structure and earning trends, as well as to its overall risk profile. When losses 
on a bank’s positions reach unacceptable levels, the positions should automati-
cally be closed or consultations initiated with risk management officers or the 
asset and liability committee to establish or reconfirm the stop-loss strategy. 
Limits to New Market Presence
Financial innovations involve profits that are much higher than those of stan-
dard instruments, because profit is a key motivating factor to innovate. In a 
highly competitive market environment, innovation also places pressure on 
competitors to engage in new business to make profits or to not lose a market 
presence. However, innovation involves a special kind of risk taking, requir-
ing that a bank be willing to invest in or trade a new instrument even though 
its return and variance may not have been tested in a market setting—or even 
though the appropriate market for the instrument may not yet exist. 
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A prudent bank should have risk management policies that proscribe its pres-
ence in new markets and its trading in new financial instruments. Limits re-
lated to a new market presence should be frequently reviewed, monitored and 
adjusted. Because the high spreads initially available in new market segments 
attract competitors, markets may pick up at a fast pace. Increasing use of a new 
instrument also helps to increase the breadth and depth of related secondary 
markets and to increase their liquidity. Once a market becomes established 
and sufficiently liquid, a bank should readjust the limits to levels applicable to 
mature markets. 
Figure 10.3 Monitoring Market Presence
Information Technology
The availability of sophisticated computer technology in recent years has been 
instrumental in developing many new financial instruments. Technology has 
improved the quality of and access to information, and this in turn has in-
creased the efficiency and liquidity of related secondary markets. Modeling and 
analytical tools that are supported with timely and accurate information and 
that are internally consistent provide the technical support necessary to conduct 
transactions and make decisions. In addition, sophisticated computer programs 
have enabled the simultaneous processing and risk evaluation of transactions, 
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providing bank management and staff with the information needed to under-
stand in real time the exact nature of risk and the value of open positions. 
It is this technological capacity that has enabled banks to engage in trading—
that is, to take positions in financial instruments, including positions in deriva-
tive products and off-balance-sheet instruments. The bank takes these  positions 
with the intention of benefiting in the short term from actual or expected dif-
ferences between buying and selling prices, or from other price or interest rate 
variations. A bank’s trading book may also include positions arising from bro-
kering or market making, as well as certain instruments taken to hedge the risk 
exposures inherent in some trading activities. 
Organization
Trading activities in most banks are carried out in organizational (treasury) 
units that are separate from standard banking activities. Most banks also rec-
ognize a portion of capital that is specifically allocated to cover the risk related 
to trading and which is partially covered by Tier 3 capital (see chapter 6). The 
management process for the bank’s trading activities has elements similar to 
those of investment management. This includes decisions regarding the total 
volume of the trading book, the portfolio selection, and the security selection—
that is, the specific types of financial instruments and the shares that they 
constitute of the bank’s trading book. 
The positions in the trading book are, by definition, held for short-term re-
sale, and transactions are normally triggered by market price movements. The 
triggers proposed to and endorsed by the responsible senior management are 
expressed in terms of bid-offer spreads. The structure of the trading portfolio 
therefore is in constant f lux throughout the trading day. 
10.4  Market Risk Measurement: Value at Risk (VAR) 
as a Possible Tool
Given the increasing involvement of banks in investment and trading activi-
ties and the high volatility of the market environment, the timely and accurate 
measurement of market risk is a necessity, including measurement of the expo-
sures on a bank’s liquidity and trading portfolios and on- and off-balance-sheet 
positions.
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Trading activities require highly skilled analytical support. Traders must use 
some form of technical analysis to gauge market movements and market oppor-
tunities. A fundamental analysis of classes of securities and of market behavior 
is also needed for the trader to be able to anticipate price movements and posi-
tion the portfolio accordingly. Ex post analysis is also important to understand 
how market movements have affected profit and loss. 
Because of the fast-changing nature of a bank’s trading book and the com-
plexity of risk management, banks engaged in trading must have market risk 
measurement and management systems that are conceptually sound and that 
are implemented with high integrity. This reinforces the fact that risk manage-
ment structures and related strategies should be embedded in a bank’s culture 
and not be dependent on just one or two people. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision’s capital adequacy standard for market risk specifies a set 
of qualitative criteria that must be met for a bank to be eligible for application 
of the minimum multiplication factor for market risk capital charges. These 
criteria include the following:
An independent risk control unit responsible for the design and imple- ¶
mentation of the bank’s market risk management system. The unit should 
be independent from business trading units and should report directly to 
senior management of the bank. It should produce daily reports on and 
analysis of the output of the bank’s risk measurement model, as well as 
analysis of the relationship between the measures of risk exposure and 
trading limits. 
Board and senior management who are actively involved in the risk con- ¶
trol process and who regard risk control as an essential aspect of business. 
The daily reports prepared by the independent risk control unit should 
be reviewed by management that has sufficient seniority and authority to 
enforce reductions in the positions taken by individual traders and reduc-
tions in the bank’s overall risk exposure. 
A market risk measurement system that is closely integrated into the daily  ¶
risk management process of a bank and that is actively used in conjunc-
tion with trading and exposure limits. The risk measurement system 
should be subject to regular back-testing—that is, to ex post comparison 
of the risk measure generated by the bank’s internal model against daily 
changes in portfolio value and against hypothetical changes based on 
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static positions. The ultimate test remains actual profits or losses com-
pared to the budgeted profits. 
A routine and rigorous program of stress testing to supplement the  ¶
risk analysis provided by the risk measurement model. The results of 
stress testing should be subject to review by senior management and 
should be ref lected in the policies and limits to market risk exposure, 
 especially when stress tests reveal particular vulnerability to a given set of 
circumstances. 
A process to ensure compliance with a documented set of bank policies,  ¶
controls, and procedures concerning the trading activities and the opera-
tion of the risk measurement system. 
The capacity to systematically assess and measure risk and to effectively man-
age the net open position is crucial. Methods range from calculation of the net 
open position (or market factor sensitivity) to value at risk and other more so-
phisticated estimates of risk. Table 10.1 provides an example of a simplistic but 
practical method to aggregate assets, as ref lected on the balance sheet, to arrive 
at a net open position. Once forward and unsettled transactions are taken into 
account, a projected position is determined at book value, translated into mar-
ket value, and then disclosed in terms of a common denominator representing 
the equivalent position in the cash markets. This methodology belongs to the 
static type of market risk measurement tools known as standard or table-based 
tools. Based on the net open position one can estimate the potential earnings or 
capital at risk by multiplying the net open position (market risk factor sensitiv-
ity) by the price volatility. This estimate provides a simple, one-factor value at 
risk; it does not, however, take into consideration the correlation between posi-
tions. Figure 10.4 illustrates the concept. 
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Table 10.1 Simplistic Calculation of Net Open Positions
Position Commodities Fixed-income Equities Currencies 
Net book value of assets per balance sheet 
Forward and unsettled transactions 
Position at book value 
Position at market value before transactions in 
derivatives 
Position in derivatives (delta-equivalent 
position in options) 
Net effective open position after transactions 
in derivatives 
Possible movements in market prices (price 
volatility) 
Impact on earnings and capital 
Figure 10.4 Potential Amount of Qualifying Capital Exposed
Such a simplistic approach to market risk assessment treats every market to which 
the bank is exposed as a separate entity and does not take into account the rela-
tionships that may exist among various markets. Each risk is therefore measured 
242 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
on an individual basis. A more comprehensive approach assumes risk assessment 
from a consolidated perspective, which takes into consideration the relationships 
among markets and the fact that a movement in one market may affect several 
others. For example, a fluctuation in the exchange rate may also affect the price 
of bonds issued in a particular currency. The potential solution to this conceptual 
problem lies in the use of statistical techniques such as value at risk. 
Risk is based on probabilistic events, and it is apparent that no single mea-
surement tool can capture the multifaceted nature of market risk. Even the 
simplest aspects of market risk management can present a problem in real-life 
situations—particularly so when a bank does not have adequate systems. At an 
absolute minimum, marking to market is a fundamental measure that should be 
taken to protect a bank’s capital. Both the stable liquidity investment portfolio 
and the trading book should be marked to market on a daily basis to ensure 
that the real value of positions is maintained. For a bank’s managers, analysts, 
and supervisors such a figure indicates the actual value of the stable liquidity 
investment and trading portfolios and indicates the steps that should be taken 
to protect capital.
Value at Risk
VAR is a modeling technique that typically measures a bank’s aggregate mar-
ket risk exposure and, given a probability level, estimates the amount a bank 
would lose if it were to hold specific assets for a certain period of time. 
It is a forward-looking method that expresses financial market risk in a form 
that anybody can understand, namely currency. It measures the predicted 
worst loss (maximum movement of the yield cure), ¶
over a target horizon (for example, 10 days, which provides the benefit of  ¶
early detection),
within a given confidence level (99 percent is the level chosen by the  ¶
Basel Committee).
The effect of a yield curve movement of one bp on the market value of a bond 
has already been explained in section 10.2. What remains in terms of the above 
definition of VAR is to determine the maximum movement that can take place 
over a given time horizon at a specified confidence level. The Basel Committee 
specifies a confidence level of 99 percent over 10 days.
243
Chapter 10: Market Risk Management 
Box 10.1 VAR Calculation
If the value of a one bp move is $780, a specific bond’s VAR would be determined 
by the potential overall basis point move, multiplied by the dollar value of $780.
For example, if the potential movement could be 30 bp over a 10-day period, the 
VAR of the bond will be 30 times $780, or $23,400.
Inputs to a VAR-based model include data on the bank’s positions and on pric-
es, volatility, and risk factors. The data should be sufficiently comprehensive to 
capture all risks inherent in a bank’s on- and off-balance-sheet positions. The 
risks covered by the model should include all interest, currency, equity, and 
commodity and option positions inherent in the bank’s portfolio.
VAR-based models combine the potential change in the value of each position 
that would result from specific movements in underlying risk factors with the 
probability of such movements occurring. The changes in value are aggre gated at 
the level of trading book segments and across all trading activities and markets. 
The VAR amount may be calculated using one of a number of methodologies: 
The ¶ historical simulation approach calculates the hypothetical change 
in value of the current portfolio, based on the historical past movements 
of risk factors. (At a 99 percent confidence level, one could take the low-
est of 100 daily observations and apply that return to the current portfolio 
to determine the maximum loss over the following day.) 
The ¶ delta-normal or variance/covariance methodology is the methodol-
ogy most widely used by portfolio managers. This approach assumes that 
the distribution of asset returns is normal and that returns are serially in-
dependent (that is, are not influenced by the previous day’s return). To cal-
culate the potential change in value of the current portfolio, one computes 
the mean and standard deviation of asset returns to achieve a combination 
of risk factor sensitivities of individual positions in a covariance matrix, 
representing risk factor volatilities and correlations between each asset. 
The¶  Monte Carlo simulation method constructs the distribution of the 
current portfolio using a large sample of random combinations of price 
scenarios, the probabilities of which are typically based on historical 
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experience. This approach is more f lexible than the other two meth-
odologies and does not rely on assumptions regarding the normality of 
returns, but the number of scenarios grows rapidly with the complexity of 
a portfolio and its risk factors. 
The measurement parameters include a holding period, a historical time ho-
rizon at which risk factor prices are observed, and a confidence interval that 
allows for the prudent judgment of the level of protection (that is, that identifies 
the maximum acceptable losses). The observation period is chosen by the bank 
to capture market conditions that are relevant to its risk management strategy. 
An appraisal of capital charges or mark-to-market exposures depends on avail-
ability of information that meaningfully expresses a bank’s exposure to market 
risk. The information provided (to senior management, the board, and third 
parties such as bank supervisors) should include both aggregated and disaggre-
gated exposures at certain control points (in time) and performance  information 
about risk and return, including a comparison of risk and performance estimates 
with actual outcomes. The disaggregation could be either by standard risk cat-
egories or asset classes (for example, equity, fixed-income, currency, commod-
ity) or by some other criterion that more correctly characterizes a bank’s risk 
profile (for example, by business units or risk types). According to the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the disclosure requirements for each port-
folio should include 
VAR calculations, broken down by type of risk or asset class and in the  ¶
aggregate, estimated for one-day and two-week holding periods, and 
reported in terms of high, medium, and low values over the reporting 
interval and at period end; 
information about risk and return in the aggregate, including a compari- ¶
son of risk estimates with actual outcomes, such as a histogram of daily 
profit/loss (P/L) divided by daily VAR, or some other representation of 
the relationship between daily P/L and daily VAR; 
qualitative discussions to assist with a comparison of the P/L to VAR,  ¶
including a description of differences between the basis of the P/L and 
the basis of the VAR estimates; and 
quantitative measure of firmwide exposure to market risk, broken down  ¶
by type of risk, that in the bank’s judgment best expresses exposure to 
risk, reported in terms of high, medium, and low values over the report-
ing period and at period end. 
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Most of the large banks that are major players with high market risk exposures 
have developed sophisticated risk indexes and tools for risk assessment and mea-
surement that can be applied across different markets. Although specific arrange-
ments may differ, these internal risk measurement models usually fit a common 
conceptual framework. The models typically measure a bank’s aggregate market 
risk exposure and, given a probability level, estimate the amount the bank would 
lose if it were to hold specific assets for a certain period of time. Because such 
VAR-based models cover a number of market risks, the bank is able to fine-tune 
its portfolio structure, drawing on a range of options for portfolio diversification 
to reduce the risk to which it is exposed and the associated capital requirements. 
As stated above, the Basel Committee has established certain quantitative stan-
dards for internal models when they are used in the capital adequacy context. 
The quantitative standards include a 99th percentile, one-tailed confidence in-
terval; a holding period of 10 trading days; and a historical observation period 
of at least one year. (If recent price volatility has been high, however, a shorter 
observation period would yield a higher value than the horizon, covering a 
longer but overall less volatile period.) VAR numbers should be aggregated on 
a simple-sum basis across risk factor categories, taking into consideration cross-
correlations within each category. 
The Basel Committee market risk capital standard (see also chapter 6) requires 
that the VAR be computed daily and the market risk–related capital require-
ments met on a daily basis. The capital requirement is expressed as the higher 
of the previous day’s VAR and the average of the daily VAR measures for each 
of the last 60 business days. This is then multiplied by an additional factor k 
(which has a minimum value of 3.0), designated by national supervisory au-
thorities and related to the quality of a bank’s risk management system. 
Supervisors will increase k by a factor of between 0.0 and 1.0 according to the 
number of times that back-testing of the internal model has shown the pro-
jected VAR to have been exceeded. Because this “plus” factor is related to the ex 
post performance of the internal model, this measure is expected to introduce a 
positive incentive to maintain a good-quality model. 
VAR, however, is based on assumptions that historical experiences may be re-
peated in future. As such it has limitations—an issue which is further discussed 
in section 10.6 (stress testing and scenario analysis). It should therefore be used 
as one tool in an integrated set of tools—and not as the only measure of a port-
folio’s exposure. 
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10.5 Risk and Performance Measurement
Management reports (for examples, see tables 10.2 to 10.5) should include de-
scriptive analyses of market strategies, market movements, and performance 
results. Risk reporting should include an analysis of the portfolio’s risk charac-
teristics, such as
modified duration, ¶
price (currency) value of a one bp change—PV01, and ¶
key rate duration. ¶
Risk reports should also cover return characteristics, which emphasize the total return 
of the portfolio, not only realized profits and coupon receipts, but also unrealized 
marked-to-market gains and losses.
Performance Reporting
Accountability for risks taken is normally demonstrated through an effective 
management reporting system, which allows an assessment of a portfolio’s per-
formance and enables management to determine the value added of investment 
decisions relative to a benchmark. A performance report should cover
overall value added of active versus passive management, ¶
value-added of each strategy and manager, and ¶
tracking of progress toward investment objectives. ¶
In addition to the value-added objectives discussed above, performance mea-
surement provides a very effective risk control tool for portfolio management, 
as discussions between the performance measurement staff and the trading 
staff inevitably lead to the detection of errors and instilling of discipline in the 
organization.
Performance reports should focus on the following key statistics (see table 
10.2): 
The composition of the portfolio compared with the benchmark  ¶
The performance to date of the portfolio and the benchmark  ¶
The existing portfolio risk as measured by the tracking error or VAR  ¶
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Table 10.2 Reporting Performance and Market Risk: Portfolio versus the 
Benchmark
Performance or Risk Measure Portfolio Benchmark Excess / Deviation
Ex ante: risk reporting Basis Points (bp or $)
Portfolio duration (months) – interest rate
Portfolio duration (months) – credit spread 
Tracking error (bp) – credit spread
Value-at-Risk (at 90, 95 and 99% confi dence level) –  time 
horizon is 1 day, 1 Week, 1 month, 6 months)
Ex post: performance reporting
Return – current month in %
Return – current year-to-date in %
Return – inception to date in %
Holding period in years
Tracking error (bp) – interest rate (tracking error equals 
standard deviation of excess returns)
Information ratio (excess return divided by the tracking error)
When measuring (calculating) performance, risk analytics staff must keep in 
mind the following issues:
The same market prices must be used for securities that are held in both  ¶
the portfolio and the benchmark.
Performance income must be reconciled with accounting.  ¶
The concept of total return means that unrealized price gains and losses  ¶
as well as realized coupon and other income are considered in the income 
(profit and loss) statement.
Risk analytics staff must also take into consideration the following:
Cash f lows to and from the portfolio, over which the portfolio manager  ¶
has no control
Various rate-of-return formulas ¶
Time-weighted methods ¶
Internal rates of return ¶
Linking returns of multiple periods ¶
Annualizing returns ¶
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Performance attribution—analyzing the components of performance—is also 
extremely useful, as it allows for an ex post critique of the results from specific 
risk-taking activities. This can help an institution refine its investment process 
to focus on those activities in which it has a proven track record and to eschew 
those activities in which it has been unable to generate excess returns. 
Interest Rate Risk Measurement Using Key Rate Duration
For a fixed-income (bond) portfolio, measuring the sensitivity to interest rates is 
a crucial activity. In table 10.3, a one bp parallel move to the yield curve (PV01 
or DV01—see 10.2 discussion of duration) is used to determine the following:
The portfolio duration (interest rate sensitivity) is 1.73 years, whereas the  ¶
benchmark portfolio is marginally less sensitive to interest rate move-
ments at a duration of 1.64 years.
The benchmark portfolio is exposed to interest rates up to three years. ¶
The portfolio manager has engaged in active management and not simply  ¶
followed the benchmark, as there are exposures to the four -and five-year 
key rates and portions of the yield curve.
The portfolio’s greatest absolute sensitivity to interest rates is at the two- ¶
year key rate, where it would gain $36,979 if interest rates moved down-
ward by one bp.
The greatest relative exposure of the portfolio against the benchmark  ¶
exists in the 2.5-year part of the yield curve, where it would lose $8,062 
more than the benchmark portfolio, were interest rates to move down-
ward by one bp.
The bank’s portfolio is more exposed to an across-the-board, one bp  ¶
interest rate movement, and would stand to gain $5,641 in such an 
unlikely case. 
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Table 10.3 Interest Rate Sensitivity of a Portfolio versus the Benchmark
Key Rates Portfolio Benchmark PV01
O/N -29 0 -30
1 WEEK -29 2 -31
1 MONTH -753 41 -795
3 MONTH -4,322 158 -4,479
6 MONTH 5,190 329 4,861
9 MONTH -2,535 669 -3,204
1 YEAR 21,587 16,524 5,063
1.5 YEAR 31,990 35,565 -3,574
2 YEAR 36,979 29,148 7,831
2.5 YEAR 12,367 20,430 -8,062
3 YEAR 13,618 10,942 2,676
4 YEAR 3,822 0 3,822
5 YEAR 1,567 0 1,567
6 YEAR 0 0 0
7 YEAR 0 0 0
8 YEAR 0 0 0
9 YEAR 0 0 0
10 YEAR 0 0 0
15 YEAR 0 0 0
20 YEAR 0 0 0
30 YEAR 0 0 0
TOTAL 119,443 113,803 5,641
Duration (years) 1.73 1.64 0.08
Duration (months) 20.70 19.72 0.98
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Credit Spread Risk Measurement Using Key Rates
We can learn more about the two portfolios (bank and benchmark) by analyzing 
the sensitivity of the key rates to a widening of the credit spreads. In table 10.4, 
a one bp widening of credit spreads (swap rate against the treasury rates, CR01) 
is used to determine the following:
Table 10.4 Sensitivity of a Portfolio to Widening of Credit Spreads versus 
the Benchmark
DV01 Portfolio Benchmark CR01
O/N -29 0 -29
1 WEEK -29 0 -29
1 MONTH -774 0 -774
3 MONTH -4,395 0 -4,395
6 MONTH 5,051 0 5,051
9 MONTH -3,785 0 -3,785
1 YEAR 15,012 0 15,012
1.5 YEAR 13,134 0 13,134
2 YEAR 26,641 0 26,641
2.5 YEAR 11,787 0 11,787
3 YEAR 2,274 0 2,274
4 YEAR 458 0 458
5 YEAR 0 0 0
6 YEAR 0 0 0
7 YEAR 0 0 0
8 YEAR 0 0 0
9 YEAR 0 0 0
10 YEAR 0 0 0
15 YEAR 0 0 0
20 YEAR 0 0 0
30 YEAR 0 0 0
TOTAL 65,336 0 65,336
Duration (years) 1 0 1
Duration (months) 11 0 11
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The benchmark portfolio has to be a government securities portfolio as it  ¶
is clearly free of any credit risk, that is, a risk-free portfolio. The portfolio 
credit spread sensitivity is 1 year (11 months), whereas the benchmark 
portfolio must have a zero credit spread duration.
The portfolio’s greatest absolute sensitivity to credit spreads is at the  ¶
two-year key rate, where it would gain $26,641 if credit spreads narrowed 
(downward) by one bp.
The greatest relative exposure of the portfolio against the benchmark  ¶
must also exist in the two-year part of the yield curve, where it would 
gain the same amount as the absolute amount of $26,641 more than the 
benchmark portfolio, were credit spreads to narrow by one bp.
The bank’s portfolio exposure to credit spread narrowing could gain it  ¶
$65,336.
In the unlikely situation where both interest rates and credit spreads moved 
downward by exactly one bp—across all parts of the yield curve—the bank’s 
portfolio would gain $70,977 ($5,641 + $65,336) more than the benchmark 
portfolio.
10.6 Stress Testing and Scenario Analysis
The Basel Committee recommendation also includes a requirement that banks 
establish and regularly use a “routine and rigorous program” of stress tests to 
identify events or influences that can negatively affect a bank’s capital position.
Stress testing is fast becoming the norm for risk measurement and analysis. As 
part of the fallout from the 2007 – 2008 financial sector crisis, some critics are 
questioning the value of tools such as VAR. The problem is not VAR itself. It 
is still a useful indicator, but remains a statistical tool, using historical infor-
mation and with at most a 99 percent confidence level; always leaving some 
potential exposure. 
The solution lies in applying common sense when using tools. Risk managers 
should know the characteristics of their portfolios and apply scenario analyses 
to ask the “what if ” questions that appear to have been sorely lacking in many 
instances.
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The purpose of stress testing is to identify events or influences that may result 
in a loss—that is, have a negative impact on a bank’s capital position. Stress 
tests should be both qualitative and quantitative in nature. Quantitative crite-
ria should identify plausible stress scenarios that could occur in a bank’s spe-
cific market environment. Qualitative criteria should focus on two key aspects 
of stress testing: evaluation of the bank’s capacity to absorb potentially large 
losses, and identification of measures that the bank can take to reduce risk and 
conserve capital. 
It is virtually impossible to develop a standard stress test scenario that has a 
consistent impact on all banks. Stress-testing methodology therefore usually 
entails a number of steps, including the following (see table 10.5): 
Table 10.5 Current Portfolio Price Movements during Major Historic 
Market Crises
Portfolio Losses
After:
Market Crisis 1 Day 1 Week 1 Month 3 Months 6 Months
1. BAHT devalues -33,792 -130,300 -133,572 -816,255 -1,280,952
-0.49 -1.88 -1.93 -11.79 -18.50
2. Ruble devalues -28,829 -184,603 -9,795 -661,150 -1,365,128
-0.42 -2.67 -0.14 -9.55 -19.72
3. Euro weakens 10,161 -198,632 -468,165 -1,190,649 -1,844,777
4. Dotcom falls -23,802 -102,202 -329,826 -1,309,357 -1,300,675
-0.34 -1.48 -4.76 -18.91 -18.79
5. US in recession -84,290 -112,331 -272,146 -559,127 -59,209
-1.22 -1.62 -3.93 -8.08 -0.86
6. September 11 terror attacks 15,112 286,579 477,924 135,269 193,305x
0.22 4.14 6.90 1.95 2.79
7. Major corporate bankruptcy 33,687 -31,941 15,066 -734,156 -466,133
0.49 -0.46 0.22 -10.60 -6.73
Review of information on the largest actual losses experienced during  ¶
a specific period, compared to the level of losses estimated by a bank’s 
internal risk measurement system. Such a review provides information on 
the degree of peak losses covered by a given VAR estimate. 
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Simulation of extreme stress scenarios, including testing of a current  ¶
portfolio against past periods of significant disturbance. Such testing 
should incorporate both the large price movements and the sharp reduc-
tions in liquidity that are normally associated with these events. 
Evaluation of the degree of sensitivity of a bank’s market risk exposure to  ¶
changes in assumptions about volatilities and correlations. In other words, 
the bank’s current position should be compared to extreme values within 
the historical range of variations for volatilities and correlations. 
Execution of bank-specific test scenarios that capture specific character- ¶
istics of a bank’s trading portfolio under the most adverse conditions. 
The complexity of stress tests normally ref lects the complexities of a bank’s 
market risk exposures and respective market environments. The results of stress 
tests should be reviewed periodically by senior management and the board and 
should prompt, as necessary, changes in specific risk management policies and 
exposure limits. If the stress tests reveal a particular vulnerability, the bank 
should promptly address the situations and risks that give rise to that vulner-
ability. The stress-test scenarios and the testing results normally are subject to 
supervisory attention. 
Estimates derived from stress tests can also be used for portfolio evaluation and 
as a management tool. For example, the estimates can be compared to actual 
profit earned or loss incurred during the period under review. Comparison of 
the potential impact on profits with reported profits and losses is an added tool 
for evaluating a bank’s market risk management. 

11
11.1  Introduction: Origin and Components of 
Currency Risk
Currency risk results from changes in exchange rates between a bank’s domestic currency and other currencies. It originates from a mismatch when assets and liabilities are valued in different currencies. That mis-
match may cause a bank to experience losses as a result of adverse exchange 
rate movements when the bank has an open on- or off-balance-sheet position, 
either spot or forward, in an individual foreign currency. In recent years, a mar-
ket environment with freely f loating exchange rates has practically become the 
global norm. This has opened the doors for speculative trading opportunities 
and increased currency risk. The relaxation of exchange controls and the liber-
Currency Risk Management
Key Messages
Currency risk results from changes in exchange rates and originates in mismatches  ¶
between the values of assets and liabilities denominated in different currencies. 
Other types of risk that often accompany currency risk are counterparty risk,  ¶
settlement risk, liquidity risk, and currency-related interest rate risk. 
When assessing currency risk, one must distinguish between the risk originating in  ¶
political decisions, risk resulting from traditional banking operations, and the risk 
from trading operations. 
Currency risk is managed by establishing position limits.  ¶
The key currency risk management limit is the net effective open position. The net  ¶
effective open position of all currencies, added together as absolute values and 
expressed as a percentage of qualifying capital, should not exceed a predetermined 
value. 
Currency risk management forms part of the asset-liability management process.  ¶
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alization of cross-border capital movements have fueled a tremendous growth 
in international financial markets. The volume and growth of global foreign 
exchange trading has far exceeded the growth of international and capital f lows 
and has contributed to greater exchange rate volatility and therefore currency 
risk. 
Currency risk arises from a mismatch between the value of assets and that of 
capital and liabilities denominated in foreign currency (or vice versa), or be-
cause of a mismatch between foreign receivables and foreign payables that are 
expressed in domestic currency. Such mismatches may exist between both prin-
cipal and interest due. Currency risk is speculative and can therefore result in a 
gain or a loss, depending on the direction of exchange rate shifts and whether 
a bank is net long or net short in the foreign currency. For example, in the case 
of a net long position in foreign currency, domestic currency depreciation will 
result in a net gain for a bank and appreciation will produce a loss. Under a net 
short position, exchange rate movements will have the opposite effect. 
In principle, the f luctuations in the value of domestic currency that create cur-
rency risk result from changes in foreign and domestic interest rates that are, 
in turn, brought about by differences in inflation. Fluctuations such as these 
are normally motivated by macroeconomic factors and are manifested over 
relatively long periods of time, although currency market sentiment can often 
accelerate recognition of the trend. Other macroeconomic aspects that affect 
the domestic currency value are the volume and direction of a country’s trade 
and capital f lows. Short-term factors, such as expected or unexpected political 
events, changed expectations on the part of market participants, or speculation-
based currency trading may also give rise to currency changes. All these factors 
can affect the supply and demand for a currency and therefore the day-to-day 
movements of the exchange rate in currency markets. In practical terms, cur-
rency risk comprises the following: 
Transaction risk, ¶  or the price-based impact of exchange rate changes on 
foreign receivables and foreign payables—that is, the difference in price at 
which they are collected or paid and the price at which they are recog-
nized in local currency in the financial statements of a bank or corporate 
entity. 
Economic or business risk ¶  related to the impact of exchange rate 
changes on a country’s long-term or a company’s competitive position. 
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For example, a depreciation of the local currency may cause a decline in 
imports and greater exports. 
Revaluation risk or translation risk, ¶  which arises when a bank’s foreign 
currency positions are revalued in domestic currency or when a par-
ent institution conducts financial reporting or periodic consolidation of 
financial statements. 
Other risks related to international aspects of foreign currency business are 
incurred by banks conducting foreign exchange operations. One such risk is a 
form of credit risk that relates to the default of the counterparty to a foreign ex-
change contract. In such instances, even a bank with balanced books may find 
itself inadvertently left with an uncovered exchange position. Another form of 
credit risk peculiar to exchange operations is the time-zone-related settlement 
risk. This arises when an exchange contract involves two settlements that take 
place at different times due to a time-zone difference, and the counterparty 
or the payment agent defaults in the interim. The maturity mismatching of 
foreign currency positions can also result in interest rate risk between the cur-
rencies concerned: a bank can suffer losses as a result of changes in interest rate 
differentials and of concomitant changes in the forward exchange premiums, 
or discounts, if it has any mismatches with forward contracts or derivatives of 
a similar nature. 
11.2 Policies for Currency Risk Management
Policy-setting responsibilities. There are many activities of banks that in-
volve risk taking, but there are few in which a bank may so quickly incur large 
losses as in uncovered foreign exchange transactions. This is why currency risk 
management deserves the close attention of the bank’s board and senior man-
agement. The board of directors should establish the objectives and principles 
of currency risk management. These should specifically include setting appro-
priate limits to the risks taken by the bank in its foreign exchange business and 
establishing measures to ensure that there are proper internal control proce-
dures covering this area of the bank’s business. Within this framework, specific 
policies and limits should be determined by a risk management committee such 
as the asset-liability management committee (ALCO) The policy guidelines 
should be periodically reviewed and updated to properly match the bank’s risk 
profile with the quality of its risk management systems and staff skills. 
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The policy guidelines should also ref lect changing circumstances in domestic 
and international currency markets, accommodating possible changes in the 
currency system—for example, in the form of capital controls introduced as the 
result of political decisions or underlying macroeconomic conditions of par-
ticular countries that would affect the currency exchange rate. In addition, the 
policies should specify the frequency of revaluation of foreign currency posi-
tions for accounting and risk management purposes. In principle, the frequency 
of revaluation and reporting should be commensurate with the size and specific 
nature of the bank’s currency risk exposures. 
For management and control purposes, most banks make a clear distinction 
between foreign currency exposure resulting from dealing and trading opera-
tions, and exposures resulting from a more traditional banking business involv-
ing assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet exposures denominated in a foreign 
currency. These may include loans, investments, deposits, borrowings, or capi-
tal, as well as guarantees or letters of credit. Because of the different nature of 
operations and the concomitant risk exposures, banks also typically maintain 
two types of currency risk management processes. Currency risk management 
involving dealing/trading operations must be an information-intensive, day-in/
day-out process under close scrutiny by senior management and the risk man-
agement committee. Management of traditional banking operations, on the 
other hand, is in most cases carried out on a monthly basis. 
Risk Exposure Limits 
A bank has a net position in foreign currency and is exposed to currency risk 
when its assets (including spot and future contracts to purchase) and its li-
abilities (including spot and future contracts to sell) are not equal in a given 
currency. Banks should have written policies to govern their activities in foreign 
currencies and to limit their exposure to currency risk and therefore to potential 
incurred losses. In principle, limits are established based on the nature of cur-
rency risk and the type of business by which that risk is incurred. These limits, 
whether they are expressed in absolute or relative terms, should be related to a 
bank’s risk profile and capital structure and to the actual history of a currency’s 
market behavior. 
Limits may be applicable in various timeframes depending on the dynamics of 
the particular activity. Limits on dealing/trading are typically established for 
overnight positions, but for some extremely dynamic activities, such as spot 
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trading, intraday limits may be necessary. The less liquid a currency market is 
and/or the more volatile the currency is, the lower the currency risk exposure 
limit should be set. 
Net Open Position Limits
The net open position limit is an aggregate limit of a bank’s currency risk ex-
posure. Normally expressed as a percentage of the bank’s capital, it may also 
be shown in relation to total assets or to some other benchmark. Logically, the 
net open position limit represents a proxy for the maximum loss that a bank 
might incur from currency risk. If the exchange rates of currencies in which a 
bank holds open positions are perfectly correlated, the limit on a net open posi-
tion would be sufficient for currency risk management purposes. In terms of 
aggregation of a bank’s exposure to various currencies, the perfect correlation 
would imply that long and short positions in various currencies could simply 
be netted. 
Because currencies are not perfectly correlated, a bank’s choice on how to ag-
gregate net open positions in various currencies to arrive at a total net open 
position (also known as the gross aggregate position) for currency risk man-
agement purposes is an indication of the bank’s risk management stance. A 
conservative bank aggregates by adding together the absolute values of all open 
positions in specific currencies, implying that the exchange rates of all cur-
rencies are expected to move in such a way that all positions would result in 
simultaneous losses. A less conservative bank often chooses a middle route, 
such as aggregating all short positions and all long positions in various curren-
cies and taking the larger of the two as an indicator of the aggregate (total) net 
open position. This latter method, known as the “shorthand method,” has been 
accepted by both the Basel Committee and the European Union. 
In many countries, prudential regulations specifically limit the net open posi-
tion, that is, a bank’s total exposure to currency risk. In some countries limits 
are common for all banks holding a foreign exchange license, while in others 
the limits are established on a bank-by-bank basis according to the supervisors’ 
assessments of the quality of risk management and the technical capacity of 
staff. International efforts also have been made to reach agreement on capital 
requirements related to currency risk, with a view to promoting these capital 
requirements as an international standard. 
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In principle, the prudential limit established in a particular country should be 
related to exchange rate volatility. In practice, the prudential limit to the net 
open position is frequently set at 10–15 percent of a bank’s qualifying capital. In 
periods when significant domestic currency devaluation is expected, the central 
bank may further restrict short positions in foreign currencies. In countries 
with relatively stable exchange rates and external convertibility, net open posi-
tion limits tend to be higher or nonexistent. 
Currency Position Limits
A well-managed bank should also maintain a set of specific limits on its risk 
exposure to specific currencies—in other words, it should establish limits on 
net open positions in each currency. Currency position limits can apply to bal-
ance sheet revaluation points, overnight positions, or intraday positions. These 
limits can be adjusted on a case-by-case basis, depending on the bank’s expec-
tations of shifts in the exchange rate between the domestic currency and the 
foreign currency. 
Other Position Limits
If engaged in currency dealing/trading, a bank should normally maintain limits 
on spot positions in each currency. Within these limits it also should establish 
limits for its individual currency dealers/traders. If a bank is engaged in busi-
ness with derivatives, it should establish limits on the size of mismatches in the 
foreign exchange book. These limits are typically expressed as the maximum 
aggregate value of all contracts that may be outstanding for a particular matu-
rity. Procedures may vary among banks, but specific limits are generally set on 
a daily basis for contracts maturing in the following week or two, on a biweekly 
basis for contracts maturing in the next six months, and on a monthly basis for 
all other contracts. 
Stop-Loss Provision
Most banks that actively participate in currency markets also maintain “stop-
loss” provisions, or predetermined loss exposure limits on various positions and 
currencies. Stop-loss exposure limits should be determined based on a bank’s 
overall risk profile, capital structure, and earning trends. When losses reach 
their respective stop-loss limits, open positions should automatically be cov-
ered. In volatile or illiquid markets, however, the stop-loss limit may not be 
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fully effective, and the market may move past a stop-loss trigger before an open 
position can be closed. 
Concentration Limit
The market value of a foreign currency–denominated contract is normally 
sensitive to both the contract’s maturity and the exchange rates between the 
relevant currencies. High concentration always increases risk. A bank should 
therefore establish limits on the maximum face value of a contract in specific 
currencies or on aggregate face values of all contracts combined. 
Settlement Risk
Settlement can become complex in the context of foreign currency operations, 
as it may involve parties in different time zones and hours of operation. An 
open position may last for several hours. And while actual losses rarely materi-
alize, the size of a potential loss can be large. Settlement risk can be mitigated 
by a request for collateral, but a bank should also establish specific limits on 
exposure to settlement risk. These limits should be related to the total amount 
that is outstanding and subject to settlement risk on any given day. A bank may 
also establish limits on settlement risk within the total exposure limit placed on 
a counterparty. In such cases, a limit could be viewed as a component of credit 
risk. 
Counterparty Risk
All transactions involving foreign contracts or foreign currency receivables also 
involve counterparty risk—the exposure to loss because of the failure of a coun-
terparty to a contract to make the expected payments. Such risk may in turn 
be a result of circumstances in the country in which the counterparty conducts 
business. This risk is particularly pronounced in countries that lack external 
convertibility and where the government imposes restrictions on access to the 
foreign exchange market and on cross-border foreign exchange transactions. To 
minimize the risk, a bank should establish counterparty risk limits, especially 
for counterparties in countries that lack convertibility or where potential exists 
for the development of a shortage of foreign exchange. Overnight and forward 
positions to individual counterparties are typical. Conservative banks may also 
establish country limits related to the total exposure to all counterparties based 
in a specific country. 
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Revaluation
Revaluation or translation refers to the points in time when a bank revalues its 
on- and off-balance-sheet positions to estimate the potential losses that exist-
ing positions might produce. Revaluation is essentially the same as “marking 
to market,” except that it pertains to changes (as a result of exchange rate f luc-
tuations) in the domestic currency value of assets, liabilities, and off-balance-
sheet instruments that are denominated in foreign currencies. Revaluation is an 
important risk management tool, regardless of whether gains and losses have 
to be recognized for tax or supervisory purposes under applicable accounting 
regimes. 
The frequency of revaluation for internal risk management purposes must be 
attuned to specific market conditions and to the degree of currency risk that is 
implicit in a bank’s operations. When estimating potential gains and losses, a 
bank should use conservative estimates of potential future exchange rate move-
ments. The determination of realistic exchange rates for revaluation purposes 
can be complex. Estimates are easiest to make for countries with freely con-
vertible domestic currency and are typically derived from historical exchange 
rate movements. For countries lacking convertibility or where rates are subject 
to manipulation or government intervention, estimates are difficult to make 
because rates can change significantly and unexpectedly. Conservative banks 
also conduct revaluations under worst-case scenarios. Clearly, not all positions 
can always be closed out, particularly in countries where there is restricted con-
vertibility or market access. The objective is to determine early enough what 
measures may need to be taken to protect the bank. 
Liquidity Risk Concerns
Currency risk management should incorporate an additional liquidity risk-
related aspect. Foreign currency transactions, whether originating on the bal-
ance sheet or off the balance sheet, may introduce cash f low imbalances and 
may require the management of foreign currency liquidity. This process can be 
carried out using a liquidity or maturity ladder that indicates mismatches and 
commitments over time in each currency. A bank may also establish limits on 
mismatches in specific currencies for different time intervals. 
In countries where the national currency does not have external convertibility, 
maturity mismatches result in higher liquidity risk, because a bank may have 
difficulty acquiring the necessary amount of foreign currency in a timely man-
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ner. In such countries, the central bank is often an active participant in for-
eign exchange markets and may provide the liquidity in foreign exchange that 
is needed for current account transactions. When assessing the adequacy of a 
bank’s foreign exchange liquidity management in a country that lacks external 
convertibility, an analyst should, for liquidity support purposes, be thoroughly 
familiar with the applicable foreign exchange market arrangements. 
Accounting Treatment
The accounting treatment of currency risk–related losses is of key importance 
for a bank’s management, as well as for analysts and supervisors. Accounting 
treatments may vary among countries, depending on the purpose of revalua-
tion. An analyst should be thoroughly familiar with the rules that are locally 
applicable on the accounting treatment of gains or losses arising from currency 
risk. The analyst should also be familiar with the process of revaluation and 
with the accounting rules used by a bank under review for risk and internal 
management reporting purposes. 
Making rules for the recognition of gains or losses that have immediate tax and 
other implications requires careful consideration by authorities and bank regu-
lators. This is particularly important in unstable and volatile economies that 
lack external convertibility and that are characterized by frequent and drastic 
domestic exchange rate adjustments. In many transition economies, a deprecia-
tion of the national currency against the currencies of major trading partners by 
200 percent per annum is not uncommon, and depreciation by 30–50 percent is 
frequent. Analysts and supervisors must be extremely careful when interpreting 
the financial statements of banks in such environments. 
For tax and supervisory purposes, revaluations of balance sheet positions are 
usually considered to be realized gains or losses, and revaluations of off-bal-
ance-sheet positions are considered unrealized. The most conservative ap-
proach requires that all gains and losses be promptly ref lected in earnings. 
Some regulators require that only realized gains or losses and unrealized losses 
be ref lected in earnings. Some countries also permit the deferment of recog-
nition of both unrealized gains and unrealized losses, resulting in misstated 
capital and earnings. 
In developing countries, the apparent application of a standard accounting 
treatment of gains and losses may be counterproductive if the taxation sys-
tem requires tax payment on all gains, even if the assets are subject to sale 
264 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
restrictions. In a country with a currency that is depreciating rapidly, even a 
small open position may create accounting adjustments in amounts that are 
comparable to or even greater than a bank’s business in the domestic currency. 
An example that illustrates this point is a situation that occurred in a transi-
tion economy where accounting adjustments of bank balance sheets resulting 
from exchange rate movements were considered realized gains or losses. In the 
process of banking system rehabilitation, assets of impaired value were replaced 
by government securities denominated in freely convertible currencies, such as 
U.S. dollars. This created large net long positions in the banking sector. In the 
case in question, banks were not allowed to sell or trade bonds if the discount 
factor was greater than 10 percent, making it impossible for them to close or 
reduce long positions. Subsequent significant devaluation of the national cur-
rency created large “realized” foreign exchange gains that were duly taxed. This 
in turn resulted in the drain of liquidity from the banking sector and significant 
damage to the banking sector and the entire economy. 
11.3 Currency Risk Exposure and Business Strategy
Most banks, especially those operating in countries with unstable currencies, 
are keenly aware of the risks associated with foreign currency business. The 
degree of currency risk exposure is therefore a matter of business orientation 
and is often related to a bank’s size. Smaller and new banks often limit their 
business to servicing the foreign currency needs of their customers. This in-
volves selling or buying foreign currency on the customer’s behalf, a process 
whereby the open currency positions that such transactions create normally 
are closed within minutes. Such banks, exposed to currency risk for very short 
periods of time and to a limited extent, therefore do not need elaborate currency 
risk management. 
Banks that maintain correspondent banking relationships with foreign banks 
or that support customer transactions denominated in foreign currencies are 
exposed to much higher levels of currency risk. The risk is higher still for banks 
that lend and borrow in foreign currency, as this may result in open currency 
positions or maturity mismatches. This business profile is typical of medium-
size banks or larger banks in developing countries. Figure 11.1 illustrates the 
potential volume of foreign currency business as part of a bank’s balance sheet 
structure in a developing country. 
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Figure 11.1 Currency Structure of Assets and Liabilities
Banks that are engaged in such activities should operate the appropriate cur-
rency risk management policies. The extent of operations and risk taking should 
correspond to the quality of the bank’s risk management process and its capital 
position—and should be in line with the regulatory, macroeconomic, and fi-
nancial market environment of each respective country. In practical terms, cur-
rency risk management can be an especially challenging task in countries that 
lack external convertibility. Exchange rate stability can be contrived because 
conditions in the currency markets of such countries—such as the right of ac-
cess and the type of transactions that are allowed in the market—are often sub-
ject to manipulation by the authorities. Markets that are shallow can be greatly 
influenced by expectations, and exchange rate adjustments, when they occur, 
tend to be drastic and are often introduced at unexpected times. Banks operat-
ing in such environments are exposed to a much higher degree of currency risk, 
and it is much more difficult to determine sound limits to such exposure. 
Figure 11.2 illustrates a bank’s currency structure of loans and deposits. The 
bank is clearly on a fast growth path. Its loan portfolio significantly exceeds 
the funding capacity provided by its deposit base and indicates that the growth 
has been fueled by nondeposit borrowings, which probably includes foreign 
borrowings. The bank is therefore exposed to funding and currency risk. For 
a bank in a developing country, where access to international markets may be 
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limited, subject to restrictions, or even closed by circumstances over which the 
bank has no control, a foreign exchange position such as this entails a high-risk 
exposure. 
Figure 11.2 Currency Structure of Loan Portfolio and Customer Deposits
Recognition of the increased risk and of the needed technical skills associ-
ated with the foreign exchange business has prompted regulators in almost all 
countries that do not maintain external convertibility to introduce two types of 
bank licenses. For a license to operate only in its domestic currency, a bank has 
to satisfy only minimum capital and technical requirements. A bank wishing 
to also operate in foreign currencies must meet much higher minimum capital 
and other requirements to obtain a license. The minimum capital needed for a 
foreign exchange license is typically two to three times more than is required 
for a domestic currency license. 
Spot Trading
Large and well-capitalized banks, including so-called internationally active 
banks, look to foreign exchange operations as a source of profits. Such banks 
actively engage in currency trading and may play the role of market makers; in 
other words, they may become dealers in foreign currencies. Banks engaged 
in currency markets and spot trading may carry sizeable net open positions, 
although for relatively brief periods of time. In certain circumstances, however, 
spot rate movements may become so rapid that an open position results in losses 
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in hours or even minutes. In addition to adequate foreign exchange risk man-
agement policies, spot trading requires effective organization and technically 
competent staff, sophisticated technology and effective information systems, 
and access to up-to-the-minute information. Banks that lack adequate infor-
mation resources are much more vulnerable to sudden spot rate movements 
prompted by temporarily unbalanced supply-and-demand conditions, inside 
information, or rumors. 
A bank may deliberately maintain open positions to take advantage of expected 
exchange rate movements. This usually takes a form of currency market arbi-
trage, or sometimes speculation, and involves the buying and selling of foreign 
currencies, securities, or derivatives. This arbitrage is motivated by discrepan-
cies between spot exchange rates prevailing at the same time in different mar-
kets, or differences between forward margins for various maturities or interest 
rates that exist concurrently in different markets or currencies. Buying a cur-
rency in one market for simultaneous sale in another market is termed arbitrage 
in space; the creation of an open position in a currency in anticipation of a 
favorable future exchange rate movement is arbitrage in time. Switching from 
one currency to another to invest funds at a higher yield is currency-related in-
terest arbitrage. From the point of view of the supervisory authorities, however, 
any deliberate assumption of risk on an open position is usually characterized 
as speculation, rather than arbitrage. 
Forward Transactions
Banks may also be engaged in forward foreign exchange transactions, which 
are settled on the agreed date and at agreed exchange rates. the maturity of the 
forward contract can be a few days, months, or years. Forward rates are affected 
not only by spot rates, which are normally influenced by market conditions, but 
also by interest rate differentials. A change in differentials may therefore result 
in a profit or a loss on a forward position, requiring that these be actively man-
aged. This in turn requires a significant capacity for information processing. In 
this case, a bank should maintain a forward book, which is usually managed on 
a gap (mismatch) basis. A forward book typically necessitates a close look, on a 
weekly or a biweekly basis, at forward positions for contracts nearing maturity, 
and a look on a monthly basis for other contracts. A bank may take a view re-
garding expected movements in interest rate differentials and then manage its 
forward positions in a way that is compatible with expected movements.
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Currency Swaps
Banks averse to risk may avoid dealing in forward contracts altogether and 
instead engage in currency swaps. Two parties to a currency swap agreement 
exchange a series of payments in different currencies at agreed dates and a prea-
greed exchange rate. A single period swap is referred to as a forward rate agree-
ment. A currency swap avoids a net open currency position but still has to be 
marked to market. In any case, in a normally dynamic trading environment, it 
is virtually impossible for a bank active in currency markets to maintain cov-
ered positions in all currencies at all times. Short or long positions in various 
currencies alternate any number of times during the course of a day. At certain 
times, established by its currency risk management procedures, a bank therefore 
typically determines its open positions and takes the necessary actions to cover 
excessive risk exposures, usually by arranging for swaps. 
Prudent risk management for a bank normally engaged in a large number of 
spot and forward transactions each day requires the establishment of a formal 
procedure for computing unrealized profits and losses at least on a daily basis—
and calculations more frequent than this are desirable. Such calculations should 
normally include the entire foreign exchange book. This is a precondition for 
effective portfolio management and provides a bank’s management with a 
meaningful insight into the performance of its foreign exchange operations and 
the associated risk. 
11.4 Review of Currency Risk Management Procedures
The volume of a bank’s foreign currency operations, including its standard on- 
and off-balance-sheet operations in foreign exchange and trading operations, 
should normally be determined by the access conditions of and liquidity in 
respective markets. When assessing a bank’s exposure to currency risk and the 
adequacy of its risk management techniques, an analyst must be aware of the 
regulatory environment and market conditions in the relevant countries and of 
the bank’s access to those markets. Currency markets in developing countries 
often have restricted access and may lack liquidity, and the availability of ad-
equate hedging instruments may be limited. These factors should be ref lected 
in the bank’s policies and operations. 
A key aspect of currency risk management review is the assessment of whether 
or not a bank has the capacity to adequately handle its level of operations in 
foreign exchange. The bank’s currency risk exposure policies, the extent to 
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which risks are taken, risk management procedures, and exactly how exposures 
are managed all must be taken into consideration. A review should also take 
into consideration the bank’s regulatory and market environment, its asset size, 
capital base, customer volume in foreign exchange, the experience of its staff, 
and other relevant factors. The nature and availability of instruments that can 
be used to hedge or offset currency risk are also critical. 
The key determinant of currency risk management is the policies that place 
limits on currency risk exposure. Policies should be reassessed on a regular basis 
to ref lect potential changes in exchange rate volatility and an institution’s over-
all risk philosophy and profile. The limits should be established in the context 
of an institution’s overall risk profile to ref lect aspects such as capital adequacy, 
liquidity, credit quality, market risk, and interest rate risk. The relative impor-
tance of each policy depends on a particular bank’s circumstances and opera-
tions. All applicable policies and procedures, including operational guidelines, 
should be clearly defined and adjusted whenever necessary. Senior management 
responsible for policy making must fully understand the risks involved in for-
eign exchange operations. The basis upon which specific policies and exposure 
limits are formed must be clearly explained in a consistent and logical manner. 
The Basel recommendation for supervisors and management is to ensure that 
a bank has in place appropriate limits and that it implements adequate internal 
controls for its foreign exchange business. Risk procedures should cover the 
level of foreign currency exposure that an institution is prepared to assume and, 
at a minimum, should include intraday, overnight, and forward limits for cur-
rencies in which an institution is authorized to have an exposure—individually 
and for all currencies combined. Stop-loss limits and settlement limits should 
also be determined. 
Currency risk management can be based on gap or mismatch analysis using the 
same principles as liquidity risk and interest rate risk management. The pro-
cess should aim to determine the appropriate mismatch or imbalance between 
maturing foreign assets and liabilities. This mismatch can be evaluated in light 
of basic information such as current and expected exchange rates, interest rates 
(both locally and abroad), and the risk-return profile that is acceptable to bank 
management. (The market risk related to currency trading is discussed in detail 
in chapter 10.) 
Table 11.1 illustrates a simplistic method to calculate the net effective open 
position. The calculation of a net effective open position in a currency should 
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consider the exposures ref lected both on and off the balance sheet and should 
include the net spot position (that is, all asset items minus all liability items, in-
cluding accrued interest denominated in the currency in question); net forward 
position (that is, amounts to be received minus amounts to be paid under for-
ward foreign exchange transactions, plus the principal on currency swaps not 
included in the spot position); mismatched forward commitments; net positions 
in derivatives; and positions resulting from operations in foreign branches. 
Table 11.1 Currency: Reporting Net Effective Open Position 
Net Effective Open 
Position in Foreign 
Currencies (FX) US Dollars UK Sterling Euro
Swiss 
Francs
Japanese 
Yen Total
Total foreign currency 
assets 
Total foreign currency 
liabilities 
Net spot position 
Mismatched forward 
commitment 
Foreign branches/
operations 
Net position in derivatives 
Net effective open 
position after hedging 
Maximum net open 
position during the month
The net position in all currencies should be aggregated and attention paid 
to the exact method of aggregation of the open positions that is used by the 
bank. A conservative bank should aggregate by adding the absolute value of 
open positions, thereby projecting the worst possible scenario for exchange rate 
movements. 
Banks in many developing countries often handle freely convertible currencies 
as a single currency for risk management purposes. The rationale for this ap-
proach is that risk exposure arising from movements in the exchange rates of 
hard currencies is much less than that arising from fluctuations in domestic 
currency. In addition, the grouping of freely convertible currencies simplifies 
currency risk management. While this system is usually adequate in countries 
where banks are not engaged in forward contracts or derivatives, situations ex-
ist in which this system may backfire. For example, environmental disasters, 
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politi cal events, and announcements of unexpectedly bad macroeconomic indi-
cators may promptly and significantly increase cross-currency risk. 
When mismatches in the maturity structure occur, interest rate and liquidity 
risk develops. A bank should have well-defined procedures for the management 
of such mismatches to maximize income and limit potential loss. Figure 11.3 
illustrates the analysis of a foreign currency deposits maturity structure. The 
maturity structure of loans funded by these deposits should fully correspond 
to the deposit maturity structure. If a bank’s risk management policies permit 
the running of mismatches, the analyst should look for evidence that the bank 
is performing effective “what if ” studies. Doing so will help the bank attain an 
effective limit structure. 
Managing maturity mismatches is a challenging task. With regard to maturity 
gaps in the forward book, the key issue is not the expected behavior of interest 
rates in relation to the various maturities of a single currency, but the expected 
differential between the interest rates of two currencies for various maturities 
and the respective risk implications. This is obviously a more complex situation 
than the management of interest rate risk for a single currency. Furthermore, 
the elimination of maturity gaps on a contract-by-contract basis is practically 
impossible for a bank that is actively involved in currency markets and that has 
a foreign exchange book made up of hundreds of outstanding contracts. 
Maturity gaps are typically handled by the use of swaps. This is a relatively 
sound risk management practice as long as any changes in exchange rates are 
gradual and the size and the length of maturity gaps managed systematical-
ly and reasonably well. This procedure, however, can result in high costs for 
bridging maturity gaps in situations where sudden and unexpected changes in 
interest rates occur that can momentarily influence the market quotations for 
swap transactions. 
272 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
Figure 11.3 Freely Convertible Currency Deposit Maturities as a 
Percentage of Total Customer Deposits
Capital Charges
Currency risk exposure implies certain capital charges that are added to the 
charge calculated for market risk (see chapter 6). A bank clearly should be able 
to prudently carry currency risk. According to various country guidelines, the 
net open foreign currency position established by a bank should not exceed 
10–15 percent of qualifying capital and reserves. Using the shorthand method, 
capital adequacy is calculated as 8 percent (or the regulatory percentage for 
the country, if different from 8 percent) of the overall net open position. The 
overall net open position is measured as the greater of the sum of the net short 
positions and the sum of the net long positions, plus the net position (short or 
long) in gold, regardless of the sign. Figures 11.4 and 11.5 illustrate the open 
positions of a bank in the various currencies in which it operates, expressed as 
a percentage of its capital and including aggregate exposure—that is, the net 
(absolute) open foreign currency position. 
 273
Chapter 11: Currency Risk Management
Figure 11.4 Currency Risk Exposure as a Percentage of Qualifying Capital
Figure 11.5 Maximum Effective Net Open Foreign Currency Position 
as a Percentage of Net Qualifying Capital and Reserves 
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Alert Systems
A bank also should maintain a system of alerts for situations in which limits are 
exceeded. An analyst should expect the bank to have well-defined procedures, 
including clear assignments of responsibilities, to handle alerts. Adequate pro-
cedures and internal controls should be in place for all other key functions re-
lated to foreign exchange operations. The analyst also should assess the proce-
dures and practices for revaluation and for measuring foreign exchange trading 
gains and losses. A prudent bank should carefully review the names of institu-
tions and individuals with which it does forward exchange business and should 
request margin cover wherever it is deemed appropriate. 
Stafﬁ ng
The efficient organization and quality of staff are a crucial part of currency risk 
management. In sum, the skills and experience of staff should be commensu-
rate with the scope of a bank’s operations. Responsibility for trading, standard 
foreign exchange operations, processing of transactions and payments, front- 
and back-office (operations) support and account reconciliation, risk manage-
ment, and revaluation functions should all be clearly separated. Especially 
critical is the separation of foreign exchange dealing, accounting, and internal 
control functions. Policies should be formulated by the board and determined 
by ALCO. Line management should be responsible for overseeing foreign cur-
rency transactions and ensuring compliance with risk limits. 
Information Systems
The analyst should assess information systems; reporting requirements; and 
the accounting, auditing, and internal control systems that support foreign ex-
change operations and the currency risk management function and that allow 
for proper surveillance. Accurate and timely information support is especially 
critical: a bank with a high volume of foreign exchange operations must have 
proper information support if it is to develop strategies for trading operations 
and executing specific transactions. Information support also is needed to man-
age open currency positions, account for transactions and keep the foreign ex-
change book, revalue the financial position, estimate potential gains and losses, 
and ensure compliance with risk management policies. An analyst should be 
able to identify the subsystems or modules that support these functions. 
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In addition, information systems should be capable of generating timely and 
complete management reports on spot and forward positions, mismatches and 
liquidity positions, foreign currency–related interest rate risk positions, and 
counterpart and country exposure positions. Information systems should have 
the capacity to highlight any exceptions to policy or exposure limits and to 
bring such exceptions to the attention of management. Information support 
should include regular reporting to senior management. 

12
12.1 Objective of Asset-Liability Management
Asset-liability management (ALM)—the management of the overall balance sheet—comprises the strategic planning and implementation and the control processes that affect the volume, mix, maturity, inter-
est rate sensitivity, quality, and liquidity of a bank’s assets and liabilities. These 
key elements are highly interdependent. 
Asset-Liability Management
Key Messages
Interest rate risk management is one of the key aspects of asset-liability ¶
management. 
The asset-liability management committee addresses the protection of both income ¶
and capital from interest rate risk. The goal of interest rate risk management is to 
maintain interest rate risk exposures within authorized levels.
Nontrading interest rate risk is the sensitivity of capital and income to changes in ¶
interest rates. 
Nontrading interest rate risk originates in mismatches in the repricing of assets ¶
and liabilities, growth rates of interest-bearing assets and liabilities, changes in 
relationships between rate indexes (basis risk), changes in the shape of the yield 
curve, and the potential exercise of explicit or embedded options. 
Banks generally attempt to ensure that the repricing structure of their balance sheet ¶
generates maximum beneﬁ ts from expected interest rate movements. This repricing 
structure may also be inﬂ uenced by liquidity issues, particularly if the bank does 
not have access to interest rate derivatives to separate its liquidity and interest rate 
views. 
Banks measure these risks and their impact by identifying and quantifying ¶
exposures through use of sophisticated simulation and valuation models, as well as 
a repricing gap analysis. 
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The central objective of this process—to stabilize and maximize the spread 
between interest paid to raise funds and interest earned on the bank’s assets, 
and at the same time to ensure adequate liquidity and to constrain risk to 
acceptable levels—is as old as banking business itself. The practices, norms, and 
techniques of asset-liability management have, however, changed substantially 
in recent years, with many commercial banks using the ALM process to take 
more risk to enhance income. Moreover, given the complexity and volatility 
of modern financial markets, the need for good asset-liability management 
has significantly increased. Adoption of a formal approach to asset-liability 
management is therefore a prerequisite for an integrated approach to managing 
the risks associated with balance sheet and off-balance-sheet items. 
The operational aspects of asset-liability management center around the struc-
turing of a bank’s balance sheet so the bank can maintain an adequate liquid-
ity and risk profile throughout an interest rate cycle. Bank balance sheets are 
not totally f lexible, in part because assets with long maturities are difficult to 
securitize or sell. Because it can take some time to change the asset portfolio 
structure, raise alternative sources of funding, and execute the necessary trans-
actions, the repositioning process normally starts even before the next interest 
rate cycle begins. 
All financial institutions face interest rate risk. When interest rates f luctuate, 
a bank’s earnings and expenses change, as do the economic value of its assets, 
liabilities, and off-balance-sheet positions. The net effect of these changes is 
ref lected in the bank’s overall income and capital. 
Broadly speaking, interest rate risk management comprises the various policies, 
actions, and techniques that a bank can use to reduce the risk of diminution of 
its net equity as a result of adverse changes in interest rates. This chapter dis-
cusses various aspects of interest rate risk and reviews the techniques available 
to analyze and manage it. These include, in particular, repricing and sensitivity 
analyses.
Asset-Liability Management Committee
The ALM strategy and related decisions should take into account and be able 
to accommodate all relevant limitations and potential distractions. The ac-
tions of both bank and nonbank competitors can affect (re)pricing potential. 
Unforeseen developments on the domestic or international front, such as the 
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financial crisis in East Asia, or changes in expectations can influence customer 
or market behavior and require complex adjustments. 
ALM decisions should be coordinated across the relevant operational divisions 
and must be effectively executed (see box 12.1). This necessitates the establish-
ment of a formal institutional structure responsible for ALM. In most banks, 
this structure typically is an asset-liability management committee (ALCO), 
the membership of which should include senior line managers of all relevant 
functional and business processes. 
For ALCO decisions to be meaningful, the committee should have at its dis-
posal a broad range of essential information related to investment and trading 
portfolios; the historical, current, and projected structure of the bank’s assets 
and liabilities; and relevant information on maturities, yields, interest rates and 
spreads, and repricing capacity and structure. The ALCO should also be in-
formed about the competitive position of the bank’s assets, liability rates, and 
yields in relation to both the market and the bank’s major competitors. The 
projected balance sheet structure and the repositioning strategy should normal-
ly be based on a quantitative model of the balance sheet, following a simulation 
of various interest rates and (re)pricing scenarios and their effects on the bank’s 
earnings, liquidity, and capital.
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Box 12.1 ALM Objective
In managing the Bank’s balance sheet, our objective is to ensure that the currency, 
interest rate, and maturity characteristics of the Bank’s liabilities and assets are 
well-aligned, so that the Bank is not exposed to material currency, interest rate, or 
maturity mismatch risks. 
We aim to ensure adequate funding for each product at the most attractive cost, 
and to manage the currency composition, maturity profile, and interest rate sensi-
tivity characteristics of the portfolio of liabilities supporting each lending product in 
accordance with the particular requirements for that product and within prescribed 
risk parameters. 
We shall achieve our objectives through implementation of an asset and liability 
management (ALM) framework leading to a portfolio-wide assessment and moni-
toring of balance sheet risks. This framework will enable us to advance broader 
balance sheet risk management issues such as
upgrading the Bank’s approach to management of its equity, income ¶
immunization techniques, and loan portfolio credit risk management; 
consolidating the portfolio-wide approach to hedging and managing the ¶
balance sheet risks so as to exploit transaction netting opportunities and 
reduce transaction costs; 
executing and implementing currency and interest rate swap transactions as ¶
needed to manage all aspects of the Bank’s balance sheet risks. 
—Example from a Treasury ALM Group 
12.2 Interest Rate Risk Management Responsibilities
In principle, the sound management of interest rate risk requires systematic 
and adequate oversight by senior management. Also needed are risk manage-
ment policies and procedures that are clearly spelled out and that are com-
mensurate to the complexity and nature of a bank’s activities and the level of its 
exposure to interest rate risk; appropriate risk measurement, monitoring, and 
control functions; and adequate internal controls. Interest rate risk should be 
monitored on a consolidated basis, including the exposure of subsidiaries. This 
does not imply the use of conventional accounting consolidation—which may 
allow offsets between positions from which a bank may not in practice be able 
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to benefit, because of legal or operational constraints—but rather the use of 
proper mechanisms to ensure the completeness and integrity of the information 
on which the risk management decisions are made. 
The bank’s board of directors has ultimate responsibility for the management 
of interest rate risk. The board approves the business strategies that determine 
the degree of exposure to risk and provides guidance on the level of interest rate 
risk that is acceptable to the bank; on the policies that limit risk exposure; and 
on the procedures, lines of authority, and accountability related to risk manage-
ment. The board also should systematically review risk to fully understand the 
level of risk exposure and to assess the performance of management in monitor-
ing and controlling risks in compliance with board policies. 
Senior management must ensure that the structure of a bank’s business and 
the level of interest rate risk it assumes are effectively dealt with, that appropri-
ate polices and procedures are established to control and limit risk, and that 
resources are available to assess and control it. Reports to senior management 
should provide aggregate information and a sufficient level of supporting detail 
to facilitate a meaningful evaluation of the level of risk, the sensitivity of the 
bank to changing market conditions, and other relevant factors. 
In most cases, day-to-day risk assessment and management is assigned to a 
specialized committee, such as ALCO. Duties pertaining to key elements of 
the risk management process should be adequately separated to avoid potential 
conflicts of interest—in other words, a bank’s risk monitoring and control func-
tions should be sufficiently independent from its risk-taking functions. Larger 
or more complex banks often have a designated, independent unit responsible 
for the design and administration of balance sheet management, including in-
terest rate risk. Given today’s widespread innovation in banking and the dy-
namics of markets, banks should identify any risks inherent in a new product or 
service before it is introduced and ensure that these risks are promptly consid-
ered in the assessment and management process. 
Banks should also have an adequate system of internal controls to oversee the 
interest rate risk management process. A fundamental component of such a 
system is a regular, independent review and evaluation to ensure the system’s 
effectiveness and, when appropriate, to recommend revisions or enhancements. 
Supervisory authorities often require the results of such reviews. 
The defined limits of risk should be enforced and banks should introduce ad-
equate procedures to keep risk exposures within those limits and to change the 
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limits when they prove inadequate. At a senior level, limits are normally estab-
lished relative to a bank’s total income or capital and then are broken down by 
portfolios, activities, or business units. The design of the system of limits should 
ensure that positions that exceed assigned limits are promptly addressed by 
management. 
The goal of interest rate risk management in the balance sheet is, therefore, to 
maintain risk exposure within authorized levels, which may be expressed in 
terms of risk to income, the market value of equity, or both. 
12.3  Models for the Management of Interest Rate 
Risk in the Balance Sheet
Banks should have clearly defined policies and procedures for limiting and con-
trolling interest rate risk. The interest rate risk measurement system employed 
by a bank should comprise all material sources of interest rate risk and should 
be sufficient to assess the effect of interest rate changes on both earnings and 
economic value. The system should also provide a meaningful measure of the 
bank’s interest rate exposure and should be capable of identifying any excessive 
exposures that may arise. It is important that it be based on well-documented 
and realistic assumptions and parameters. The system should cover all assets, 
liabilities, and off-balance-sheet positions, should use generally accepted fi-
nancial concepts and risk measurement techniques, and should provide bank 
management with an integrated and consistent view of risk in relation to all 
products and business lines. 
“Gap” Model
It was common practice in the 1980s and early 1990s for financial institutions 
to analyze their exposure to interest rate risk using the “gap” approach. This ap-
proach is so named because it aims to allocate assets and liabilities to maturity 
“buckets,” defined according to their repricing characteristics, and to measure 
the “gap” at each maturity point. 
In a gap model, the components of the balance sheet are separated into items 
that are sensitive to interest rates and those that are not. These are in turn 
sorted by repricing period (or modified duration) and allocated to time periods 
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known as time or maturity buckets. Maturity buckets should be set up based 
on key rates (described as specific maturity points on the spot rate curve) and 
should take into consideration the correlation of yields. 
It is important to note that the focus of this analysis is on repricing (that is, 
the point at which interest rates may be changed) and not on the concept of 
liquidity and cash f low. In terms of this approach to risk management, the gap 
is closed when the repricing of rate-sensitive assets and liabilities is adequately 
matched. Table 12.1 illustrates a simplified framework for conducting a repric-
ing gap analysis. 
A positive gap indicates that a higher level of assets than liabilities reprice in 
the time frame of the maturity bucket—a balance sheet position that is also 
referred to as asset sensitive. This would give rise to higher income should the 
specific yield increase. The opposite balance sheet position is referred to as li-
ability sensitive or as negative gap, and describes a situation in which a similar 
increase in the yields associated with a specific time interval would produce a 
decrease in net interest income. 
Theoretically, once a balance sheet repricing position is known, a framework is 
put into place to judge the overall exposure of a bank to interest rate f luctua-
tions. Management then has the option of structuring a balance sheet to pro-
duce a zero gap, which would presumably immunize a bank from interest rate 
f luctuations. Such protection may, however, also result in a lower level of net 
interest margins. Banks generally attempt to ensure that the repricing structure 
of their balance sheet generates maximum benefits from expected interest rate 
movements. For example, if a bank expects short-term yields to increase, it 
would want more assets than liabilities to be repriced in the short term. This is 
not always possible in practice because of the structural difficulties in illiquid 
markets, or because exchange controls limit access to offshore markets and to 
instruments that are designed to help manage risk exposure. 
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Table 12.1 A Repricing Gap Model for Interest Rate Risk Management
Balance Sheet Items – Duration  / Economic Value of Equity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Assets / Repricing – 
Key Rates
Balance 
Sheet 
$ million 6 months
12 
months 2 years 30 Zero
Key Rate 
Duration
Assets and Approximate 
Duration (years) Amount 0.25 0.5 1 15 0 Calculated
Cash and balances with the 
Central Bank
4.000 4 0.25
Securities portfolio (includes 
stand-alone and hedging 
derivatives)
34.000 1 3 22 8 4.23
Fair value of positions in 
derivatives 
4.000 4 0.25
Inter-bank  placements 14.000 10 4 0.46
Loans and advances to other 
customers
76.000 15 46 15 3.66
Fixed assets net of depreciation 2.000 2 0.00
Other assets (net of provisions) 6.000 6 0.00
Total Assets 140.000 19 18 72 23 8 3.08
Weighted Duration of Assets 3.08 0.03 0.06 0.51 2.46 0.00 3.08
ALM Derivatives
Weighted duration of assets – 
after ALM derivatives
Liabilities and Owners Capital
Due to other banks and credit 
institutions
14.000 14 0.25
Core funding – retail  and 
corporate core deposits 
45.000 14 11 5 15 5.31
Non-core funding 8.000 8 0.25
Foreign funding 24.000 12 12 0.38
Fair value of liabilities in respect of 
derivatives
0.000
Other borrowings 23.000 8 9 6 4.20
Other liabilities 4.000 4 0.00
Subordinated Debt 2.000 2 15.00
Total Liabilities   120.000 56 32 5 23 4 3.17
Weighted Duration of Liabilities 3.17 0.12 0.13 0.04 2.88 0.00 3.17
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Table 12.1 continued
Balance Sheet Items – Duration  / Economic Value of Equity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Assets / Repricing – 
Key Rates
Balance 
Sheet $ 
million 6 months
12 
months 2 years 30 ZERO
Key Rate 
Duration
Shareholder’s Equity 20.000
Total Liabilities & Capital 140.000 0.00
GAP -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 0.47 -0.41 0.00 -0.09
Duration of Equity – prior to 
hedging
2.54
ALM Derivatives
Weighted duration of liabilities – 
after ALM derivatives
Duration of Equity – after using 
ALM derivatives
Calculation of EVE:  2.54 =  [ 3.08*140 - 3.17*120]/20
One of the benefits of a repricing gap model is the single numeric result, which 
provides a straightforward target for hedging purposes. Unfortunately, a re-
pricing gap is a static measure and does not give the complete picture. Where 
management uses only current-year income to judge rate sensitivity, the re-
pricing approach tends to overlook or downplay the effects of mismatches on 
medium- or long-term positions. Gap analysis also does not take into account 
variations in the characteristics of different positions within a time band; in 
other words, all positions within a time band are assumed to mature or reprice 
simultaneously. In reality, this will happen only to the extent the yields within 
the maturity bucket are highly or perfectly correlated and reprice off the same 
yield curve. A cumulative gap can arise from a number of different incremental 
gap patterns and may obscure yield curve exposures, that is, sensitivity to the 
changes in the shape of the yield curve. In addition, gap analysis does not con-
sider expected changes in balance sheet structure and ignores both basis risk 
and the sensitivity of income to option-related positions. 
There are other limitations also to the efficacy of gap analysis. The level of 
net interest margin (the ultimate target of interest rate risk management) is 
normally determined by the relative yields and volumes of balance sheet items, 
the ongoing dynamics of which cannot be fully addressed by a static model. 
Moreover, a static gap model assumes linear reinvestment—a constant rein-
vestment pattern for forecast net interest income—and that funding decisions 
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in the future will be similar to the decisions that resulted in the bank’s original 
repricing schedule. A static gap model thus usually fails to predict the impact 
of a change in funding strategy on net interest margins. 
Repricing gap models nonetheless are a useful starting point for the assessment 
of interest rate exposure. Banks also have over time progressed from simple 
gap analysis to more sophisticated techniques. Ideally, a bank’s interest rate 
measurement system will take into account the specific characteristics of each 
interest-sensitive position and will capture in detail the full range of potential 
movements. As this is in practice extremely difficult to accomplish, in most 
instances an ALCO will employ a variety of methodologies for interest rate 
risk analysis. 
Sensitivity Analysis
This process applies different interest rate scenarios to a static gap model of a 
bank’s balance sheet. (See also table 10.3.)
Simulation
This process involves constructing a large and often complex model of a bank’s 
balance sheet. Such a model will be dynamic over time and will integrate nu-
merous variables. The objective of a simulation exercise is to measure the sen-
sitivity of net interest income, earnings, and capital to changes in key variables. 
The risk variables used include varying interest rate paths and balance sheet 
volumes. Simulation is highly dependent on assumptions, and it requires sig-
nificant time before the inputs made yield meaningful results; it may therefore 
be more useful as a business planning tool than for interest rate risk measure-
ment. If it is used as a risk measurement tool, the parameters should be highly 
controlled to generate as objective a measure of risk as possible. 
Duration Analysis
Table 12.1 illustrates the importance of bank management focusing on the du-
ration of the balance sheet as a whole, including the duration contribution of 
any derivatives position. 
Interest rate risk is measured by calculating the weighted average duration of 
all assets, liabilities, and off-balance-sheet positions and then measuring the 
sensitivity of the equity to a change in interest rates. 
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The duration analysis model is then used to determine the effective duration of 
equity (or the economic value of equity, EVE, the exposure of the bank’s equity 
to interest rate risk). It has the advantage of providing a longer-term perspective 
than other models, such as simulation and interest rate gap models, which focus 
on current earnings, and is thus typically used as a complementary measure to 
set acceptable bands within which the duration exposure of capital may vary. 
Current Market Practice
The more sophisticated banking institutions use a mixture of risk management 
strategies. Banks increasingly use derivative instruments such as swaps, op-
tions, and forward-rate agreements to hedge interest rate exposure, and tech-
niques such as simulation and duration analysis, still provide useful information 
regarding the impact of these instruments on a bank’s interest rate position. 
Banks should measure their vulnerability to loss under stressful market condi-
tions, including the breakdown of the key assumptions on which their interest 
rate models are built, and should consider the results of any such assessment 
when establishing and reviewing their policies and limits on interest rate risk. 
The stress test should be tailored to the risk characteristics of a bank; it should 
also be designed to provide information on the circumstances in which the bank 
would be most vulnerable—when the assumptions and parameters on which the 
interest rate risk measurement or simulation models are based would experience 
sudden or abrupt changes. Test scenarios should consider such abrupt changes 
in the general level of interest rates and in the relationships among key market 
rates (especially those commonly used as index rates), and also should address 
potential changes in the volatility and liquidity conditions in all markets where 
the bank maintains a presence.
Because interest rate risk can have adverse effects on both a bank’s earnings 
and its economic value, two separate but complementary approaches exist for 
assessing risk exposure: net interest income (NII) simulation and economic 
value of equity (EVE) analysis. The following information comes from a very 
informative discussion of NII and EVE contained in several annual reports of 
Sun Trust Bank.
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Net Interest Income
From the perspective of earnings, which is the traditional approach to interest 
rate risk assessment, this analysis focuses on the impact of interest rate changes 
on a bank’s net interest income. 
Future interest rates cannot be predicted, but management can simulate the 
impact on net interest income under a variety of scenarios, including gradual 
changes in rates, rapid changes, economic shocks, and growing and shrinking 
yield curves. The simulation may incorporate likely customer behavior under a 
given set of facts, or it may test possible outcomes assuming unlikely behaviors 
or an extreme event. The simulation can be used to analyze the effect of alter-
native strategies on NII levels. 
Figure 12.1 depicts the estimated sensitivity of NII to gradual changes in 
interest rates. The sensitivity is measured as a percentage change from the 
forecasted NII assuming stable interest rates for the next 12 months. 
As shown in figure 12.1, a gradual decrease in interest rates (during period 3) 
would increase NII, and a gradual increase in interest rates would reduce NII. 
Figure 12.1 Net Interest Income Sensitivity
Economic Value of Equity
The impact of interest rate changes on the economic value of equity (EVE) 
reflects the sensitivity of the bank’s net worth to f luctuations in interest rates. 
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EVE provides a more comprehensive measure of the potential long-term effects 
of interest rate changes than models that focus on earnings. 
While NII simulation highlights interest rate risk over a relatively short time, 
EVE analysis incorporates all cash f lows over the estimated remaining life of 
all balance sheet and derivative positions. The sensitivity of EVE to changes 
in the level of interest rates is a measure of the longer-term repricing risk and 
options risk embedded in the balance sheet. In contrast to the NII simulation, 
which assumes interest rates will change gradually over a period of time, EVE 
uses instantaneous changes in rates. 
Because EVE measures the discounted present value of cash f lows over the 
estimated lives of instruments, the change in EVE does not directly correlate 
to the degree that earnings would be affected over a shorter period, such as the 
current fiscal year. Further, EVE does not take into account factors such as 
future balance sheet growth, changes in product mix, changes in yield curve 
relationships, and changing product spreads that could mitigate the adverse 
impact of changes in interest rates. 
Figure 12.2 ref lects the estimated sensitivity of equity to changes in interest 
rates. The sensitivity is measured as the percentage change in equity.
Figure 12.2 Equity Sensitivity to Interest Rates (EVE) 
290 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
12.4 The Impact of Changes in Forecast Yield Curves
In addition to the traditional repricing gap method having the limitations of 
any static model in a dynamic environment, the interpretation of a repricing 
schedule can also be rather complex and requires in-depth knowledge of a 
bank’s operating characteristics. One can obtain yield curve forecasts from a 
bank and develop an understanding of the institution’s interest rate view. This 
is a crude but, for the purposes of a bank assessment, effective way to under-
stand the potential impact of a given change in interest rates on an income 
statement and capital and reserves. 
The market’s forward yield curves offer a more objective view on the paths 
interest rates may follow, indicating the market’s expectations and providing a 
“best guess” estimate. The market additionally can provide objective measures 
of the expected volatility of yields that can be used, within a given confidence 
level, to measure risk. 
It must be accepted that, in certain markets, a balance sheet repricing struc-
ture cannot easily be changed. Figure 12.3 illustrates forecast yield curves for 
a range of instruments and a range of points in time, starting from the current 
period (displaying the actual yield curve) to a period one year into the future 
(displaying a forecast yield curve in the future). 
Figure 12.3 Current and Forecast Yield Curves
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Repricing Gaps and Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 12.4 illustrates the effect on income and capital that is caused by a 
change in a key market rate (such as the central bank discount rate). The objec-
tive of such a sensitivity analysis is to highlight the effect of a specific key rate 
on the income statement and on capital and reserves. Interest rate risk may not 
necessarily result in a loss, but it should be monitored to identify those banks 
that assume particularly significant levels of risk. 
A bank normally should set limits to the impact it is prepared to absorb to 
its earnings and to the economic value of its equity in the event of changes 
in market interest rates. The form of limits should be related to the size and 
complexity of the bank’s positions. For banks engaged in traditional banking 
activities and that do not hold derivatives or instruments with embedded 
options, simple limits are enough. For banks with complex and diversified 
business, a detailed limits system may be needed to take into account all 
possible sources of interest rate risk. Such a system should also consider 
specific scenarios of movements in market interest rates and historic rate 
volatilities. 
Figure 12.4 Potential Effect on Capital as a Result of a Movement in 
Interest Rates

13
Operational Risk Management 
in a Treasury Environment
“Operational risk is the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people, and systems or from external events.”
—Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, October 2006
Key Messages
Operational risk has to be  ¶ minimized whereas credit and market risk is normally optimized.
Operational risk management has become increasingly important as the Basel Committee  ¶
has ﬁ nalized its capital and reporting requirements.
Operational risks assessments must identify business functions and activities in the same  ¶
manner as line managers manage the life cycle of those functions for each business line. 
Such functional activities must be clearly aligned to management’s strategic, operational, 
reporting, and compliance objectives.
Risk assessments should include more than traditional internal controls to ensure a holistic  ¶
approach that integrates all aspects of risk, especially technology, information security, 
new product and project risk, as well as externalities such as business disruptions.
Control objectives should be established by considering an entity’s business objectives  ¶
(strategic, operational, ﬁ nancial, and compliance) and then modifying those objectives 
after due consideration of the risk environment in which they have to be achieved.
Key controls should be streamlined and reviewed regularly to assess the efﬁ ciency of  ¶
business processes. 
Compliance with laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines is paramount; it is the culture of  ¶
compliance that determines the environment within which trading decisions are made. 
Operational risk management requires clear reporting, with performance and risk  ¶
indicators linked to the control of risks arising from business activities. 
Operational risk reports should be designed to ensure that questions related to trends  ¶
in indicators address what happened, why it happened, the impact of events, as well as 
subsequent management action and accountability; and are integrated into the reporting 
mechanism. 
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13.1  Operational Risk Management and the Basel 
Committee Initiatives
Managing operational risk presents some unique challenges to banks. As operational risk events are largely internal to institutions, the causes or risk factors may not be universally applicable. Moreover, 
the magnitude of potential losses from specific risk factors is often not easy to 
project. Very large operational losses have been considered to be rare or isolated 
occurrences, which causes the perception that it is difficult to get management 
to focus on the often mundane work required to design an effective mechanism 
for systematic reporting of trends in a bank’s operational risks.
Risk managers attempt to optimize credit and market risk, whereas manage-
ment strives to minimize operational risk.
Despite these challenges, senior management and the board must be actively 
involved in the monitoring and reporting of operational risk management by 
line managers.
The objectives of an operational risk management framework and supporting 
systems are therefore to: 
Define and explain exposures and incidents that result from people,  ¶
processes, systems, and external events; and generate enterprise-wide 
understanding of the drivers of operational risk incidents.
Provide early warning of incidents and escalation of potential risk by  ¶
anticipating risks and identify problem areas through ongoing monitoring 
of key risk indicators. 
Reduce vulnerability to external and systemic effects. ¶
Clearly define the roles and responsibilities of line personnel in managing  ¶
operational risk and empower business units to take necessary actions.
Strengthen management oversight. ¶
Provide objective measurement tools. ¶
Integrate qualitative and quantitative data and other information. ¶
Influence business decisions. ¶
Accomplishing these objectives may require a change in the behavior and culture 
of the firm. Management must not only ensure compliance with the operational 
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risk policies established by the board, but also report regularly to senior executives. 
Several tools that can assist them in this task will be discussed in this chapter:
Identification of key performance and risk indicators ¶
Loss-incident databases ¶
Risk mapping: graphical representation of the probability and severity of  ¶
risks
Self-assessment of the controls in place to manage and mitigate opera- ¶
tional risk
The Basel Committee initiative has increased the attention on operational risk 
because in the modern environment, the level of risk for banks has increased. 
Increased reliance on sophisticated technology, expanding retail operations, 
growing e-commerce, outsourcing of functions and activities, and greater use 
of structured finance (derivative) techniques that claim to reduce credit and 
market risk have all contributed to the higher level of operational risk.
The traditional definition of operational risk relies on the sources of risk or 
events that subject a bank to losses from its methods of operations. The tradi-
tional sources of risk are
people, ¶
processes, ¶
systems, and ¶
external events. ¶
These very sources of risk are also the resources available to a bank when per-
forming its business line functions and risk management activities.
The Basel Committee’s Core Principles on Banking Supervision address op-
erational risk in Principle 15, which requires supervisors to ensure that banks 
have risk management policies and processes to identify, assess, monitor, and 
control or mitigate operational risk. These policies and processes should be 
commensurate with the size and complexity of the bank (see box 13.1). 
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Box 13.1 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – 
Core Principle 15 – Operational Risk
Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place risk management policies and 
processes to identify, assess, monitor, and control/mitigate operational risk. These policies 
and processes should be commensurate with the size and complexity of the bank.
Essential criteria 
1. The supervisor requires individual banks to have in place risk management policies and processes to 
identify, assess, monitor and mitigate operational risk. These policies and processes are adequate for 
the size and complexity of the bank’s operations, and the supervisor confirms that they are periodically 
adjusted in the light of the bank’s changing risk profile and external market developments. 
2. The supervisor requires that banks’ strategies, policies and processes for the management of operational 
risk have been approved and are periodically reviewed by the board. The supervisor also requires that the 
board oversees management in ensuring that these policies and processes are implemented effectively. 
3. The supervisor is satisfied that the approved strategy and significant policies and processes for opera-
tional risk are implemented effectively by management. 
4. The supervisor reviews the quality and comprehensiveness of the bank’s business resumption and 
contingency plans to satisfy itself that the bank is able to operate as a going concern and minimize 
losses, including those that may arise from disturbances to payment and settlement systems, in the event 
of severe business disruption. 
5. The supervisor determines that banks have established appropriate information technology policies 
and processes that address areas such as information security and system development, and have made 
investments in information technology commensurate with the size and complexity of operations. 
6. The supervisor requires that appropriate reporting mechanisms be in place to keep the supervisor 
apprised of developments affecting operational risk at banks in their jurisdictions.
7. The supervisor confirms that legal risk is incorporated into the operational risk management processes 
of the bank.
8. The supervisor determines that banks have established appropriate policies and processes to assess, 
manage, and monitor outsourced activities. The outsourcing risk management program should cover 
conducting appropriate due diligence for selecting potential service providers;  ¶
structuring the outsourcing arrangement;  ¶
managing and monitoring the risks associated with the outsourcing arrangement;  ¶
ensuring an effective control environment; and  ¶
establishing viable contingency planning.  ¶
Outsourcing policies and processes should require the institution to have comprehensive contracts and/
or service level agreements with a clear allocation of responsibilities between the outsourcing provider 
and the bank. 
Additional criterion  
The supervisor determines that the risk management policies and processes address the major aspects 
of operational risk, including an appropriate operational risk framework that is applied on a groupwide 
basis. The policies and processes should include additional risks prevalent in certain operationally inten-
sive businesses, such as custody and correspondent banking, and should cover periods when operational 
risk could increase. 
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In its 2003 document, Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of 
Operational Risk, the Basel Committee provided guidance to banks for man-
aging operational risk, in anticipation of the implementation of the Basel II 
Accord, which requires a capital allocation for operational risks. These guide-
lines contained 10 operational risk principles under the following headings:
Developing an appropriate risk management environment. The first three 
principles outline the obligations of the board of directors (or the level of execu-
tives with the ultimate executive decision-making function) and senior man-
agement in managing operational risk. Principle 1 states that the board must 
recognize operational risk as a distinct risk category; provide a definition of op-
erational risk that applies to all units within the firm; and establish the policies 
for identifying, assessing, monitoring, and controlling it. Principle 2 states that 
the board should ensure that there are comprehensive internal audits of adher-
ence to the operational risk policies, and that audits are conducted by competent 
staff who are not directly responsible for managing operational risk. Principle 3 
gives senior management the responsibility for implementing firmwide opera-
tional risk policies and for developing specific policies to manage operational 
risk for all of the bank’s material products, activities, processes, and systems.
Risk management: identification, assessment, monitoring, and mitigation 
or control. The next four principles address operational risk management in 
the day-to-day activities of the banking organization. Under Principle 4, banks 
should assess the operational risk inherent in all of their existing material prod-
ucts, activities, processes, and systems. Before new products, activities, pro-
cesses, and systems are introduced, an assessment of the operational risk should 
be implemented. Principle 5 requires that there be an established process to 
monitor operational risk profiles and potential exposures to losses on an on-
going basis. Regular reports on risk management should be submitted to the 
board of directors and senior management. Under Principle 6, banks should 
periodically review their operational risk control procedures and strategies and 
make adjustments as necessary. Principle 7 advises banks to adopt contingency 
and business continuity plans to ensure their ability to maintain operations and 
limit losses in the event of severe business disruption.
Role of supervisors. Principle 8 states that banking supervisors should require 
all banks, regardless of size, to have an effective framework in place to identify, 
assess, monitor, and control/mitigate material operational risks as part of an 
overall approach to risk management. Under Principle 9, supervisors should 
298 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
conduct, directly or indirectly, regular independent evaluations of a bank’s poli-
cies, procedures, and practices related to operational risks. Supervisors should 
ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms in place to apprise them of devel-
opments at banks under their jurisdiction.
Role of disclosure. Principle 10 states that banks should make sufficient public 
disclosure to allow market participants to assess their approach to operational 
risk management. 
Table 13.1 provides a graphic image of the Basel model. It also provides a pos-
sible match of the Basel risk sources (events) to the traditional risk drivers, 
namely people, processes, systems, and external events. The model identifies 
eight potential business lines and seven event types for which operational risk 
should be assessed, which is a departure from the textbook description of event 
types or the sources of risks mentioned previously.
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Table 13.1 Basel II Operational Risk Business Lines and Risk Event Types
Operational Risk – Business Lines and Event Types per Basel
Event types
Business lines Internal Fraud
External 
Fraud
Employment 
Practices and 
Workplace 
Safety
Clients, Products 
and Business 
Services
Damage to 
Physical 
Assets
Business 
Disruption and 
System Failures 
(technology risk)
Execution, 
Delivery 
and Process 
Management
Identify 
Business Line 
with Highest 
Incidence 
of Monetary 
LossesRisk Drivers People
External 
Events People
People / 
Processes
External 
Events
Systems / 
External Events Processes
Corporate fi nance
Trading and sales
Retail banking
Commercial banking
Payment and settlement
Agency and custody services
Asset management
Retail brokerage
Identify risk source with highest 
incidence of monetary losses
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13.2  A Framework for Managing and Reporting 
Operational Risk
The problem with the presentation of the Basel model in table 13.1 is that it 
does not provide information regarding the functions and activities required to 
complete the life cycle of a transaction for a given business line. In addition, 
many entities view some of the Basel-identified “business lines” (for example, 
payment and settlement) as functions serving more than one business line—
rather than as business lines in their own right.
Business Life Cycle-Based Framework
Using the proprietary securities trading business line within a bank’s treasury 
as an example, the functions required can be divided into enterprise-wide func-
tions and operational-level functions. The enterprise-wide functions are
strategic planning, ¶
governance, ¶
general management, ¶
capacity development (own infrastructure), and ¶
business development. ¶
On an operational level, the functions of securities trading include
new client portfolio set-up, ¶
portfolio management, ¶
settlement and control, ¶
valuation and accounting, and ¶
risk analytics. ¶
Reflecting back on figure A3.1 (annex to Chapter 3), which summarized the 
COSO (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission) 
approach to enterprise risk management (ERM), the implementation of an op-
erational risk methodology that incorporates both the COSO ERM and Basel 
requirements is illustrated as shown in table 13.2.
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Table 13.2 ERM Model Expanded to Include Enterprise Functions Required to Complete the Life Cycle of a 
Transaction for a Business Line
ERM Model – Linked to Business Functions and Activities
Functions Activities
Internal 
Environment Objectives
Risk & Event 
Identifi cation
Risk 
Assessment
Risk 
Response
Control 
Activities
Information 
Communication Monitoring
Enterprise:
1.  Strategic planning
2.  Governance
3.  General management
4.   Infrastructure and own 
capacity development 
5.  Business development
Operational:
6.  New client portfolio set-up
7.  Portfolio Management
8.  Settlement & control
9.  Valuation & accounting
10. Risk analytics
Activities 
required to 
perform each of 
the 10 separate 
functions
Tone
Integrity
Ethics
Strategic People Likelihood Avoid Policies Identify relevant information
Monitor 
entire ERM 
process
View of risk Operational Processes Impact Reduce Procedures Capture Ongoing activities
Risk 
management 
philosophy
Reporting Systems Share Communicate Separate evaluations
Risk appetite Compliance External events Accept
Enable people 
to carry out 
responsibilities
Modify 
processes 
where 
needed
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Beneﬁ ts of a Structured Approach to Operational Risk 
Management
Most organizations appear to adopt risk and control assessments to satisfy their 
financial controllers and internal auditors—and seldom to leverage the prin-
ciples of COSO that can be adapted easily to facilitate the implementation of an 
operational risk management approach, that mimic transaction f lows, and that 
provide line management with an intuitive tool for managing operational risk. 
In many organizations, the basic COSO requirement to communicate, inform, 
and monitor is almost ignored by controllers and auditors—who appear quite 
satisfied to attest that controls were designed efficiently and operating effectively. 
This situation leads to endless waste of resources and encourages line manage-
ment to avoid the burdensome control activities.
Managers themselves often disagree about definitions and approaches. Entities 
that have had some success in implementing a coherent approach to operational 
risk management agree that a willingness to experiment is important; too much 
analysis can lead to a lack of decision making, proving the old adage that “you 
don’t plow a field by turning it over in your mind.”
Adopting a consistent framework to operational risk management throughout 
an entire organization allows an organization to achieve the following:
Specific improvements in controls or documentation processes ¶
Improvements in the control environment of the organization ¶
Automation of activities and control processes  ¶
Better analysis of risk drivers and more efficient linkage of controls to  ¶
sources of risk
Increased risk management awareness by process owners (line managers  ¶
and staff)
Management understanding of its responsibility to manage and monitor  ¶
risk and controls effectively
Senior management reporting that is clear, comprehensive, integrated,  ¶
and actionable
Leveraging activities rather than duplication ¶
Consistent standards ¶
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Strategic questions asked, and shifting corporate mindset and culture ¶
Single repository of risk and control data—as well as action items ¶
Enhanced learning and end-user support ¶
Adopting a structured approach will result in greater efficiency. The regulatory 
burden will be converted into a sound business requirement. By avoiding du-
plication, audit fatigue can be reduced as multiple redundant audit and control 
questionnaires are virtually eliminated. Such questionnaires often satisfy only a 
single unit’s objectives and seldom benefit line management.
Business process reengineering. Management buy-in can be obtained by en-
suring that the risk assessment and control phase is used to streamline cum-
bersome manual processes or detective controls, which may require time-
consuming reconciliations after the event, when certain controls may easily be 
automated. For example, performing risk analysis before the introduction of 
new projects and products could promote a successful launch by alerting man-
agement to potential problems in advance. Moreover, it would be more cost 
effective than having to alter processes after the fact, if a postevent analysis 
identifies unacceptable risk.
Table 13.3 builds on table 13.2 to illustrate how all the COSO objectives (as 
well as Sarbanes-Oxley requirements) can be achieved while remaining rel-
evant to the business objectives of line managers.
It provides an overview of the steps required to implement a structured approach 
to operational risk assessment and management, while including reporting and 
monitoring functions as well. Implementation of a structured approach to op-
erational risk management should eliminate the need for additional question-
naires to satisfy internal or external auditors—or any other risk, control, or 
compliance function in the organization.
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Table 13.3 Operational Risk Management
Functions Activities
Business 
Objectives
Process 
Flows
Risk Assessment and 
Response Key Controls Reporting & Monitoring Information & Communication
Data / 
Metrics
Enterprise:
1. Strategic 
planning
2. Governance
3. General 
management
4. Infrastructure 
and own 
capacity 
development 
5. Business 
development
Operational:
6. New client 
portfolio set-up
7. Portfolio 
Management
8. Settlement & 
control
9. Valuation & 
accounting
10. Risk 
analytics
Activities 
required to 
perform 
each of the 
10 
separate 
functions
Provide 
business 
rationale for 
performing 
tasks
Prepare 
fl owchart 
of 
activities 
– by 
function
Identify drivers of risk:
People
Processes
Systems
External events
Defi ne control objectives 
and ensure that they are 
aligned with business 
objective as modifi ed by 
risk assessment
Decide on policies and 
procedures
How can one know that 
entity is meeting its business 
objectives
How can one know that entity 
is meeting its control 
objectives – risk environment 
deteriorating
Metrics 
required
Frequency
Classify 
objectives 
into 4 
categories 
Strategic
Operational
Reporting
Compliance
Describe 
manner in 
which 
functions / 
activities 
performed
Consider all sources 
of risk:
Activity process fl ows
IT
Information security
Business continuity
Adequacy of facilities
Regulatory compliance
New project 
implementation
Management concerns
What measures (key 
controls) are in place to 
achieve risk 
management objectives
   regular monitoring (by 
whom)
  ensuring accuracy
  completeness
  validity 
  correct period
  appropriateness
  classifi cation?
Key Performance Indicators:
Link to drivers of 
performance
Determine why is indicator 
a KPI
   What business question 
answered
   What is  benchmark / 
standard 
  Decisions infl uenced
  Actions taken
Backward looking
Key Risk Indicators: 
Link to drivers of risk 
Determine why is indicator a 
KRI
What control objective 
refl ected
   What is benchmark / standard 
  Decisions infl uenced
  Actions taken
Early warning of developing 
risks
Forward looking
Determine  
sources of 
data
Align 
objectives 
with 
appropriate 
functions
Formulate risk response
How likely is it that a 
risk will materialize? 
How badly will it affect 
my business if risks do 
materialize (impact)
Where will the impact 
be felt:
  Monetary (M)
  Reputational (R)
  Compliance (C)
Determine whether 
controls are:
   manual (M) or 
automated (A)
   preventive (P) or 
detective (D)? Report and ensure action and monitoring by senior 
management
Report and ensure action and 
monitoring by senior 
management
Ensure 
effi ciency of 
data 
collection 
Responsibility
Ensure that 
business 
objectives 
are 
reviewed 
regularly
Decide on a risk 
response:
  Avoid
  Accept
  Reduce
  Share
Evaluate design & 
operating effectiveness
Modify processes where needed
use framework for business process re-engineering
Investigate 
automated 
data mining 
possibilities
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The framework answers the following questions from a line manager’s 
perspective:
What businesses/business lines am I in? ¶
What generic functions are required for the completion of the (transac- ¶
tion) life cycle of the business line?
What activities are necessary to perform each function? ¶
What are my business objectives (why am I doing this)? Are my functions  ¶
and activities aligned with these objectives?
How am I currently achieving my business objectives (understanding  ¶
process f lows)?
What will prevent me from achieving my business objectives (risk areas,  ¶
risk drivers, and my response to the risks identified—can I live with the 
risk)?
How can I manage the obstacles that could prevent me from achieving  ¶
my objectives (controls)?
Which indicators will tell senior management that the obstacles that  ¶
could prevent achievement of objectives are well managed, escalating, 
or have outdated management processes (KPI/KRI)? In order to com-
municate results effectively, analysts should analyze trends and determine 
reasons for trends and events; thereby convincing management to:
evaluate performance effectiveness ❏
take action when risk indicators demand attention ❏
re-engineer cumbersome manual processes  ❏
re-engineer inefficient manual and detective (after-the-fact) controls ❏
How can we improve information management—database construction  ¶
and data mining?
When implementing any framework, risk managers should avoid falling into 
the trap of allowing a software model to dictate the operational risk manage-
ment methodology. Software should be acquired that allows managers to col-
lect data that support the firm’s objectives. Tools should not manage opera-
tional risk.
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13.3  Identiﬁ cation of Business Line Functions and 
Activities
Key questions in determining which functions are required and useful for the 
transaction cycle are why a particular function is necessary and how it contrib-
utes to achieving the business line’s business objectives. Once the key func-
tions are determined, management must decide on actionable activities that 
will achieve functional objectives in the most efficient manner.
Table 13.4 identifies the functions and activities of the securities trading busi-
ness line and indicates how the activities align with business objectives. The 
process requires answering two questions:
What are the major functions performed during the life cycle of a trans- ¶
action or a given business line?
What activities are required to achieve each functional objective? ¶
Some risk specialists disagree with the notion of mixing enterprise functions 
such as strategy, governance, and general management with line management 
operational functions. However, when one reviews each function’s activities, it 
becomes clear that lack of a well-communicated strategy will quickly lead to 
an organization that is not structured correctly for achieving its stated business 
objectives. That, in turn, will almost inevitably place staff career planning in 
jeopardy: resource allocation could be haphazard as any new idea that is pro-
posed could take priority, to the detriment of achieving longer-term goals. 
When human and systems capacity is not developed prior to marketing new 
business opportunities—prior to training staff and installing automated sys-
tems infrastructure (where practical)—the result will be unnecessary manual 
and other workaround processes, controls after the event (detective rather than 
preventive controls), losing operational efficiencies, and exposing the enterprise 
to needless human and systemic stress. In the long run, a situation like this will 
play out in the way, for example, client portfolios are set up, adversely affect-
ing settlement, accounting, and risk analytics functions—all directly related to 
operational risk management.
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Table 13.4 Securities Trading (Business Line) Functions and Activities
Functions Activities
Strategic planning
Formulate and accept a mission that supports the overall IBRD mission (values & core beliefs)
Formulate a three- to fi ve-year vision
Articulate and communicate strategic objectives
Select appropriate achievement measurement criteria
Governance
Structure business lines and units to facilitate achievement of the mission and strategic objectives
Recommend appropriate Strategic asset allocation model and external performance 
benchmarks to relevant policymakers
Implement policies and guidelines in accordance with board decisions
Implement an effective risk management process
Reengineer inappropriate or outdated business processes
Determine appropriate risk reporting and managerial criteria to internal and external clients
General management
Manage people
Manage staff careers in alignment with strategic plan
Plan and manage facilities
Plan and manage budget resources
Report on managerial activities
Capacity development 
(own infrastructure)
Develop products, publications, and projects aligned to mission
Develop human resource skills (staff training)
Business 
development
Agree on a business development and target market strategy
Adopt a marketing and communications strategy
Adopt a standard approach to assessing new client needs
Assess risk and reward for potential new clients
New client portfolio 
set-up
Conclude legal and investment management agreements (IMA) with clients
Set up new client portfolio
Set up agreed-on counterparty arrangements
Portfolio management
Construct and/or rebalance portfolio according to client directives
Perform pretrade compliance
Execute trades (choose trading platform)
Determine and agree on overall liquidity needs
Settlement and 
control
Confi rm and settle transactions
Make and receive payments (e.g., SWIFT)
Investigate transactions when necessary
Manage cash transaction fl ows and reconciliations
Maintain static data
Manage bank and custodian relations
Valuation and 
accounting
Value portfolios
Accounting for portfolios
Manage external (CTR) and other reporting requirements
Agree on level of service to internal and external clients
Risk analytics
Design, test, and implement risk models
Measure risk and communicate to BLs and TREVP
Measure portfolio performance and compare with agreed-on benchmarks
Monitor compliance activities
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13.4  Process Flows: Documenting the Manner in Which 
Functions Are Performed
The manner in which activities are performed exposes an entity to operational 
risk and inefficiencies. Management must select the technologies most likely to 
ensure optimal cost effectiveness at the lowest possible risk exposure. To select 
the proper technologies, management must first determine the business ratio-
nale for performing functional activities:
What business objectives are satisfied by performing the activities? ¶
How does the business perform the activities, that is, what is the process  ¶
f low?
Figure 13.1 provides an example of the activities involved in processing a fixed 
income investment, using f lowcharts.
Figure 13.1 Trade Process Flow—From Risk-Analytics Perspective 
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13.5   Risk Assessment: Contribution of People, 
Processes, Systems, and External Events
There is sometimes a temptation in treasury environments to think of risk as 
being exclusively quantitative. Therefore, the challenge is to find a framework 
for the measurement of operational risk and governance that appeals to quanti-
tatively oriented people and into which nonquantitative risk can be seamlessly 
integrated.
Risk is defined as anything that hinders the ethical achievement of sustain-
able business objectives and results. This includes the failure to exploit oppor-
tunities and to maintain organizational relevance. Every organization faces a 
variety of risks from external and internal sources that must be assessed. Risk 
assessment is the identification and analysis of those risks that potentially jeop-
ardize the achievement of business objectives. Risk assessment forms a basis for 
determining how risks should be managed. A precondition to risk assessment 
is establishment of business objectives that are internally consistent and aligned 
with an organization’s strategy and mission.
When undertaking a risk assessment, a bank must ask the following key ques-
tions regarding each function and its related activities (see table 13.5):
What are the sources of risk (people, processes, systems, external events)? ¶
What risks are covered by the internal control framework? ¶
What are the information technology (IT) and systems risks? ¶
What are the information security risks? ¶
What are the risks related to business continuity? ¶
What are the risks related to facilities and location? ¶
What special risks may result from servicing external clients and comply- ¶
ing with regulatory requirements?
What are the additional risks from planning and implementing new  ¶
products or projects?                      
What else is bothering management? ¶
How likely is it that a risk will materialize?  ¶
How badly will business be affected if risks do materialize, and will the  ¶
impact be monetary, reputational, or related to compliance?
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Once the risks have been identified, management must determine whether to 
accept the risks (because the low impact or likelihood of occurrence does not 
justify the expense of controlling them) or to mitigate the risks by avoiding, 
reducing, or sharing them.
Risk (and control) assessments normally work best when the questioning pro-
cess is guided by an experienced neutral observer. 
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Table 13.5 Risk Assessment: Questions for Each Functional Activity—Linked to Basel and ERM Models
Risk Assessment Questions for Each Functional Activity - Linked to Basel and ERM Models
Risk Questions and 
Response
What 
risks are 
covered 
by internal 
control 
framework
What 
IT (Info 
Technology) 
risks have 
to be 
considered
What 
Information 
Security 
risks have 
to be 
considered
What  risks 
related to 
Business 
Continuity 
have to be 
considered
What  risks 
related to 
Facilities 
& Location 
have to be 
considered
What special 
risks result 
from servicing 
External 
Clients / 
as well as 
complying with 
Regulatory 
Requirements
New 
Products? 
What 
additional 
downstream 
risks 
result from 
planning and 
implementing 
new products 
or projects  
What else 
is bothering 
management
How likely 
is it that a 
risk will 
materialize
How badly 
will it 
affect the 
business 
if risks do 
materialize
Where will 
the impact 
be felt:
What 
is the 
response 
to the 
risks 
identifi ed
Basel Event Types
Internal 
fraud
External 
fraud
Business 
disruption 
and system 
failures
Business 
disruption 
and system 
failures
Internal 
fraud
External 
fraud
Business 
disruption 
and system 
failures
Damage 
to physical 
assets
Damage 
to physical 
assets
Employment 
practices 
and 
workplace 
safety
Clients products 
and business 
services
Clients 
products 
and business 
services
Execution 
delivery and 
process 
management
Execution 
delivery and 
process 
management
Operational Risk Defi nition 
Drivers of Risk
People
External 
events
Systems
External 
events
People
External 
events
Systems
External 
events
External 
events
External 
events
People
Processes
Systems
External events
People
Processes
Systems
External 
events
People
Processes
Systems
External events
ERM: Enterprise Risk 
Management COSO Model Likelihood Impact
Monetary (M)
Reputational 
(R) 
Compliance 
(C)
Avoid risk
Reduce 
risk
Accept 
risk
Share risk
Function Activities
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13.6 Control Assessment
Internal control is a process intended to provide reasonable assurance of achiev-
ing effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting, 
and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. This includes safeguard-
ing assets.
The control environment sets the tone of an organization, providing discipline 
and structure. It includes integrity and ethical values, the competence of the 
staff, management’s philosophy and operating style, the way management as-
signs authority and responsibility, the way management trains and develops 
staff, and the attention and direction provided by the board of directors. Policies 
and procedures are the control activities that help ensure that management di-
rectives are carried out and the organization achieves its objectives. Control 
activities—such as approvals, authorizations, verifications, reconciliations, re-
views of operating performance, security of assets, and segregation of duties—
occur throughout the organization, at all levels, and in all functions.
Controls can be either formal or informal. Formal controls include policy man-
uals, procedures, hierarchy, and regulations. Informal controls include ethics, 
competence, morale, trust, skills, leadership, processes, culture, information, re-
sources, measurements, policies, communication, teamwork, and procedures. 
When assessing a control process, management should address the following 
issues (see table 13.6):
Considering the business rationale and related risks, what is the risk man- ¶
agement (control) objective?
Who is responsible for monitoring this risk? ¶
What measures (key controls) are in place to achieve the risk management  ¶
objective (for example, regular monitoring, accuracy, completeness, valid-
ity and correct period, appropriateness, classification)?
Is this control manual or automated? ❏
Is this control preventive or detective? ❏
Who performs the risk management activity?  ¶
Is there evidence (including from external parties or other divisions) that  ¶
the control activity is routinely carried out?
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Is the effectiveness of any key control dependent on more than one indi- ¶
vidual or business unit?
How does this risk management activity differ from current best market  ¶
practice?
Usually management must satisfy its auditors that it has complied with its own 
stated risk management processes. One way of integrating compliance testing 
into routine management activities would be to require that any analysis or 
discussion of significant financial and risk trends and f luctuations, and any 
performance or reporting problems highlighted in quarterly financial reports, 
be linked to management’s own description of its risk management procedures. 
Including the risk matrix as an agenda item in quarterly reporting would en-
sure that any changes to processes or risk management controls made during 
the financial reporting cycle are documented in a timely manner. Such reviews 
should also identify new risks and necessary changes to existing processes and 
internal controls. 
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Table 13.6 Control Assessment Questions
Control Design & Operating Effectiveness
Functions Activities Considering 
the business 
rationale 
and related 
risks, what 
is the risk 
management 
(control) 
objective?
Who is 
responsible for 
monitoring this 
risk?
What measures 
(key controls) 
are in place to 
achieve the risk 
management 
objective (for 
example, regular 
monitoring, 
accuracy, 
completeness, 
validity and 
correct period, 
appropriateness, 
classifi cation)?
Is the control 
manual (M) or 
automated (A)?
Is the control 
preventive (P) or 
detective (D)?
Who performs 
the risk 
management 
activity and 
what evidence 
exists that it is 
done (include 
explicit 
references to 
reliance on 
external parties 
and other 
divisions)?
Design: How 
do these risk 
management 
activities differ 
from current best 
market practice?
Operating:  
Are people 
actually doing 
what they 
should be 
doing in terms 
of control 
procedures?
How would 
management 
know that they 
are meeting 
their business 
objectives?
Key 
performance 
Indicators
How would 
management 
know  when risk 
management 
controls are 
not working as 
planned or the 
risk environment 
is deteriorating?
Key Risk 
Indicators
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13.7 Key Indicators of Performance and Risk
Managing operational risk requires identifying appropriate indicators of per-
formance and risk. This requires collecting data (metrics)—internally and ex-
ternally—which are representative of business processes. Such data is normally 
presented in relationship with a given frequency, for example, wages per hour. 
When compared to an independent or previously agreed benchmark, a metric 
becomes a risk or performance indicator.
Many operational risk managers choose not to define key performance indica-
tors and key risk indicators separately. If one has to differentiate, one could 
begin by defining a key performance indicator (KPI) as a metric expressed in 
terms of a target. KPIs are seen as backward-looking and describing past per-
formance (see table 13.7).
Table 13.7 Difference between Metrics and Indicators
Activity: Confi rm and Settle Transactions Month 1 Month 2 Month 3
Trade volumes – use data mining 1000 1100 900
Metric: Number of errors – use data mining 14 21 19
Benchmark / Threshold 1.5% 1.5% 1.5%
Upper limit – immediate action required 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Trades with errors 1.4% 1.9% 2.1%
KPI: error rate as % of benchmark 93% 127% 141%
KRI: excess errors above benchmark -6.7% 27.3% 40.7%
Risk factor compared to: 
Benchmark and upper limit of acceptability
1 2 3
A key risk indicator (KRI) is defined as an operational or financial variable 
that provides a reliable basis for estimating the likelihood and the severity of 
one or more operational risk events. It can be a specific causal variable as well 
as a proxy for the drivers of the events and losses related to an operational risk. 
A KRI can be strictly quantitative, like the turnover rate in a business unit or 
the number of settlement errors, or more qualitative, like the adequacy of a 
system or the competence of personnel. It can be perfectly objective, like the 
number of hours of system downtime, or more subjective, like the overall com-
plexity of a portfolio of derivatives. But to be useful, a KRI will always have 
to be somehow linked to one of the risk drivers—or even better, to one of the 
mechanisms generating an operational failure. It follows that indicators have 
to be regularly reviewed and updated by discarding those that have become 
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 irrelevant or redundant, changing the way key data are collected and processed, 
and developing new indicators according to the evolution of the risk and the 
control environment. 
KRIs are measurable indicators that track exposure or loss and show a status 
at a given point in time or, as one person put it, “trouble.” Anything that can 
perform this function may be considered a risk indicator. Although credible key 
risk indicators are of utmost importance, managers should not spend endless 
hours trying to define such indicators. Advice from experienced risk managers 
is that a risk indicator should be defined and then used; if it is not appropriate, 
it will sort itself out over time and modifications can then be made.
KRIs may be financial indicators, but more often they are operational statistics 
that are combined and manipulated into KRIs and then included in an op-
erational risk management report. The report informs the board of directors 
if controls are operating effectively and if trends in risk management remain 
within acceptable limits. Examples might include statistics on trading volumes, 
settlement errors, trade fails, and so forth.
Unlike KPIs (which look backward at past performance), KRIs look forward at 
potential risks. KRIs should be validated for different types (for example, expo-
sure and control), different risk classes (people, technology, and processes), and 
for different units as well as treasury-wide. KRIs should quantify all tangible 
and intangible aspects needed for risk-based decision making, that is, system 
failures, compliance, internal audits, turnover, and so forth.
A good KRI should have at least the following characteristics and abilities:
Based on objective standards that are accepted by line managers and  ¶
preferably having external benchmarks available
Useful ¶
Easy to apply and be understood by the end users ¶
Developed using an objective and consistent methodology ¶
Providing a clear understanding of the risk variables underlying the indi- ¶
cator, such as the likelihood and impact of occurrence
Containing advance warning features ¶
Quantifiable (numbers, dollars, or percentages) ¶
Tied to management objectives, risk owners, and risk categories ¶
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Demonstrating clearly where problems might arise ¶
Timely and cost effective to produce, utilizing automated data mining  ¶
techniques where possible
KRIs are particularly useful in providing senior management with assurance 
that the control framework is functioning as intended (and as documented). 
Business managers should identify KRIs for each control in their jurisdiction.
For example, as a metric such as the number of trade entry errors increases, 
the probability of some underlying and potentially systemic mistakes and er-
rors of judgment is likely to rise. In other words, changes in the value of this 
metric above a predetermined threshold are likely to be associated with changes 
in operational risk exposure or operational loss experience. One can establish 
this point by determining who needs the information, what business or control 
objective–related question is being answered, why that specific metric is unique 
in answering the question, and which decisions are influenced or actions taken 
based on the KPI or KRI requiring this metric as input (see table 13.8).
Management should determine what data are needed for developing indicators 
and how that data can be collected. The data collected should disclose a clear 
understanding of which risks management should be and are monitoring. The 
following questions should help management prepare operational risk reports 
in a cost-effective manner:
How does management know that it is meeting its business objectives  ¶
(KPIs), and what is the target success rate (benchmark) aimed for by 
management?
How does management know when risk management controls are not  ¶
working as planned or the risk environment is deteriorating (KRIs)?
Why are these aspects ref lective of success or escalating risks? ¶
Who needs this information? ❏
What business or control objective question is answered by this  ❏
metric?
How is this metric unique in answering business question? ❏
What decisions are influenced by these data? ❏
What actions should be taken based on the KPIs and KRIs? ❏
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How will data collection take place? ¶
What data should be collected? ❏
How often should data be collected? ❏
Where can the data be found? ❏
How should the data be collected? ❏
Who will be responsible for collecting the data? ❏
When designed properly and reported in a timely manner, risk and perfor-
mance indicators provide a predictive warning of potential issues that may ad-
versely affect the business. However, credible risk and performance indicators 
emerge only when risk managers fully understand the end-to-end operational 
f low of the business.
With a detailed mapping of the business process, a risk manager can design 
indicators that will yield the best information, based on high-quality metrics. 
A practical way to map the business process is described by Sergio Scandizzo.1
1  Sergio Scandizzo, The Operational Risk Manager’s Guide—Tools and Techniques of the Trade, 
London: Riskbooks, 2007.
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Key Risk Indicators
Table 13.8 Determination of Metrics for Inclusion as KPIs and KRIs
Function Activity
Metric / 
Statistic
unit / time 
scale of 
measurement
KPI
metric as 
% of target
KRI
metric as 
indicator of 
future risks
Who 
Needs this 
Information
What 
Business 
or Control 
Objective 
Question is 
Answered by 
this metric
How is this 
Metric linked 
to Risk Drivers
Why is 
metric 
unique in 
answering 
business 
question
Decisions 
Infl uenced
Actions 
Taken based 
on KPI / KRI Data Source
Frequency of 
collection
Settlement 
& 
Control
Confi rm (validate) 
transaction, 
automatically 
update positions 
and enter into 
settlement system
Make and receive 
payments (e.g. 
Swift)
Investigate 
transactions 
when necessary
Manage cash 
transaction 
fl ows and 
reconciliations
Maintain static 
data
Manage bank 
& custodian 
relations
320
Analyzing Banking Risk 
13.8  Operational Risk Reporting: Analysis, Actions, and 
Accountability
Reporting and Monitoring Operational Risk
Principle 5. Banks should implement a process to regularly monitor operational 
risk profiles and material exposures to losses. There should be regular reporting of 
pertinent information to senior management and the board of directors that sup-
ports the proactive management of operational risk. 
Principle 6. Banks should have policies, processes and procedures to control and/
or mitigate material operational risks. Banks should periodically review their risk 
limitation and control strategies and should adjust their operational risk profile 
accordingly using appropriate strategies, in light of their overall risk appetite and 
profile.
Sound Practices for the Management and Supervision of Operational Risk
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
December 2003
Well-structured management information, reviewed regularly as part of the 
governance process, will contribute significantly to the identification and man-
agement of operational risk. By linking operational risk management functions 
to key performance and key risk indicators, management is provided with risk-
based management information that focuses on risk management processes that 
pertain to each business line function and its related activities. The risk metrics 
include operational issues related to the trading activity, such as the monitor-
ing of rate resets and other triggers on structured trades, settlement issues, and 
legal confirmations with respect to derivatives and debt service. 
Internal control systems need to be monitored, a process that assesses the qual-
ity of the system’s performance over time. This is accomplished through ongo-
ing monitoring activities and separate evaluations. Ongoing monitoring occurs 
in the course of business and includes regular management and supervisory 
activities and other actions staff may take in the performance of their duties. 
The scope and frequency of separate evaluations will depend primarily on an 
assessment of risks and on the effectiveness of ongoing monitoring procedures. 
Internal control deficiencies should be reported upstream as part of regular re-
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porting to senior management. Identified deficiencies should, in turn, initiate 
analytical investigation of the reasons for f luctuations and errors, to determine 
if such occurrences are the result of the development of new risks or the failure 
of existing risk management processes. This approach operationalizes the risk 
management process as a normal part of the management process, ensuring 
that risk assessment is not merely something that is performed once a year to 
satisfy some external reporting requirement.
Pertinent information must be identified, captured, and communicated in a 
form and within a time frame that enables people to carry out their responsibili-
ties. Information systems produce reports containing the operational, financial, 
and compliance-related information that make it possible to run and control a 
business. They deal not only with internally generated data, but also with the 
information about external events, activities, and conditions that is necessary 
for informed decision making and external reporting. Effective communica-
tion must also occur in a broader sense, f lowing down, across, and from the 
bottom. In a healthy control environment, communications are open. When a 
business objective is in jeopardy, bad news f lows rapidly, enabling timely cor-
rective action to be taken. All personnel must receive a clear message from top 
management that their control responsibilities must be taken seriously. They 
must understand their own role in the internal control system and understand 
how their individual activities relate to the work of others. They must have a 
means of communicating significant information upstream. There also needs 
to be effective communication with external parties, such as customers, suppli-
ers, regulators, and shareholders. 
An operational and enterprise risk dashboard should address key questions for 
management:
Are any strategic, operational, reporting, or compliance objectives at risk? ¶
Which key risk and performance indicators require immediate action? ¶
Are all policies, limits, and laws complied with? ¶
Who should be accountable for actions required as a result of issues  ¶
highlighted?
Are key messages highlighted in the most efficient manner to convey  ¶
critical information?
Are required actions and accountabilities clearly conveyed? ¶
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A prototype operational risk report is shown in figure 13.2. The report is 
EXCEL based and can be used together with inexpensive software such as 
XCELSIUS.
Figure 13.2 Sample Operational Risk Management Report
The foundation of the report is that a trend analysis should be performed on all 
key risk indicators, identifying significant f luctuations and asking the follow-
ing four important questions:
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What has happened that draws attention? ¶
Why has it happened? ¶
What is the impact of the trend or situation? ¶
What actions need to be taken to reverse an unacceptable trend? Who is  ¶
responsible for taking the action, and when should it be done? 
It is a pity that internal auditors are not more involved with operational risk 
issues—so much of what is implicit in modern internal auditing can be used 
almost “as is,” to enhance operational risk management.
Internal auditors leave out the most powerful tool in the arsenal provided by 
their auditing standards—namely the power and impact of “analytic review” or 
“financial analysis.”
This leads to undue emphasis on control design and detailed testing, rather 
than an evaluation of whether the impact of risks and controls are actually 
being monitored by management. And how will management know that the 
controls are functioning? Not through theoretical work but by analyzing trends 
in key performance and key risk indicators and determining whether managers 
pay heed and take action when unsatisfactory trends emerge.
It is not enough to analyze operational risk on a business line basis—one has 
to understand the life cycle of transactions within a business line, because the 
life cycle clarifies the various functions and activities required to manage a 
business line. Although this may seem natural because of the need to allocate 
responsibility and reward performance and good behavior, it will give a biased 
view of operational risk exposures and may even miss some of them altogether. 
In fact, failures in one part of the process can generate failures in others as well 
as materialize into losses within units that are organizationally separate, while 
being part of the same business line process.
Some people distinguish between “scorecards” and “dashboards.” A scorecard 
presents risk or performance indicators focused on the strategic level, providing 
management with information regarding execution of strategic objectives. A 
dashboard (see figure 13.2) contains performance indicators, risk indicators, 
and metrics—all focused on the functional level, for example, settlements and 
control, or accounting/valuation. In order to design a dashboard, background 
information must be easy to complete and assist with the analytical standards 
required of a good dashboard. Table 13.9 provides guidance in this regard.
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Table 13.9 Design of Dashboard—Input Table to Facilitate Analysis
Operational Report Design
If Metric Is not Automated – Be Critical
Input Information
Time 
Series
Chart types 
required Analysis Issues Projects
Items to 
Escalate to 
Dashboard
trend line 
bar chart 
and trend 
line pie 
charts
what happened
why did it happen
what is the impact 
of the trends or 
events
what action 
should 
management take
date (original and 
revised)
accountable 
senior manager
Bullet
Description
Action 
required
Bullet
Description
Action 
required
KRI – by function
KRI 1
KRI 2 etc
KPI – by function
KPI 1
KPI 2
Benchmark – by indicator
Target rate for each KPI
Excess risk rate for 
selected KRIs
Operational Metrics – by 
activity
Operational metric 1
Operational metric 1
Financial Metrics – by 
activity
Financial metric 1
Financial metric 2
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Annex 13A. Overview of Functions and Activities in a 
Treasury Environment
Establishing the Overall Policy Framework
Prior to the commencement of any funding, market operations, or risk manage-
ment activities, senior management decides on policies governing the various 
treasury functions. Typically the board of directors or a delegated senior com-
mittee specifies the types of funding and investments in which a bank might 
engage. The authorization thus issued normally would include a list of eligible 
instruments and their derivatives and would specify rules pertaining to allow-
able counterparties, currencies, and maturity structures. These general policy 
directives may also specify the principles underlying the asset-liability man-
agement of the balance sheet and may authorize the use of an external asset 
management firm for managing the bank’s investments. 
Responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of a control framework 
(risk management framework) and the list of officers authorized to transact on 
behalf of the bank normally is specified in internal guidelines. Unlike corporate 
policy, which should be approved by the board of directors, these operational 
guidelines may be approved at a treasury or investment policy committee level. 
As financial markets are constantly changing, it is imperative that policy guide-
lines be reviewed on a regular basis. 
Portfolio Management (Market Operations)
Financial intermediaries must necessarily transform the duration (interest rate 
exposure) of their liabilities to different interest exposures on the asset side 
of the balance sheet. At the same time, intermediaries must be able to meet 
their commitments (such as deposits or bond repayments) when they come due 
or are called. The actual inflow and outflow of funds will not necessarily be 
ref lected in contractual terms and may vary according to market conditions. A 
financial intermediary therefore is inherently exposed to liquidity mismatches. 
Consequently, liquidity policies and liquidity risk management are key ele-
ments of its business strategy. (The importance of managing liquidity risk is 
more fully discussed in chapter 8.) 
Access to cost-effective funding for the bank’s treasury can be influenced by 
interest rates and the spread environment, by the activities of competitors in 
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the market, by demand for credit, by a bank’s credit rating, and by the local 
environment (for example, the availability of arbitrage markets). The structure 
of a bank’s funding is a key aspect of liquidity management. 
A bank with a stable, large, and diverse deposit base is likely to have fewer 
liquidity problems than one lacking such a deposit base. Assessment of the 
structure and type of deposit base and the evaluation of the condition (stability 
and quality) of the deposits, therefore, is the starting point for liquidity risk as-
sessment. The following information is necessary to conduct an assessment of 
the funding environment: 
Product range  ¶
Deposit concentration  ¶
Deposit administration  ¶
Funding structure  ¶
Approach to potential sources of funding  ¶
With respect to borrowings, management should ensure that the funding risks 
are properly managed. Unauthorized transactions or changes (that is, those 
without proper approval or those made by unauthorized staff) could cause po-
tential financial and reputation risks for the bank. Transaction information 
that is not captured correctly or promptly—especially when complex funding 
structures such as index-linked bonds and swaps are utilized—could result in 
settlement delays or failures, and the poor timing of transaction execution may 
cause opportunity costs. Inappropriate behavior on the part of employees (for 
example, favoring certain counterparties) or imperfect execution could also 
cause potential monetary losses and harm to the bank’s reputation. 
From an operational risk perspective, some funding structures require man-
ual intervention during the life of the instrument, because treasury computer 
software may be unable to capture the required rates or intervention triggers. 
Where derivatives are used as a part of the funding structure, transactions ex-
ecuted in excess of a counterparty’s credit line limit would increase exposure. 
Incorrect determination of derivative parameters, such as notional amounts, 
periodic coupon cash f lows, dates, and day count conventions, also can cause 
potential financial losses.
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Investment and Cash Flow Management
In a commercial banking environment, the investment and trading process as-
sists in smoothing short-term liquidity shortfalls and surpluses, to maximize 
returns with minimum cash balances and to provide cash f lows to all inter-
nal and external clients. The investment function also manages longer-term 
assets as a contingent source of liquidity, while earning a reasonable return 
on the investment portfolio. (Management of liquidity and other investment 
portfolios is discussed in chapter 9, and market risk management is discussed 
in chapter 10.)
As the risk profiles of different classes of instruments can differ markedly, in-
dividual portfolio managers normally take responsibility for subportfolios in 
different asset classes and of differing maturity profiles. A complicating fac-
tor in the investment management process arises when a bank requires collat-
eral from counterparties (for example, for swaps). The calculation and secure 
management of such collateral usually involves a custodian, which requires a 
mechanism to ensure accurate computation and recordkeeping capacity. 
Use of External Asset Managers
Bank boards of directors may sometimes authorize outsourcing the manage-
ment of a specific percentage of liquid assets or investments to try to obtain a 
higher portfolio return or to secure a transfer of technology. The use of exter-
nal managers is an effective way to obtain professional management of a bond 
portfolio while a bank is building internal capacity. It is important to recall, 
however, that at least 90 percent of the risk and return of the portfolio will 
come from the selection of the benchmark (through the strategic asset alloca-
tion process); no more than 10 percent is likely to come from active manage-
ment by external managers. 
To avoid any negative surprises, it is therefore critical that management under-
stands the differences in expected risk and return from different benchmarks, 
and that the benchmarks selected for external managers have acceptable risk/
return attributes. In addition, it is essential to determine how much risk exter-
nal managers will be permitted, compared with the benchmark. This can be 
expressed in terms of an acceptable level of underperformance as measured in 
basis points of return.
328 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
Before embarking on an external manager program, there are important steps 
to take: 
Determine the selection criteria and the selection process.  ¶
Determine the benchmarks and risk limits to be incorporated into the  ¶
investment management agreements. 
Determine the fee basis (that is, f lat versus performance fees).  ¶
Establish performance review and criteria (for example, tracking error,  ¶
Sharpe ratios) for firing managers. 
Monitor the manager’s compliance with risk limits.  ¶
Arrange payment of management fees.  ¶
Establish service requirements for training.  ¶
Bank management may choose to outsource targeted amounts in stages to en-
able evaluation of how well the external managers are fulfilling their mandate. 
Knowing that the size of their mandate could be increased could also be an 
important incentive for the external managers to do well. 
Treasury Operations
Management of the treasury operations function has become increasingly com-
plex with changes in the financial markets, regulatory requirement changes, 
and technological advances. 
Risk in this area is considered to be the highest when manual interventions 
take place. The management response has been a focus on automation of the 
activities of recording and settling trades—“straight-through” processing. 
Automation of the treasury operations function focuses a significant portion 
of the risk on the market operations activity where electronic inputs are made, 
necessitating greater control over the payment approval and release function, 
including enhanced control over the confirmation of transactions and the rec-
onciliation of bank accounts at other institutions (nostro accounts). 
In recent years many traditional treasury operations functions have been out-
sourced, but those that often remain in the treasury are 
cash management,  ¶
banking relations,  ¶
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settlement of trades, and  ¶
accounting, valuation, and reporting for treasury activities (asset-liability  ¶
management, funding, and investing). 
Settlement of Trades
Settlement risk is the risk that settlement in a transfer system will not take 
place as expected because one party defaults on its clearing obligations. A de-
fault on settlement leads to both credit (counterparty) and liquidity risk. The 
best manner in which to mitigate settlement risk is clearly to have a safe and 
efficient payment system.
The settlement function must ensure the proper settlement of transactions ex-
ecuted by the portfolio management and funding sides of the treasury. The 
role of settlement staff is to minimize the operational risk associated with the 
settlement process by strictly adhering to stated controls. To summarize, the 
settlement function must 
ensure that all transactions are confirmed (verbally or through SWIFT,  ¶
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) on a 
timely basis; 
ensure that all payments are made accurately and in a timely manner;  ¶
ensure that all receipts are recorded accurately and in a timely manner;  ¶
ensure that all securities are delivered and received accurately and in a  ¶
timely manner; and
maintain all standard reference and static data, such as standard settle- ¶
ment instructions, authentication and test keys between banks, and 
customer information files (including phone and telex/fax numbers, bank 
contacts, and addresses). 
All failed transactions must be monitored and followed up until resolved. Lack 
of notification regarding failed transactions can lead to prolonged exposure to 
financial and reputational risk. All failed transactions should be communicated 
to the trading f loor, as a lack of communication between settlement staff and 
traders regarding fails will prevent the teams from exploring ways to eliminate 
avoidable failed transactions in the future. 
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Risks associated with the settlement function include the following: 
Transactions may be improperly entered in the trading system software.  ¶
Inaccurate or incomplete trade entry could result in settlement, account-
ing, financial reporting, and valuation errors. 
Actionable events (reset triggers, reset rates, or other “ticklers”) may be  ¶
missed, resulting in errors in interest accruals, cash f lows, settlement, ac-
counting, financial reporting, and valuation. 
Derivative (legal) documentation between the bank and its counterparties  ¶
may not be executed and finalized, creating possible differences in the 
understanding of trade details. 
Cash Management and Banking Relations2
The major objectives of the cash management and banking relationship func-
tions are to optimize cash planning and to facilitate the straight-through pro-
cessing of funds. To achieve these objectives, staff in these areas must ensure 
the timely processing of payments and receipts, provide an efficient correspon-
dent banking infrastructure, foster a high customer service level for client in-
vestigations, and minimize the operational risk associated with cash processing 
by following through on outstanding and suspense items. 
Following are some of the risks associated with this dual function: 
Unauthorized instructions for transfers may occur if access to terminals is  ¶
not strictly enforced. 
Transactions can be delayed or rejected if data are not entered in the  ¶
system correctly. 
Loss and misappropriation of funds or fraud may occur as a result of  ¶
improper unauthorized changes to SWIFT messages. 
Checks may be misplaced, deposited to a wrong account, or not deposited  ¶
at all. 
Delivery of funds to the wrong account can delay receipt of funds by the  ¶
rightful beneficiary. This creates a reputational risk and may result in 
monetary claims for late delivery. 
2  Although the banking relations function could justifiably be considered to belong outside of the 
treasury operations area, for the sake of simplicity it is discussed here.
 331
Chapter 13: Operational Risk Management in a Treasury Environment
Delivery of payment to the incorrect beneficiary will result in loss of  ¶
funds should those payments prove unrecoverable. 
Discrepancies in value date, mismatching, and human error may result in  ¶
inaccurate data and therefore incorrect cash reconciliations. 
Incorrect cash positions may be reported to trading f loor cash managers,  ¶
resulting in potential financial losses to the bank.
Accounting and Reporting of Treasury Activities
Accurate recordkeeping is crucial in risk management. A sound recordkeep-
ing system should keep track of transactions on a trade-date basis and should 
maintain all supporting information. Postings to the general ledger and memo-
randum accounts should originate with and be reviewed by persons who do not 
have the authority to execute transactions. Ledgers should be reconciled fre-
quently with the respective account statements and confirmations held by the 
staff executing the transactions. Recordkeeping should be subject to internal 
audit on a regular basis. 
The role of the accounting function in treasury operations is to measure trea-
sury results and reflect them in the financial statements and supporting reports. 
Accountants have to ensure the accuracy of any market data used in valuations 
and generate any accounting entries required by generally accepted accounting 
practice, such as the adjustment of financial assets and liabilities to fair values. 
These are challenging requirements, as they require the treasury accounting 
function to field a full complement of personnel who are trained not only in 
the accounting function, but also in the substance of the various trading and 
derivative products. The challenge is compounded by the fact that the essential 
investment data typically must be sourced from many different systems, and 
few of these systems provide reports that could be described as user-friendly. 
Consequently, some management information reports must be prepared manu-
ally, with the attendant risk of data integrity errors. One way in which treasury 
operations managers attempt to address multiple data sources is by relying on 
integrated operational databases, or “data warehouses,” from which manage-
ment reports can be customized. 
To ensure the consistency of data and reporting sources, the accounting func-
tion also may be split into two areas: one for pure reporting, and the other for 
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reconciling key data and reports produced by different systems. The two areas 
involve different activities.
Accounting-related activities include
ensuring that accounting is set up to accommodate new business require- ¶
ments and products in a timely manner, 
performing daily accounting data review and control for all portfolios,  ¶
reviewing performance reports for all portfolios as an additional valida- ¶
tion and control of accounting information, 
reviewing new and changed trades,  ¶
reviewing profit and loss accounts,  ¶
preparing regulatory reports, and  ¶
reviewing accounting entries, especially manual ones.  ¶
Reconciliation activities include
reconciling data from different systems for accuracy, completeness, and  ¶
agreement; 
reconciling the accounting system with the custodian system to ensure  ¶
that all securities are accounted for (a custodian is a financial institution 
that keeps custody and records of a bank’s or other institution’s securities); 
and 
ensuring that all manual entries are appropriate.  ¶
Quantitative Strategies
The primary objective of a quantitative strategies function is to help strengthen 
the investment processes by increasing the use of analytical tools and tech-
niques and by conducting quantitative modeling and research. Quantitative 
strategies apply to the disciplines of strategic asset allocation and market analy-
sis; the quantitative strategies function also conducts financial modeling for the 
benefit of the investment, liquidity, funding, and asset-liability management 
businesses of a bank. In major banks, this function supports external clients or 
even other asset managers. 
Models and analytical tools are used to support risk management decision 
making at the day-to-day business level as well as strategic risk/reward decision 
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making at the portfolio level. As it is essential that the data used for modeling 
are consistent and reliable, the modeling function should be responsible for 
ensuring that the infrastructure by which data are centralized is adequate. 
The responsibilities of the quantitative strategies function include the develop-
ment and production of monthly market analysis charts, the tracking and dis-
semination of the market views and sentiment indicators of market strategists 
and participants, and the systematic synthesis and dissemination of investment 
research and views. These analyses should be performed internally by econo-
mists and financial analysts and externally by market and industry experts. For 
this function to be credible, it must develop and maintain extensive relation-
ships with external quantitative market strategists working at broker dealers, as 
well as with pension fund managers and asset managers. 
Model Validation
Implementation of models and handling of any system changes are operational 
risk issues; improper use of a model or using incorrect data with a model ex-
poses an entity to significant operational risk. 
Validation of the models used in the treasury environment is raised as a policy 
issue to ensure that the analyst is aware of the importance of segregating the 
responsibility for model development and usage from the checking and valida-
tion of such models. Table 13.5 places model development in the risk analytics 
function and identifies model validation as a policy issue to highlight the im-
portance of independent checks and balances.
A Sobering Thought on Risk Models
The LTCM (Long-Term Capital Management) risk model told them that the loss they 
incurred on one day in August 1998 should have occurred once every 80 trillion 
years. It happened again the following week.
Howard Davies
Former Chairman
UK Financial Services Authority
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Risk Measurement
Risk measurement and risk management focus on providing a disciplined ap-
proach to risk control in portfolio management. The objective of the function 
is to provide an independent assessment of the market risks being taken across 
the various treasury businesses. This assessment is for the benefit of risk budget 
decision makers (traders) as well as management. The risk factors normally 
covered by market risk measurement include interest rates, exchange rates, eq-
uity prices, and commodity prices.
Risk measurement requires the periodic computation of risk positions (daily, 
monthly, quarterly). It normally provides daily risk reporting to the portfolio 
managers to assist in their investment decisions and to support periodic bench-
mark rebalancing. It therefore benefits the risk decision makers by providing 
them with feedback on their positions and by facilitating the determination of 
future positions. Management in turn uses the outputs of the risk analytics and 
compliance function to monitor the risks being taken across the various busi-
ness lines and to ensure compliance with established guidelines.
A prerequisite of the risk measurement function is to ensure that all securities 
are properly valued (that is, are marked to market). This is achieved by map-
ping investments to an appropriate pricing source. Proper pricing will lead to 
accurate measurement of total returns and performance.
Because the models used to assess the risks on treasury businesses are often 
run on a variety of systems and, in some cases, by third-party vendors, the risk 
measurement function should take responsibility for managing the complex 
array of risk systems and vendors. To maintain their knowledge of best prac-
tice and leading-edge technologies and techniques, staff working in this area 
should maintain extensive relationships with the vendors of risk management 
and measurement systems as well as with their market counterparts, such as 
pension fund and asset managers, and with broker dealers and other industry 
experts. 
Performance Measurement and Analysis
The objective of performance measurement is to determine the total return of 
the benchmark and the total return of the portfolio, and to report the results 
to management.
Performance analysis (and attribution) is the process of decomposing the total 
return or cost of a portfolio into a series of primary risk factors, quantifying the 
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extent to which key risk decisions (such as sector allocations, security selection, 
and benchmark or manager risk) have contributed to portfolio performance. 
This can be done on either an absolute or a relative basis (that is, versus an 
index). The objective of the performance analysis function is to develop tools 
and methodologies capable of measuring the contributions to performance of 
different levels of decision making. The goal is to have models that assess and 
attribute performance on an absolute basis and also relative to benchmarks, 
thus providing a basis for refining and improving the decision-making process. 
Performance attribution both contributes to and facilitates the development of 
the risk budgeting and risk management frameworks. 
Performance and Risk Reporting
Accurate and timely reporting is essential to support decision-making processes 
and to support the monitoring of a treasury’s performance in pursuit of its ob-
jectives. Risk-based reporting thus is a critical part of investment management 
and of the risk management of portfolios. 
A risk reporting team should have a library of standard reports to evaluate the 
key performance and risk statistics needed for the assessment of investment and 
funding decisions; it should also have the necessary tools for ad hoc, in-depth 
analysis. 
Portfolio reports must deliver information that is both adequate and timely 
enough to enable portfolio managers to evaluate their portfolio risk and size 
their positions such that they remain within a tolerable risk level. This informa-
tion should include performance and risk measures such as duration, sensitivity, 
value at risk, and yield curve risk. 
Each functional area should be responsible for its own reports. For example, 
daily compliance and risk reports should be produced respectively by the com-
pliance and risk management teams; daily performance reports for a fixed-in-
come portfolio (and monthly performance and attribution reports) may be gen-
erated by the treasury operational unit in collaboration with the performance 
attribution function. Responsibility for regular and ad hoc market-related re-
ports may be assigned to a quantitative strategies function. Where information 
from multiple functional areas in a treasury is presented in a joint report, the 
risk analytics and compliance unit’s role should be to coordinate the preparation 
and ensure the consistency and timely production of the report.
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Compliance
The purpose of the compliance function is to ensure that all treasury transac-
tions and business activities comply with appropriate laws, regulations, policies, 
guidelines, and ethical standards. A strong compliance function is an impor-
tant cornerstone to counterparty and client confidence that the treasury func-
tion will act appropriately and in their best interests. It is important that the 
monitoring of compliance with investment, borrowing, swap authorities, and 
other guidelines be centralized for an entire banking group and its asset man-
agement clients. 
Additional areas of responsibility of the compliance function include 
participating in due diligence meetings with external service providers  ¶
and asset managers to ensure they have the capacity to assess compliance 
with given guidelines; 
assisting in drafting guidelines that are measurable and consistent;  ¶
designing portfolio management policies for treasury portfolios, for ex- ¶
ample, trading limits, selection of vendors, procedures, reporting require-
ments, and introduction of new financial instruments; 
liaising with both the internal and external auditors; and ¶
assisting in the development of a treasury code of ethics.  ¶
The compliance staff must monitor compliance with guidelines and report ex-
ceptions; they must also work internally with colleagues and externally with 
counterparties to remedy infractions and prevent their recurrence. A mature 
compliance function will be able to assist with the development of treasury sys-
tems infrastructure and to participate in data quality meetings with colleagues 
from treasury operations and other areas. 
Technology Support, Security, and Business Continuity (IT)
Although the IT function may be housed outside of the treasury, systems se-
curity requirements would necessitate that the treasury IT function be closely 
aligned with treasury operations. In whatever unit IT is located, it should pro-
vide the systems mechanism and infrastructure to support treasury activities. 
The primary success indicator of the IT function is the ability of the treasury to 
participate competitively in financial markets without suffering financial losses 
due to systems-related problems. 
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The IT specialist in a treasury has to provide trading f loor and accounting sys-
tems capable of capturing in real time all market data, from all providers, that 
are needed to value any type of financial instrument. Market data should be 
retrievable for repricing, reporting, historical analysis, and other purposes, and 
the treasury systems should support trade maintenance applications, including 
automated rate resetting, money market rollovers, and other repetitive tasks. 
The main risks and difficulties facing the treasury IT specialist include the 
following: 
High dependence on outside vendors. The lack of the necessary IT skills  ¶
within the organization usually results in outsourcing of the activity. 
“Scope creep.” Documentation of user requirements for system devel- ¶
opment projects may be threatened by the tendency of users to make 
changes well into the implementation phase. 
Consistent reporting from a centralized database. The production of of- ¶
ficial reports can involve numerous workflow procedures, raising the risk 
that data—translated into different spreadsheets using different calcula-
tion routines—will be altered. 
Information security of data, workstations, and application systems. The  ¶
IT industry is advancing too quickly for most treasury security teams to 
keep pace, and the risks of virus attacks and break-ins are increasing. 
An adequate disaster recovery facility. Particularly in remote locations,  ¶
there is a risk that business continuity could not be sustained in a major 
systems failure. 
Outsourcing of hardware and systems management. External standards  ¶
of support may not be as stringent as those maintained internally. 
Maintaining support of application systems that utilize diverse develop- ¶
ment software. The rapid advance of IT exposes legacy systems to the 
inevitable danger of market expertise becoming increasingly hard to find. 

14
14.1  Introduction: The Importance of Useful 
Information
The provision of transparent and useful information on market partici-pants and their transactions is an essential part of an orderly and ef-ficient market, as well as a key prerequisite for imposing market dis-
cipline. For a risk-based approach to bank management and supervision to be 
effective, useful information must be provided to each key player. These players 
(as discussed in chapter 3) include supervisors, current and prospective share-
holders and bondholders, depositors and other creditors, correspondent and 
other banks, counterparties, and the general public. Left alone, markets may 
not generate sufficient disclosure. Although market forces normally balance 
the marginal benefits and costs of disclosing additional information, the end 
result may not be what players really need. 
Transparency and Data Quality
Key Messages
Accounting information has to be useful.  ¶
Relevance, reliability, comparability, and understandability are attributes of useful  ¶
information. 
Financial statements should strive to achieve transparency through the fair  ¶
presentation of useful information. 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) contain sufﬁ cient disclosure  ¶
requirements to ensure fair presentation. 
Perceived deﬁ ciencies in ﬁ nancial reporting standards often relate to inadequate  ¶
enforcement of and nonadherence to existing standards. 
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Banking legislation traditionally has been used to force disclosure of infor-
mation. However, legally mandated disclosure has involved the provision of 
prudential information required by bank supervisors and the compilation of 
statistics for monetary policy purposes, rather than the provision of information 
that enables a comprehensive evaluation of financial risks. Nevertheless, even 
such imperfect information has improved the functioning of markets. 
The financial and capital market liberalization trends of the 1980s have brought 
increasing volatility to financial markets and consequently have increased the 
information needed to ensure financial stability. With the advance of financial 
and capital market liberalization, pressure has increased to improve the use-
fulness of available financial sector information through the establishment of 
International Financial Reporting Standards and minimum disclosure require-
ments. These requirements address the quality and quantity of information 
that must be provided to market participants and the general public. The provi-
sion of information is essential to promote the stability of the banking system, 
and regulatory authorities have made the improvement of information quality a 
high priority. Banks are also encouraged to improve their internal information 
systems and develop a reputation for providing quality information. 
In the 1990s, the changing structure of financial intermediation further 
strengthened the case for enhanced disclosure. The substitution of tradable 
debt securities for bank lending and the increased use of financial instruments 
to transfer risk have reduced the importance of banker-client relationships while 
expanding the role of markets and market prices in the allocation of capital and 
risks in the financial system. This shift has also affected disclosure require-
ments: to make informed choices, investors need sound information about the 
profile and nature of risks involved. 
The public disclosure of information is predicated on the existence of qual-
ity accounting standards and adequate disclosure methodology. The process 
normally involves publication of relevant qualitative and quantitative informa-
tion in annual financial reports, which are often supplemented by biannual or 
quarterly financial statements and other important information. Because the 
provision of information can be expensive, its usefulness for the public should 
be weighed against cost when disclosure requirements are determined. 
It is also important to time the introduction of information well. Disclosure of 
negative information to a public that is not sufficiently sophisticated to interpret 
it could damage a bank—and possibly the entire banking system. In situations 
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where low-quality information is put forth or users are not deemed capable of 
properly interpreting what is disclosed, public requirements should be carefully 
phased in and progressively tightened. In the long run, a full-disclosure regime 
is beneficial, even if some immediate problems are experienced, because the 
cost to the financial system of not being transparent is ultimately higher than 
that of revealing information. 
14.2 Transparency and Accountability
Transparency refers to creating an environment where information on existing 
conditions, decisions, and actions is made accessible, visible, and understand-
able to all market participants. Disclosure refers more specifically to the process 
and methodology of providing the information and of making policy decisions 
known through timely dissemination and openness. Accountability refers to the 
need for market participants, including the relevant authorities, to justify their 
actions and policies and accept responsibility for both decisions and results. 
Transparency is a prerequisite for accountability, especially to borrowers and 
lenders, issuers and investors, and national authorities and international finan-
cial institutions. The following section discusses the benefits of transparency, 
emphasizes what transparency is not, and elucidates the constraints on trans-
parent behavior. 
Over the past decade, the issues of transparency and accountability have been 
increasingly and strongly debated as part of economic policy discussions. Policy 
makers in some countries have long been accustomed to secrecy, which has 
been viewed as a necessary ingredient for the exercise of power in sensitive 
situations; it also has the added benefit of hiding incompetence! However, se-
crecy also hinders the emergence of the desired effects of policies. The changed 
world economy and financial f lows, which have entailed increasing interna-
tionalization and interdependence, have placed the issue of openness at the 
forefront of economic policy making. There is growing recognition on the part 
of national governments, including central banks, that transparency improves 
the predictability and therefore the efficiency of policy decisions. Transparency 
forces institutions to face up to the reality of a situation and makes officials 
more responsible, especially if they know they will be called upon to justify 
their views, decisions, and actions. For these reasons, timely policy adjustment 
is encouraged. 
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In part, the case for greater transparency and accountability rests on the need 
for private sector agents to understand and accept policy decisions that af-
fect their behavior. Greater transparency improves economic decisions taken 
by other agents in the economy. Transparency is also a way to foster account-
ability, internal discipline, and better governance, while both transparency and 
accountability improve the quality of decision making in policy-oriented in-
stitutions. Such institutions—as well as other institutions that rely on them to 
make decisions—should be required to maintain transparency. If actions and 
decisions are visible and understandable, monitoring costs can be lowered. In 
addition, the general public is more able to monitor public sector institutions, 
shareholders and employees have a better view of corporate management, credi-
tors monitor borrowers more adequately, and depositors are able to keep an eye 
on banks. Poor decisions therefore do not go unnoticed or unquestioned. 
Transparency and accountability are mutually reinforcing. Transparency en-
hances accountability by facilitating monitoring, while accountability enhances 
transparency by providing an incentive to agents to ensure that their actions 
are properly disseminated and understood. Greater transparency reduces the 
tendency of markets to place undue emphasis on positive or negative news and 
thus reduces volatility in financial markets. Taken together, transparency and 
accountability can also impose discipline that improves the quality of decision 
making in the public sector. This can result in more efficient policies by im-
proving the private sector’s understanding of how policy makers may react to 
events in the future. 
What transparency cannot ensure. Transparency and accountability are not, 
however, ends in and of themselves, nor are they panaceas to solve all problems. 
They are instead designed to assist in increasing economic performance and 
may improve the working of international financial markets by enhancing the 
quality of decision making and risk management among market participants. 
In particular, transparency does not change the nature of banking or the risks 
inherent in financial systems. Transparency cannot prevent financial crises, but 
it may moderate the responses of market participants to bad news. Transparency 
also helps market participants anticipate and assess negative information, and 
thereby mitigates panic and contagion. 
Constraints on transparency. The dichotomy that exists between transparency 
and confidentiality should also be noted. The release of proprietary information 
may enable competitors to take advantage of particular situations, a fact that of-
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ten deters market participants from full disclosure. Similarly, monitoring bod-
ies frequently obtain confidential information from financial institutions, an 
event that can have significant market implications. Under such circumstances, 
financial institutions may be reluctant to provide sensitive information without 
the guarantee of client confidentiality. However, both unilateral transparency 
and full disclosure contribute to a regime of transparency. If such a regime were 
to become the norm, it would ultimately benefit all market participants, even if 
in the short term it might create discomfort for individual entities. 
14.3 Transparency in Financial Statements
The objective of financial statements is to provide information about an entity’s 
financial position (balance sheet), performance (income statement), and chang-
es in financial position (cash f low statement). The transparency of financial 
statements is secured through full disclosure and by providing fair presentation 
of the information necessary for making economic decisions to a wide range of 
users. In the context of public disclosure, financial statements should be easy 
to interpret. 
As can be expected, specific disclosure requirements vary among regulators. 
Nonetheless, there are certain key principles whereby standards should be eval-
uated, according to a report submitted to the G7 finance ministers and central 
bank governors in 2000. These key principles are summarized in box 14.1. 
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The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has 
been a necessary measure to facilitate transparency and proper interpreta-
tion of financial statements. In 1989, the Framework for the Preparation and 
Box 14.1 Criteria for Evaluating International 
Financial Reporting Standards
Financial reporting (accounting) standards should contribute to—or at least be 
consistent with (and not hamper)—sound risk management and control practices 
in banks. They should also provide a prudent and reliable framework for generating 
high-quality accounting information in banks. 
Accounting standards should facilitate market discipline by promoting transpar-
ent reporting of banks’ financial position and performance, risk exposures, and risk 
management activities. Accounting standards should facilitate and not constrain 
the effective supervision of banks.
Disclosure should be sufficiently comprehensive to allow assessment of a bank’s 
financial position and performance, risk exposures, and risk management activities. 
International financial reporting standards should be suitable for implementation 
not only in the most advanced financial markets but also in emerging markets. 
Certain specific criteria underpin high-quality accounting. Accounting principles 
should generate relevant and meaningful accounting information. They should 
generate prudent, realistic, and reliable measurements of financial position and 
performance and consistent measurements of similar or related items.
There are also certain internationally accepted criteria for financial reporting stan-
dards. Accounting standards should not only have a sound theoretical foundation, 
but also be workable in practice. Accounting standards should not be overly com-
plex in relation to the issue addressed. They should be sufficiently precise to ensure 
consistent application, and they should not allow alternative treatments. When 
alternative treatments are permitted, or judgments are necessary in applying ac-
counting principles, balanced disclosures should be required.
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
Report to G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, April 2000 
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Presentation of Financial Statements was included in the IFRS to accomplish 
the following: 
Explain concepts underlying the preparation and presentation of financial  ¶
statements to external users 
Guide those responsible for developing accounting standards  ¶
Assist preparers, auditors, and users in interpreting the IFRS and in deal- ¶
ing with issues not yet covered by the standards 
Financial statements are normally prepared under the assumption that an en-
tity will continue to operate as a going concern and that events will be recorded 
on an accrual basis. In other words, the effects of transactions and other events 
should be recognized when they occur and be reported in the financial state-
ments for the periods to which they relate. 
Qualitative characteristics are those attributes that make the information pro-
vided in financial statements useful. If comprehensive, useful information does 
not exist, managers may not be aware of the true financial condition of their 
bank and key governance players may be misled. This would in turn prevent 
the proper operation of market discipline. In contrast, the application of key 
qualitative characteristics and appropriate accounting standards normally re-
sults in financial statements that present a true and fair picture. Following are 
the requisite qualitative characteristics of financial information:
Relevance. ¶  Information must be relevant because it influences the eco-
nomic decisions of users by helping them to evaluate past, present, and 
future events or to confirm or correct past assessments. The relevance of 
information is determined by its nature and material quality. Information 
overload, on the other hand, can force players to sift through a plethora of 
information for relevant details, making interpretation difficult. 
Reliability. ¶  Information should be free from material errors and bias. 
The key aspects of reliability are faithful representation, priority of sub-
stance over form, neutrality, prudence, and completeness. 
Comparability. ¶  Information should be presented consistently over time 
and be congruous with related information and with other entities to en-
able users to make comparisons. 
Understandability. ¶  Information should be easily comprehended by users 
with reasonable knowledge of business, economics, and accounting, as 
well as the willingness to diligently study the information. 
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The process of producing useful information comprises the following critical 
points to ensure the comprehensiveness of the information provided: 
Timeliness. ¶  A delay in reporting may improve reliability, but could 
simultaneously result in decreased relevance. 
Benefit vs. cost. ¶  Benefits derived from information should normally 
exceed the cost of providing it. Banks in developing countries often lack 
adequate accounting systems and therefore have a lower capacity for 
providing relevant information. The level of sophistication of the target 
audience is also important. Both of these aspects affect the costs and 
benefits of improved disclosure. However, the mere fact that that a bank 
might not have accounting systems capable of producing useful informa-
tion should not be accepted as an excuse for not obtaining and providing 
it for the markets. 
Balancing qualitative characteristics. ¶  Providers of information must 
achieve an appropriate balance of qualitative characteristics to ensure 
financial statements are adequate for their particular environment. 
In the context of fair presentation, it is better to not disclose information than to 
disclose information that is misleading. It is therefore not surprising that when 
an entity does not comply with specific disclosure requirements, the IFRS re-
quire full disclosure of the fact and the reasons for noncompliance. Figure 14.1 
summarizes how transparency is secured through the proper application of the 
concepts making up the IFRS framework. 
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Figure 14.1 Transparency in Financial Statements 
14.4 Disclosure in the Financial Statements of Banks
Disclosure requirements related to financial statements have traditionally been 
a pillar of sound regulation. Disclosure is an effective mechanism to expose 
banks to market discipline. Although a bank is normally subject to supervision 
and provides regulatory authorities with information, this information is often 
confidential or market sensitive and is not always available to all categories of 
users. Disclosure in financial statements should therefore be sufficiently com-
prehensive to meet the needs of other users within the constraints of what can 
348 
Analyzing Banking Risk 
reasonably be required. Improved transparency through better disclosure may 
(but not necessarily) reduce the chances of a systemic banking crisis or the ef-
fects of contagion, as creditors and other market participants will be better able 
to distinguish between the financial circumstances that face different institu-
tions and countries. 
Users of financial statements need information to assist them in evaluating a 
bank’s financial position and performance and in making economic decisions. 
Of key importance are a realistic valuation of assets, including sensitivities to 
future events and adverse developments, and the proper recognition of income 
and expenses. Equally important is the evaluation of a bank’s entire risk profile, 
including on- and off-balance-sheet items, capital adequacy, the capacity to 
withstand short-term problems, and the ability to generate additional capital. 
Users may also need information to better understand the special character-
istics of a bank’s operations, in particular solvency, liquidity, and the relative 
degree of risk involved in various dimensions of the banking business. 
The issuance of IFRS has followed developments in international financial 
markets. Over time, the coverage of IFRS has been broadened to both include 
new topics (for example, disclosure and presentation related to new financial 
instruments) and enhance the existing international standards. 
Historically, Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) did not place 
heavy burdens on banks to disclose their financial risk management practices. 
This situation changed in the 1990s with the introduction of International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 30 (subsequently scrapped with introduction of 
IFRS 7) and IAS 32 (whose disclosure requirements were transferred to IFRS 
7). IAS 32, which is now largely superseded by IFRS 7, resulted in many finan-
cial regulators requiring a “full disclosure” approach. 
IAS 30 encouraged management to comment on financial statements describ-
ing the way liquidity, solvency, and other risks associated with the operations 
of a bank were managed and controlled. Although some banking risks may be 
ref lected in financial statements, a commentary can help users to understand 
their management. That provision is now embodied in IFRS 7, which is ap-
plicable to all banks, meaning all financial institutions that take deposits and 
borrow from the general public with the objective of lending and investing and 
that fall within the scope of banking-related or similar legislation. 
IAS 39 establishes principles for recognizing, measuring, and disclosing infor-
mation about financial instruments in the financial statements. The standard 
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significantly increases the use of fair value accounting for financial instruments, 
particularly on the assets side of the balance sheet. Despite the introduction of 
IAS 39, leading accounting standard setters are still deliberating the advantages 
and disadvantages of introducing fair market value accounting for financial assets 
and liabilities as well as for the corresponding risks. This process should foster a 
consistent, market-based approach to measuring the risk related to various finan-
cial instruments. However, without prudent and balanced standards for estimat-
ing fair value, the use of a fair-value model could reduce the reliability of financial 
statements and increase the volatility of earnings and equity measurements. This 
is particularly true when active markets do not exist, as is often the case for loans, 
which frequently account for the lion’s share of a bank’s assets. 
IAS 39 distinguishes between four classes of financial assets: assets held at fair 
value through profit and loss (for example, trading and other elected securi-
ties); assets available for sale; assets held to maturity; and loans and receivables. 
In addition, IAS 39 identifies two classes of financial liabilities: those at fair 
value, and liabilities shown at amortized cost. The standard outlines the ac-
counting approach in each case (see table 14.1). It also categorizes and sets out 
the accounting treatment for three types of hedging: (a) fair value, (b) cash 
f low, and (c) net investment in a foreign subsidiary. 
Table 14.1 Measurement of Financial Assets and Liabilities under IAS 39
Category Measurement Financial Assets Classes
Financial 
Liabilities Classes Comments
1 Fair value 
through profi t 
and loss
Trading securities Trading liabilities Short sales or issued debt with intention 
to repurchase shortly
Derivatives Derivatives Unless designated as qualifying hedging 
instruments
Other elected 
assets
Other elected 
liabilities
Fair value option (elected)—
inconsistencies reduced where part of 
a documented group risk management 
strategy, or liabilities contain embedded 
derivatives
2 Amortized cost Held-to-maturity 
securities
Accounts payable
Issued debt 
securities
Deposits from 
customers
3 Amortized cost Loans and 
receivables
N/A
4 Fair value 
through equity
Available-for-sale 
securities
N/A
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The only potentially controversial portion of IAS 39 relates to the treatment 
of impairments of financial instruments, which states that an asset is impaired 
if there is objective evidence (including observable data) as a result of one or 
more events that have already occurred after the initial recognition of the asset. 
Objective evidence includes significant financial difficulty of a debt issuer or 
obligor, a breach of contract such as a default or delinquency in interest or prin-
cipal payments, or granting the borrower a concession that the lender would not 
otherwise consider.
IAS 39 requires that when performing a collective assessment of impairment, 
assets must be grouped according to similar credit risk characteristics, indica-
tive of the debtors’ ability to pay all amounts due according to the contractual 
terms. Loss events must have an impact on future cash f lows that can be reli-
ably estimated. 
Losses expected as a result of future events, no matter how likely, are not rec-
ognized. (This conditionality appears to create a conflict with bank supervisory 
approaches that require a general percentage provision for loan losses, based 
on empirical evidence that such losses have actually occurred somewhere in 
the portfolio. The differences in approach need not be insurmountable if one 
considers historical realities related to loan portfolios.) 
IAS 32 and IFRS 7 supplement other international financial reporting stan-
dards that apply equally to nonbank and banking entities. The disclosure re-
quirements, as well as other accounting standards specific to banks, are derived 
from the IFRS framework. The standard entitled “Presentation of Financial 
Statements” gives general guidance on the basic principles, structure, and con-
tent of financial statements. 
Although separate IFRS standards were issued (IAS 32, IAS 39, and IFRS 7), 
they are applied in practice as a unit because they deal with exactly the same 
accounting phenomenon. IAS 39, which deals with the recognition and mea-
surement of financial instruments, also contains supplementary disclosures to 
those required by IAS 32. 
IFRS 7 aims to rectify some of the remaining gaps in financial risk disclosure 
by adding to the existing accounting standards the requirements described in 
table 14.2.
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Table 14.2 Financial Risk Disclosure Requirements under IFRS 7v
Measurement Instruments Nature & Extent  of Risks Signifi cance
Statement of 
Financial Position
Statement of 
Comprehensive 
Income Hedging
Assets       
Fair value through P&L
Trading securities
Each type of risk from assets & liabilities: 
qualitative & quantitative
 
Credit risk – per class of asset   
                          
Liquidity risk – all fi nancial liabilities
           
Market risk by type – all assets & liabilities
Value of fi nancial instruments must be 
stated on Statement of Financial 
Position 
 or 
Related amounts shown on Statement 
of Comprehensive Income
Carrying values Net gains & losses Description
Designated fair value assets Reclassifi cation
Net gains & losses – separate 
disclosure of movements through 
equity – AFS assets
Gains & Losses
Derivatives
Derecognition
Total interest income & expense 
(using effective interest rate 
method)
Effectiveness
Collateral – for assets pledged
 
Ineffective portions transferred 
from equity – where applicable
Fair value through equity Available-for-sale securities
Impairments – by class
 
Amortized securities Held-to-maturity securities (HTM)
Amortized assets – other
Loans & receivables
Liabilities
Fair value through P&L
Trading securities Embedded equity derivatives
Designated fair value assets
Defaults & breaches (loans payable)Derivatives
Amortized liabilities Other liabilities
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Current international financial reporting standards provide a solid and trans-
parent basis for the development of national disclosure requirements. These 
standards already require banks to disclose extensive information on all of the 
categories of risk that have been addressed here, adding transparency to the 
presentation of financial statements. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has stated its belief that the fair-
value approach is appropriate in situations where it is workable—for example, 
when financial instruments are being held for trading purposes. 
14.5 Application of Accounting Standards
For several years, but especially in the wake of the East Asian financial crises 
of the late 1990s, there has been criticism regarding deficiencies in bank ac-
counting that have resulted in the incomplete and inadequate presentation of 
financial information in annual financial reports. Market participants perceive 
the opacity of financial information not only as official oversight but also as the 
Achilles’ heel of effective corporate governance and market discipline. Market 
participants need a wide range of economic and financial information for deci-
sion-making purposes and therefore react negatively to poor disclosure. 
There seems to be a perception among market participants and the general 
public that the lack of adequate information about a bank’s financial position, 
results, and cash f low are the consequence of insufficient accounting standards. 
This misperception seems to stem from general ignorance of the sound ac-
counting standards that already exist. 
Contrary to popular belief among nonaccountants, the predominant problem is 
not always a lack of sound and adequate accounting standards, but rather that 
regulatory and accounting authorities do not enforce the principles underlying 
existing standards. In fact, the establishment of disclosure requirements is not 
sufficient in and of itself. Disclosure requirements have to be accompanied by 
active regulatory enforcement—and perhaps even fraud laws—to ensure that 
the information disclosed is complete, timely, and not deliberately misleading. 
Regulatory institutions need to have adequate enforcement capacities. 
Both banks and their external auditors may lack proper incentives to disclose 
more than the regulatory authorities and market discipline demand of them. 
Market participants, as well as rating agencies, could therefore make a valu-
able contribution to improving the level of transparency in financial reporting 
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by demanding comprehensive, full disclosure. They could also demonstrate a 
direct link between investor confidence and transparent disclosure. In addi-
tion, disclosure could be improved by peer pressure. A bank’s competitors could 
demonstrate that disclosure is advantageous to an institution because investors 
and depositors are more likely to provide capital and deposits at lower prices to 
transparent entities than to nontransparent ones. 
Disclosure Practices
A frequent problem with disclosure, especially that which involves a new sys-
tem, is the hesitancy of a bank’s management and supervisors, as well as market 
participants, to disclose highly negative information. Such information, which 
has the strongest potential to trigger a market reaction, typically is disclosed 
at the last possible moment and is often incomplete. Even professional mem-
bers of the public, such as rating agencies, may be slow to react to and disclose 
potential problems. The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision has been 
monitoring bank disclosure practices for several years. In a May 2002 report 
on the results of the 2000 disclosure survey, the Basel Committee made the 
following observations:
Most basic information relating to capital structure and ratios, accounting  ¶
and presentation policies, credit risk, and market risk was well disclosed. 
Information about credit risk modeling, credit derivatives, and securitiza- ¶
tion was disclosed by fewer than half of the banks. 
The most notable increases in disclosure involved questions about com- ¶
plex capital instruments, policies and procedures for setting credit risk 
allowances, securitization, and operational and legal risks—although 
securitization disclosures still was not very frequent. 
Most banks continued to release fundamental quantitative data pertinent  ¶
to their capital structure, as would be required under the Pillar 3 work-
ing paper. Although they were less forthcoming about their holdings of 
innovative and complex capital instruments, the rate of disclosure in this 
area has generally been improving. 
The risk-based capital ratio was almost always disclosed, but fewer than  ¶
half of the banks provided information on the credit and market risks 
against which the capital serves as a buffer. 
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Most banks appeared to make fairly extensive disclosures about their in- ¶
ternal models for market risk. The main opportunity for future improve-
ment involves the results of stress testing. 
Just over half of the banks described fully their process for assessing  ¶
credit exposures, and only a few more provided summary information 
on the use of internal ratings. Fewer than half provided basic informa-
tion about their credit risk models. These disclosure areas take increased 
importance under the proposed revision of the Basel Capital Accord, as 
disclosure of key information regarding the use of internal ratings will be 
necessary for banks to qualify for the internal ratings–based approach in 
the new accord. In this regard, the large improvement in the disclosure of 
the internal risk rating process since the 1999 survey is encouraging. In 
the area of asset securitization, less than one half of banks provided even 
the most basic disclosure of the amount and types of assets securitized 
and the associated accounting treatment. 
Most banks disclosed key quantitative information concerning credit risk,  ¶
another area with required disclosures under the Pillar 3 working paper. 
Disclosures of provisioning policies and procedures are improving. About 
one-half of the banks discussed the techniques they use to manage im-
paired assets. However, only a small number of banks disclosed the effect 
of their use of credit risk mitigants. 
Approximately three-fourths of banks discussed their objectives for  ¶
derivatives and their strategies for hedging risk. The proportion of banks 
making quantitative disclosures was lower, and trends here are mixed. 
Approximately two-fifths of banks that use credit derivatives disclosed  ¶
their strategy and objectives for the use of these instruments, as well as 
the amount outstanding. However, more detailed information was not 
often provided. 
While approximately four-fifths of banks provided breakdowns of their  ¶
trading activities by instrument type, somewhat fewer provided informa-
tion about the diversification of their credit risks. Fewer than one-half 
supplied a categorical breakdown of problem credits. 
There was a dramatic increase in the rate of disclosures of operational and  ¶
legal risks since the first survey, although the level is still not as high as 
that for the more basic market and credit risk information. 
Basic accounting policies and practices were generally well disclosed.  ¶
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The results of the Basel Committee 2001 survey was published in May 2003 
and a portion of the results are summarized in table 14.3.
Table 14.3 Public Disclosures by Banks
Accounting and Presentation Policies 1999 2000 2001
Total number of banks 57 55 54
Qualitative disclosures:
Disclosed the basis of measurement for assets at initial 
recognition and subsequent periods, e.g., fair value or historical 
cost
98% 100% 100%
Described the accounting policies and method of income 
recognition used for trading activities (using both cash instruments 
and derivatives) and non-trading activities
91% 89% 93%
Described the treatment of hedging relationships affecting the 
measurement of assets
80% 85% 85%
Disclosed the basis for determining when assets are considered 
past-due and/or impaired for accounting and disclosure purposes 
(number of days where appropriate)
77% 80% 83%
Quantitative disclosures: 
Disclosed income and expense information grouped by nature or 
function within the bank 
89% 98% 98%
Provided summary information about how trading activities affect 
earnings, based on internal measurement and accounting systems
88% 85% 83%
Distinguished between trading assets and trading liabilities 50% 48% 47%
All disclosures 82% 84% 84%
Source: 2001 Disclosure Survey, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, May 2003.
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15.1 Introduction: The Bank Supervisory Process
Banking supervision, based on the ongoing analytical review of banks, serves the public good as one of the important factors in maintaining stability and confidence in the financial system. It represents Pillar 2 of 
the Basel II Accord and has become the key ingredient of the capital adequacy 
framework. This chapter discusses the key principles of supervisory reviews 
and the relationship between banking risk analysis and the supervision pro-
cess. From the methodological perspective, an analytical review of banks by 
A Risk-Based Approach to 
Bank Supervision
Key Messages
The analyst or supervisor should determine what happened, why it happened, the  ¶
impact of events, and a credible future strategy to rectify unacceptable trends. 
The supervisory process of off- and on-site supervision is similar to the ﬁ nancial  ¶
analysis of information, which has to be tested through veriﬁ cation of preliminary 
conclusions. On-site examination is essential, but could be performed by 
supervisors, analysts, or external auditors. 
Regulators and supervisors should ensure that all ﬁ nancial institutions are  ¶
supervised using a consistent philosophy, to ensure a level playing ﬁ eld for ﬁ nancial 
intermediaries. 
Properly used, banking analysis can enhance the institutional development of the  ¶
banks concerned. 
Supervisory review, recognized as Pillar 2, has become a key ingredient of the  ¶
capital adequacy framework under the Basel II Accord.
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supervisors is similar to that used by private sector analysts, external auditors, 
or a bank’s own risk managers, except for the focus and ultimate purpose of the 
analysis. 
Bank supervision, which normally includes off-site surveillance and on-site ex-
aminations, is an integral part of a much broader and continuous process, as 
summarized in figure 15.1. This process includes the establishment of a legal 
framework for the banking sector, the designation of regulatory and super-
visory authorities, the definition of licensing conditions and criteria, and the 
enactment of regulations that limit the level of risk that banks are allowed to 
take. Other necessary steps include the establishment of a framework for pru-
dential reporting and off-site surveillance and the execution of these activities, 
followed by on-site supervision. The results of on-site examinations provide 
inputs for the institutional development process of relevant banks and for the 
improvement of the regulatory and supervisory environment.
With growing integration and interdependence of international financial mar-
kets, banking supervision has become an increasingly important means to 
strengthen both national systems and the global financial system. In 1997, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published a set of prin-
ciples, known as the Basel Core Principles (BCP), that provide a framework 
of minimum standards for sound supervisory practices and are considered uni-
versally applicable. The BCP are neutral about different approaches to supervi-
sion. Since their inception, the BCP have become a de facto standard for sound 
prudential regulation and supervision of banks. The updated 2005 version of 
the BCP is provided in appendix C.
In addition to effective supervision, other factors necessary for the stability of 
banking and financial systems and markets include sound and sustainable mac-
roeconomic policies, a well-developed financial sector infrastructure, effective 
market discipline, and an adequate banking sector safety net (see chapter 2).
 359
Chapter 15: A Risk-Based Approach to Bank Supervision
Figure 15.1 The Context of Bank Supervision 
A risk-based supervisory analysis of banks follows a number of stages; the re-
sults of one stage serve as inputs to the next. The ultimate objective of this pro-
cess is a set of recommendations that, if properly implemented, result in a safe, 
sound, and properly functioning financial intermediary. Table 15.1 summarizes 
the stages of the analytical review process. 
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Table 15.1 Stages of the Analytical Review Process
Analytical Phase Source/Tools Available Output
Structuring and collection of 
input data
Questionnaire, fi nancial statements, 
other fi nancial data
Completed input data, questionnaires, and 
fi nancial data tables
Processing of data Completed input data (questionnaires 
and fi nancial data tables)
Processed output data
Analysis/interpretation of 
processed/structured output data
Data converted into information Analytical results
Development of an off-site 
analysis report of the bank’s risks
Analytical results and previous on-site 
examination reports
Off-site examination report and/or terms 
of reference for on-site examination
Follow-up through on-site 
examination, audit, or analytical 
review
Off-site examination report and terms 
of reference for on-site examination
On-site examination report and 
institutional development plan or a 
memorandum of understanding
Institutional strengthening
On-site examination report and 
memorandum of understanding for 
institutional development
Well-functioning fi nancial intermediary
Repeat the process building on the 
previous reports and regulatory 
defi ciencies identifi ed
Repeat the process . . . Repeat the process . . .
Pillar 1 of the Basel II Accord sets a buffer for uncertainties that affect the 
banking population as a whole. The buffer aims to provide reasonable assurance 
that a bank with good internal systems and well-managed controls, a “stan-
dard” business profile, and a well-diversified risk profile will meet the mini-
mum goals for soundness, as embodied in Pillar 1. Bank-specific uncertainties 
are expected to be assessed and addressed under Pillar 2. Supervisors should 
therefore regularly review and evaluate banks’ internal processes and systems, 
especially related to risk management and capital adequacy assessment, as well 
as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory capital 
ratios and other prudential norms (Pillar 2, Principle 2). In this context, super-
visory processes should ensure that various instruments that can reduce Pillar 
1 capital requirements are well understood and used as part of a sound, tested, 
and properly documented risk management process. If not, supervisors should 
require (or encourage) banks to operate with a capital buffer that is over and 
above the Pillar 1 standard (Pillar 2, Principle 3).
An analytical review normally comprises a review of the bank’s financial condi-
tions, its internal processes and systems, and specific issues related to risk ex-
posure and risk management. In addition to verifying the conclusions reached 
during off-site reviews, on-site reviews cover a much larger number of topics 
and are more concerned with qualitative aspects, including the availability and 
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quality of management information. The questions asked during all phases of 
the analytic review process should focus on 
what happened, ¶
why it happened, ¶
the impact of the event or trend,  ¶
the actions or response of the bank’s management, and  ¶
the systems and tools that the bank had at its disposal to deal with the  ¶
issue and whether it effectively utilized them.
The details that an analyst should look for during an analytical review related 
to risk management have been discussed in chapters 4 through 13. Analytical 
tools provided in this publication were discussed in section 1.5, including tables 
and graphs based on processed input data that relate to balance sheet structure, 
profitability, capital adequacy, credit and market risk, liquidity, and currency 
risk. Taken together, they make up a complete set of a bank’s financial ratios 
that are normally subject to off-site surveillance. The tables enable analysts to 
judge the effectiveness of the risk management process and to measure perfor-
mance. Combined with the qualitative information obtained from the ques-
tionnaire (see appendix 1), these statistical tables make up the raw material on 
which the analysis contained in off-site reports is based. Graphs provide a visual 
representation of results and are in essence a snapshot of the current situation in 
a bank. The graphs illustrated in the publication may also be used during the 
process of off-site surveillance as a starting point for on-site examination. 
15.2  Banking Risks and the Accountability of 
Regulatory/Supervisory Authorities
During the course of their operations, banks are subject to a wide array of risks, 
as summarized in table 15.2. In general, banking risks fall into the following 
three categories: 
Financial risks, ¶  as discussed in chapters 7 through 12. 
Operational risks ¶  related to a bank’s overall business strategy and the 
functioning of its internal systems, including computer systems and 
technology, compliance with policies and procedures, and the possibility 
of mismanagement and fraud (chapter 13). 
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Environmental risks, ¶  including all types of exogenous risks that, if they 
were to materialize, could jeopardize a bank’s operations or undermine 
its financial condition and capital adequacy. Such risks include political 
events (for example, the fall of a government), poor financial infrastruc-
ture, natural contagion resulting from the failure of a major bank or a 
market crash, banking crises, natural disasters, and civil wars. Event risks 
are, in most cases, unexpected until immediately before the event occurs. 
Therefore, banks may not be able to adequately prepare for such risks oth-
er than by maintaining a capital cushion. The dividing line between the 
end of an event risk and the beginning of systemic risk is often blurred. 
Table 15.2 Banking Risk Exposures
Financial Risks Operational Risks Environmental Risks
Balance sheet structure Internal fraud Country & political risk
Earnings & income statement 
structure
External fraud Macroeconomic policy
Capital adequacy Employment practices and workplace 
safety
Financial infrastructure
Credit Clients, products and business services Legal infrastructure
Liquidity Damage to physical assets Banking crisis & contagion
Market Business disruption and system failures 
(technology risk)
Interest rate Execution, delivery and process 
management
Currency 
Risk that is inherent in banking should be recognized, monitored, and con-
trolled. Some financial risks are regulated through prudential guidelines for 
a particular type of banking risk exposure. The effectiveness of a bank’s man-
agement of financial risk, monitoring of risk exposure, and compliance with 
prudential guidelines by bank supervision form the backbone of the bank su-
pervision process, both off- and on-site. Regulations, however, can be costly for 
a bank. The manner in which regulators perform their functions determines 
the specific impact of regulations on the market, as well as the cost of compliance 
for the bank. Costs include provision of information to regulators; maintenance 
of an institution’s internal systems that measure risk and ensure compliance 
with regulations; and restrictions that may influence certain business decisions, 
effectively reducing a bank’s profitability. In addition to the direct cost of regu-
lation, hidden costs also exist, such as a bank’s compromised ability to innovate 
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or quickly adjust to changing market conditions, which might in turn prevent it 
from capitalizing on its comparative advantages or competitive position. 
With regard to operational risks (with the exception of business strategy risk), 
regulators typically establish guidelines that banks are expected to follow. 
Adherence to the guidelines is subject to supervision, typically as part of an 
on-site examination. A bank’s business strategy is also given attention. As part 
of the initial licensing process, the authorities review and implicitly endorse 
a bank’s business strategy. The strategy and its risk implications are always 
discussed during the process of an on-site examination and possibly also in 
the context of off-site surveillance. In many countries, senior management is 
obliged to conduct quarterly discussions on a bank’s business strategy with su-
pervisory authorities, especially in the case of large banks upon which market 
stability may depend. 
The category of risks related to a business environment may or may not fall 
within the scope of supervisory authorities. Banking system regulatory authori-
ties (including the central bank) are usually closely related to many key aspects 
of a bank’s business environment, however. Entry and licensing regulations ef-
fectively determine a banking system’s structure and the level and nature of 
competition. The criteria for issuing licenses must therefore be consistent with 
those applied in ongoing supervision. If the supervisory authority is different 
from the licensing authority, the former should have a legal right to have its 
views considered by the latter. 
Monetary authorities also play a critical role in determining a business environ-
ment. The choice, design, and use of monetary policy measures and instru-
ments are inextricably related to banking system conditions, the nature of bank 
competition, and the capacity of the banking system to innovate. In the choice 
and use of policy instruments, pragmatic considerations (which imply a connec-
tion to supervisory authorities) are of prime importance. It is essential to look 
not only at specific policies or measures, but also at the context in which they 
are applied. Similar policies may be transmitted but work in different ways, 
depending on the structure, financial conditions, and dynamics of the banking 
system and markets. Supervisory authorities are not involved with other aspects 
of business environments that have risk implications, such as macroeconomic 
policies, which often determine supply and demand conditions in markets and 
are a major component of country risk. In addition, authorities are not usually 
directly concerned with the tax environment (which directly affects a bank’s 
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bottom line), the legal framework, or the financial sector infrastructure (in-
cluding the payment system and registries), but they may be very influential in 
proposing changes and improvements in these areas. 
Supervisory authorities play a critical role in event risks. Although these risks 
may not be foreseen and often cannot be prevented, the authorities evaluate the 
impact of such events on the status and condition of the banking system and 
of the markets. They also ensure that proper arrangements are put in place to 
minimize the impact and extent of disruption, to mobilize other authorities 
to effectively deal with the consequences of certain events, and, ultimately, to 
oversee the orderly exit of failed institutions. 
15.3 The Supervisory Process
All banking systems have at least one regulatory and supervisory authority. 
However, the locus, structure, regulatory and enforcement powers, and specific 
responsibilities of each authority are different. This variation is usually a conse-
quence of traditions and of the legal and economic environment of a particular 
country. Decisions on regulatory and supervisory authorities are sometimes po-
litically motivated. In most countries, the regulatory and supervisory authority 
for the banking sector is assigned to the central bank, but the current trend is 
for the consolidation of all financial supervision in a separate entity, outside 
the central bank. The responsibilities of bank supervision usually include the 
following: 
Issuance and withdrawal of banking licenses on an exclusive basis  ¶
Issuance and enforcement of prudential regulations and standards  ¶
Authority to prescribe and obtain periodic reports (that is, establish  ¶
prudential reporting as a precondition for off-site surveillance) and to 
perform on-site inspections 
Assessment of fines and penalties and the initiation of emergency actions,  ¶
including cease and desist orders, management removal and suspension 
orders, and the imposition of conservatorship 
Closure and/or liquidation of banks  ¶
Supervisory review should specifically assess the following material risks faced 
by the bank:
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Credit risk review involves internal risk rating systems, portfolio analysis  ¶
and aggregation, securitization and use of complex credit derivatives, 
exposure to risk, and risk concentration.
Operational risk review involves assessing the bank’s tolerance for opera- ¶
tional risk and its approach to identifying, assessing, monitoring, control-
ling, and mitigating the risk.
Market risk review involves the methodologies used to assess and manage  ¶
this risk by individual staff members, business units, and bankwide. For 
more sophisticated banks, the assessment of internal capital adequacy 
for market risk should be based, at a minimum, on value-at-risk model-
ing and stress testing, including risk concentration and illiquidity under 
stressful market scenarios. For all banks, supervisory review should in-
clude stress testing appropriate for the individual bank’s trading activity.
Interest rate risk assessment should review assumptions, techniques, and  ¶
management practices for all material interest rate positions, including 
relevant repricing and maturity data.
In addition, the supervisory review should examine the bank’s management 
information reporting and systems, the manner in which business risks and 
activities are aggregated, and management’s record in responding to emerging 
or changing risks. Close attention should be given to the bank’s internal control 
structures—their coverage and their effectiveness.
The supervisory review process under Pillar 2 of the Basel II Accord grants 
initial approval and validation of banks’ capacity to use “advanced” methods 
for capital assessment under Pillar 1, in particular the internal rating-based 
framework for credit risk and the advanced measurement approaches for opera-
tional risk. The review must verify compliance, on a continuing basis, with the 
minimum standards and disclosure requirements related to the use of advanced 
methods in Pillar 1. The review must assess risks that are not fully captured by 
the Pillar 1 process (for example, credit concentration risk) and factors not tak-
en into account by the Pillar 1 process (for example, interest rate, business, and 
strategic risk). The impact of factors external to the bank (for example, business 
cycle effects) must be considered. The supervisory review process under Pillar 
2 is intended not only to ensure that banks understand and have adequate risk 
management processes and capital to support all the risks in their business, but 
also to encourage banks to develop and use better risk management techniques 
in monitoring and managing their risks.
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To be effective, a supervisory authority must have appropriate enforcement 
power and an adequate degree of autonomy. Enforcement and autonomy are 
necessary if the authority is to resist undue pressures from the government, 
banks and their shareholders, depositors and creditors, borrowers, and other 
people who use financial services. Supervisory authorities should command the 
respect of the banks they oversee. 
The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision has identified certain precondi-
tions and set certain standards for effective banking supervision (appendix C). 
These standards require that a supervisory authority has a clear, achievable, 
and consistent framework of responsibilities and objectives, as well as the abil-
ity to achieve them. If more than one supervisory authority exists, all must 
operate within a consistent and coordinated framework to avoid regulatory and 
supervisory arbitrage. Where distinctions between banking business and other 
deposit-taking entities are not clear, the latter could be allowed to operate as 
quasi-banks, with less regulation. Supervisory authorities should have adequate 
resources, including the staffing, funding, and technology needed to meet es-
tablished objectives, provided on terms that do not undermine the autonomy, 
integrity, and independence of the supervisory agencies. Supervisors must be 
protected from personal and institutional liability for actions taken in good 
faith while performing their duties. Supervisory agencies should be obliged to 
cooperate and share relevant information, both domestically and abroad. This 
cooperation should be supported by arrangements for protecting the confiden-
tiality of information.
Supervisory authorities, however, cannot guarantee that banks will not fail. 
The potential for bank failure is an integral part of risk taking. Supervisors 
have a role to play, but there is a difference between their role in the day-to-day 
supervision of solvent institutions and their handling of problem institutions to 
prevent contagion and systemic crisis. Supervisors should seek to intervene at 
an early stage to prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels required 
to support the risk characteristics of a particular bank and should require rapid 
remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored (Pillar 2, Principle 4 of 
the Basel II Accord). These actions may include intensifying the monitoring of 
the bank, restricting the payment of dividends, requiring the bank to prepare 
and implement a satisfactory capital adequacy restoration plan, and requiring 
the bank to raise additional capital immediately. Supervisors should have the 
discretion to use the tools best suited to the circumstances of the bank and its 
operating environment (see figure 15.2).
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When approaching systemic issues, the key concern of supervisory authorities 
is to address threats to confidence in the financial system and of contagion to 
otherwise sound banks. The supervisor’s responsibility is to make adequate ar-
rangements that could facilitate the exit of problem banks with minimum dis-
ruption to the system. At the same time, the methods applied should minimize 
distortions to market signals and discipline. Individual bank failure, on the 
other hand, is an issue for shareholders and management. In some cases, a bank 
failure may become a political issue—especially in the case of large banks—and 
involve decisions whether, to what extent, and in what form public funds should 
be committed to turning the situation around. 
Figure 15.2 Supervisory Tools
Supervisory Tools
Tools Area of application Advantages Disadvantages
Rules Pillar I: Capital requirements
Certainty
Simplicity
Direct
Static
Infl exible
Limited
Incentives Pillar I: Approaches Behavioral impact Sensitivity
Discretion Pillar II: Supervisory review Adaptable UncertaintyNot comparable
Market discipline (Disclosure) Pillar III Market-based Overshoots
Off-site Surveillance versus On-site Examination
An effective banking supervision system comprises some form of both off-site 
surveillance and on-site examination. Table 15.3 summarizes the different focuses 
of these two processes. Off-site surveillance is, in essence, an early-warning device 
that is based on the analysis of financial data supplied by banks. On-site exami-
nation builds upon and supplements off-site surveillance and enables supervisory 
authorities to examine details and to judge a bank’s future viability. The extent of 
on-site work and the method by which it is carried out depend on a variety of fac-
tors. In addition to differences in supervisory approaches and techniques, the key 
determinant of the objectives and scope of supervision is whether they aim only to 
safeguard banking system stability or if they are also expected to protect the inter-
est of depositors. In some countries, a mixed system of on-site examination exists 
that is based on collaboration between supervisors and external auditors. 
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Table 15.3 Off-site Surveillance versus On-site Examination
Off-Site Surveillance On-Site Examination
Objectives
Monitor the fi nancial condition of both individual banks and 
the banking system
Monitor the fi nancial condition, performance, and future 
viability of individual banks
Provide peer statistics and the means for comparison with 
a peer group
Assess reasons for deviations from peer group
Provide early identifi cation of problems and 
noncompliance
Provide a detailed diagnosis of problems and 
noncompliance
Give priorities for the use of supervisory resources Provide recommendations to management
Guide scheduling of on-site examinations Initiate punitive actions as needed
Methodology
Analytical, risk-based Analytical, risk-based
Descriptive Evaluative, tests descriptions
Uses questionnaires and prescribed reporting formats Uses interrogation of and discussions with bank 
management and responsible staff
Based on fi nancial data reporting Based on on-site visits and examination of actual records
Uses
Most effective in assessing trends in earnings and capital 
and comparing performance against peers
Most effective in determining the quality of management, 
the appropriateness of asset/liabilities and fi nancial 
risk management,  and the effectiveness of policies, 
procedures, systems, and controls
Input to sensitivity analysis, modeling, and forecasting Input to institutional strengthening or development 
programs
Depends on the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of 
fi nancial information reported by banks
Allows verifi cation to determine accuracy of fi nancial 
information and adherence to sound accounting standards 
and principles
Provides comparative data in a standard format for 
supervisory authorities, fi nancial analysts, and bank 
management
Uses comparative data and off-site prudential reports
Could be used to monitor selected types of fi nancial 
institutions and the banking sector
Input to economic and monetary policy makers
Off-site surveillance. The central objective of off-site surveillance is to moni-
tor the condition of individual banks, peer groups, and the banking system. 
The principles described in this publication provide the tools for a comprehen-
sive off-site analysis of banks. Based on this assessment, the performance of a 
bank is then compared with its peer group and the banking sector overall to 
detect significant deviations from the peer group or sectoral norms and bench-
marks. This process provides an early indication of an individual bank’s prob-
lems as well as systemic problems; it also assists in the prioritization of the use 
of scarce supervisory resources in areas or activities under the greatest risk. Off-
site monitoring systems rely on financial reporting in a prescribed format that 
is supplied by banks according to previously determined reporting schedules. 
Reporting formats and details vary among countries, although most supervi-
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sory authorities systematically collect and analyze data concerning liquidity, 
capital adequacy, credit risk, asset quality, concentration of and large exposures, 
interest rate, currency and market risks, earnings and profitability, and balance 
sheet structure. Supporting schedules may also be requested to provide greater 
detail of a bank’s exposure to different types of risk and its capacity to bear 
that risk. Schedules are determined by the type and subject of related reports. 
For example, supervisory authorities may require liquidity to be reported on a 
weekly or even a daily basis, large exposures on a monthly basis, financial state-
ments quarterly, and asset classification and provisions semiannually. 
The sophistication and exact purpose of analytical reviews also vary from coun-
try to country. Most supervisory authorities use some form of ratio analysis. 
The current financial ratios of each bank are analyzed and compared to histori-
cal trends and to the performance of their peers to assess financial condition 
and compliance with prudential regulations. This process may also identify 
existing or forthcoming problems. Individual bank reports are aggregated to 
attain group (or peer) statistics for banks of a particular size, business profile, 
or geographical area. These aggregated reports can then be used as a diagnostic 
tool or in research and monetary policy analysis. 
Off-site surveillance is less costly in terms of supervisory resources. Banks pro-
vide the information needed for supervisors to form a view of a bank’s exposure 
to the various categories of financial risk. Supervisory authorities then manipu-
late and interpret the data. Although off-site surveillance allows supervisors to 
systematically monitor developments concerning a bank’s financial condition 
and risk exposures, it has the following limitations: 
The usefulness of reports depends on the quality of a bank’s internal  ¶
information systems and on the accuracy of reporting. 
Reports have a standard format that may not adequately capture new  ¶
types of risks or the particular activities of individual banks. 
Reports are not able to sufficiently convey all factors affecting risk man- ¶
agement, such as the quality of a bank’s management personnel, policies, 
procedures, and internal systems. 
On-site examinations enable supervisors to validate the information provided 
by a bank during the prudential reporting process, to establish the diagnosis 
and the exact cause of a bank’s problems with an adequate level of detail, and 
to assess a bank’s future viability or possible problem areas. More specifically, 
on-site examinations should help supervisors assess the accuracy of a bank’s 
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reports, overall operations and condition, the quality and competence of man-
agement, and the adequacy of risk management systems and internal control 
procedures. Other aspects that should be evaluated include the quality of the 
loan portfolio, adequacy of loan loss provisions and reserves, accounting and 
management information systems, the issues identified in off-site or previous 
on-site supervisory processes, adherence to laws and regulations, and the terms 
stipulated in the banking license. On-site examination is very demanding in 
terms of supervisory resources and usually can address only some of a bank’s 
activities. 
On-site examinations can take different forms depending on a bank’s size and 
structure; available resources; and the sophistication, knowledge, and experience 
of supervisors. Supervisory authorities should establish clear internal guidelines 
on the objectives, frequency, and scope of on-site examinations. Policies and 
procedures should ensure that examinations are systematic and conducted in 
a thorough and consistent manner. In less-developed supervisory systems, the 
examination process often provides only a snapshot of a bank’s condition, with-
out assessing potential risks or the availability and quality of systems used by 
management to identify and manage them. On-site supervision begins with 
business transactions and proceeds from the bottom up. Examination results 
from the successive stages of supervision are compiled and eventually consoli-
dated to arrive at final conclusions regarding a bank’s overall financial condi-
tion and performance. This approach is characteristic of countries in which 
management information is unreliable and bank policies and procedures are 
not well articulated. 
In well-developed banking systems, supervisors typically use a top-down ap-
proach that focuses on assessing how banks identify, measure, manage, and 
control risk. Supervisors are expected to diagnose the causes of a bank’s prob-
lems and to ensure that they are addressed by preventive actions that can reduce 
the likelihood of recurrence. The starting point of an on-site examination is an 
assessment of objectives and policies related to risk management; the directions 
provided by the board and senior managers; and the coverage, quality, and ef-
fectiveness of systems used to monitor, quantify, and control risks. The com-
pleteness and effectiveness of a bank’s written policies and procedures are then 
considered, as well as planning and budgeting, internal controls and audit pro-
cedures, and management information systems. Examination at the business-
transaction level is required only if weaknesses exist in systems for identifying, 
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measuring, and controlling risks. In many countries, external auditors examine 
systems and processes at this level. 
Early-warning systems. In the 1990s, supervisory authorities started to refine 
their early-warning systems—aimed at supervisory risk assessments and iden-
tification of potential future problems in the financial system and individual 
banks. The systems generally combine qualitative and quantitative elements. 
Just as approaches to banking regulation and supervision differ from country to 
country, the designs of such early-warning systems also vary, but four generic 
types can be distinguished: 
Supervisory bank rating systems. ¶  The most well known of these is 
C-A-M-E-L-S (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, 
Earning, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk). A composite rate is 
assigned to a bank typically as a result of an on-site examination. 
Financial ratio and peer group analysis systems ¶  (normatives). These are 
based on a set of financial variables (typically including capital adequacy, 
asset quality, profitability, and liquidity) that generate a warning if certain 
ratios exceed a predetermined critical level, fall within a predetermined 
interval, or are outliers with regard to the past performance of a bank. 
Comprehensive bank risk assessment systems. ¶  A comprehensive assess-
ment of the risk profile of a bank is made by disaggregating a bank (or a 
banking group) into significant business units and assessing each separate 
business unit for all business risks. Scores are assigned for previously 
specified criteria, and assessment results are aggregated to arrive at the 
final score for the whole bank or banking group. 
Statistical models. ¶  These attempt to detect those risks most likely to lead 
to adverse future conditions in a bank. In contrast with the other three 
systems, the ultimate focus of statistical models is the prediction of the 
probability of future developments rather than a summary rating of the 
current condition of a bank. Statistical models are based on various indi-
cators of future performance. For example, there are models that estimate 
a probability of a rating downgrade for an individual bank (for example, 
the probability that the most recent CAMEL rating will be downgraded 
based on financial data supplied in prudential reporting). Failure-of-sur-
vival prediction models are constructed on a sample of failed or distressed 
banks; the models aim to identify banks whose ratios or indicators (or 
changes thereof) are correlated to that of already failed or distressed 
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banks. Expected-loss models are used in countries where the statistical 
basis of failed or distressed banks is not large enough to be able to link 
changes in specific financial variables to probabilities of failure. These 
models are based on failure probabilities derived from banks’ exposure to 
credit risk and other data, such as the capacity of existing shareholders 
to supply additional capital. Some regulators have constructed statistical 
models based on other variables. For example, high assets growth that 
has not been adequately matched with strengthened management and 
institutional capacity has often been the culprit for bank failure. There-
fore, a model tracing a high rate of asset growth combined with measures 
of institutional capacity could be used as an early-warning system. 
Table 15.4 summarizes generic features of the most frequently used types of 
early-warning systems. In many cases, supervisory authorities use more then 
one early-warning system. The major issues with early-warning systems is the 
proper choice of variables upon which the prediction is based, the availability 
of reliable input data, and the limitations related to quantification of qualitative 
factors that are critically related to banks’ performance (for example, manage-
ment quality, institutional culture, integrity of internal controls). 
Table 15.4 Generic Features of Early Warning Systems
Assessment 
of Current 
fi nancial 
Condition
Forecasting 
Future Fin. 
Condition
Use of 
Quantitative 
Analysis 
and 
Statistics
Use of 
Qualitative 
Assessments
Focus on 
Formal 
Risk 
Categories
Link with 
Formal 
Supervisory 
Actions
Supervisory Ratings
on-site *** * * *** * ***
off-site *** * ** * ** *
Financial Ratio and Peer 
Group Analysis
*** * *** * ** *
Comprehensive Risk 
Assessment Systems
*** ** ** ** *** ***
Statistical Models ** *** *** * ** *
*not signifi cant;  **signifi cant;  ***very signifi cant
Source: BIS Paper on Supervisory Risk Assessment and Early Warning Systems, December 2000   
The use of early-warning systems in a country provides an important head start 
for implementation of the Basel II Accord. Under the Basel II Accord, super-
visory authorities are expected to evaluate the quality of external ratings and 
decide what would be a reasonable set of risk-weights to use in their jurisdiction 
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for capital adequacy calculation. Peer group analysis, risk assessment systems, 
and statistical models provide a solid basis for rational decisions on such key 
parameters.
15.4 Consolidated Supervision
The institutional classification under which a financial intermediary operates 
has traditionally been assigned based on predominant financial instruments 
or services offered by the intermediary. The institutional classification desig-
nates regulatory and supervisory authorities for particular institutions and the 
corresponding regulatory treatment—for example, regarding minimum capital 
levels, capital adequacy, and other prudential requirements such as liquidity 
and cash reserves. Increasing financial market integration blurs the difference 
between various types of financial institutions and increases opportunities for 
regulatory or supervisory arbitrage, which ultimately increases systemic risk. 
Although perfect neutrality may not be possible or even necessary, authorities 
should strive to level the playing field for specific markets and to reduce the 
scope for regulatory arbitrage. In other words, when different financial institu-
tions compete in the same market for identical purposes, their respective regu-
lations must ensure competitive equality. The regulatory environments that 
potentially allow for regulatory (or supervisory) arbitrage display at least one of 
the following features: 
Inconsistent or conflicting regulatory philosophies for different types of  ¶
financial institutions 
Deficiencies or inconsistencies in defining risks and prudential require- ¶
ments for different types of financial institutions 
Differences in the cost of compliance for respective financial institutions  ¶
Lack of coordination between regulatory and supervisory authorities in  ¶
the financial sector 
Supervision of Cross-Border Operations
The international expansion of banks increases the efficiency of both global and 
national markets, but it may create difficulties during the supervision process. 
For example, cross-border transactions may conceal a bank’s problems from its 
home-country supervisors. Certain practices by subsidiaries in less- regulated en-
vironments are also hidden from home-country supervisors and may  ultimately 
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create losses that can impair the bank’s capital. Internationalization could po-
tentially be used as a vehicle to escape regulation and supervision in situations 
when problem assets are transferred to less-stringent regulatory environments 
or to areas with less effective supervision. Internationally active banks therefore 
present a challenge to supervisory authorities. 
Cooperative efforts are needed to ensure that all aspects of international bank-
ing are subject to effective supervision and that remedial actions are well coor-
dinated. The failure of a number of large, internationally active banks spurred 
the issuance of minimum standards for the supervision of such groups by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Basel concordat is based on the 
following principles: 
A capable home-country authority should supervise internationally active  ¶
banks and banking groups on a consolidated basis. 
The creation of a cross-border banking establishment should receive the  ¶
prior consent of both home- and host-country supervisory authorities. 
Such bilateral supervisory arrangements should be specified in a memo-
randum of understanding signed by both authorities. 
Home-country supervisory authorities should possess the right to collect  ¶
information concerning the cross-border establishment of the banks and 
banking groups that they supervise. The collection by and exchange 
of information between authorities should be guided by principles of 
reciprocity and confidentiality. Confidential information should be safe-
guarded against disclosure to unauthorized parties. 
If a host-country supervisory authority determines that the home-country  ¶
supervisory arrangements do not meet minimum standards, it can pro-
hibit cross-border operations or impose restrictive measures that satisfy its 
standards. 
Home-country supervisory authorities should inform host-country  ¶
authorities of changes in supervisory measures that have a significant 
bearing on the relevant bank’s foreign operations. 
One of the primary reasons why consolidated supervision is critical is the risk 
of a damaging loss of confidence and of contagion that extends beyond legal 
liability. Supervisory arrangements and techniques differ because of legal, in-
stitutional, historical, and other factors, so no single set of criteria exists to 
conclusively establish whether consolidated supervision is effective or not. In 
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principle, consolidated supervision should assess and take into account all risks 
run by a banking group wherever they occur, including branches and subsidiar-
ies, nonbank companies, and financial affiliates. More specifically, consolidat-
ed supervision is expected to support the principle that no banking operation, 
wherever located, should escape supervision. It also serves to prevent the double 
leveraging of capital and to ensure that all risks incurred by a banking group (no 
matter where it is booked) are evaluated and controlled on a global basis. 
Consolidated supervision should extend beyond the mere consolidation of ac-
counts. Supervisory authorities should consider the exact nature of the risks in-
volved and design an appropriate approach to assessing them. Consolidated ac-
counting may even be inappropriate when the nature of risk varies, for example, 
when market risk differs from market to market. The offsetting of market risks 
during the process of accounting consolidation may result in an inaccurate risk 
exposure position. Liquidity risk should be considered primarily on a market-
by-market or currency-by-currency basis. 
The Basel II Accord significantly extends the scope of multiple approvals. 
Consequently, the Accord recognizes the need to develop effective cross-border 
understandings on the application of capital standards to international banking 
groups, and effective cooperation and coordination between home- and host-
country supervisors is an essential element of its successful implementation. 
Where a banking group has operations in at least one country other than its 
home country, implementation of the new Basel II Accord may require it to 
obtain approval for its use of certain advanced approaches (for example, internal 
ratings–based approach for credit risk or advanced measurement approach for 
operational risk) from relevant host-country supervisors on an individual or 
subconsolidated basis. In addition, the banking group may need approval from 
its home-country supervisor with respect to consolidated supervision under 
Basel II. The degree and nature of cooperation between supervisors may differ 
across these different supervisory responsibilities. Whatever arrangements are 
employed, banks would also have an important role to play in assisting the ef-
fective and efficient cross-border implementation efforts of supervisors. 
Supervision of Conglomerates
Supervisory arrangements involving conglomerates are even more complex. An 
international financial group active in banking, securities, fund management, 
and insurance may be subject to a number of regulatory regimes and supervised 
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by authorities in a number of countries. Problems related to a conglomerate’s in-
formation, coordination, and compliance with prudential regulations—which 
are complex enough in a single-country environment—are compounded at 
the international level, particularly when operations involve emerging-market 
economies. 
Financial conglomerates may have different shapes and structural features, re-
f lecting varying laws and traditions. Key aspects to be considered in the super-
vision of conglomerates are the overall approach to supervision, the transpar-
ency of group structures, the assessment of capital adequacy, and the prevention 
of double gearing. In addition, contagion, the effect of intragroup exposures, 
and the consolidated treatment of large exposures play a role because of strong 
differences in exposure rules in banking, securities, and insurance. 
The problem of consolidated supervision has been addressed internationally 
by a tripartite group consisting of representatives of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision and interest groups involved in both the securities and 
insurance sectors. (The Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates succeeded the 
informal tripartite group in 1996.) Their joint statement on the supervision of 
conglomerates specifies the following: 
All banks, securities firms, and other financial institutions should be  ¶
subject to effective supervision, including that related to capital. 
Geographically and functionally diversified financial groups require con- ¶
solidated supervision and special supervisory arrangements. Cooperation 
and information f low among supervisory authorities should be adequate 
and free from both national and international impediments. 
The transparency and integrity of markets and supervision rely on ad- ¶
equate reporting and disclosure of information. 
The tripartite group recommended accounting-based consolidation as an ap-
propriate technique to assess capital adequacy in homogeneous conglomerates. 
This process allows for the straight-forward comparison, using a single set of 
valuation principles, of total consolidated assets and liabilities, as well as the 
application at the parent level of capital adequacy rules to consolidated figures. 
With regard to heterogeneous conglomerates, the group recommended a com-
bination of three techniques: the building-block prudential approach (whereby 
consolidation is performed following solo supervision by respective supervisory 
authorities), risk-based aggregation, and risk-based deduction. 
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The scope of application of the Basel II Accord provides specific require-
ments related to consolidation and supervision of financial conglomerates. The 
best approach to supervision and the assessment of capital adequacy continue 
to receive close international attention. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision encourages the home and host supervisors of the major interna-
tional financial and banking groups to continue discussions among themselves 
and with the institutions that they supervise. It is important that these group 
efforts continue to make progress and that home and host authorities build on 
the working relationships that are being developed to create effective coopera-
tive mechanisms to implement the Basel II Accord.
15.5  Supervisory Cooperation with Internal and 
External Auditors
Internal auditing has been defined by the Institute of Internal Auditors as “an 
independent, objective activity that … helps an organization to accomplish its 
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve 
the effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes.”
The Role of Internal Auditors
Although the importance of the internal audit function of a bank has been dis-
cussed in chapter 3, it is worth repeating that the function should cover all of a 
bank’s activities in all its associated entities. It should be permanent, impartial, 
and technically competent, operating independently and reporting to a bank’s 
board or to the chief executive officer. 
Supervisory authorities normally issue regulatory requirements for banks’ inter-
nal control systems, aiming to establish some basic principles for the system and 
quality of controls applied by banks. Although the extent of regulations var-
ies, internal audit/control regulations normally cover policies and procedures 
for management of credit risk and other core banking risks, such as liquidity 
management, foreign exchange and interest rate risks, and risk management of 
derivatives and computer and telecommunication systems. On-site supervision 
normally includes an evaluation of internal controls in a bank and of the qual-
ity of the internal audit function. If satisfied with the quality of internal audit, 
supervisors can use the reports of internal auditors as a primary mechanism to 
identify control or management problems in the bank.
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Use of External Auditors
External auditors and bank supervisors cover similar ground but focus on dif-
ferent aspects in their work. Auditors are primarily concerned with fair presen-
tation in the annual financial statements and other reports supplied to share-
holders and the general public. They are expected to express an opinion on 
whether financial statements and other prudential returns (when applicable) 
fairly present the condition and results of a bank’s operations. To express such 
an opinion, auditors must also be satisfied with a bank’s accounting policies and 
principles and the consistency of their application, and auditors must be sure 
that the bank’s key functional systems are coherent, timely, and complete. 
Because supervisory resources are scarce, to avoid duplication of examination 
efforts, supervisory authorities have come to increasingly rely on external audi-
tors to assist in the on-site supervision process. Potential reliance on assessments 
and judgments of external auditors implies that supervisors have an interest in 
ensuring high bank auditing standards and that auditors meet certain quality 
criteria. In many countries, banking regulations require that the banks’ exter-
nal audits be carried out by auditors who have adequate professional expertise 
available in their firms and meet certain quality standards. 
Auditors are often expected to report to the supervisory authorities any failures 
by banks to fulfill the requirements related to their banking license and other 
material breaches of laws and regulations—especially where the interests of 
depositors are jeopardized. In some countries the external auditors are asked 
to perform additional tasks of interest to the supervisors, such as to assess the 
adequacy of organizational and internal control systems, as well as the consis-
tency of methods and databases used for the preparation of prudential reports, 
financial statements, and management’s own internal reports. 
A supervisor’s request to an external auditor to assist in specific supervision-
related tasks should be made in the context of a well-defined framework. This 
process demands, at a minimum, adherence to international accounting and 
auditing standards. 
An important prerequisite for cooperation between the supervisory authorities 
and external auditors is a continuing dialogue between the supervisory authori-
ties and the national professional accounting and auditing bodies. Such discus-
sions should routinely cover all areas of mutual concern, including generally ac-
cepted accounting practices and auditing standards applicable to banks, as well 
as specific accounting problems, such as appropriate accounting techniques to 
be introduced for specific financial innovations. 
Appendix A
Questionnaire: 
Analytical Review 
of Banks
The following questionnaire is intended primarily for 
use by consultants performing diagnostics of banks.
Name of bank: Telephone number:
Address:
Date completed: Fax number: 
Person(s) responsible for completion: E-mail address:
1. Executive summary and recommendations
What are the biggest challenges facing your bank in the 
next few years?
What are your strategies to overcome those challenges?
What are your bank’s greatest strengths?
What risks do lenders/investors face in lending money to 
your organization:
-external to your bank
-internal to your bank?
Why would money lent to your banks be a good investment 
for lenders/investors?
How would your bank use money lent by lenders/investors 
to develop fi nancial markets or specifi c sectors in your 
country?
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2. Institutional development needs
What are your bank’s greatest development needs as 
identifi ed in the conclusions and recommendations section 
(section 15) at the end of this report?
Which areas will you focus on in the coming year?
What role can lenders/investors play in assisting you with 
the development of your institution?
What active plans do you have to ensure that reforms are 
sustained?
Who would be the primary contact person in your 
organization to take responsibility for the institutional 
development plan and coordinate with lenders/investors if 
a loan is granted?
3. Overview of the ﬁ nancial sector and regulation – 
Tables A.1 and A.2
3.1 Status of fi nancial infrastructure (disclosure, payment 
systems, securities clearing systems, and so forth)
3.2 Banking and the fi nancial system: the status of fi nancial 
market   regulation
3.3 Banking regulation
3.4 Accounting regulation: Must fi nancial statements 
be prepared in compliance with International Financial 
Reporting Standards?
Which are the key laws affecting the banking system in 
your country?
When were the banking laws and regulations last 
changed?
Description of any areas where current national legal 
practices cause diffi culty for banks (for example, 
bankruptcy and foreclosure procedures).
Describe the supervisory approach and philosophy (of 
the regulators): the scope of the oversight activity, the 
frequency of visits by central bank offi cials, and reports 
or information that must be submitted on a regular basis. 
Please provide a copy of the most recent submission of 
each such report.
What is the minimum capital requirement and how do your 
capital adequacy guidelines differ from the BIS guidelines?
Describe any cash reserve and liquid asset requirements 
of the central bank.
Are prudential regulations strictly enforced?
Please describe any anticipated changes to the regulatory 
requirements (including provisioning requirements) that 
are planned (or rumored) for the future.
Please describe relationship with regulators and 
signifi cant disputes, if any.
Please describe the results of the most recent review of 
your bank by the supervisory authorities. Please attach a 
copy of the supervisory review letter.
What was the method of grading, and what was the score 
your bank achieved?
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4. Overview of the bank and its risk management culture
4.1 Historical background and general information – 
Table A.2
Provide a brief history of the bank, detailing incorporation 
dates, earlier names, mergers, major events, and so forth.
What is your ranking in the banking system:
 By capital?  
 By assets?
What is the bank’s main business focus and what are its 
main product areas? Also please identify key changes and 
milestones.
Describe special initiatives being undertaken for 
development of commercial/small business lending 
activities (including segment-specifi c delivery channels, 
product development, etc.)  Please describe ways in which 
such focus is supported (relevant strengths, market data, 
competitive positioning, and so forth).
What is your bank’s mission statement?
What is the bank’s strategy relative to
 • present and expected economic environment; 
 • sources of competitive strength;
 •  main elements of business strategy (lending, 
fee-based services, equity participation, and other 
areas of diversifi cation or expansion, for example, 
geographic or product lines); 
 •  strengths of principal competitors in main business 
areas (foreign/local/joint-venture banks); 
 •  major business risks perceived and strategies to 
minimize such risks.
4.2 Group and bank organization structure – 
Tables A.3–A.6
Provide a group organization chart, table A.3, showing 
holding companies, ultimate controlling entities, 
associates, and subsidiaries (identifying major assets, 
shareholding, and management relationships).
Identify other fi nancial institutions in the group.
Provide an organization chart of the bank under review 
(include as table A.4).
How many staff members does the bank have (table A.5)?
How many departments and divisions does the bank have? 
Name them and provide an organization chart describing 
the key departments and divisions as well as the number 
of staff in each.
How many branches does the bank have (table A.6)? 
Describe their geographic spread and size.
How many staff members have a post–high school 
education? Provide details about technical institute and 
university graduates.
Identify how the development of human resources 
complements the risk focus of the bank. (This is done 
to ensure that the right caliber staff is recruited and 
trained to enable compliance and maintenance of the risk 
management procedures established.)
To what extent are staff paid competitive market-based 
salaries to enhance retention of them?
To what extent are bonuses paid to staff?
What training is offered to staff?
How does the organizational structure encourage good 
risk management? (Also see risk management culture, 
section 4.5.)
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4.3 Accounting systems, management information, 
and internal control
Provide audited annual fi nancial statements for the 
past three years, together with copies of the auditors’ 
management letters.
Provide unaudited accounts for each quarter this year-
to-date.
Provide copies of any international prospectuses issued in 
the past fi ve years.
Describe the status of the bank’s accounting systems and 
records.
How much reliance can be placed on the fi nancial 
reporting and information systems?
Describe IFRS implementation issues and diffi culties in 
the bank.
Have there been any changes in the bank’s accounting 
policies over the past four years?  If so, please describe.
Describe accounting policies used in the bank, and provide 
a description of the key differences from IFRS. Elaborate 
on
 • Income recognition/accrual
 • Securities marking to market (IAS 39)
 • Fixed asset revaluations
4.4 Information technology – Table A.7
Describe the computer systems in operation (both 
hardware and software), including microcomputers 
(whether used as terminals or stand-alone units).
What back-up and recovery systems are available?
How is security in the EDP area controlled?
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4.5 Risk management culture and decision-making 
process – Table A.11
What major risks (stemming from either its products or the 
environment) does the bank face?
Planning and defi ning risk tolerance levels: Have the board 
and executive management delineated the level of risk 
they are willing to assume for each area and overall?
Risk identifi cation: How is the risk in current operations 
identifi ed?
Risk supervision and management: How are current and 
proposed operations managed?
Risk monitoring: Evaluate the effectiveness of control 
implementation.
How effectively are board-approved risk tolerance levels 
communicated in the organization?
Evaluate the manner in which risk is being assumed, 
measured, limited, controlled, and reported.
5. Corporate governance
5.1 Shareholders/ownership – Table A.8
Describe major changes in shareholding and operations, 
including the dates of the changes, since foundation 
(mergers, acquisitions, divestments, and so forth).
When was the last shareholders’ meeting of the bank and 
how many shareholders were present? What percentage 
of the total shares did they represent?
What is the main business of the key shareholders, and 
who controls those shareholders?
Are there any provisions allowing shareholders voting 
rights that are not in proportion to their shareholding?
Describe any options or other rights given to persons to 
acquire more share capital.
Do any resolutions require more than a simple majority to 
be accepted? If so, name such provisions.
What direct involvement, if any, do the shareholders have 
with the bank, the board of directors, and the management 
board?
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5.2 Board of directors – Table A.9 and A.11
For how long is the board of directors elected? What are 
the board’s main objectives and responsibilities?
Describe the board of directors’ involvement with bank 
policy setting, especially in risk management.
To what extent does the board of directors review fi nancial 
information during the year and at year-end?
Is the board of directors committed to the active use 
of risk-based management information? These “ideal” 
management accounts should be the driving force in 
identifying where the bank wishes to see itself in terms of 
ideal critical management information. This goal should 
determine what other systems development and training 
should take place, and how.
5.3 Executive management – Tables A.10 and A.11
Who appoints the chief executive offi cer?
Elaborate on the interaction between bank management 
and the bank’s policy-setting board, the responsibility 
for the determination of bank policy and objectives, 
delegation of authority and responsibility, internal systems 
and procedures for performance reviews, and checks on 
accountability.
Discuss the interaction between bank management and 
employees in carrying out the bank’s objectives.
Do senior management and the board receive and require 
risk-based management information on a regular basis?
Is risk-based management information used to ensure 
that procedures are in place to safeguard assets and 
depositors as well as ensure the integrity of data?
Which management accounts should be developed 
to identify critical risk management issues for top 
management? (Distinguish between information needed on 
a daily basis, and information to be presented on a monthly 
or less frequent basis for management and directors’ 
meetings.)
Identify the risk management systems and procedures 
that must be designed to support the information needs 
of management, to ensure that the desire for proper risk 
management drives all systems development.
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5.4 Internal audit/audit committee of the board – 
 Table A.11
Describe the key objectives, role, and strategy of the 
internal audit department.
How many persons work in the internal audit department? 
Describe their experience, qualifi cations, and location by 
head offi ce and branches.
Do those who carry out the internal audit function report to 
a subcommittee of the board of directors? If not, to whom 
do they report and how frequently?
Do the members of the board of directors receive and 
review the internal audit reports?
Do internal audit reports discuss deviations from policies? 
What else is discussed in those reports?
What is the average length of service (years) in internal 
audit of 
 • head of internal audit
 • other auditors
How many of the internal auditors have a formal audit or 
accounting qualifi cation?
How many of the internal auditors are specialized in
 • treasury audits
 • information technology audits
 • other (describe)
What is the frequency of branch and departmental internal 
audits?
 • Regular
 • Irregular (surprise)
Describe key areas receiving attention during an internal 
audit visit.
Summarize key audit comments, by category, in the latest 
internal audit. 
Has evidence of fraud ever been found in examinations of 
your bank?  If so, please describe.
Describe the bank’s anti-money-laundering procedures/
control/internal audit processes.
5.5 External auditors
Are International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and 
International Standards of Auditing (ISA) followed?
Who are the external auditors of the bank and how long 
have they been auditing the fi nancial statements? If they 
were appointed recently, name their predecessors and the 
reason for the change.
Identify the major items reported on by the auditors during 
the past three years. 
Supply copies of the latest two management reports from 
the auditors.
What audit and consulting fees have been paid to the 
auditors during the past two years?
To what extent do the auditors evaluate the bank’s risk 
management procedures?
Discuss the involvement of and relationship between the 
external auditors and management.
How often do the regulators require that banks change 
their audit fi rm?
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FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT
6. Balance sheet structure and the changes therein – 
Tables A.12 and A.13
6.1  Composition of the balance sheet
Asset structure: growth and changes
Liabilities structure: growth and changes
6.2 Overall on- and off-balance-sheet growth
6.3 Low-earning and nonearning assets
Analyze the bank’s balance sheet structure over time and 
describe
 • what has happened
 • why it happened
 • the impact of the trend or observation
 • the planned response to the situation
 • alternative recommendations regarding the situation 
observed
Provide past fi nancial statements and annual reports for 
your bank, and discuss recent fi nancial performance.
Describe the structure of your balance sheet and any 
planned changes.
Describe (and quantify) the nature, volume, and anticipated 
use of credit commitments, contingent liabilities, 
guarantees, and other off-balance-sheet items. 
7. Income statement structure and the changes 
 therein (proﬁ tability/earnings) – Table A.14
7.1 Sources of income: changes in the structure and trends 
of income
7.2 Structure of assets compared with structure of income
7.3 Margins earned on intermediation business
7.4 Operating income and operating expenses breakdown
7.5 Return on assets and shareholders’ funds
Analyze the bank’s profi tability over time and describe
 • what has happened
 • why it happened
 • the impact of the trend or observation
 • the planned response to the situation
 • alternative recommendations regarding the situation 
observed
Describe the major sources of income and most profi table 
business areas.
Describe the bank’s dividend payout policy.
Describe the extent to which accrued but uncollected 
interest is taken into income—especially if such interest 
income relates to loans that you or the bank place in risk 
categories of substandard or worse.
Describe the extent to which collateral values (rather 
than operating cash fl ows) are the basis for decisions to 
capitalize interest or to roll over extensions of credit.
List any income or expenditure recognition policies that 
might affect (or distort) earnings.
Describe the effect of material intergroup transactions, 
especially those relating to the transfer of earnings and 
asset/liability valuations.
Are there any revenue and expense items that may be 
signifi cantly overstated or understated?
Describe areas and the manner in which greater 
effi ciencies can be achieved.
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8. Capital adequacy
8.1 Capital retention policies
8.2 Compliance with capital adequacy requirements
8.3 Potential future capital requirements
8.4 Structure of shareholders’ funds
8.5 Risk profi le of balance sheet assets
Analyze the bank’s capital adequacy over time and 
describe
 • what has happened
 • why it happened
 • the impact of the trend or observation
 • the planned response to the situation
 • alternative recommendations regarding the situation 
observed
What plans does the bank have for the maintenance of 
minimum regulatory capital, given your past growth and 
future plans for expansion?
What access does the bank have to capital and fi nancial 
assistance?
What are the bank’s growth experiences, plans, and 
prospects for the future?
Is capital growth funded by internal cash generation or 
capital contributions?
To what extent have reserves been generated by 
revaluations of fi xed assets and investments, or from the 
capitalization of interest on classifi ed loans?
In the case of capital contributions, were they in cash or 
in kind 
(fi xed assets)?
In the case of contributions in kind (fi xed assets), state 
the proportion that such contributions (see table 5.3A) 
constitute as a percentage of total capital and describe the 
process used to obtain a reliable third-party valuation.
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9. Credit risk management
9.1 Credit risk management policies, systems, and 
 procedures
Use the structure of section 4.5 (risk management culture) 
to discuss the following questions.
How is credit risk managed in the bank? Include a 
description of the lending organization, concerned 
departments, management levels, and staffi ng.
Provide the profi le and lending skills of your chief lending 
offi cers, credit managers and offi cers, and all relevant 
staff.
Describe the key risks that you face and control in this 
area.
What are your strengths as far as this risk area is 
concerned?
What are the most pressing development needs for your 
bank as far as this risk area is concerned?
Describe the top-level information prepared for the most 
senior management in the bank.
What information is asked for during the loan application 
request?
Describe the contents of loan fi les. How do you use this 
information to monitor the quality of loans?
Describe the standard loan process from the client’s initial 
inquiry, or the bank’s marketing efforts, to the fi nal lending 
decision, and provide a description of the credit decision 
process.
What are the criteria used for granting loans? Also 
describe any specifi c limits, ratios, and so forth used by 
you in the evaluation process.
Describe any specifi c lending procedures and techniques 
for project appraisal, approvals, and legal fi nalization 
of projects, procurement and disbursement, as well as 
follow-up and supervision of such projects.
Describe any formalized credit policies, procedures, 
and underwriting criteria for the identifi cation of target 
markets.
Discuss the procedures for management of problem loans, 
describing specialized workout departments or intensive 
care units and detailing their scope, skill, resources, and 
effi ciency.
What instruments or remedies are available to ensure that 
borrowers repay their loans to the bank? Describe also the 
mechanisms that exist for legal recovery, foreclosure and 
repossession of collateral, and transmission of legal rights.
Describe the taxation deductions allowed for loan loss 
provisioning as well as the infl uence that taxation has on 
your bank’s provisioning policy.
At what point do you suspend interest and how do you 
control the overall amounts owed by a client in such a 
case?
What is the total number of corporate and retail loans?
Has your bank made any loans on other than normal credit 
terms (pricing or directed)?
To what extent have you accepted equity in clients as 
payment for loans?
What percentage of loans have been rescheduled once?
What percentage of loans have been rescheduled more 
than once?
For what percentage of loans do you act as a fi scal agent?
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9. Credit risk management (continued)
9.2 Profi le of borrowers
9.3 Maturity of loans
9.4 Loan products
9.5 Sectoral analysis of loans
9.6 Large exposures to individuals and connected parties
9.7 Loan and other asset classifi cation and provisioning
9.8 Analysis of loans in arrears
9.9 Connected lending (to related parties)
Analyze the bank’s loan portfolios over time and describe
 • what has happened
 • why it happened
 • the impact of the trend or observation
 • the planned response to the situation
 • alternative recommendations regarding the situation 
observed
Describe the major loan products offered by the bank.
Describe your bank’s current policies, practices, and 
procedures to identify common ownership, control, 
and reliance on common cash fl ows. You should also, if 
appropriate, suggest new guidelines and new procedures 
by which concentrations should be identifi ed and tracked 
in the bank.
Are all assets (in addition to the loan portfolio) with a credit 
risk in fact classifi ed as to quality and provided against, 
when needed?
Describe your methodology for the determination of the 
level of reserves required.
To what extent do you rely on collateral for establishing 
the recommended reserves? Specify the methodology 
used to establish the value of the collateral. What types of 
collateral do you regard as acceptable?
Under what circumstances do you use specifi c reserves 
and when are general reserves used?
10. Organization of the treasury function – Table A.15
10.1 Organization of the treasury function  
10.2  Policy-setting environment: asset allocation, 
benchmarks, use of external managers
10.3 Market operations: funding, investing, and trading
10.4 Risk analytics and compliance
10.5 Treasury operations (administration)
Describe the arrangements for disaster recovery/back-up/
hot sites.
How many persons work in the treasury? 
How are treasury counterparty limits approved and 
monitored?  How often are limits reviewed?
Does your bank treasury use a telephone recording 
machine?
Describe your process for treasury deal confi rmations and 
reconciliation.
What hedging techniques and products are used to protect 
against mismatches?
 • Interest rate sensitivity
 • Exchange rate sensitivity
Maturity profi le sensitivity
How does the bank consolidate and track exposures 
arising from lending, money market, FX settlement, trade-
related transactions, and securities transactions to the 
same customer?
How are overlimit trades and exception trades reported?
How does the bank undertake treasury risk management/
revaluation of positions?
Describe the compliance offi cer’s duties, experience, and 
qualifi cations.
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11. Securities portfolio management (stable liquidity 
portfolio) – Tables A.16–A.19
Describe:
 • what happened
 • why it happened
 • the impact of the trend or observation
 • the planned response to the situation
 • alternative recommendations regarding the situation 
observed
Describe the decision-making process for taking trading 
positions.
Explain the treatment of losses when liquidating securities 
investment positions when market value is less than cost.
Please describe the bank’s policy of classifying securities 
into trading or investment categories and if this policy has 
changed recently.
12. Proprietary trading and market risk management – 
Tables A.16–A.19
12.2 Securities classifi cation policies
12.3 Structure of the securities portfolios
12.4 Net effective open positions and potential capital 
exposures
12.5 Market risk attached to off-balance-sheet activities 
and derivatives
Describe
 • what happened
 • why it happened
 • the impact of the trend or observation
 • the planned response to the situation
 • alternative recommendations regarding the situation 
observed
How is market risk managed in the bank?
Describe the key risks that you face and control in this 
area.
Describe the top-level information prepared for the most 
senior management in the bank.
What are your strengths as far as this risk area is 
concerned?
What are the most pressing development needs for your 
bank as far as this risk area is concerned?
Describe the Board’s policies with regard to risk tolerance 
of derivatives exposures—onshore/offshore, exchange/
OTC.
Describe the reports used to track derivatives exposure 
and risk management.
Describe settlement procedures for securities and their 
derivatives.
Are derivatives booked in all trading desks or traded 
separately?
Does the bank write options?  If yes, which?
Are there unhedged options?
Describe the control of derivative credit risk.
Describe what computer systems are employed to monitor 
derivatives positions. 
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13. Asset-liability management (ALCO): interest rate 
risk management
Use the structure of section 4.5 (risk management culture) 
to discuss the following questions.
Describe:
 • what happened
 • why it happened
 • the impact of the trend or observation
 • the planned response to the situation
 • alternative recommendations regarding the situation 
observed
13.1 Interest rate risk management policies, systems, and 
procedures
13.2 Forecasting interest rates
13.3 Measures to determine the potential impact of 
exogenous rate movements on the bank’s capital
How is interest rate risk managed in the bank?
Describe the key risks that you face and control in this 
area?
How often does ALCO meet?
What reports are presented to ALCO?
Are ALCO minutes written and circulated?
How does the bank determine its target gap structure, 
given the most likely interest rate scenarios?
How are analyses performed to set strategies to achieve 
optimal target gap structure?
Name the person or group who is assigned to ensure 
strategies are correctly implemented.
What are your strengths as far as this risk area is 
concerned?
What are the most pressing development needs for your 
bank as far as this risk area is concerned?
Does the bank have an ALCO support unit?
To whom does it report?
What are its responsibilities?
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14. Asset-liability management (ALCO): liquidity risk 
management
14.1 Liquidity risk management policies, systems, and 
procedures
14.2 Compliance with regulatory requirements
14.4 Sources of deposits—profi le of depositors
14.3 Maturity structure of deposits
14.5 Large depositors and volatility of funding
14.6 Maturity mismatches of assets and liabilities
14.7 Liquidity risk measures
Describe
 • what happened
 • why it happened
 • the impact of the trend or observation
 • the planned response to the situation
 • alternative recommendations regarding the situation 
observed
Use the structure of section 4.5 (risk management culture) 
to discuss the following questions.
How is liquidity risk managed in the bank?
Describe the key risks that you face and control in this 
area.
Describe the top-level information prepared for the most 
senior management in the bank.
What are your strengths as far as this risk area is 
concerned?
What are the most pressing development needs for your 
bank as far as this risk area is concerned?
How strong is the interbank market? What is your 
participation in that market?
Do you have adequate access to money markets or other 
ready sources of cash? If so, please describe these 
sources.
What reliance does your bank place on interest-sensitive 
funds?
To what extent do you make use of central bank credit?  
Report how many times you used central bank credit in the 
last 12 months, describing the different types of access 
used and the maximum amount involved.
What ability do you have to readily convert assets into 
cash?
Describe your capacity to meet unexpected deposit 
withdrawals and other demands for payment.
What other sources of funding do you have available in 
case of a shortage of liquidity.
How many depositors does the bank have in total?
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15. Asset-liability management (ALCO): currency risk 
management
15.1 Currency risk management policies, systems, and 
procedures
15.2 Currency structure of assets and liabilities
15.3 Currency structure of off-balance-sheet activities
15.4 Maturity structure of foreign currency liabilities
15.5 Currency structure of loans and deposits
15.6 Net effective open position and capital exposed
Describe
 • what happened
 • why it happened
 • the impact of the trend or observation
 • the planned response to the situation
 • alternative recommendations regarding the situation 
observed
Use the structure of section 4.5 (risk management culture) 
to discuss the following questions.
How does the bank manage its currency risks?
Describe the key risks that you face and control in this 
area?
Describe the top-level information prepared for the most 
senior management in the bank.
What are your strengths as far as this risk area is 
concerned?
What are the most pressing development needs for your 
bank as far as this risk area is concerned?
16. Operational Risk – Table A.20
16.1 Fraud experience—internal and external
16.2 Employment practices and workplace safety
16.3 Use of information technology to enhance operational 
risk management
16.4 Effectiveness of internal control processes
16.5 Use of management information for operational 
management purposes
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17. Conclusions and Recommendations
Discuss the following.
17.1 The changes that appear necessary within the 
bank’s culture and managerial practices, given the nature 
and relative complexity of its operations, including (as 
applicable) 
 • the need for full sponsorship by the board and 
executive management;
 • the necessary enabling culture in which every 
manager is expected to consider risk (that is, to identify, 
measure, and report on risk exposure);
 • the changes that appear necessary after the 
assessment of evaluation, monitoring, and reporting 
systems that cover critical risk functions;
 • the convenience of adopting appropriate risk 
objectives for each function and for the bank as a whole;
 • the need to institute a formal process for the general 
manager or CEO of the bank and the board to review and 
evaluate all expected and unexpected risks and all risk-
taking activities; and
 • the convenience of designating a member of 
senior executive management for overseeing all risk 
management, with authority to act on risk problems and 
ensure risk control.
17.2 The implications of the problems identifi ed and 
for instituting a bankwide risk management function, 
the process and phases required for such action, and 
the role and function within the organization of the risk 
management senior offi cial.
17.3 The manner in which risk management functions could 
be instituted in the bank.
17.4 The feasibility of installing effective, comprehensive, 
bankwide risk management and the implications for the 
bank.
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Table A.1 Financial Regulation and Compliance
Category Description of regulation
Bank’s actual 
position (date)
Expected position 
after coming 
transaction
Shareholding
Capital
Minimum Equity
Capital/Risk Weighted Assets
Other Capital Ratios (Specify)
Assets
Single Borrower Limit (and connected lending)
Group Borrower Limit (and connected lending/
loan concentrations)
Aggregate Large Exposures Limit
Investments (quoted)
Investments (unquoted)
Related Party Lending
Industry Sector Limit
Other Asset Ratios (specify)
Loan classifi cation guidelines *
Normal Loans – General Provision (upper limit)
Precautionary/Watch
Substandard
Doubtful
Loss
Liquidity
Liquid Assets/Liabilities
Loans/Deposits
Other Liquidity Ratios (specify)
Funding
Reserves/Deposits
Deposit/Capital Limit
Funding Maturity Mismatch Limit
Open FX Position
Other Funding Ratios
Other
Market Risk Capital Requirements  (value at risk)
Derivatives
Currency risk
Investment Limits
 • for equity investments
 • for property and other fi xed assets
Suspension and Reversal of Interest
Deposit Insurance
* Loan classifi cation guidelines: How are restructured/renegotiated loans treated for asset classifi cation purposes? 
(Differentiate clearly between rules based on period that loan is past due and guidelines based on expected cash fl ow and 
recoverability of loan.) Is the provision required based on the total exposure to the client? Are these provisions calculated 
before or after allowance for the collateral? How much of the loan loss provision is tax deductible?
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Table A.2 Market Share and Profi le of Banking System
Foreign 
Banks
Banking 
Groups
Specialized 
Financial 
Institutions 
Your Key 
Competitor
Other 
Domestic 
Banks
Your Bank
 Current 
Year
Prior 
Year
Prior 
Year -1
Prior 
Year-2
Market Share as a % of total 
market (estimate): % % % % % % % % %
Total Corporate Loans – FX
Total Corporate Loans – TL
Total Deposits – FX
Total Deposits – TL
Leasing
Trade Finance Letters of Credit
Letters of Guarantee
Residential Housing Mortgages
FX Trading
Retail/Consumer Lending
Credit Cards
Number of Bank Branches
ATMs
Asset Management
Investment Banking (Advisory)
Broking
Securities Trading
Other (Please Specify)
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Table A.5 Total Number of Employees*
Year-to-Date Current Year Prior Year
Senior Management
Corporate Lending
Commercial Lending
Small Business Lending
Retail/Consumer Lending
Leasing
Trade Finance
Off-Shore Banking
Asset Management
Investment Banking (Advisory)
Brokering
Investments
Treasury
Operations
Internal Audit
Other Categories (identify)
Total
* Show employee numbers per product group, including products sold through subsidiaries.
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Table A.6 Branch Statistics
Year-to-Date Current Year Prior Year
Total number of branches:
 • Metropolitan/Large Cities
 • Country areas
 • International
Number of ATMs
Average Staff  Number
Average Deposits
Average Loan Assets
Average Operating Expenses*
Average Operating Income
* Excluding interest cost and provisioning. Please provide breakdown of occupancy, depreciation, communication, 
business development and marketing, and other expenses. 
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Table A.7 Information Systems
Describe the computer technology used in the bank.
Function Software Name/Vendor
Platform 
(for example, 
mainframe, PC)
Accounting
Loans
Foreign exchange processing
Risk management
Retail banking/branches
MIS
Credit cards
Electronic mail
Others (describe)
Communications network
Describe any ongoing communications problems 
experienced.
Attach a diagram of the main IT confi guration.
Functionality:  Does the IT system allow
 •  Allocation of revenues and expenses by profi t 
center or branch/line of business?
 • Accurate calculation of product profi tability?
IT Staff Analysis
 • System maintenance
 • Development
 • Other (describe)
Budget:  Describe the EDP budget for the current year:
 • Software
 • Hardware
 • Communications
Budget:  Describe the planned budget for
 • Software
 • Hardware
 • Communications
Disaster Recovery:  Describe the hot-site (back-up 
system).
 • Who operates it?
 • Where is it?
 • Hardware?
400 
Analyzing Banking Risk
Table A.8 Shareholding
Shareholders (as of ______) Number of Shareholders Shares Held
Percentage of 
Shares
Number Unit Size
Private companies* 
Private individuals* 
Subtotal: private sector shareholders 
Public sector and government companies 
(less than 51 percent private) **
Total shareholding
List of shareholders who own more than 
5 percent of the bank’s shares Name Shares Held Percentage of Shares
Number Unit Size
List of shareholders and companies that 
effectively or indirectly own more than 
5 percent of the bank’s shares through their 
control over shareholders of the bank
* The ultimate (and real) owner of the shares determines whether the shareholder is from the private or the public sector.
** If shares are held as nominees, indicate who the ultimate owner is.
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Table A.9 Board of Directors
Name Where Employed
Shareholders/
Entity 
Represented
Private 
Sector-
Owned 
(Y/N)
Qualifi cations Experience Responsibility*
* Responsibility examples: administration, corporate banking, international division, domestic treasury, retail banking, 
internal control, fi nance and accounting, information systems, branch management.
Table A.10 Executive Management
Name Qualifi cations Experience Responsibility *
* Responsibility examples: administration, corporate banking, international division, domestic treasury, retail banking, 
internal control, fi nance and accounting, information systems, branch management.
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Table A.11 Key Risk Committee Memberships
Name Qualifi cations Experience Responsibility *
Audit Committee of the Board
ALCO
Credit Committee
Investment Committee
Operational and Other Risk 
Committees
* Responsibility examples: administration, corporate banking, international division, domestic treasury, retail banking, 
internal control, fi nance and accounting, information systems, branch management
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Table A.12 Balance Sheet Assets
Assets Prior Period-2
Prior 
Period-1
Prior 
Period
Current 
Period
Cash and cash balances with central banks
Financial assets held for trading
Derivatives held for trading
Equity instruments
Debt instruments
Financial assets designated at fair value 
through profi t or loss 
Available-for-sale fi nancial assets
Equity instruments
Debt instruments
Loans and receivables
Held-to-maturity investments
Debt instruments
Loans and advances
Derivatives – Hedge accounting purposes
Tangible assets
Property, Plant and Equipment
Investment property
Intangible assets
Goodwill
Other intangible assets
Investments in associates, subsidiaries and 
joint ventures
Tax assets
Current tax assets
Deferred tax assets
Other assets
Non-current assets and disposal groups 
classifi ed as held for sale
TOTAL ASSETS 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Table A.13 Balance Sheet Liabilities
Liabilities Prior Period-2
Prior 
Period-1
Prior 
Period
Current 
Period
Deposits from central banks
Financial liabilities held for trading
Derivatives held for trading
Short positions
Deposits from banks and other credit institutions
Deposits from customers
Debt certifi cates (including bonds intended for repurchase in 
short term)
Other fi nancial liabilities held for trading
Financial liabilities designated at fair value through profi t 
or loss 
Deposits from banks and other credit institutions
Deposits from customers
Debt certifi cates (including bonds)
Subordinated liabilities
Other fi nancial liabilities designated at fair value through 
profi t or loss 
Financial liabilities measured at amortized cost
Deposits from banks and other credit institutions
Deposits from customers
Debt certifi cates (including bonds) – own securities issued
Subordinated liabilities
Financial liabilities associated with transferred fi nancial 
assets
Derivatives - Hedge accounting purposes
Fair value hedges
Cash fl ow hedges
Hedge of a net investment in a foreign operation
Fair value hedge of interest rate risk
Cash fl ow hedge interest rate risk
Fair value changes of the hedged items in portfolio hedge of 
interest rate risk 
Provisions
Restructuring
Pending legal issues and tax litigation 
Pensions and other post retirement benefi t obligations
Credit commitments and guarantees
Onerous contracts
Other provisions
Tax liabilities
Other liabilities
Share capital repayable on demand (e.g. cooperative shares)
Liabilities included in disposal groups classifi ed as held for 
sale
TOTAL LIABILITIES 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Table A.14 Income Statement
Financial & Operating Income and Expenses Prior Period -2 
Prior 
Period -1 
Prior 
Period 
Current 
Period
Interest income     
Cash & cash balances with central banks     
Financial assets held for trading (if accounted for separately)     
Financial assets designated at fair value through profi t or loss (if 
accounted for separately)     
Available-for-sale fi nancial assets     
Loans and receivables (including fi nance leases)     
Held-to-maturity investments     
Derivatives – Hedge accounting, interest rate risk     
Other assets     
(Interest expenses)     
Deposits from central banks     
Financial liabilities held for trading (if accounted for separately)     
Financial liabilities designated at fair value through profi t or loss (if 
accounted for separately)     
Financial liabilities measured at amortised cost     
Derivatives – Hedge accounting, interest rate risk     
Other liabilities     
Expenses on share capital repayable on demand     
Dividend income     
Financial assets held for trading (if accounted for separately)     
Financial assets designated at fair value through profi t or loss (if 
accounted for separately)     
Available-for-sale fi nancial assets     
Fee and commission income     
(Fee and commission expenses)     
Realised gains (losses) on fi nancial assets & liabilities not measured at 
fair value through profi t or loss, net     
Available-for-sale fi nancial assets     
Loans and receivables (including fi nance leases)     
Held-to-maturity investments     
Financial liabilities measured at amortised cost     
Other     
Gains (losses) on fi nancial assets and liabilities held for trading, net     
Equity instruments and related derivatives     
Interest rate instruments and related derivatives     
Foreign exchange trading     
Credit risk instruments and related derivatives     
Commodities and related derivatives     
Other (including hybrid derivatives)     
Gains (losses) on fi nancial assets and liabilities designated at fair value 
through profi t or loss, net     
Gains (losses) from hedge accounting, net     
Exchange differences, net     
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Table A.14 Income Statement (continued)
Financial & Operating Income and Expenses Prior Period -2 
Prior 
Period -1 
Prior 
Period 
Current 
Period
Gains (losses) on derecognition of assets other than held for sale, net     
Other operating income     
Other operating expenses     
Administration costs     
Staff expenses     
General and administrative expenses     
Depreciation     
Property, Plant and Equipment     
Investment Properties     
Intangible assets (other than goodwill)     
Provisions     
Impairment     
Impairment on fi nancial assets not measured at fair value through profi t 
or loss     
Financial assets measured at cost (unquoted equity)     
Available-for-sale fi nancial assets     
Loans and receivables (including fi nance leases)     
Held to maturity investments     
Impairment on non-fi nancial assets     
Property, plant and equipment     
Investment properties     
Goodwill     
Intangible assets (other than goodwill)     
Investments in associates and joint ventures accounted for using the 
equity method     
Other     
Negative goodwill immediately recognised in profi t or loss     
Share of the profi t or loss of associates and joint ventures accounted for 
using the equity method     
Profi t or loss from non-current assets and disposal groups classifi ed as 
held for sale not qualifying as discontinued operations        
TOTAL PROFIT OR LOSS BEFORE TAX FROM CONTINUING OPERATIONS     
Tax expense (income) related to profi t or loss from continuing operations     
TOTAL PROFIT OR LOSS AFTER TAX FROM CONTINUING OPERATIONS     
Profi t or loss after tax from discontinued operations        
TOTAL PROFIT OR LOSS AFTER TAX AND DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS     
Profi t or loss attributable to minority interest     
PROFIT OR LOSS ATTRIBUTABLE TO EQUITY HOLDERS OF THE PARENT 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Table A.15 Organization of the Treasury Environment
Example: Activities per Functional Area
Policy Framework 
Income Earned from 
Securities
Market Operations Risk Analytics & Compliance Treasury Operations
Investment guidelines Retail funding – local and 
foreign
Risk measurement (liquidity, 
credit and market and 
currency risk) 
Cash management
Strategic asset allocation 
and benchmarks
Wholesale funding – local 
and foreign
Pricing, portfolio 
performance analytics, and 
reporting
Settlements
Asset-liability management: 
Managing the market 
exposures in the bank's 
balance sheet
Structured loans or funding Governance, compliance, 
and operational risk 
Accounting
Managing and use of 
external managers
Investment portfolio 
management (fi xed income, 
money markets, asset 
and mortgage-backed 
securities, swaps, futures 
and options, equities)
Quantitative strategies 
and risk research    
(strategic asset allocation, 
benchmark construction, 
benchmark management, 
and modeling)
Information services – IT 
(could also be outside the 
treasury)
Model validation – 
independent from model 
development
Proprietary trading 
(instruments as above)
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Table A.16 Securities Trading Income
Income Earned from Securities Volumes Securities Traded
Trading 
Portfolio 
Income
Investment 
Portfolio 
(stable 
liquidity) 
Income
Total  
Income 
from 
Securities 
Portfolios
Current 
-4
Current 
-3
Current  
-2
Prior 
Period 
Current 
Period
Current 
Budget
Current 
-4
Current 
-3
Current 
-2
Prior 
Period 
Current 
Period
Current 
Budget
Public sector (central 
government and agencies) 
bonds 
Corporate bonds
Structured products
Asset-backed securities
Mortgage-backed securities
Asset swaps
Money market instruments 
(LIBOR spread products)
Certifi cates of deposit
Time deposits
Repurchase agreements
Resale agreements
Derivatives *
Currency swaps
Interest-rate swaps
Futures and Options
Currency forward contracts
Quoted equities
Unquoted equities
* Purpose: Hedging / % is on behalf of clients (with underlying transaction) / Position-taking
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Table A.17 Trading Controls
Amount per 
balance 
sheet
Counterparties
Average  
yield to 
maturity
Average 
maturity VAR Trading limits Stop-loss limits
Stress 
tests
$ Public sector
Private 
sector $ Treasurer Managers Traders Daily Monthly
Public sector (central 
government and agencies) 
bonds 
Corporate bonds
Structured products
Asset-backed securities
Mortgage-backed securities
Asset swaps
Money market instruments 
(LIBOR spread products)
Certifi cates of deposit
Time deposits
Repurchase agreements
Resale agreements
Derivatives 
Currency swaps
Interest-rate swaps
Futures and options
Currency forward contracts
Quoted equities
Unquoted equities
TOTAL
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Table A.18 Potential Risk Analytics Reports
Risk Area  Title Reference
Potential 
Reports – 
Details
Frequency
Daily Weekly Monthly Periodic 
Counterparty risk
Market risk
Liquidity risk
Currency risk
Performance 
measurement and 
analysis
Table A.19 Example of Daily/Monthly Checklist of Portfolio 
Compliance Issues
Date and 
Reviewer:
Rule Reference Short Description
Investment 
Management 
Agreement 
Language
Calculation 
of Guideline
Reporting 
Tool
Interpretation 
of Measure
Portfolio 
Reviewed
1. Laws
2. Regulations
3. Institutional 
Policies
3.1 Risk limits
4. Institutional 
Guidelines
4.1  Investment 
Restrictions
4.2  Allowable 
Duration Range
4.3  Limit to Duration 
Range
4.4  Eligible 
Instruments
4.5  Issuer’s Credit 
Rating
4.6 Eligible Currency
5. Operational 
Guidelines
5.1 Issuer 
Concentration
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Table A.20 Treasury Operations: Reporting (Funding & Investing)
Reporting Area Title Reference Sub-Report Types Frequency
    Daily Weekly Monthly Periodic
A. Accounting Reports        
Financial reports   Trial Balance / Balance Sheet /  Income Statement / Trade details / Settlement entries     
Holdings reports   Inventory / Asset allocations / Performance (return on investments) reports     
B. Control Reports        
Internal reconciliations   Systems-to-systems / Control accounts (suspense accounts)     
External reconciliations   Custodian reconciliations / cash account maintained by internal treasury function     
Cash   Control accounts with external banks / cash accounts with internal clients     
C. Pricing Reports        
Source reports   Reuters / Bloomberg / Brokers / Other pricing services     
Exception (Diagnostic) 
reports   Unusual fl uctuations / New instruments     
Valuation reports   Fair value accounting (IAS 39)     
Analysis reports   Trends     
D. Operational  Reports        
Transactional reports   Cash fl ows / Resets / Deal volumes / Call volumes / Settlement reports     
Operational risk   Analysis of trend impacts     
E. Regulatory Reports        
Security commissioners        
Central Bank        

Appendix B
Core Principle by Principle Assessment
Name of country: Telephone number:
Address of supervisory 
authority:
Date completed: Fax number:
Person(s) responsible for 
completion:
E-mail address:
EVALUATION
ASSESSMENT RATINGS
1 Compliant
2a Largely compliant and efforts to achieve compliance are underway
2b Largely compliant and efforts to achieve compliance are not underway
3a Materially noncompliant and efforts to achieve compliance are underway
3b Materially noncompliant and efforts to achieve compliance are not underway
4a Noncompliant and efforts to achieve compliance are underway
4b Noncompliant and efforts to achieve compliance are not underway
Summary of 
Core Principles 
Evaluation
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# Summarized Description of Core Principles Assessment
1 Framework for supervisory authority: 1 2 3 4 n/a
1(1) Clear responsibilities and objectives for each agency
1(2) Each such agency should possess operational independence and adequate 
resources
1(3) Suitable legal framework, including provisions relating to authorization of banking 
1(4) Enforcement powers to address compliance with laws as well as safety and 
soundness concerns
1(5) Legal protection for supervisors
1(6) Arrangements for confi dential information sharing between supervisors 
2 Permissible activities must be clearly defi ned, and control of the use of the word 
“bank” 
3 Right to set licensing criteria re governance and business plan and reject 
applications—prior consent of home country supervisor
4 Authority to review and reject proposals to transfer signifi cant ownership or 
controlling interests 
5 Establish and review major acquisitions/ investment criteria by a bank and resulting 
structures re risks or hindering of effective supervision
6 Set minimum capital adequacy requirements/components of capital (Basel 
minimums for internationals)
7 Ensuring that banks have a comprehensive risk management strategy in place
8 Independent evaluation of credit policies, practices, and procedures related to 
granting of loans/investments 
9 Satisfi ed re practices and procedures for loan evaluation—the quality of assets/
loan loss provisions and reserves
10 Satisfi ed with information systems and limits to restrict large exposures to single or 
related borrowers
11 Connected lending to related companies and individuals on an arm’s-length basis, 
effectively monitored, mitigate risks
12 Identifying, monitoring, and controlling country risk and for maintaining reserves 
against such risks
13 Accurately measure, monitor, and control market risks—specifi c limits and/or a 
capital charge
14 Satisfi ed that banks have in place a liquidity management strategy
15 Identify, assess, and monitor operational risk 
16 Effective systems identify, assess, and monitor interest rate risk
17 Internal controls in place with regard to complexity of business—independent 
external audit
18 Banks have adequate policies/ “know-your-customer” rules that promote high 
ethical and professional standards in the fi nancial sector—to prevent money 
laundering
19 Develop understanding. Independent validation of supervisory information through 
on-site examinations or use of external auditors
20 Regular contact with bank management and a thorough understanding of the 
institution’s operations
21 Means of off-site analyzing prudential reports and statistical returns from banks on 
a solo and consolidated basis
22 Banks maintain and publish fi nancial statements that fairly refl ect their condition 
using consistent accounting policies and practices providing a true and fair view of 
their fi nancial condition on a regular basis
23 Ability for timely remedial measures when banks commit prudential or regulatory 
violations, or where depositors are threatened in any other way, including ability to 
revoke the banking license
24 Ability to supervise the banking group on a consolidated supervision basis. Global 
consolidation and supervision over internationally active banking ventures 
25 Contact/information exchange with other supervisory authorities to ensure effective 
host country supervision. Supervision of foreign establishments must require the 
same high standards as are required of domestic institutions and must have powers 
to share information needed by the home country supervisors
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Example: Core Principle 1 (1): An effective system of 
banking supervision will have clear responsibilities 
and objectives for each agency involved in the 
supervision of banks.
Essential criteria
1. Laws are in place for banking, and for (each of) the 
agency (agencies) involved in banking supervision. The 
responsibilities and objectives of each of the agencies are 
clearly defi ned.
2. The laws and/or supporting regulations provide a 
framework of minimum prudential standards that banks 
must meet.
3. There is a defi ned mechanism for coordinating actions 
between agencies responsible for banking supervision and 
evidence that it is used in practice.
4. The supervisor participates in deciding when and how 
to effect the orderly resolution of a problem bank situation 
(which could include closure, assisting in restructuring, or 
merger with a stronger institution).
5. Banking laws are updated as necessary to ensure that 
they remain effective and relevant to changing industry 
and regulatory practices.
Additional criteria
6. The supervisory agency sets out objectives and is 
subject to regular review of its performance against its 
responsibilities and objectives through a transparent 
reporting and assessment process.
7. The supervisory agency ensures that information on the 
fi nancial strength and performance of the industry under 
its jurisdiction is publicly available.
Discussion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assessment
The country is largely compliant with Core Principle 1 (1).  Efforts to achieve compliance are not underway.

Appendix C
Basel Core Principles 
for Effective 
Banking Supervision 
October 2006
The Basel Core Principles defi ne 25 principles that are 
needed for a supervisory system to be effective. Those 
principles are broadly categorized into seven groups: 
1.  Th e objectives, independence, powers, transparency, and cooperation 
(Principle 1) 
2. Licensing and structure (Principles 2 to 5)
3. Prudential regulation and requirements (Principles 6 to 18)
4. Methods of ongoing banking supervision (Principles 19 to 21)
5. Accounting and disclosure (Principle 22)
6. Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors (Principle 23)
7. Consolidated and cross-border banking supervision (Principles 24 and 25)
Objectives, Independence, Powers, Transparency, and 
Cooperation
Principle 1 – Objectives, independence, powers, transparency, and coopera-
tion. An eﬀ ective system of banking supervision will have clear responsibili-
ties and objectives for each authority involved in the supervision of banks. 
Each such authority should possess operational independence, transparent 
 processes, sound governance, and adequate resources, and be accountable for 
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the discharge of its duties. A suitable legal framework for banking supervi-
sion is also necessary, including provisions relating to authorization of banking 
establishments and their ongoing supervision, powers to address compliance 
with laws as well as safety and soundness concerns, and legal protection for 
supervisors. Arrangements for sharing information between supervisors and 
protecting the conﬁ dentiality of such information should be in place. 
Licensing and Structure
Principle 2 – Permissible activities: Th e permissible activities of institutions 
that are licensed and subject to supervision as banks must be clearly deﬁ ned, and 
the use of the word “bank” in names should be controlled as far as possible. 
Principle 3 – Licensing criteria: Th e licensing authority must have the power 
to set criteria and reject applications for establishments that do not meet the 
standards set. Th e licensing process, at a minimum, should consist of an assess-
ment of the ownership structure and governance of the bank and its wider 
group, including the ﬁ tness and propriety of board members and senior man-
agement; its strategic and operating plan; internal controls and risk manage-
ment; and its projected ﬁ nancial condition, including its capital base. Where 
the proposed owner or parent organization is a foreign bank, the prior consent 
of its home country supervisor should be obtained. 
Principle 4 – Transfer of signiﬁ cant ownership: Th e supervisor has the power 
to review and reject any proposals to transfer signiﬁ cant ownership or control-
ling interests held directly or indirectly in existing banks to other parties. 
Principle 5 – Major acquisitions: Th e supervisor has the power to review major 
acquisitions or investments by a bank, against prescribed criteria, including the 
establishment of cross-border operations, and conﬁ rming that corporate aﬃ  li-
ations or structures do not expose the bank to undue risks or hinder eﬀ ective 
supervision. 
Prudential Regulation and Requirements
Principle 6 – Capital adequacy: Supervisors must set prudent and appropriate 
minimum capital adequacy requirements for banks that reﬂ ect the risks that 
the bank undertakes, and must deﬁ ne the components of capital, bearing in 
mind its ability to absorb losses. At least for internationally active banks, these 
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requirements must not be less than those established in the applicable Basel 
requirement. 
Principle 7 – Risk management process: Supervisors must be satisﬁ ed that 
banks and banking groups have in place a comprehensive risk management 
process (including board and senior management oversight) to identify, evalu-
ate, monitor, and control or mitigate all material risks and to assess their overall 
capital adequacy in relation to their risk proﬁ le. Th ese processes should be com-
mensurate with the size and complexity of the institution. 
Principle 8 – Credit risk: Supervisors must be satisﬁ ed that banks have a credit 
risk management process that takes into account the risk proﬁ le of the institu-
tion, with prudent policies and processes to identify, measure, monitor, and 
control credit risk (including counterparty risk). Th is would include the grant-
ing of loans and making of investments, the evaluation of the quality of such 
loans and investments, and the ongoing management of the loan and invest-
ment portfolios. 
Principle 9 – Problem assets, provisions, and reserves: Supervisors must be 
satisﬁ ed that banks establish and adhere to adequate policies and processes 
for managing problem assets and evaluating the adequacy of provisions and 
reserves. 
Principle 10 – Large exposure limits: Supervisors must be satisﬁ ed that banks 
have policies and processes that enable management to identify and manage 
concentrations within the portfolio, and supervisors must set prudential lim-
its to restrict bank exposures to single counterparties or groups of connected 
counterparties. 
Principle 11 – Exposures to related parties: To prevent abuses arising from 
exposures (both on balance sheet and oﬀ  balance sheet) to related parties and 
to address conﬂ ict of interest, supervisors must have in place requirements 
that banks extend exposures to related companies and individuals on an arm’s-
length basis; these exposures are eﬀ ectively monitored; appropriate steps are 
taken to control or mitigate the risks; and write-oﬀ s of such exposures are made 
according to standard policies and processes. 
Principle 12 – Country and transfer risks: Supervisors must be satisﬁ ed that 
banks have adequate policies and processes for identifying, measuring, moni-
toring, and controlling country risk and transfer risk in their international 
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lending and investment activities, and for maintaining adequate provisions and 
reserves against such risks. 
Principle 13 – Market risks: Supervisors must be satisﬁ ed that banks have 
in place policies and processes that accurately identify, measure, monitor, and 
control market risks; supervisors should have powers to impose speciﬁ c limits 
and/or a speciﬁ c capital charge on market risk exposures, if warranted. 
Principle 14 – Liquidity risk: Supervisors must be satisﬁ ed that banks have 
a liquidity management strategy that takes into account the risk proﬁ le of the 
institution, with prudent policies and processes to identify, measure, moni-
tor, and control liquidity risk, and to manage liquidity on a day-to-day basis. 
Supervisors require banks to have contingency plans for handling liquidity 
problems. 
Principle 15 – Operational risk: Supervisors must be satisﬁ ed that banks have 
in place risk management policies and processes to identify, assess, monitor, 
and control and mitigate operational risk. Th ese policies and processes should 
be commensurate with the size and complexity of the bank. 
Principle 16 – Interest rate risk in the banking book: Supervisors must 
be satisﬁ ed that banks have eﬀ ective systems in place to identify, measure, 
monitor, and control interest rate risk in the banking book, including a well-
deﬁ ned strategy that has been approved by the board and implemented by 
senior management; these should be appropriate to the size and complexity 
of such risk. 
Principle 17 – Internal control and audit: Supervisors must be satisﬁ ed that 
banks have in place internal controls that are adequate for the size and complex-
ity of their business. Th ese should include clear arrangements for delegating 
authority and responsibility; separation of the functions that involve commit-
ting the bank, paying away its funds, and accounting for its assets and liabilities; 
reconciliation of these processes; safeguarding the bank’s assets; and appropri-
ate independent internal audit and compliance functions to test adherence to 
these controls as well as applicable laws and regulations. 
Principle 18 – Abuse of ﬁ nancial services: Supervisors must be satisﬁ ed that 
banks have adequate policies and processes in place, including strict “know-
your-customer” rules, that promote high ethical and professional standards 
in the ﬁ nancial sector and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or 
unintentionally, for criminal activities. 
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Appendix C: Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
Methods of Ongoing Banking Supervision
Principle 19 – Supervisory approach: An eﬀ ective banking supervisory sys-
tem requires that supervisors develop and maintain a thorough understanding 
of the operations of individual banks and banking groups, and also of the bank-
ing system as a whole, focusing on safety and soundness and the stability of the 
banking system. 
Principle 20 – Supervisory techniques: An eﬀ ective banking supervisory sys-
tem should consist of on-site and oﬀ -site supervision and regular contacts with 
bank management. 
Principle 21 – Supervisory reporting: Supervisors must have a means of col-
lecting, reviewing, and analyzing prudential reports and statistical returns from 
banks on both a solo and a consolidated basis, and a means of independent veri-
ﬁ cation of these reports, through either on-site examinations or use of external 
experts. 
Accounting and Disclosure
Principle 22 – Accounting and disclosure: Supervisors must be satisﬁ ed that 
each bank maintains adequate records drawn up in accordance with accounting 
policies and practices that are widely accepted internationally, and publishes, 
on a regular basis, information that fairly reﬂ ects its ﬁ nancial condition and 
proﬁ tability. 
Corrective and Remedial Powers of Supervisors
Principle 23 – Corrective and remedial powers of supervisors: Supervisors 
must have at their disposal an adequate range of supervisory tools to bring 
about timely corrective actions. Th is includes the ability, where appropriate, to 
revoke the banking license or to recommend its revocation. 
Consolidated and Cross-Border Banking Supervision
Principle 24 – Consolidated supervision: An essential element of banking 
supervision is that supervisors supervise the banking group on a consolidated 
basis, adequately monitoring and, as appropriate, applying prudential norms to 
all aspects of the business conducted by the group worldwide. 
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Principle 25 – Home-host relationships: Cross-border consolidated supervi-
sion requires cooperation and information exchange between home supervisors 
and the various other supervisors involved, primarily host banking supervisors. 
Banking supervisors must require the local operations of foreign banks to be 
conducted to the same standards as those required of domestic institutions. 
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